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A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1861-5 



A HISTORY OF 
THE CIVIL WAR 

IN THE UNITED STATES 

1861-5 



w;- BIRKBECK WOOD, M.A. 

LIEUTENANT (cADET CORPs) 2ND VOLUNTEER BATTALION DEVON REGIMENT 
AND 

MAJOR J. E. EDMONDS, R.E., p.s.c. 

D.A.Q.M.G., HEADQUARTERS 



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

SPENSER WILKINSON 



WITH THIRTEEN MAPS AND ELEVEN PLANS 



NEW YORK: 
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

LONDON: METHUEN & CO. 
1905 



Ml'] 



First Published in jgoj 



CONTENTS 



II. 
III. 

IV. 
V. 

VI. 



XI. 



XII. 
XIII. 



PACE 

Preface . . . . . . . ix 

Introduction . . . . . xi 

List of Works to which Reference is made in the Foot- 
notes . . . . ... xviii 

Diary of the Principal Events in the two Theatres of War xix 

CHAPTER 

I. Secession and Slavery . . . . i 

Note on the Constitutional Compromises . . . 7 

Fort Sumter . . . . . 10 

The Border States . . . . . iS 

The Military Outlook . . . . 24 

Bull Run . . . . . , 31 

Note on Battle of Bull Rwi . . . . 41 

McClellan Reorganises the Army of the Potomac 

— Discussion of Plans for the next Campaign . 42 

VII. The Peninsular Campaign up to the Battle of 

Seven Pines . . ... 54 

VIII, The Peninsular Campaign (continued) . . . 65 

IX. Jackson's Valley Campaign . . . . 81 
X. The Second Battle of Manassas (or Second Bull 

Run) . . . . • • 93 
Lee's first Invasion of the North — The Antietam 

(or Sharpsburg) . . . . . 118 

Note on the Numerical Strength of the two Armies . 138 

Fredericksburg . . . . . 139 

Grant in the West — Fort Donelson and Shiloh . 153 

Note on Battle of Shiloh . . . -171 



VI 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER 

XIV. Bragg in the West — Murfreesborough 
Note on Battle of Murfreesborough 
XV. Chancellorsville . . . . 

Note on Battle of Chancellorsville 

XVI. Gettysburg . . . • 

Note on Battle of Gettysburg 
XVII. The Conquest of the Mississippi — Vicksburg 
Note on the Vicksburg Campaign 

XVIII. The Struggle for East Tennessee — Chickamauga 
AND Chattanooga 
Note on Battle of Chickamauga 

XIX. Lee and Meade in Virginia — Winter Operations 

and Plans . . . . 

XX. Grant and Lee in Virginia — From the Wilder 
NESS TO Cold Harbour . . . 

XXI. The Siege of Petersburg . . . 

XXIL The Atlanta Campaign 
XX in. The March to the Sea 

Note on Sherman's March 
XXIV. The Shenandoah Valley in 1864 
XXV. Hood's Invasion of Tennessee — Sherman's Cam 

PAIGN in the CaROLINAS 

XXVI. Naval Operations . . . • 

XXVII. Fall of Richmond and Collapse of the Con 
federacy . . . . 

XXVIII. Retrospect . . . . 

Note on Reconstruction 



INDEX OF MAPS 

AT END OF VOLUME 

I. General Map of Theatre of War and 
Key to Section Maps, 

11, West Virginia. 

III, Northern Virginia, 

IV, Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
V. Shenandoah Valley, 

VI, Kentucky and Tennessee. 

VII, Southern Virginia, 

VIII, Country round Richmond and Petersburg. 

IX. Missouri, 

X. Lower Mississippi, 

XI, Country near Vicksburg, 

XII. Georgia, 

XIII. Country near Atlanta. 



BATTLE PLANS IN THE TEXT 



Bull Run . 




Fc 


ice pa 


s^ 32 


Second Bull Run, or Manassas 






108 


The Antietam 






126 


Shiloh 








166 


Chancellorsville 








, 196 


Gettysburg . 








, 222 


Chickamauga 








280 


Chattanooga 








2S8 


Cedar Creek 








, 434 


Nashville . 








, 452 


Five Forks . 








, 512 



PREFACE 

THIS book has been compiled in the hope that it will 
prove of assistance to those who are commencing 
the study of the Civil War by providing within a reason- 
able compass an impartial account of the events of the 
four years of hostilities. 

In dealinor with such a wealth of material the method 
pursued has been necessarily somewhat eclectic. For the 
first two years of the War the ground was covered by the 
late Mr. Ropes' Story of the Civil War, and the authors 
were well content to follow the guidance of that talented 
writer, one of the ablest military historians that any country 
has ever possessed. 

Colonel Henderson's Stonewall Jackson has been freely 
consulted for the operations in Virginia up to the battle of 
Chancellorsville. Not only does the present work owe to 
that model of military biographies, and to the stimulating 
influence of its author's Staff College lectures, much of its 
inspiration, but the earlier chapters were directly submitted 
to Colonel Henderson, and the writers wish to record as a 
small tribute to his memory their grateful acknowledgment 
for advice and criticism. 

Although no direct references have been made in the 
text to Colonel Allan's Army of Northern Virginia, the 
authors are greatly indebted to that excellent work in 



X PREFACE 

forminor an estimate of Lee's strategy in the campaigns of 
1862. 

It is a great misfortune that three writers of such 
exceptional ability have been removed by death with their 
work unfinished. In consequence, the authors found them- 
selves at a distinct disadvantag-e when dealing with the 
second half of the Civil War, owing to the lack of such 
luminous guidance. 

Throughout the narrative, recourse has been had to 
Scribner's Campaigns of the Civil War. The volumes of 
this series are of a very varying value both from a literary 
and a historical standpoint, and, coming as they do from 
Federal pens, display a certain sectional bias. This bias, 
it is hoped, has been counteracted by reference to the 
articles by Southern writers in the four volumes of Battles 
and Leaders. To one volume of the Scribner Series, 
Humphreys' The Campaig7i in Virginia iii '64 and '6^, the 
authors are under special obligations, finding it an invalu- 
able guide for the operations in the East during the last 
twelve months of the War. 

Besides the books to which explicit reference is made in 
the footnotes a laroe number of others have been laid 

o 

under contribution, particularly the memoirs of Grant and 
Sherman, and the works on General Lee by General A. L. 
Long and Colonel W. H. Taylor. 

In the compilation of the plans, recourse has chiefly 
been had to the Topographical maps of the United States 
Geological Survey, and the ''Atlas to accompany the 
Official Records of the U^iion and Confederate Armies ." 

The authors desire also to express their personal obliga- 
tion to G. H. Putnam, Esq., himself a veteran of the War, 
tor his kindly assistance and encouragement. 



INTRODUCTION 

THE history of a war may be approached in three 
different ways corresponding to three planes of 
thought. In the first instance, perhaps, it is a pastime. 
People read of a war in order to gratify their taste for the 
excitement of action, much as they read any well-composed 
story of adventure or travel. 

The ambitious officer, determined to make himself master 
of his business, sooner or later discovers that the only way 
of understanding war during peace is by the study of its 
realities contained in the records of past wars. For this 
purpose the histories of the popular kind avail him little. 
He requires an accurate record as the basis of his thinking, 
and the educational value of his study consists in the 
exercise of his judgment upon the facts after he has ascer- 
tained them. Military history of this kind involves enor- 
mous labour, for it is made up of several processes, each of 
which is possible only after a special training. The officer's 
object is to prepare himself to direct in war an army or 
a portion of an army. He wishes to clear his mind 
completely as to the form and substance of the orders 
which, in case he has the command of a body of troops, 
he ought to issue in any given contingency. He has, 
therefore, to familiarise himself as far as he can with the 
various possible situations that may arise in war ; to think 
out for each situation the different solutions that are 



xii INTRODUCTION 

possible, and to know the advantages and disadvantages of 
each of them. Unless he has done this there is Httle 
probability that in the actual emergency he will be able to 
act rightly and promptly. If he is to extract the neces- 
sary practice from military history, he must, in the first 
instance, ascertain the real facts. He must be able to put 
himself as fully as possible into the precise position of the 
general whose action he is considering, must know how 
the problem presented itself to that general's mind, and 
what data were accessible to him. In other words, he 
must know what troops the general had and where they 
were, what information he had about the enemy's troops 
and movements, and what was the spirit of the instructions 
h-e had received from his government, or from some com- 
mander in a position of higher authority than himself. 
These data are not usually to be found in popular histories. 
They are fully ascertainable only in those cases where the 
records have been preserved, where the official correspond- 
ence, the field-states, the reports, and the orders can be 
examined. To collect, verify, and arrange these documents 
is the first business of the student of a war, and its satis- 
factory performance implies a familiarity with the laws of 
historical evidence. 

When the facts have been ascertained and arranged 
in their casual connection the real criticism, or exercise 
of the judgment, begins, for the student then has to 
consider whether a particular move made by the General 
whom he is studying was, in the circumstances, the 
right move or the best move. It may have been the right 
move, though unsuccessful ; it may, though successful, 
have been by no means the best that was open to the 
commander. 



INTRODUCTION xiii 

The full benefit of this method of studying a past war 
can be obtained only when the student puts himself, from 
day to day, in the general's place, and each time, after 
ascertaining the exact situation, makes up his mind as to 
the orders which he himself would have issued in the 
same situation. When he then proceeds to study the 
orders which the general actually gave, he derives inex- 
haustible instruction from the comparison between his own 
ideas and those of the man who was at the moment 
responsible. This method of historical study has, within 
the last generation, been adopted in every progressive 
army in the world as the highest form of self-discipline 
which, during peace, is open to the professional officer as a 
preparation for the responsibilities of command. It forms 
a fine training both of the mind and the will. If the 
British Army is in future to maintain its great traditions, 
this form of study will have to be naturalised among its 
officers. Yet among the recent so-called ''reforms" at the 
headquarters of the Army, the creation of a historical 
department of the General Staff is conspicuous as a 
change which has often been talked of but never been 
carried out. When, however, that department has been 
created, it will in time produce books not for the amuse- 
ment of the public at large, but for the laborious study of 
those comparatively few officers who mean at all cost to 
qualify themselves for command. 

There is a third and still higher plane on which the 
history of a war ought to be and can be treated. It 
assumes as its material the completed work of the technical 
military historian, and upon that basis examines a war 
as an act in the historical sequence of the world's life. It 
asks the questions : How did this war come about ? what 



xiv INTRODUCTION 

were the causes at stake ? and what the nature of the settle- 
ment produced ? It is an exercise not of the military, but 
of the political or historical judgment, weighing in the 
balance the conduct of nations and governments, and 
recording for the benefit of living statesmen the errors, the 
blunders, sometimes the crimes, and sometimes also the 
noble work of their predecessors. 

To write the history of a war on this highest plane, from 
the point of view of statesmanship, is of course the aim of 
every political historian who treats of a war ; but such 
writers do not always rise to the level required, partly 
because, in too many cases, the technical history has never 
been adequately treated, and partly because the political 
historians, as a rule, have not the trained military judgment 
without which they cannot command the military reader's 
confidence for their general deductions. 

Some twenty years ago I tried to call the attention of 
the officers of the Volunteer Force to the American Civil 
War as the one which they could study with the most 
profit. It has for officers whose knowledge of foreign 
languages is, for the most part, limited, the great advantage 
that the original documents, of which an enormous mass 
has been preserved and published, are, without exception, 
in English. Its long duration and the great extent of the 
theatre of the operations, both by land and sea, make it a 
storehouse of almost every type of military action. The 
changes in weapons which have taken place since its 
conclusion have been so great as to preclude any student 
from supposing that he can anywhere find in it actions to 
be precisely copied, a temptation to be avoided, the object 
of military history being not to provide patterns to be 
copied mechanically, but to stimulate independent thought. 



INTRODUCTION xv 

Since then much has been done to utiHse this war for the 
technical instruction of officers, but there has been, so far 
as I am aware, hardly any attempt to review the great 
struggle as a whole in order to learn its political lessons. 
Yet of those political lessons I believe that English states- 
men are much in need. 

I believe that all serious wars in or between civilised 
communities are struggles between right and wrong, and 
that on the whole, and as a rule, it is the cause of right 
which prevails. The American Civil War appears to me 
to be a striking illustration of this belief. The cancer from 
which the body politic of the United States was suffering 
during the first half of the nineteenth century was the 
institution of negro slavery. The Civil War was the 
operation which provided the needed relief. That slavery 
was the main cause of the war has been repeatedly denied, 
and there are many who hold that the vital issue lay in the 
controversy between the advocates of state rights and those 
of federal unity. Political theories like those in question 
are, as a rule, only the forms by which men seek to justify 
their deeper purposes. The theory of State rights and of 
the legality of secession was originally the weapon forged 
by some of the New England States when they dissented 
from a portion of the foreign policy of the Federal Govern- 
ment. One of the greatest difficulties which the statesman 
has to face is that of seeing through the political doctrines 
and theories under which, very often, the vital matters of 
national life and welfare are obscured. It is part of the 
tragic humour of fate that sometimes the noblest characters 
are the champions of lost causes. The brilliant personali- 
ties of men like Lee and Stonewall Jackson have, for too 
many English readers of American history, been the 



xvi INTRODUCTION 

magnets which have biassed the judgment and hidden the 
truth. The great figure of the story is that of President 
Lincoln, whose honest purpose of heart enabled him not 
only to grasp the true nature of what was taking place, but 
to bring the cause of right to its triumphant conclusion. 
Lincoln was the statesman who conducted the war, and 
beside him the figures even of such great generals as 
Grant and Sherman sink into comparative insignificance. 
Yet it is probable that if at any period of his life Lincoln 
had had the opportunity to make himself acquainted with 
the true nature of war, if before he was elected to the 
Presidency he had read and pondered over the half-dozen 
chapters in which Clausewitz discusses the relations be- 
tween war and policy, he would have better estimated the 
resistance which he had to expect and the effort needed to 
overcome it. As it was he had to learn in the bitter school 
of experience. That which marks him out from later 
statesmen of our own day is that he learned his lesson. 
What a contrast between such a man and the present 
Prime Minister of England, who, at the close of the great 
struggle in South Africa, thought, or professed to think, 
that the cause of the difficulties had been not in the 
political blindness of the government, but in the technical 
imperfections of a War Office which, after all, had without 
any breakdown of moment, provided and maintained a 
force five times as large as it had ever been authorised to 
contemplate. 

It is because I am convinced that the true nature of war 
and its relation to national life can be learned from a study 
of the American Civil War as a whole, that I venture to 
commend to English readers the work of Mr. Wood and 
Major Edmonds. The technical aspect of the war has 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

been sufficiently explored by a great number of profes- 
sional writers of several nationalities. The writers of this 
volume, therefore, have had the benefit of abundant pre- 
paratory labours. They may be trusted for the accuracy 
and completeness of their story though the judgment of 
individual men and special events is, in every case, their 
own. To draw the moral and learn the lesson is the 
reader's business. 

SPENSER WILKINSON 

May isl, 1905 



LIST OF AYORKS TO WHICH REFERENCE IS 
MADE IN THE FOOTNOTES 



Quoted as Official Records. 
,, Nicolay. 
,, Force. 
,, Webb. 

Palfrey. 
, , Doubleday. 

Cist. 
,, Greene. 
,, Pond. 



War of the Rebellion, Official Records and Atlas 

Nicolay's The Outbreak of Rebellion 

Force's From Fort Henry to Corinth 

Webb's The Peninsula . 

Palfrey's The Antietam atui Fredericksburg . 

Doubleday's Chancellorsville and Gettysburg 

Cist's The Army of the Cumberland 

Greene's The Mississippi 

Pond's The Shenandoah Valley , 1864 

Cox's Atlanta. 

Cox's March to the Sea, 

Humphreys' The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865 . Quoted as Humphreys. 

Phisterer's Statistical Record . . Sometimes quoted as Statistical Record 

Livermore's Numbers and Losses in the Civil War . . Quoted as Livermore. 

Mahan's The Gulf and the Inland Waters . . . ,, Mahan. 

Dodge's A Bird's-eye View of Our Civil IVar Sometimes quoted as Dodge. 

General J. B. Gordon's Ketniniscences of the Civil War . Quoted as Gordon. 

Battles and Leaders, 4 vols. . . . . . , , B. & L. 

Hendeison's Stonewall /ackson, 2 \o\s. . . . ,, Henderson. 

Fiske's 7 he Mississippi Valley in the Civil ]Var . . ,, Fiske. 



Taylor's Destruction and Reconstruction 

Fitzhugh Lee's General Lee 

Maury's Recollections of a Virginian. 

Allan's Jackson's Valley Campaign 

White's Lee and the Southern Confederacy 

Longstreet's From Manassas to Appomattox. 

Hamlin's Battle oj Chancellorsville 

H. W. Wilson's Ironclads in Action 

Ropes' Story of the Civil War, 2 vols. 

Sheridan's Memoirs, 2 vols. 

J. E. Johnston's Narrative 

Hamley's Operations of War. 

Schouler's History of the United States, vol. vl. 

Swinton's Story of the Grand Army 

Morris's The American Navy. 

Burgoyne's Submarine Navigation. 

Keift-r's .Slavery and Four Years of War, vol. ii. 

Clianning's A Student's History of the United States. 

Bryce's The American Commonwealth, vol. ii. 

Massachusetts Military Historical Society, vol. 10 



Sometimes quoted as Taylor. 

, Quoted as Lee's Lee. 

. Quoted as Allan. 

. Quoted as White's Lee. 

. Quoted as Hamlin. 
,, Wilson. 
,, Ropes. 
Sometimes quoted as Memoirs, 
, , , , Narrative. 

, Quoted as Schouler. 
,, Swinton. 



Quoted as Keifer. 
,, Channing. 
, , Bryce. 

M. H. S. 



DIARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE 
TWO THEATRES OF WAR 



Mar 



1861 

4. Inauguration of President Lincoln. 



April 12. Bombardment of Fort Sumter. 

Eastern Theatre of War 

May 10. 

^. 
July 21. Battle of Bull Run. 
Nov. I. McClellan appointed General-in- 
Chief. 

M 19- 



Jan. 19. 
Feb, 6. 

„ 16. 
Mar. 9. 

„ 16. 

., 17. 
.. 23. 
„ 29. 
April 2. 
„ 6-7. 

May I. 

M 8. 

,, 25. 





,, 


31- 


J' 


LUie 


I. 
8. 

9- 

17. 




)» 


26 



1862 



Battle of the jl/om'iora.nd Mcrrimac. 



Embarkation of troops for the York- 
town Peninsula commenced. 

[Jackson attacks Shields at Kerns- 
town.] 



McClellan arrives at Fortress Mon- 
roe. 



[Jackson defeats Milroy and Schenck 
at McDowell.] 

[Jackson defeats Banks at Win- 
chester. ] 

Battle of Seven Pines, 

Lee takes command in the field. 

[Jackson defeats Fremont at Cross 
Keys. ] 

[Jackson defeats Shields at Port 
Repul)lic. ] 

[Jackson leaves the Shenandoah 
Valley.] 

Jackson arrives on McClellan's 
flank. 

Battle of Beaver Dam Creek, com- 
mencement of the "Seven days' 
fighting." 



Western Theatre of War 
Lyon compels surrender of Camp Jack- 



Halleck takes command of Department 
of the Missouri, and Buell of Depart- 
ment of the Ohio. 



Battle of Mill Springs. 
Grant captures Fort Henry. 
Surrender of Fort Donelson. 

Halleck appointed to supreme com- 
mand in the West. 



Albert Johnston assumes command of 
the Army of the Mississippi. 



Battle of Shiloh and death of Albert 

Johnston. 
New Orleans occupied by Federals. 



XX 



DIARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS 



Eastern Theatre of War 
June 26. Pope placed in command of Army 
of Virginia. 



July 



27. 

I. 

2. 
II. 



Battle of Malvern Hill. 
McClellan reaches the James River. 
Halleck appointed General-in-Chief. 



August. 
,, 29-30. Second battle of Bull Run or 
Manassas. 
September. 
,, 4. Lee crosses the Potomac into Mary- 
land. 
,, 5. Pope relieved of command and 
McClellan reinstated. 
Battle of the Antietam. 
Lee recrosses the Potomac. 



Oct. 



Nov 



Dec. 



17- 

19. 

3- 



26. 

7- 
24. 

13- 
29. 

31- 



McClellan crosses the Potomac. 
McClellan superseded by Burnside. 

Battle of Fredericksburg. 



Western Theatre of War 



Bragg appointed to command Con- 
federates in the West. 



Grant takes command of the Armies of 

the Tennessee and Mississippi. 
Kirljy-Smith invades Kentucky. 



Bragg invades Middle Tennessee. 



[Battle of Corinth.] 
[Battle of Perryville.] 



Grant's first movement towards Vicks- 
burg. 

Sherman defeated at Chickasaw Bluffs. 
[Battle of Murfreesborough.] 



1863 



Jan. II. 
„ 26. 
February. 
April 30. 



Burnside superseded by Hooker. 



May 2-4. Battle of Chancellorsville. 
,, 10. Death of Stonewall Jackson. 
,, 12. 
„ 16. 

,. 17- 
June 15. 

,, 28. 
July 1-3- 

>> 4- 

M 9- 

» H- 
Sept. 7-8. 

,, 19-20. 

Oct. 16. 



Lee crosses into Maryland. 
Meade supersedes Hooker. 
Battle of Gettysburg. 



Lee withdraws across the Potomac. 



19. Meade advances to the Rappa- 
hannock. 



Nr 



.. 24-S. 

,, 26. Meade crosses the Rapidan. 
Dec. I. Meade retires to north of the Rapidan. 



McClernand captures Post of Arkansas. 

Yazoo expedition. 

Grant crosses the Mississippi at Bruins- 
burg. 
Grant occupies Port Gibson. 

Battle of Raymond. 
Battle of Champion's Hill. 
Pemberton withdraws into Vicksburg. 



Surrender of Vicksburg. 
Surrender of Port Hudson. 

Bragg evacuates Chattanooga. 

Bragg defeats Rosecrans at Chicka- 

mauga. 
Grant appointed to command Military 

Division of the Mississippi. Sherman 

to command Department of the 

Tennessee. 



Bragg sends Longstreet against Burn- 
side at Knoxville. 
Battle of Chattanooga. 



DIARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS 



XXI 



1864 
Eastern Theatre of War 
Feb, 14. 
March. 

,, 9. Grant appointed General-in-Chief. 
May. 
,, 4. Grant crosses the Rapidan. 

,, 6. [Butler lands at Bermuda Hundred!.] 



Battle of the Wilderness. 

Battles round Spottsylvania Court 

House. 
Death of J. E. B. Stuart. 
[Beauregard drives Butler back to 

his lines.] 
Battle of Cold Harbour. 
Grant withdraws to cross the James 

River. 
Early sent to the Shenandoah Valley. 
Grant's army on south side of the 

James River. 
Attack on Petersburg. 

[Early defeats Wallace on the 

Monocacy.] 
[Early before Washington.] 
[Early recrosses the Potomac] 



Failure of the Petersburg mine. 
Battle of Mobile Bay. 
[Sheridan appointed to command 
in the Shenandoah Valley.] 

[Battle of Winchester]. 
[Battle of Fisher's Hill.] 



Oct. 19. [Battle of Cedar Creek.] 
Nov. 15. 



„ 20. 

„ 30. 

Dec. 15-16. 

., 21. 



>) 


5-6. 


»> 


8-12. 


>l 


12. 


1) 


16. 


June 1-3. 


i> 


12. 





13- 


i> 


15- 


„ i 


i5-i8 


II 


27. 


July 


9- 


>i 


II. 


)> 


14. 


fi 


17. 


>> 


20. 


i> 


22. 


>> 


30. 


Aug. 


5- 


" 


7. 


Sept 


. 2. 


II 


19- 


,, 


22, 


II 


29. 



Western Theatre of War 
Sherman at Meridian. 
Banks' Red River expedition. 
Sherman succeeds Grant in the West. 
Failure of Red River expedition. 
Sherman commences to move from 
Chattanooga against Atlanta. 



Battle of Kenesaw Mountain. 



Hood supersedes Johnston. 
Battle of Peach Tree Creek. 
Battle of Atlanta. 



Hood evacuates Atlanta. 



Hood moves against Sherman's com- 
munications. 

Sherman leaves Atlanta on his march 
through Georgia, leaving Thomas in 
Tennessee. 

[Beauregard orders Hood against 
Thomas]. 

[Battle of Franklin.] 

[Battle of Nashville.] 

Sherman enters Savannah. 



Feb. 



17. 
18. 
22. 
27. 



Lee appointed 
Chief. 



1865 



Commander - in- 



[Sheridan moves up the Valley.] 



Sherman commences his march through 
the Carolinas. 



Sherman reaches Columbia. 
Fall of Charlestown. 
[Fall of Wilmington.] 



xxii DIARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS 

Eastern Theatre ok War Western Theatre of War 

Battle of Bentonville. 
Sherman at Goldsboro. 

Battle of Five Forks. 

Lee abandons Richmond. 

Battle of Sailor's Creek. 

Lee surrenders at Appomattox 
Court House. 

President Lincoln assassinated. 

Johnston surrenders at Greenboro. 

Jefferson Davis captured. 



Mar. 


19- 


>> 


23- 


April 


I. 


t t 


2. 


11 


6. 


" 


9- 


J 


14. 


»» 


26. 


May 


10. 



A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 18611865 

CHAPTER I 
SECESSION AND SLAVERY 

The right of Secession — The Southern view of Secession — The Northern view — No 
compromise possible — The slavery question — Northern view and Southern view — 
Attacks on slavery — Clamour for emancipation — The real difference between North 
and South — Plutocracy v. Aristocracy — General causes of Secession. 

IN considering the causes of the American Civil War it is 
necessary to touch, however h'ghtly, upon two questions — the 
right of Secession claimed by the South, and the part played 
by slavery in bringing about the conflict. It is most important to 
bear in mind, that as regards the relation of the individual States 
to the Union diametrically opposite views were held by the peoples 
of the North and South. The theory put forward by the South 
was, that the Union was an artificial compact made by thirteen 
separate Sovereign States, who by their own free act created a 
central Government, to which for the common good of each and 
all they delegated certain powers. Such powers as they did not 
expressly delegate were, it was claimed, reserved by the individual 
States : there was no article in the Constitution forbidding 
Secession : that was a right reserved by the Sovereign States and 
might be legitimately exercised by any State or States, if the 
powers entrusted to the central Government seemed likely to be 
used for any other end than the welfare of the individual States : it 
was essential that some such power should be retained by the 
States to prevent this Government of their own creation being 
converted into a despotism such as they had originally fought 
against, when they sundered themselves from Great Britain, 

In support of this theory the Southerner argued that at the 
peace of 1783 the British Government recognised the revolted 
Colonies as " free sovereign and independent States " : that the 
Constitution of 1787 required ratification by nine of the thirteen 



2 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

States before it could come into being, and that no State which 
refused to ratify it, could be bound by it : that as a matter of fact 
it was not accepted by either North Carolina or Rhode Island until 
some time after the other eleven States had ratified it, and that 
during that interval those two States remained independent 
sovereign powers: that certain States^ expressly reserved the 
right of withdrawal, when accepting the Constitution, in case it 
were perverted to their injury : tliat the framers of the Constitution 
had never contemplated the tie, which bound the different States 
to the Union, as other than a moral one : consequently the Con- 
stitution of the United States gave no legal power to the central 
Government of coercing any State, which might choose on what- 
ever grounds to withdraw from the Union : and that it was in the 
North among the New England States that the threat of Secession 
had first been heard at the time of the war with Great Britain in 
1814. 

The theory held in the North was, that the revolted Colonies 
passed direct into States of an Union : that the Union, as 
Mr. Lincoln declared in his Inaugural Address, was much older 
than the Constitution, that it dated back to the Articles of 
Association in 1774, was matured and continued by the Declaration 
of Independence and still further matured by the Articles of 
Confederation in 1778: that the faith of all the then thirteen 
States was pledged to maintain its perpetuity, and that one of 
the declared objects for establishing the Constitution of 1787 was 
"to form a more perfect Union."^ It followed therefore from the 
statement of President Lincoln, that the States at the moment 
when they declared themselves independent were already united : 
that so far from the States having artificially created the Union, 
the Union was the mother of the States and only through it had 
they any life of their own: that the peace with England in 1783 
had called into existence not thirteen separate nations, but one 
nation only — the nation of the United States, Each State was 
in a sense a sovereign State, but in a very different sense to that 
which was attached to the phrase by the South. They were 
Sovereign States in as much as their political rights were not 
derived from any superior power : they retained their political 
identity : they were autonomous communities : yet they consti- 
tuted only one nation : from the first they had been thirteen 
United Communities, and the powers which each separately had 
exercised or claimed to exercise fell far short of those which 
belong to a National Government. 

Between such diametrically opposite views no compromise was 
possible : eventually the sword had to cut the Gordian knot. Into 

' ^.<^. Virginia, Massachusetts, Suiitli Carolina, and New York. Lcc's Lee, So. ^ 
* I "Ropes, 75, SS 9. 



SECESSION AND SLAVERY 3 

the bottomless controversy as to which view was the right one, it 
is needless to enter here. But two remarks may be made. First, 
even granting that the right of Secession belonged to the thirteen 
original States which accepted the Constitution, it is hard to see on 
what grounds such a right could be claimed by States like Missis- 
sippi or Alabama, which entered the Union subsequently to the 
ratification of the Constitution by the original thirteen.^ Secondly, 
the right of Secession, as it was not explicitly affirmed, may be 
regarded as implicitly denied by the framers of the new Confede- 
rate Constitution. 

Equally difficult of solution is the question of the part played 
by slavery in bringing about Secession. Was the Southern 
Confederacy an attempt to found a slave empire? Was the one 
right, which it claimed as dearer to it than all others, the right to 
hold others in slavery ? This was the view generally held at the 
time by the North and since repeated by many writers.^ They 
argue that slavery was forced by its very nature to be aggressive : 
slave labour was wasteful and extravagant : especially when 
applied to the cultivation of tobacco, it tended to exhaust the 
soil : consequently slavery was compelled to find fresh fields to 
conquer : hence the aggressions of filibusters encouraged by 
Southern sympathy in Cuba and Central America : hence the 
annexation of Texas and the Mexican War : hence the attempt 
of slavery to evade the compromise of 1820 and to establish itself 
in the Territories north of the 36° 30' line: hence the theory of 
Squatter Sovereignty, voiced by Douglas and embodied in the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, which turned Kansas into a field of blood : 
hence the Secession of the slave States, when a President was 
elected pledged to resist the aggressions of slavery and keep it 
within its Constitutional bounds. And as a final proof such writers 
point triumphantly to the speech of Alexander H. Stephens, the 
Vice-President of the Confederacy on March 21st, 1861. "Our 
new Government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea : its 
foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth 
that the negro is not equal to the white man : that slavery, 
subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal 
condition. This our new Government is the first in the history 
of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical and 
moral truth." 

On the other hand it is not difficult to show that this view is in 
many ways too sweeping. In the first place the South was not a 
nation of slave-holders. Of the 8,300,000 whites in the fifteen 
slave States (including besides the eleven, which seceded, Mary- 
land, Kentucky, Missouri and Delaware) only 346,000 owned 

^ I Ropes, 26. 

^ Nicolay may be taken as a fair representative of the Northern view. 



4 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

slaves, and of these 69,000 owned only one slave apiece.^ Slave 
labour was a positive disadvantage to the large majority of whites, 
who were not slave-owners. A distinction, too, must be drawn 
between the seven States which seceded first, and the four — 
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas — which only 
seceded after President Lincoln's call to arms, when they were 
summoned to provide troops to crush what they regarded as a 
perfectly legitimate movement. It is impossible to regard their 
Secession as an attempt to found a slave empire. It was not an 
aggressive but a defensive step, to uphold the principle of State 
Sovereignty which they cherished as their birthright. The feeling 
which thinking men in those States held towards slavery was that 
it was an evil which must be tolerated. In the slow course of 
time emancipation would come. But when that time should be 
must be left to Providence with its inscrutable ways, to the mild 
and mellowing influence of Christianity. Any attempt to precipi- 
tate that hour by an appeal to force could only serve to aggravate 
the evil. Any appeal to force was a violation of the right of 
State Sovereignity and must be resisted to the bitter end. 

Nor do the sweeping charges made by Northerners hold good 
even of the seven States, which originally seceded. They too 
might claim that in their case Secession was a defensive step. 
There was a party in the North, Abolitionists as they styled them- 
selves, "Black Republicans" as their enemies termed them, which 
year by year with gathering force and increasing violence de- 
nounced slavery as the crime of all crimes, and the slave-holder as 
the worst of criminals. Slavery was guaranteed by the Constitu- 
tion as a domestic institution : therefore the orators of this party 
denounced the Constitution as " a covenant with death and an 
agreement with IIcll": they were prepared to sweep away the 
Constitution in order to carry out emancipation. It is small 
wonder, if under such fanatical attacks the slave-holder hardened 
his heart. He knew what horrors attended a slave insurrection, 
and he saw the Abolitionist virtually inciting the slave to rise. 
Throughout the South a deep and abiding resentment spread. 
But besides justly condemning the violent language and revolu- 
tionary tendencies of the Abolitionists, the Southerner saw clearly 
that as a policy emancipation was fraught with enormous difficul- 
ties. The slave-holder practically had his capital locked up in 
his slaves. The British Parliament had recognised the rights of 
ownership, and had granted ;<{^20,ooo,ooo as compensation to the 
West Indian planters, but to compensate the slave-holders on the 
North American Continent would have imposed upon the United 
States Treasury a burden which it could not bear. Moreover, the 
Abolitionists denounced all compensation as collusion with crime. 

' I Henderson, io6. 



SECESSION AND SLAVERY 5 

Looking again at the British solution of the problem in the 
West Indies it was clear, that before complete emancipation could 
take place, the negro must pass through a probationary period of 
several years' apprenticeship. But it was emancipation complete 
and immediate, for which the Abolitionist clamoured : and the 
more extreme members of the party went even further : they 
demanded for the negro the political rights of full citizenship. 
Such a grant would have placed the slave-holder in many places 
politically at the mercy of his former slaves. Nor did the instances 
of the British West Indies nor Hayti afford any convincing proof 
that the negro himself would be any better off for emancipation. 
But, it may be argued, the Abolitionists, if the loudest, were not 
the largest or most influential party in the North. There was a 
much wider section, whose idol was the Union. Even for the sake 
of emancipation they would not imperil its precious life : and of 
this section, strong in numbers and sane in counsel, Abraham 
Lincoln was the fitting representative. The new President spoke 
with no uncertain sound in his inaugural address : he declared 
that he had " no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with 
the institution of slavery in the States, where it exists " : he 
expressed his belief that he had no lawful right to do so. 

Why then should the Southern States manifest such unreason- 
able alarm, and seek to destroy the Union in order to avoid an 
imaginary danger? The answer is that Mason and Dixon's line 
of 36° 30' was something more than an artificial boundary between 
slavery and emancipation. It had come to be the geographical 
boundary line between two separate peoples. The character, 
institutions, and interests of the North and South were as different 
as those of any two neighbouring nations. Southern Society was 
an aristocracy based upon a rigid observance of class-distinctions : 
the North was a plutocracy, and even wealth carried with it little 
claim to social recognition unless accompanied by merit.^ The 
South was an agricultural community, and enjoying as it did a 
virtual monopoly of the cotton market, demanded free trade. The 
North was largely devoted to manufacturing industries, and in its 
own interests enforced a protective tariff, which told heavily against 
Southern prosperity. 

Thus the two sections fell further and further apart : material 
interests made them alien the one to the other : as time went on . 
they grew to know less and less of each other, and what they 
knew were the bad points in each other.^ The South easily 
mistook the loudest voice for the most authoritative : had the 
Democratic candidate failed at the Presidential election of 1856, 
it would have seceded then.^ When in i860 the Democratic vote 
was split and a President elected, who only represented the 
^ I Henderson, 102, '^ i Henderson, 103. ^ White's Lee, 75. 



6 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

minority, the time for action seemed come. The Union was 
obsolete : the moral tie, which in Southern eyes was all that it 
had ever represented, was grown too weak to hold together in 
an artificial alliance conflicting interests and different stages of 
society. Secession was a step which had long been contemplated 
by the South : and it was a step taken deliberately not by a 
minority of slave -owners for their own selfish ends, but by a 
nation which almost unanimously believed that the time had 
come for a new order of things. Without slavery there might 
perhaps have been no Secession ; but slavery was only one, 
though the most powerful, of the causes which rendered Secession 
inevitable. 

Besides the slave-holders as a class there was another body of 
men who had a direct interest in Secession. These were the office 
holders and professional politicians, who, owing to the Republican 
victory at the polls in i860, found their occupation gone and their 
emoluments forfeited. It was to their direct interest to establish 
a new order of things in which they could return to their old func- 
tions and draw their old incomes.^ It is frequently claimed by 
Northern writers, that the Secession movement was the work of a 
conspiracy of an entirely unscrupulous clique, who overawed 
individual opinion and gained their ends by fraud and deceit : in 
Texas alone of the Cotton States was the Ordinance of Secession 
submitted to a direct vote of the people i^ in all the others the 
loyal and law-abiding majority was coerced and betrayed into 
Secession. But such an explanation, though containing a certain 
element of truth in as much as there were certain classes which 
had a direct interest in Secession, fails to explain the unanimity 
and unflinching resolution, with which all the people of the 
Southern Confederacy fought through the four long years of 
strife. The majority of an Anglo-Saxon people will not let itself 
be coerced for long into a course of action entailing all the horrors 
and trials of war, unless it genuinely believes that its own interests 
are assailed and its own safety endangered.^ The Cotton States 
seceded, because the people of those States believed that under a 
Republican President their existence as Sovereign States was in 
peril.'* 

' There was also another class at the South with a direct interest in Secession. This 
consisted of the numerous planters who were heavily indebted to Northern factors. To 
them a rebellion was the best mode of wiping out their debts. 

2 Nicolay, ii. ^ i Henderson, 113. 

* Lincoln, when a candidate in 1858 for the United States Senate, had used language 
which might well excite misgivings in the South. " I do not expect the Union to be 
dissolved. I do not expect the house to fall [an allusion to ' a house divided against it- 
self']. But I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or the 
other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it 
where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate 
extinction." 



CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISES 



NOTE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISES 

The framers of the American Constitution deHberately put aside two 
questions for the solution of time, viz. States' Rights and Slavery. To 
have forced either of these to an issue would have been fatal to the adop- 
tion of the Constitution. That itself was based upon the principle of 
compromise. To prevent the smaller States being swamped by the larger, 
it was provided that any State, whatever its size, should have equal repre- 
sentation in the Senate. In the House of Representatives representation 
was to be proportional, but as a concession to the Slave States three-fifths 
of the slaves in any State were to be included in the estimate of the 
population, and the existence of the Slave Trade was secured for twenty 
years. The question whether any State ratifying the Constitution tetained 
the power of rescinding that act of ratification and withdrawing from the 
Union was silently ignored. 

During the next half-century the assertion of States' Rights was three 
times made, by the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-9, by the 
New England Convention at Hartford in 1814, and by South Carolina in. 
1832. The Resolutions were drawn up by Madison and Jefferson in 
opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of the Adams Administration. 
They styled the Constitution a " compact," and declared the States 
Sovereign and independent with the right to judge of the infraction of 
the Constitution and to remedy such infraction by an Act of Nullification. 
This doctrine of the States' Right of Nullification, then enunciated for 
the first time, was strongly condemned by the North, and met with no 
further support in the South. 

The Hartford Convention was due to the indignation of the New Eng- 
land States with the war policy of the Madison Administration. Resolu- 
tions were passed proposing that these States should be allowed to 
undertake their own defence, and for that purpose to retain a reasonable 
proportion of the Federal taxes levied upon them. The right of Nullifica- 
tion was again asserted, and there were even hints of Secession. The 
speedy termination of the war put an end to this agitation. 

In South Carolina a State Convention declared the Tariff Acts of 1828 
and 1832 null and void. The masterful President, Andrew Jackson, was 
determined to enforce the Federal authority, and hostilities were only 
averted by a compromise, which whilst satisfying the demands of South 
CaroHna, preserved the dignity of the Federal Government. 

Three great compromises were made with slavery. The first was that 
of 1787, already referred to. The second is known as the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820. When in 1818 Missouri applied for admission to the 
Union as a Slave State, sectional feeling was violently excited. Hitherto 
the balance between the Slave and the Free States had been maintained 
by admitting them in pairs, thus securing them an equal representation in 
the Senate. But if Missouri were now admitted as a Slave State, slavery 



8 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

would be established west of the Mississippi to the north of the prolonga- 
tion of the Ohio line, which till then had served as the boundary between 
Slavery and Freedom. If Missouri's claim were admitted, other Terri- 
tories west of the Mississippi might in time make a similar demand, and 
the whole of the Trans-Mississippi might be ultimately given over to 
slavery, in which case the political balance would be destroyed. The 
Compromise of 1820 admitted Missouri as a Slave State, whilst to pre- 
serve the balance Maine was brought into the Union as a Free State, and 
with a view to the future it was provided that " in all that territory ceded 
by France under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of 36° 30', not 
included in the limits of Missouri, slavery is for ever prohibited." The 
result of this second compromise was to continue Mason and Dixon's 
line^ to the west of the Mississippi as the boundary between Slavery and 
Freedom, and to state explicitly that the presence of Missouri as a Slave 
State north of that line was to be regarded as an exception and not as a 
precedent. 

Thirty years later a third compromise became necessary. The annexa- 
tion of Texas, in itself a political victory for slavery, was followed by a 
war with Mexico, and over the Mexican spoils party feeling was fiercely 
stirred. Once more Henry Clay, the author of the Missouri Compromise 
and of the compromise with South Carolina, came forward with an 
arrangement, which for a while sufficed to avert sectional strife. By the 
Compromise of 1S50 it was provided that California should be admitted 
as a Free State, but that the Territories of Utah and New Mexico, 
recently acquired from Mexico, should be organised without any restric- 
tion as to slavery : at the same time a more stringent Fugitive Slave Law 
was passed. 

Four years later Stephen Douglas, a Democratic Senator from Illinois, 
brought forward a Bill for the organisation as the Territory of Nebraska 
on similar lines of all the Louisiana Purchase north of the Missouri Com- 
promise line, and west of the States of Missouri and Iowa. Such a 
proposition was a clear violation of the Compromise of 1820, and the 
passing of the Kansas-Nebraska Act led to a state of civil war in Kansas. 

In 1857 Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, delivered judg- 
ment to the effect that the slave was a form of property, and as such had 
just as strong a claim as any other form of property upon the Federal 
Government for protection. He pronounced that Congress had no power 
to legislate against property, and therefore the Missouri Compromise was 
unconstitutional. With this decision of the Supreme Court the theory 
of "Squatter-Sovereignty," advocated by Douglas, came into collision. 
Douglas, when seeking re-election to the Senate in 1858, was entrapped 
by Lincoln, the rival candidate, into uttering the "Freeport heresy." He 
declared that the Legislature of a Territory had the power, if it chose, of 
forbidding absolutely slavery within its limits. This doctrine was a flat 
contradiction of the Dred Scott decision and lost Douglas the support of 

' Mason and Dixon determined the eastern portions of Delaware, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania, and ran the line westward for some distance (1762-7). The line was 
afterwards continued to the western limit of Marylanil and atlopted by Pennsylvania and 
V'irginia as limiting their respective territories. The Ohio line was practically a pro- 
longation of Mason and Dixon's line (Channing, 116). 



CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISES 9 

the South at the election of i860. The Southern Democrats rejecting 
Douglas, nominated J. C. Breckinridge, whilst the Northern Democrats 
supported Douglas. A third Democratic candidate was Bell, nominated 
by the so-called Constitutional Union Party, which hoped to save the 
Union by ignoring the question of slavery altogether. The Democratic 
vote was hopelessly split. Breckinridge received 72 electoral votes, Bell 
39, and Douglas 12. The Republican candidate received 180, and was 
thus elected by an overwhelming majority, but at the polls a million less 
votes had been cast for him than for the three Democratic candidates. 



CHAPTER II 
FORT SUMTER 1 

The election of President Lincoln and Secession of Soutli Carolina — President Buchanan 
and his Cabinet — The Charleston Forts — President Buchanan decides not to rein- 
force the garrison — South Carolina sends Commissioners to Washington and Major 
Anderson occupies Fort Sumter — Steamer with supplies for Fort Sumter is fired on — 
President Buchanan evades giving a decision— Anderson's position — Other States 
secede and seize United States property — The Confederacy formed February, 1861 — 
Failure of negotiations for the surrender of Fort Sumter — Both sides endeavour to 
avoid war — Inauguration of President Lincoln — Fort Sumter asks for assistance — 
Bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter. 

ON November 6th, i860, Abraham Lincohi was elected 
President of the United States, His election was the 
signal for the Cotton States to secede. In this movement 
South Carolina, as might be expected from its past history, took 
the lead. As far back as October 5th, Governor Gist of that State 
had addressed a circular letter to the Governors of the other 
Cotton States, inquiring what would be their attitude in the event 
of Lincoln's election.^ When their fears were confirmed, the South 
Carolina Legislature took prompt action. A Convention was 
ordered, a new Governor elected, who was a more fiery Seces- 
sionist even than his predecessor, and bills passed organising the 
military forces of the State. On December 17th the Convention 
met, and on the 20th passed an Ordinance of Secession declaring 
" the Union between South Carolina and other States under the 
name of the United States of America dissolved." 

Lincoln's term of office would not commence till March 4th, 
1 861. Till that date President Ikichanan continued to hold the 
reins of power. He was a Democrat and a sympathiser with the 
demands of the South ; three members of his Cabinet were South- 
erners, and the Secessionists counted upon his acquiescence in the 
new order of things. But in his Message to Congress on December 
3rd, President Buchanan expressly denied the right of Seces- 
sion;^ and though he added that in his opinion no right was given 
by the Constitution to the Government to coerce a seceding 
State, he declared his intention of collecting the revenue and 

' See Map I. ^ Nicohiy, i. ^ I Ropes, 19. 



Dec, i860] FORT SUMTER 11 

holding the forts and other public property of the United States 
throughout the whole country. After this declaration two of 
the Southerners in his Cabinet resigned.^ But Floyd, Secretary 
of War, continued to hold office in the hope of influencing the 
President in Southern interests. 

The right of Secession claimed by South Carolina as a Sovereign 
State carried with it the further right to resume possession of 
the forts, arsenals, and other public buildings within its territories 
after arriving at a financial settlement with the Government of 
the States still remaining in the Union. Consequently, on the 
forts in Charleston Harbour the interest of the moment centred. 
If South Carolina was really, as it claimed to be, a Sovereign 
State, then it was intolerable that any other Power should hold 
forts commanding its principal harbour ; and, if Secession was 
followed by war, it became a military necessity to secure possession 
of them. These forts were three in number : Castle Pinckney, 
a small island less than a mile from the city, whose fortifications 
were too old-fashioned to be capable of defence ; Fort Moultrie, on 
Sullivan's Island, on the north side of the harbour, about four miles 
from the city ; and Fort Sumter, lying in the centre of the harbour 
channel on an artificial island. To hold these forts there was 
a wholly inadequate force of about a hundred officers and men of 
the United States Army under Major Anderson,^ This small 
garrison was stationed in Fort Moultrie, which against an attack 
from the land side was incapable of offering a prolonged resistance. 
There were no troops in either of the other two forts. In view 
of possible hostilities Anderson's natural course was to move 
his command from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, a post of 
considerable strength and of great importance as commanding the 
entrance to the harbour. It was, however, obviously the interest 
of the South Carolinians to prevent Anderson leaving a position 
where he and his troops were practically at their mercy; and 
the South Carolinian representatives in Congress had endeavoured, 
though without success, to gain a promise from President Buchanan 
that Anderson should not move from the one post to the other.^ 

The question with which Mr. Buchanan's cabinet had to deal 
was, whether or not Anderson should be reinforced. From a 
military standpoint there could be no doubt of the necessity of the 
step. Both the Commander-in-Chief, General Scott, and the 
Secretary of State, General Cass, urged it. But on political 
grounds it might well seem inexpedient. Any attempt to reinforce 

^ Cobb of Georgia and Thompson of Mississippi. 

^ I Ropes, 37. Nicolay, 63, says that the garrison consisted of nine commissioned 
officers, sixty-eight non-commissioned officers and men, eight musicians, and forty-three 
non-combatant workmen. 

^ For the controversy between the South Carolinian representatives and President 
Buchanan, see i Ropes, 56-60. 



12 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Anderson was very likely to precipitate the collision, which, above 
all else, President Buchanan sought to avoid. His one aim and 
object was, whilst doing his duty to the Union and refusing to 
countenance Secession, to defer the inevitable struggle (for in- 
evitable it was, if the right of Secession were refused recognition) 
until his own term of office was ended. It was not difficult, there- 
fore, for Floyd so to play upon the President's fears, that he was 
induced, at a cabinet council of December 13th, to put aside all 
military considerations and decide against the sending of reinforce- 
ments,^ 

The South Carolina Convention, after passing the Ordinance 
of Secession resolved to despatch commissioners to Washington, 
in order to bring about a general settlement of those questions 
which their action had given rise to, with the United States Govern- 
ment. The commissioners reached Washington on December 26th. 
But the following morning the position was entirely changed 
by the news that the previous night Anderson had transferred his 
command from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. This important 
step Anderson took in accordance with the instructions of the 
Government, which authorised him to transfer his command, when- 
ever he had " tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile 
act." Though Anderson undoubtedly believed that a hostile 
act was in contemplation by the authorities of South Carolina, 
it is quite clear that he was mistaken in his belief.^ At that date, 
when the Convention was sending commissioners to Washington, 
an act of open hostility would have stultified their whole position. 
At Charleston Anderson's action was condemned as a breach 
of faith and construed as an act of war. Governor Pickens seized 
the Arsenal, Castle Pinckney, and Fort Moultrie, and gave orders 
for the erection of batteries commanding Sumter and the harbour 
entrance. At Washington the commissioners violently demanded 
an explanation and apology, and a withdrawal of Anderson's 
troops altogether from Charleston Harbour. On December 31st 
the President gave them their answer in a letter couched in very 
moderate language, in which he pointed to the hostile acts 
committed by Governor Pickens in seizing United States property, 
and declined to order the withdrawal of Anderson. Thereupon 
the commissioners left Washington, and Floyd, who had vainly 
hoped to induce the President to recall Anderson, sent in his 
resignation.''' 

The Cabinet, thus rid of its last Southern member, now took 
up a much more decided attitude in view of the unquestionably 

' Nicolay, 24-6. - i R()i)es, 39. 

" Floyd's resignation had been sent in on the 29th, and was accepted on the 31st. He 
was already in bad odour for a finaiKial transaction, which closely resembled official 
theft. See Nicolay, 31. 



jAN.,i86i] FORT SUMTER 13 

hostile acts committed by the South Carolina authorities, and 
resolved to reinforce Sumter at once. An unarmed steamer, the 
Star of the West, was chartered, and sent to Charleston with 
reinforcements and provisions. But, as it was entering the harbour 
on January 9th, it was fired on by the batteries which Governor 
Pickens had caused to be erected, and forced to retire. Anderson 
immediately sent to the Governor, demanding an explanation 
of this insult to the United States flag. The Governor as promptly 
assumed entire responsibility for the act, and insisted that the 
continuance of United States troops in Charleston Harbour was an 
" act of positive hostility." Anderson's hands were tied by the 
instructions of his Government, which limited his military opera- 
tions to those required for the defence of his post. He accordingly 
informed the Governor that he should send an officer to Washington 
to ask for further instructions. Pickens, emboldened by Anderson's 
indecision, on the following day made a formal demand for the 
surrender of the fort. Anderson naturally refused compliance, 
but suggested that they should both send representatives to 
Washington to refer the demand for the surrender of the fort 
to the President. This suggestion was readily accepted by the 
Governor, who despatched Mr. Hayne, the Attorney-General 
of the State, as his envoy, and he was accompanied by one of 
Anderson's officers. 

The arrival of this fresh ambassador only added to the em- 
barrassment of President Buchanan, It was of course impossible 
for him to allow Fort Sumter to be sirrendered after his declara- 
tion of December 3rd, yet, if he gave a downright refusal, open 
war might ensue, and war he was bent on avoiding at all costs. 
However the action of the other Cotton States caused Hayne to 
modify his plan of operations : the case of South Carolina became 
merged in that of the Southern Confederacy. Meanwhile Ander- 
son was ordered to hold Sumter, but not to take any steps, which 
could be construed as hostile, unless his own safety were clearly 
endangered. Reinforcements and provisions were promised him, 
if he thought it necessary to ask for them. He had provisions, 
which would last him over March 4th, and stated his belief that he 
could hold his position against any force, which could be brought 
against him. President Buchanan was only too glad to leave the 
question of Fort Sumter to his successor for solution. 

In the meanwhile, till that successor should assume office, all 
the responsibility for the safety of Sumter was thrown upon 
Anderson. He believed rightly that any attempt to reinforce or 
provision his command would lead to hostilities on the part of 
South Carolina. Like the President he wished at all costs to 
avoid war, believing that it would fail to restore the Union. Con- 
sequently he allowed his political convictions to overrule his 



14 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

military judgment and made no demand for the promised rein- 
forcements, altiiough he was keenly alive to the ignominy of his 
position, and quite aware that the hostile batteries rapidly nearing 
completion would shortly render any attempt to reinforce his post 
impracticable. 

The other Cotton and Gulf States were not slow to follow the 
example of South Carolina. The method of procedure was the 
same. A State Convention was summoned, which passed an 
Ordinance of Secession. Following upon this ordinance, some- 
times even anticipating it, the State authorities proceeded to seize 
all forts, arsenals, and United States property lying in their 
territories. As almost the whole of the small United States Army 
was employed on the Indian frontier, the commandants at the 
different posts were unable to resist the demands of the State 
militia for their surrender : and thus all the southern forts, with 
the exception of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour, Fort 
Pickens in Pensacola Harbour and the forts at Key West and 
Tortugas off the southern extremity of Florida, were speedily lost 
to the Union. Mississippi seceded on January 9th, Florida on 
January loth, Alabama on January nth, Georgia on January 19th, 
Louisiana on January 26th, and Texas on February ist. 

Hayne, the envoy from South Carolina, arrived in Washington 
on January 13th. He found in the capital many of the Senators 
and Representatives of the States, which had already seceded, or 
were on the point of doing so. Their representations induced him 
to delay presenting his demand for the surrender of Fort Sumter, 
until the preparations for forming the new Confederacy were com- 
plete. Although the different States had seceded independently, 
they recognised that their only chance of successfully maintaining 
the right of Secession lay in their uniting together into a single 
Confederacy. President Buchanan was already committed to a 
policy of non-coercion, and it was clearly to the interest of the 
seceding States, that South Carolina should not by precipitate 
action endanger the peaceful establishment of the new Con- 
federacy. A Provisional Congress of delegates from these States 
met at Montgomery, Alabama, on February 4th, and on the 8th 
adopted a Provisional Government, on the 9th elected Jefferson 
Davis of Mississippi President, and Alexander Stephens of 
Georgia Vice-President, and on March nth completed and 
adopted what was intended to be a permanent Constitution. 

Hayne delayed presenting his demand for the surrender of P'ort 
Sumter till January 31st. Holt, who had succeeded Floyd as 
Secretary of War, was charged by President 13uchanan with the 
task of conducting the negotiations with Hayne. Whilst dis- 
claiming all hostile intentions against South Carolina, even 
alleging that Fort Sumter was held by the United States for the 



Feb., 1 86 1] FORT SUMTER 15 

protection of South Carolina against the possibility of a foreign 
attack, he refused to take into consideration at all the demand for 
the surrender of the fort.^ Finding his mission vain, Hayne left 
Washington on February 8th. Governor Pickens at once hastened 
his preparations for attacking Sumter. 

But iDefore these preparations were completed, on February I2th 
the Confederate Congress passed a resolution entrusting to the 
Confederate Government the settlement of all questions between 
the different seceding States and the United States Government, 
and three Commissioners were shortly afterwards despatched to 
Washington for the purpose. Governor Pickens on the 13th 
wrote to the Government at Montgomery, impressing upon them 
the necessity of prompt action and the importance of gaining 
possession of Fort Sumter before President Buchanan's term of 
office ended. ^ He stated the position with admirable clearness. 
" President Buchanan cannot resist, because he has not the power. 
Mr. Lincoln may not attack, because the cause of quarrel will 
have been, or may be, considered by him as past." But the Con- 
federate Government was almost as anxious as President Buchanan 
himself to avoid giving any pretext for war. In their view every 
day's delay was a day gained. The longer the existence of the 
new Government continued unchallenged, the better seemed the 
chance of ultimate recognition, both by the Government at 
Washington and by the European Powers. On the 15th a resolu- 
tion was passed by the Confederate Congress, leaving to the 
President the duty of taking the necessary military steps for 
securing the possession of P'orts Sumter and Pickens, and on the 
20th Jefferson Davis wrote to Governor Pickens that he would 
very shortly send an engineer officer to examine the position at 
Charleston, and two days later in another letter expressed the 
hope that the Governor would do nothing which might prevent 
the issue of peace or war being decided solely by the newly con- 
stituted Confederate Government. 

On March 3rd General Beauregard arrived at Charleston as the 
officer charged by the Confederate Government with the duty of 
reducing Fort Sumter, if necessary. The day after Beauregard's 
arrival at Charleston, Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated as Presi- 
dent of the United States at Washington. His inaugural address 
was couched in distinct but moderate language. The right of 
Secession was denied ; all Secession ordinances declared legally 
void ; the President's determination expressed " to hold, occupy 
and possess the property and places belonging to the Govern- 
ment " ; " acts of violence within any State or States against the 
authority of the United States," pronounced "insurrectionary or 
revolutionary." On the other hand, Lincoln used no menaces. 

^ I Ropes, 6^. - I Ropes, 69. 



16 THE CIVIT. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

He did not propose to invade the secedinf^ States ; he denied that 
his pohcy need lead to either bloodshed or violence. If either 
ensued, it would be the act of the Secessionists, not of the Govern- 
ment. " In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen," he 
concluded, "and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. 
The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict 
without bein<:; yourselves the af^L^ressors." 

Thus Lincoln's policy laid upon the new Confederacy the 
necessity of strikinf:^ the first blow, if it hoped to extort by force 
the recognition which he refused to grant it. Such a blow was 
speedily forthcoming. On March 5th a letter was placed before 
the Cabinet at Washington from Anderson, in which he stated 
that the garrison of I'^ort Sumter would soon be in danger of 
starvation, and that to permanently secure the position in Charles- 
ton Harbour a force of 20,000 men would be necessary.^ General 
Scott, when consulted upon the point, declared an expedition on 
such a scale to be impracticable. It would be impossible to raise 
so large a force within the time. He expressed himself in favour 
on military grounds of withdrawing the garrison from a post 
which could not be permanently held. But on political grounds 
it was possible to make out a strong case in favour of attempting 
a merely temporary relief. To evacuate the post would seem too 
like granting in act that recognition which in word was refused 
to the new Confederacy ; and if the attempt to send temporary 
relief led to an outbreak of hostilities, then the odium of com- 
mencing the civil war would be thrust upon the South, and a 
more united resistance might be looked for from the North. 
Lincoln summoned two Cabinet Councils to consider the ques- 
tion. The first, summoned on March 15th, decided by a majority 
of five to two against making any such attempt. But at a meeting 
of the Cabinet a fortnight later, four out of the seven members 
expressed themselves in favour of a relief expedition. It would 
seem that in the interval the influence of the President had pre- 
vailed over that of his Secretary of State, Mr. Seward. The latter, 
whom many had expected to be the real head of the Government, 
held the strangely optimistic view that the Secession movement 
was on the wane,- and if treated in a conciliatory spirit would 
shortly die a natural death. Captain Fox was appointed to the 
command of the expedition, which he had from the first urgently 
recommended. 

It was determined that in the first instance the attempt should 
be limited to provisioning Fort Sumter. Such a step could not 
be regarded reasonably as an act of war, and to resist it by force 
would certainly i)ut the Secessionists in the wrong. That there 
might be no possible pretext for any resort to violence, President 

' Nicolny, 50. ' Nicoliiy, 52. 



April. i86i] FORT SUMTER 17 

Lincoln on April 8th officially informed Governor Pickens that 
an attempt would be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions 
only, and, if this attempt were not resisted, no effort to throw in 
men, arms, or ammunition would be made without further notice. 
The Southern Confederacy immediately resolved to resist the 
attempt. It might well seem to them that, as the burden of 
taking the offensive was laid upon them, the first blow might just 
as well be struck in Charleston Harbour as anywhere else. On 
April nth Beauregard sent to Anderson, formally demanding the 
surrender of the fort. On his refusal the Confederate batteries 
opened fire at 4.30 a.m. on the I2th.^ The larger and more effec- 
tive half of the guns of Fort Sumter were mounted en barbette on 
the rampart, and it was found impossible in the face of the Con- 
federate fire to work these. ^ On the 13th, as the barracks had 
been set on fire by red-hot shot, and the conflagration caused the 
magazine to be closed and deprived the gunners of a sufficient 
supply of powder,^ Anderson offered to surrender. Part of the 
fleet had appeared off the harbour on the 12th, but the absence 
of the Powhatan, which had been detached on other service* by 
an unwarrantable piece of interference on the part of Seward, 
prevented it coming to the help of the hard-pressed garrison. On 
the 14th, at noon, the United States flag was hauled down and the 
fort evacuated, 

^ I Ropes, 84. - Nicolay, 63. 3 Nicolay, 68. 

* The Powhatan has been ordered to the Gulf of Mexico. Her absence forced Fox 
to abandon his original plan. But he intended to make an attempt to enter the harbour 
on the night of the 13th. Sumter, however, was surrendered on the afternoon of that 
day (i Ropes, 85, note). A severe storm also rendered it difficult to enter on the 
I2th (Nicolay, 66). 



CHAPTER III 
THE BORDER STATES 

The extent of Secession — The effect of Lincoln's call for troops — Secession of Virginia, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas — Importance of Maryland — Lincoln's 
forces — Events in Missouri — Events in Kentucky — Attitude of West Virginia — 
General McClellan in West Virginia — His successes at Rich Mountain and Carrick's 
Ford. 

THE Southern Confederacy as established at Montgomery in 
February embraced a territory larger than that of France, 
Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain combined, with a popu- 
lation, white and black, of over five millions.^ In his inaugural 
address President Davis intimated that the non-seceded Slave 
States would be permitted to join the Confederacy. These States 
were eight in number : Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, Ten- 
nessee, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and Delaware, but in the 
last named the institution of slavery had almost disappeared. 
The first four of these States subsequently joined the Confederacy, 
almost doubling the territorial area, population, and material re- 
sources of Secession.^ 

When the news of the surrender of Fort Sumter reached 
Washington, President Lincoln, on April 15th, had issued a 
proclamation calling out 75,000 militia for the purpose of putting 
down the insurrection. Calls for the proper quota of troops were 
made upon all the States which had not yet seceded. This call 
was indignantly refused by the Governors of all the eight Slave 
States with the exception of Maryland and Delaware. The Border 
States had hitherto held aloof from Secession. Though Slave 
States, they held fast to the Union. Lying nearer the North, they 
knew that the fears entertained by the seceding States were 
exaggerated : they believed that the Abolitionist outcry did not 
represent Northern public opinion, and considered that the institu- 
tion of slavery was not in such danger as to justify a rupture 
of the Union. But when President Lincoln clearly announced 
his intention of applying coercion to the seceded States, and 
called upon the Border States to furnish their contingents for the 

' A. H. Stephen's Savannah speech, March 2lst. '^ Nicolay, 8i. 

l3 



April, i86i] THE BORDER STATES 19 

purpose, the position was entirely changed. The cherished prin- 
ciple of State Sovereignty was now in peril. No alternative was 
left to these States but to obey the call of the President for troops, 
and thereby to assist in the coercion of Sovereign States lawfully 
exercising their right of Secession, or themselves to join the ranks 
of Secession. Neutrality was impossible. 

On April 17th the State Convention of Virginia, by eighty-eight 
votes to fifty-five, passed an Ordinance of Secession, and the 
Governor of the State, Letcher, took immediate steps to seize the 
military arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the Gosport navy-yard near 
Norfolk. The example of Virginia was followed by North Caro- 
lina, Tennessee, and Arkansas. A similar course was attempted 
in the other three States : Missouri, Maryland, and Kentucky. 
But their proximity to Free States prevented their attempt being 
successful. It was of vital importance to the Federal Government 
at Washington to prevent Maryland seceding. For in that case 
the position of the Capital, hemmed in between Maryland and 
Virginia, would have been one of the greatest peril. Baltimore, 
the capital of Maryland, was violently Secessionist, and it was 
through Baltimore that the railway connecting Washington with 
the North ran. On April 19th, the anniversary of Lexington, 
the 6th Massachusetts Regiment reached Baltimore on its way 
to Washington. Marching from one railway depot to the other, 
it was attacked by a furious mob. Shots were exchanged and 
lives lost on both sides. The regiment succeeded in making its 
way to the train, and reached Washington that evening ; but the 
mob took possession of Baltimore. Hicks, the Governor of the 
State, who was pledged loyally to support the Union cause, found 
himself powerless to resist the wave of popular indignation. He 
suffered himself to be persuaded to call out the militia, which was 
largely officered by Secessionists. The City Council appropriated 
half a million of dollars to purchase and manufacture arms.^ On 
the same night the bridges on the Harrisburg and Philadelphia 
railroads, which connected Baltimore with the north, were burnt. 
From the capital the fever of Secession spread to the country 
towns ; the United States flag virtually disappeared from Mary- 
land.^ On the 2 1st Washington found itself cut off from tele- 
graphic communication with the North, and on the following day 
there was a stampede of Southern sympathisers southwards. For 
a few days the United States capital wore the aspect of a be- 
leaguered city. But on April 25th the 7th New York Regiment, 
which had been conveyed by water from Philadelphia to Anna- 
polis, and after a twenty-mile march had gained railway com- 
munication with Washington, entered the capital in triumph. It 
was closely followed by the 8th Massachusetts Regiment. The 

^ Nicolay, 89. ^ Nicolay, 89. 



20 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

crisis was passed, and a steady stream of Northern regiments 
commenced to pour into Washington. 

These troops were the three months' militia called out under the 
President's proclamation of April 15th. Lincoln, recognising the 
growing strength of the Southern Confederacy, on May 3rd called 
for three years' volunteers to the number of 42,034, and ordered 
that the regular army should be increased by 22,714 men, and the 
naval forces by 18,000.^ These steps showed Lincoln's apprecia- 
tion of the military situation, but in the meantime the work 
immediately to hand had to be undertaken by the three months' 
militia. General Scott, Commander-in-Chief of the United States 
forces, recognised the impossibility of conducting offensive opera- 
tions on a large scale with such troops, and wished to confine 
himself to securing the line of the Potomac from the mountains 
to the sea. 2 This included the re-establishment of Federal 
authority in Maryland, and if possible the recapture of Harper's 
Ferry. But little organised opposition was encountered in Mary- 
land. A large proportion of its inhabitants were faithful to the 
Union ; and when Baltimore, the centre of Secession, was occupied 
by General Butler on May 13th, open resistance to the United 
States Government promptly came to an end. The more ardent 
Secessionists, finding themselves unable to carry their State out 
of the Union, betook themselves to the South, and Maryland 
regiments were subsequently found fighting under the Stars and 
Bars. 

Jackson, the Governor of Missouri, being a strong Secessionist, 
made a determined effort to take his State over into the Southern 
Confederacy. He encountered, however, a powerful opponent in 
Frank P. Blair, junior, whose elder brother, Montgomery Blair, 
was Postmaster-General in Lincoln's cabinet, so that the demand 
of the Missouri Unionists for help and protection quickly made 
itself heard at Washington. Governor Jackson hoped to gain 
possession of the United States arsenal at St. Louis, but being 
thwarted by the arrival of reinforcements under Captain Nathaniel 
Lyon, instructed one of his militia generals, PVost, to organise 
volunteer companies in a camp of instruction at St. Louis. Ap- 
plication was made to President Davis for cannon, muskets, and 
ammunition. They arrived in the camp on May 8th. On the 
loth Lyon, with his own battalion of regulars and some volun- 
teer regiments raised by Blair from the Unionists in the State, 
surrounded Camp Jackson, in the west of the city, where Frost 
had begun to collect his Secessionist regiments, and compelled 
its unconditional surrender. Jackson, when he learnt the news 
at the State capital, Jefferson City, having persuaded a compliant 
Legislature to pass a Mihtia Bill constituting him an irresponsible 

' 1 Kuijcs, III. ' Nicolay, 107. 



May, i86i] THE BORDER STATES 21 

military dictator, adjourned it on May 15th, and prepared for open 
hostilities, taking Sterling Price, an ex-Governor of the State, as 
his Commander-in-Chief in place of Frost. On May nth General 
Harney, commanding the Department of the West, had returned 
to St, Louis and taken over the direction of affairs. Instead of 
continuing the offensive movement begun by Lyon, he favoured 
a policy of compromise, and let himself be entrapped into an 
agreement with Price, by which he remained inactive, whilst the 
other was left at liberty to carry out his revolutionary programme.^ 
Blair was fortunate enough to secure from the Washington Govern- 
ment permission to supersede Harney, if such a step seemed 
advisable. Accordingly, on May 30th, Lyon was restored to 
command. As Governor Jackson refused to disband the militia, 
which he and Price had raised, Lyon sailed up the Missouri to 
Jefferson City and occupied it on June 15th. The Governor fled 
without attempting resistance, but joined Price at Boonville some 
fifty miles up the river and prepared to make a stand there. Lyon 
hastily re-embarked his troops, numbering about 2,000, landed four 
miles below Boonville on June 17th, and the same day routed the 
Secessionist forces. This defeat practically terminated Jackson's 
Governorship. The State Convention reassembled on July 22nd, 
and on the 31st elected and inaugurated a Provisional Govern- 
ment with St. Louis as its official headquarters and Hamilton 
Gamble, a loyal supporter of the Union, its Governor. 

Magoffin, Governor of Kentucky, also refused to obey the 
President's call for troops. This State, stretching the whole 
distance from Virginia to Missouri and bordering on the three 
Free States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, held a very important 
position. The Legislature, which contained an Unionist majority, 
on May i6th passed a resolution of neutrality. But neutrality 
was quickly proved to be an impossibility. Neither North nor 
South could for military reasons be content with such an attitude. 
Recruiting within the State was carried on for both causes. On 
either side of Kentucky hostilities were going on both in West 
Virginia and in Missouri, where a Confederate invasion from 
Arkansas was repelled. Fremont, just appointed commander of 
the Department of the West, was preparing a grand expedition 
down the Mississippi. It was to check this threatened advance 
that the Confederates resolved to violate the neutrality of Kentucky. 
On September 5th the Confederate general, Polk, commanding 
on the Mississippi seized Hickman, a town lying on the river in 
Kentucky territory. The Federal general, Grant, commanding at 
Cairo made prompt reply by occupying on September 6th the 
important post of Paducah, lying at the junction of the Cumber- 
land and Tennessee rivers with the Ohio. On the 7th Polk, push- 

^ Nicolay, 121. 



22 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

ing further up the Mississippi, occupied Columbus, and on the 9th 
formally notified Governor Magoffin of his presence on Kentucky 
soil. On September 14th the Legislature, in which, since a general 
election in August, the Unionists had gained an overwhelming 
majority, called upon Polk to withdraw his troops, and a little 
later passed further ordinances finally identifying the State with 
the Northern cause. 

Although the State Convention of Virginia had passed an 
Ordinance of Secession on April 17th, yet the western portion 
of that State was strongly Unionist in sentiment. Geographically, 
Virginia was divided by the Alleghanies into two parts ; and 
modes of life, commercial interests, and, to some extent, sectional 
jealousy combined to render the geographical division a political 
one as well. The inhabitants of the western portion of the State, 
a land of mountain and forest, were mainly hunters or lumber 
men : the plantation system was impossible, and consequently 
only a very small part of the population consisted of slaves. 
Material interests caused, them to look towards the Ohio and 
Mississippi rather than the Atlantic coast. By interest and senti- 
ment they formed part of the Great West. But the richer and 
more populous eastern part of the State outvoted the western 
half and had acquired complete control of the State Government. 
It is not surprising that West Virginia saw in the Ordinance of 
Secession an opportunity for breaking loose from the very one- 
sided connection with her eastern neighbour. If the State of 
Virginia could secede from the Union, then West Virginia would 
secede from Secession. On May 13th delegates met from twenty- 
five counties of West Virginia at Wheeling to deliberate upon the 
necessary steps to be taken for the repudiation of the Ordinance 
of Secession. The State Government at Richmond was, how- 
ever, by no means disposed to relinquish its hold upon West 
Virginia. It was valuable not merely for recruiting purposes and 
as a source of supplies, but strategically, because through it ran 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, the main line of communication 
between Washington and the West. 

Probably the Richmond authorities underestimated the strength 
of the Unionist feeling on the other side of the Alleghanies. 
A very small force under Colonel Porterfield was sent from 
Staunton in the Shenandoah Valley across the mountains to 
Beverly,^ to raise recruits, check the spread of Unionist feeling, 
and, if possible, break up the railway. But West Virginia was 
very favourably situated for receiving help from the Federal 
Government. Its nearest neighbour was the large State of Ohio, 
which had responded with alacrity to President Lincoln's call for 
troops and had raised thirteen regiments under the command of 

1 See Map II. 



May. i86i] THE BORDER STATES 23 

Major-General George B. McClellan. This officer was a personal 
favourite of General Scott, who, in the beginning of May, ap- 
pointed him to the command of the Military Department of the 
Ohio, including Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. He at once realised 
the importance of securing West Virginia to the Federal cause, 
and promptly despatched a force south, which on June 3rd sur- 
prised Colonel Porterfield's command at Philippi, whither it had 
advanced with a view to menacing Grafton, an important junction 
on the railroad, and routed it so effectually that the engagement 
came to be known as "the Philippi races." On June nth dele- 
gates duly elected from forty counties met in formal Convention 
at Wheeling, reorganised the State Government, appointing 
E. H. Peirpoint provisional Governor ; and on August 20th passed 
an ordinance creating the new State of Kanawha, which was two 
years later formally admitted into the Federal Union as the State 
of West Virginia. 

The Confederate Government, loath to abandon such an im- 
portant military position, and fearing lest McClellan should 
advance by the Beverly and Staunton turnpike into the Shenan- 
doah Valley, despatched General Garnett to relieve Porterfield. 
Garnett posted his force of about 4,000 men so as to command 
the two roads leading to Beverly from the north-west. But 
McClellan confronted him with greatly superior numbers, and on 
July nth surprised the detachment of Colonel Pegram at Rich 
Mountain, holding the more southern road, and forced him to 
capitulate with his whole command. Garnett, cut off from his 
base at Beverly, was forced to retreat in a northern direction, was 
closely pursued and killed in a rearguard action at Carrick's Ford 
on July 13th. With the fall of the Confederate general, McClellan's 
campaign in West Virginia came to an end. Insignificant as 
were the two engagements in themselves, yet they had very im- 
portant results. The northern portion of West Virginia was there- 
by permanently secured to the Union, and McClellan's success was 
so magnified by public opinion, that after the rout of Bull Run 
he was summoned to Washington to direct operations in the main 
theatre of war. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE MILITARY OUTLOOK 

The opposing forces — The task of the North— The existing United States Army — Com- 
parison of the raw material availal)le — Difficulties of the offensive — The command of 
the sea — Jefferson Davis — Abraham Lincoln ; his selection of generals. 

THE Secession of the four Border States caused the Con- 
federacy to remove its scat of Government from Montgomery 
to Richmond. Jefferson Davis entered his new capital on 
May 29th. Thus the two combatants were face to face with less 
than one hundred miles dividing their respective capitals. 

At first sight the North seemed far the stronger. Twenty-two 
States were arrayed against half that number. The population of 
the North numbered twenty-two millions, including less than half a 
million of slaves. The population of the Southern Confederacy 
amounted to five and a half millions of whites and three and a half 
of blacks.^ It was hoped by the North that the negroes would prove 
a serious embarrassment to the Confederates, but this was very far 
from being the case. The slaves were loyal to their masters, watched 
over the women and children whilst the men were away fighting, 
tilled the fields, raised the crops, and were largely employed in 
building fortifications. Still the white population of the North was 
four times that of the South. In material resources, in business 
capacity, and in mechanical skill, the South could not compare with 
the North. The North was largely a manufacturing community ; 
the South was almost entirely agricultural. The South depended 
upon the North for many of the necessaries of life. The North 
had almost entire control of the military and naval resources of the 
country. The United States Government retained possession of 
whatever there was of organised preparation for war. It is hardly 
surprising that it was the popular belief of Northerners that 
Secession would be crushed in ninety days. 

But to the shrewd observer it was plain that the North had 
undertaken an enormous task in attempting to subjugate the 
South. It would not be sufificient to win victories as a preliminary 
to dictating advantageous terms of peace ; it was necessary to 

* I Ropes, 98. Hut Henderson (i. 129) states the white population at seven millions. 



i86i] THE MILITARY OUTLOOK 25 

crush piecemeal the national spirit of resistance in a country nearly 
four times the size of France.^ From the Potomac to the Gulf of 
Mexico was 800 miles ; from the Rio Grande, the western frontier 
of Texas, to Charleston on the Atlantic coast was 1,700.^ Through- 
out this vast distance the means of communication were very 
limited : the railway system of the South was very much less 
developed than amongst the Northern States. Nor were there 
any great cities whose capture would necessarily bring about the 
downfall of the Confederacy. New Orleans, the commercial 
capital of the South, fell early in 1862, but the war lasted three 
years longer. It seemed as though the North had embarked upon 
a task even more stupendous than Napoleon's when he undertook 
the conquest of Russia. 

As regards military preparedness the North was but little 
further advanced than the South. Both powers alike had really to 
create their military forces from the very beginning. Before the 
outbreak of war the United States Army numbered about 16,000 
officers and men.^ The native American scorned service in the 
army except as an officer. The uniform was a badge of servitude.* 
The cutting down of military expenses was a favourite theme of 
the pushing orator, seeking to win a cheap popularity. The rank 
and file were almost entirely composed of Irish and Germans. 
Naturally they had no State ties, and consequently, when Secession 
came, the non-commissioned officers and men of the United States 
Army almost to a man stood fast by the Union, and refused to 
desert their paymaster.^ But this force of regulars, small as it 
was, was not available for the work of crushing the South. By far 
the greater part of it was stationed in the Far West and scattered 
among the many small forts, which guarded the Indian frontier. 
Only 3,000 could be spared for the actual operations of war in the 
East.*^ So parsimonious had been the Government's treatment of 
its unpopular army that provision for transport, supply, and war 
organisation was almost entirely lacking. Of the 1,200 officers 
who, having received a military education at West Point, were 
available for service in 1861 about one-fourth were Southerners;^ 
and the vast majority of these, with one or two notable exceptions, 
such as General Scott and G. H. Thomas,^ went with their 
respective States, and resigned their commissions in the United 
States service. Thus the South secured at once a body of 
officers who had all received a sound military education, to which 
many of them added an experience of actual warfare gained in 
the Mexican campaigns. Some of these officers had been the 

^ Nicolay, 8i. '^ i Henderson, 131, 132. 

3 I B. & L., 7. * I Henderson, 128. 

^ I Henderson, 127. ^ i Henderson, 135. 

' I Henderson, 127. ^ Scott and Thomas were both Virginians. 



26 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

most conspicuous men in the United States service. Robert E. 
Lee, Albert Sidney Johnston, and Joseph E. Johnston would 
probably have been regarded as the three soldiers in America best 
qualified for holding large independent commands. The last- 
named had been Quartermaster-General in the United States 
Army, and to Lee General Scott had proposed to give the command 
of the army which was to conquer the South.^ 

The two combatants were similarly situated, in so far as they 
both had ready to hand a body of competent officers and both 
had to create a volunteer army for the trained soldiers to command. 
But the Southern volunteers were better fighting material than the 
Northerners. The Southerner loved fighting for its own sake : to 
him, born and reared under an aristocratic regime, war seemed the 
best and noblest of sports : he was a born horseman, a skilled shot, 
and trained by his mode of life to become an excellent scout. 

The Northerner had none of these natural advantages. He 
hated war as dragging him from his business and commercial 
pursuits : the stern joy of battle had no home in a heart devoted to 
the search for wealth. His daily vocations did not fit him for 
a military life : the counting-house and the store were but a poor 
school for the future soldier. Only in the West, where man was 
still engaged in a struggle with Nature, and the work of civilisation 
was but half completed, was there anything like military enthusiasm 
to be found. There the conditions of life more nearly resembled 
those of the South, and the military instinct was more easily 
engendered. But, though the Northern soldier fought not from 
love of fighting, but from stern necessity, yet his purpose was just 
as resolute as that of his Southern foe. War had been forced 
upon him, and he was determined to see it through. No half 
measures would satisfy him now : he must see the South beaten to 
her knees. Thus, though the Southerner would more quickly 
develop into a soldier, the Northerner, if only he were given time, 
would learn the lesson of military discipline, and, animated by 
a stern sense of duty, would prove no contemptible antagonist. 
If the war lasted for any considerable length of time the quality 
of the Northern armies would improve steadily, more and more 
nearly approaching to the higher standard of Southern efficiency, 
whilst throughout the whole struggle the advantage of a great 
superiority in numbers would be with the North, an advantage 
which would make itself felt the more as time went on. 

Yet, since the North, by the very nature of its task, was obliged 
to assume the offensive and undertake the invasion and conquest 
of the Confederacy, it was certain to find it most difficult to make 
its numerical superiority fully felt. Every forward movement 
would carry its armies further from their base and expose longer 

' Schouler, 66. 



iS6i] THE MILITARY OUTLOOK 27 

lines of communication to attack. It would be quite possible for 
the Southern leaders with ordinary military skill to concentrate at 
the actual points of contact a force fully equal to that of their 
opponents. The Confederates were acting on the defensive, 
operating on interior lines, and this gave them an advantage 
which has been reckoned at the proportion of five to two.^ Thus 
the defensive position of the Confederacy went far to counter- 
balance the numerical superiority of the North. From a military 
point of view the odds were not very much in favour of the 
North. The South might even gain such successes at the first 
as would lead to a reaction at the North, or to the intervention of 
foreign Powers. Time alone would enable the Federal Government 
to make its vast superiority in numbers and material resources 
fully felt, and it could not count with any certainty upon having 
that time. 

Yet at one point, and that a vital point, the Southern Confede- 
racy was singularly vulnerable. The North had entire command 
of the sea. Very few naval officers seceded from the United States 
Service. The products of the South were carried across the seas 
in Northern vessels, owned, built, and manned at the North. The 
Federal Government found no difficulty in manning the very large 
fleet, which in the course of the war was called into existence : 
admirable material could be found in the crews of the trading and 
fishing vessels. But the South had practically no naval resources 
at all. Only the very smallest part of her population was engaged 
in maritime pursuits : she had no shipbuilding industry. She 
could neither build nor man ships, and so was powerless to break 
through the iron belt with which the fleets of the North ringed her 
round. 

President Lincoln, at the very outbreak of the war, on April 19th 
declared the Southern coasts in a state of blockade. Cotton, 
which was the chief source of Southern wealth, could no longer be 
exported : the ammunition, arms, and equipments of war, which 
were so sorely needed, could not be imported. It is true that 
the blockade runners did a considerable business ; but it was a 
business which steadily decreased with the greater vigilance and 
growing numbers of the Federal ships, and from the first it was 
inadequate to supply the needs of a nation. The command of 
the sea enabled the North to destroy her opponent by slow starva- 
tion : sooner or later her internal resources must be exhausted, 
and the Confederacy collapse from sheer inanition. The North 
reaped a twofold advantage from its naval supremacy. Not only 
did it blockade the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, but by gaining pos- 
session of the Mississippi it severed the main artery of the Con- 

1 The country was singularly adapted for defensive warfare, and the attacking force 
would be continually obliged to assault strongly entrenched positions. 



28 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

federacy. The loss of the control of the Mississippi deprived the 
Confederate Government of the supplies both of men and pro- 
visions which it could otherwise have drawn from Louisiana, 
Texas, and Arkansas, all of them great cattle breeding districts, 
whose inhabitants displayed military aptitude in a marked degree. 
In forecasting the chances of the two combatants, it is necessary 
to glance for a moment at the characters and qualifications of the 
rival Presidents. Jefferson Davis, both as soldier and politician, 
had had a thorough training in public life. He had received a 
military education, having graduated at West Point in 1828; he 
retired from the army, but served with distinction through the 
Mexican War as colonel of a Mississippi regiment of volunteers ; 
he had sat in the National House of Representatives, had been an 
United States Senator, had served as Secretary of War in President 
Pierce's administration, and had been chairman of the Military 
Committee in the United States Senate up to the outbreak of the 
Civil War. When Mississippi seceded, it elected him Commander- 
in-Chief of the State forces : when the Southern Confederacy was 
formed, the almost unanimous voice of the South chose him as its 
first President.^ It is possible that his own ambition was for a 
military rather than a political post, and that he would have per- 
ferred to command armies in the field rather than be President of 
the Confederacy. But as President, just as under the Constitution 
of the United States, he was also Commander-in-Chief of all the 
forces of his country. He was thus enabled to exercise a direct 
control over all military operations. With such a good record as 
his, it was certain that the first steps in military organisation would 
be wisely taken.^ The troops were at a very early stage formed 
into brigades, military rank was carefully graduated to suit the 
size of the various commands. Generals commanded armies, 
Lieutenant-Generals army corps, Major-Generals divisions, and 
Brigadier-Generals brigades. These careful distinctions of rank 
secured a subordination and discipline among the higher officers 
of the Southern armies, which was not to be found at the outset in 
those of the North, where at first there was no rank higher than 
that of Major-General, and consequently officers of the same rank 
were to be found holding commands of very different importance. 
With his experience in the Mexican War and as Secretary of War 
President Davis was enabled to make a judicious selection of his 

* The Georgia delogalcs first voted fur IIowoll C<)1)1), l)ut finiling that the other States 
supported Jefferson Davis withdrew their canditlate, that the election might be unanimous 
(I B. & L., 103). 

'^ Vet his subordinates did not realise all the necessities of the struggle. When J. B. 
Gordon, afterwards the Confederate General and Corps Commander, telegraphed offer- 
ing to raise a squadron of cavalry, ho received the alliterative reply, "No cavalry now 
needed" (Gordon, 4). This is an interesting precedent to Pall Mall's "Unmounted 
men preferred" in 1899. 



iS6i] THE MILITARY OUTLOOK 29 

higher officers. The Confederate armies were from the first well 
led, and in but very few cases did those selected for high com- 
mands prove inadequate to the task. 

But at the same time there were distinct disadvantages in having 
for President a man who had been trained as a soldier. He was 
inclined to interfere with his generals, and hamper their operations 
in the field on military as well as political grounds. General Lee's 
strategic genius was constantly thwarted by President Davis's 
military judgment, and still more was this the case with the opera- 
tions of General Joseph Johnston. From the first he formed two 
false conceptions ; he believed that European Powers would inter- 
vene on behalf of the new-born Confederacy to avert the cotton 
famine, with which the blockade of the Confederate ports threatened 
the manufacturers, and he failed to see that a defensive policy may 
often best be served by offensive measures. 

In all respects Abraham Lincoln was a direct contrast to the 
Southern President. He had no military experience save such as 
could be gained from having served in a single Indian campaign ; 
his political training was confined to service in his State Legis- 
lature and a single term in Congress. He had started in a very 
humble station of life ; he had tried various professions and 
employments without achieving marked success in any;^ he had 
never been engaged in business on a large scale. His natural 
limitations mainly displayed themselves in an unnecessary de- 
spondency- on the one hand and a feverish haste for action on the 
other, which tended to bring him into collision with his generals. 
But to counterbalance these defects he had an unfailing supply of 
sound common sense, and a wonderful gift of political insight ; 
with an accuracy which few statesmen have surpassed he was able 
to gauge the state of public opinion at various critical moments ; 
and from the first to last he showed a magnificent and unfaltering 
devotion to the Union. He was fully aware of his own military 
ignorance; if he interfered with his generals it was on political 
grounds ; as far as possible he left them to form their own military 
plans and did his best to help in carrying them out. 

And when once he had found a general who inspired him with 
confidence, he placed implicit trust in him and gave him a whole- 
hearted support. But with his military inexperience it took him 
a long time to find such a general. The earlier years of the war 
tell a tale of successive disasters due to the incompetence of the 
Federal generals. Leader after leader was tried in command of 
the army of the Potomac, and each only proved as great a failure 
as his predecessor. A grievous error was committed by President 
Lincoln at the opening of the war in making important military 

^ But as a political lawyer he had made himself a name in his native State of 
Illinois. 2 J i;^opes, 224. 



30 THE civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

appointments on purely political grounds — a practice which sooner 
or later led to well deserved disappointment and defeat.^ Thus it 
came about, that the Confederate armies fought throughout the 
war more or less under their original leaders, whilst the generals 
who led the Federal hosts to ultimate victory belonged to a 
different generation to those who had commanded at the begin- 
ning of the war. Yet with all his shortcomings it may well be 
doubted whether Lincoln's mistakes in the conduct of the war 
were as costly as those of his infinitely more experienced rival in 
the South. 

' I Ropes, 112, 113. 



CHAPTER V 
BULL RUNi 

Situation in Virginia — Harper's Ferry — Clamour for action in the North — General 
McDowell's advance — The Bull Run position — McDowell's plans — General Patterson 
withdraws from the Shenandoah Valley — Junction of Johnston's and Beauregard's 
forces — McDowell's orders — Beauregard's plans — The battle — Attack on Beaure- 
gard's left — McDowell determines to press his advantage — Succession of isolated 
assaults and Jackson's counterstroke — Flight of the Northerners without pursuit — 
Results of the battle. 

ON neither side were the military authorities disposed to take 
the offensive. General Scott was not in favour of using 
the three months' militia for any but defensive operations. 
General Lee, when he assumed command in Virginia, instead of 
making any attempt to push across the Potomac either to assist 
Baltimore or to attack Washington, concentrated his attention 
upon putting Northern Virginia in a state of defence. The same 
policy was pursued by President Davis, when on arriving at 
Richmond at the end of May he took over the control of all the 
military forces of the Confederacy. Forces were gradually 
collected and stationed, some at Harper's Ferry to protect the 
Shenandoah Valley, and others at Manassas Junction to cover the 
Orange and Alexandria railroad, and at Aquia Creek to defend 
the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad. Manassas Junction 
was of great strategical importance, as the main railroad there 
connected with the Manassas Gap railway running to Front Royal 
in the Shenandoah Valley. As long as the Junction was covered, 
the Confederate forces would be operating on interior lines and 
troops could be brought from "the Valley" to reinforce those 
on the Orange and Alexandria railroad and vice versa. So 
absorbed were the Confederate authorities in defensive prepara- 
tions, that no attempt was made to secure possession of Arlington 
Heights, which, rising on the south side of the Potomac, com- 
manded Washington. Nor was it till May 24th that the Federal 
Government felt itself in a position to occupy these Heights so 
vital to the capital's security. 

^ (See Map III.) The Confederates called the battle of July 2ist the Battle of 
Manassas, and dignified the engageiftent of the iSth with the title of the Battle of 
Bull Run. 

31 



32 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

General Scott's defensive measures included an attempt to re- 
capture Harper's Ferry as a necessary step for the protection of 
Maryland. Major-General Patterson, a veteran of the 1812 and 
Mexican Wars, was selected to command the force detailed for this 
purpose. General J. E. Johnston, with a force of about 1 1,000 men 
and twenty^ guns, was holding Harper's Ferry for the Confederates, 
and at Manassas Junction General Beauregard, fresh from his 
triumph at Sumter, was in command of an army of 22,000 men and 
twenty-nine guns.- General Scott's original plan was to make the 
main attack upon the smaller force at Harper's Ferry, and for this 
purpose Patterson was strongly reinforced, whilst McDowell was 
to detain Beauregard at Manassas Junction and prevent him 
sending help to his colleague in the Valley.^ Johnston, however, 
had no intention of risking a battle for the possession of Harper's 
Ferry. He considered that the position was in itself indefensible, 
being commanded from the north side of the Potomac by the 
Maryland Heights,* and on the south side by the Loudoun 
Heights. As Patterson slowly advanced from Chambersburg in 
Pennsylvania towards Williamsport, twenty miles above Harper's 
Ferry, the Confederate general made his preparations for evacuat- 
ing his post, and on June 15th fell back to Winchester, the key of 
the communication with North-East Virginia. General Scott 
thu€ succeeded in regaining Harper's Ferry. 

But in the meanwhile a new plan of operations was being 
forced upon the Government at Washington. Popular opinion 
demanded that some bold stroke should be attempted before the 
three months' militia were disbanded. The real worthlessness for 
offensive purposes of these militia was not understood by men 
who had no experience of warfare. It was believed by the 
ignorant public, that a success gained against Beauregard's army 
would lead to astonishing results ; the fall of Richmond was 
regarded as the logical consequence of a victory at Manassas 
Junction. "On to Richmond" was now the cry, and to the 
popular clamour the President and his Cabinet yielded. On June 
24th, Brigadier-General McDowell, commanding the Federal 
forces south of the Potomac, by the orders of General Scott laid 
before the Cabinet a plan of operations. McDowell, who had 
served in Mexico and previous to the outbreak of the Civil War 
held the rank of Major in the United States Army, was just as 
much opposed to an advance as was the Commander-in-Chief 
However he had no course but to submit the required plan 
of campaign, undertaking with a force of 30,000 men to fight 
Beauregard, provided that Johnston was kept fully occupied in the 

' I Ropes, 124. 

* I Ropes, 125. This estimate includes Holmes' brigade at Aquia Creek. 

* Nicolay, 172. * See Map IV. 




■"^1 ill 



July, i86i] BULL RUN 83 

Shenandoah Valley. It was never contemplated that McDowell 
alone should fight Beauregard and Johnston combined. General 
Scott undertook that, if Johnston did succeed in joining Beaure- 
gard, Patterson should be close upon his heels. 

In presenting his plan of campaign, McDowell asked permis-^ 
sion to form his troops into brigades, a striking commentary upon 
the state of military efficiency as yet attained by the militia 
army.^ It is not surprising, therefore, that it was not till July i6th 
that McDowell felt himself in a condition to take the field. On 
the afternoon of that day he marched out with 35,732 men and 
forty-nine guns ;^ of these eight companies of infantry, one 
battalion of marines, and nine batteries belonged to the regular 
army. By the morning of the i8th the greater part of his army 
was concentrated at Centreville, twenty-two miles from Washing- 
ton and five and half from Manassas Junction.^) His advance, as 
was only to be expected, had been very slow. The troops had not 
learnt to march any distance : six miles was as much as they 
could do in a day: they had no idea of discipline, and left their 
ranks to pick blackberries, fill their water-bottles, and even to take 
a few hours' rest in the shade of the woods which bordered on the 
road. If their marching powers were bad, their fighting capacity 
was not likely to be much better. Only brigaded a week before, 
they had never been exercised in mass ; deployment for battle had 
not yet been practised ; they had received no musketry instruction, 
and many of the regiments had never fired ball cartridge until 
they met the enemy in open battle. 

Between Centreville and Manassas Junction flows the river 
of Bull Run : behind it Beauregard had taken up his position. 
(See Plan.) It was likely to prove no slight obstacle to raw troops, 
being about as broad as the Thames at Oxford,*^ with wooded 
precipitous banks ; its several fords were carefully guarded by the 
Confederates. On the i8th Tyler, commanding the first division 
of the Federal army, pushed forward a brigade to reconnoitre the 
lower fords, but exposed it to a heavy fire, with the result that the 
brigade fell back in considerable confusion. This incident was 
unfortunate, as it discouraged the Federal troops from the outset, 
and the men of one regiment and one battery, whose period of 
service was just completed, insisted upon their immediate dis- 
charge. The 19th and 20th were spent in collecting the stragglers, 
bringing up supplies, and reconnaissance work. 

The affair of the i8th convinced McDowell that a direct frontal 
attack on the line of Bull Run was too hazardous. He determined 
therefore to turn the Confederate flank. His first intention was to 
move to his own left and outflank their right, but reconnaissances 

' I Ropes, 127. - I Ropes, 127. 

^ I Henderson, 166. ■• i Henderson, 166. 



34 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

showed him that the country on that side was too wooded and 
difficult for the attempt.^ It remained therefore to operate against 
the Confederate left, and his engineers were busy till late on the 
20th searching for an unguarded ford. Sudley Ford was at last 
fixed upon as suitable for the purpose, about two miles above the 
Stone Bridge, where the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run. 
From Sudley Springs, close to the Ford, a road runs parallel to 
the river to Manassas. McDowell's plan was to swing his right 
wing across the river at Sudley Ford, march it down the Sudley- 
Manassas road till it uncovered the Stone Bridge, where his 
centre would cross, and with two-thirds of his army annihilate the 
Confederate left and roll up their whole line from left to right. 
His own left was to be stationed at and near Centreville, covering 
the roads leading thither from the fords of Bull Run. 

The defects of this plan were, that it involved a tedious march 
of from ten to twelve miles for the right wing before that force 
could reach the battlefield ; that it depended upon the co-operation 
of the right and centre and required considerable skill on the 
part of the inexperienced officers commanding divisions and 
brigades ; and finally, that it exposed the weakly held base and 
line of communications to a concentrated attack from the enemy's 
right and centre. McDowell's plan of campaign required, as an 
absolutely essential condition of success, that Johnston should be 
detained in the Valley and prevented from joining Beauregard. 

But General Patterson completely failed to carry out his allotted 
task of holding Johnston in check. When the Washington 
Government determined upon the forward movement to Manassas 
Junction, part of Patterson's army was recalled to join in the 
advance. Finding himself deprived of some of his best troops 
and batteries, that general displayed a degree of caution which 
was quite uncalled for, as he still retained numerical superiority over 
Johnston's army. But like so many Federal generals after him, he 
had formed an exaggerated estimate of his opponent's strength, 
and was afraid to attack him in any position of his own selection. 
He had returned to the north side of the Potomac after his 
reinforcements were withdrawn. But under pressure from Scott 
he again crossed the Potomac at Williamsport - with 14,000 men 
on July 2nd, and "crawled on" to Martinsburg. Johnston moved 
out from Winchester and took up a position waiting to be attacked. 
At the end of four days, as Patterson made no movement, he again 
withdrew to Winchester. Patterson, repeatedly urged by General 
Scott to keep in close touch with Johnston, at last, on the 15th, 
advanced from Martinsburg in the direction of Winchester, and on 
the i6th was at Bunker Hill, but the following day moved to his 
left and occupied Charlestovvn, considerably increasing his distance 

' I R.-prs, 136 7. 2 See Map V. 



July, i86i] BULL RUN 35 

from Johnston, and leaving that general to carry out, without any 
fear of interruption, the movement which he was ordered to 
execute on the i8th. 

As Johnston and Beauregard held quite independent commands, 
it was difficult to ensure co-operation between them, especially 
as Beauregard was full of enterprise and in favour of offensive 
operations, whilst Johnston was a cautious general preferring to 
act on the defensive. Each expected that he would be attacked 
by superior numbers, and urgently pressed for reinforcements from 
the other's army. Beauregard's information received through spies 
in Washington was reliable, and President Davis had determined 
at the fitting moment to reinforce him with the whole of Johnston's 
army. But both the President and General Lee, his military 
adviser, saw that the junction must be delayed until McDowell 
was fairly committed to a forward movement, otherwise he would 
fall back to the defences in front of Washington and the Valley 
would be left at the mercy of Patterson. Indeed, they delayed so 
long, that, had not unforeseen circumstances prevented McDowell 
from attacking till the 2ist, the reinforcements would have come 
too late. On the 17th Beauregard telegraphed to Richmond, that 
McDowell's advance had begun the previous day. At i a.m. on 
the 1 8th Johnston received a telegram ordering him to move 
at once to Beauregard's assistance. Jackson's brigade led the 
march, and passing the Blue Ridge at Ashby's Gap took the train 
at Piedmont, and reached Manassas Junction at 4 p.m. on the 19th. 
A collision on the single line of railway prevented the other troops 
following as rapidly as was expected,^ and on the morning of 
the 2 1st only three of the four brigades of Johnston's army were 
with Beauregard. 

On the night of the 20th McDowell ordered Tyler to move at 
2.30 the following morning with three of the four brigades con- 
stituting his division along the Warrenton turnpike to the Stone 
Bridge. He was to be followed by Hunter's and Heintzelman's 
divisions, which at a certain point were to leave the turnpike and 
take a wood-road branching off to the right and leading to Sudley 
Ford. Miles' division with Tyler's 4th Brigade was to remain at 
Centreville, guarding the line of communications and observing the 
lower fords of Bull Run. Runyon's division had been left to 
guard the line between Centreville and Washington, and was not 
available for the battle of the 21st. There was considerable con- 
fusion and delay in commencing the movement owing to the fact 
that the brigade camps had not been pitched with any reference to 
the intended operations, and the narrow streets of Centreville were 

^ I Henderson, 165. But Johnston, Narrative, 58, denies that the railway track was 
obstructed by any collision, and attributes his failure to bring up all his troops in time to 
the " niiseralile mismanagement of the railroad trains." 



36 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

blocked by troops of all three divisions entering simultaneously. 
At 6 a.m. Tyler arrived in front of the Stone Bridge, which was 
guarded by a demi-brigade under Evans, and at 6.30 a.m. com- 
menced the demonstration, which was to keep Evans at the bridge 
until the Federal right wing was ready to fall upon his flank and 
rear. Evans, however, was an experienced soldier, and soon 
suspecting, by the cloud of dust which marked the advance of 
the Federal right, that Tyler's demonstration was a mere feint, 
and that an attempt was being made to turn his left flank, about 
9 a.m. moved with six of his ten companies and a battalion called 
the Louisiana Tigers^ to his left and rear, and took up a position 
north of Young's Branch on the Matthews Hill across the Manassas- 
Sudley road. 

Johnston, who had only reached Manassas Junction the previous 
day, had wisely allowed Beauregard to fix the plan of battle. The 
latter had settled to throw the bulk of his troops across the river 
by the lower fords, and bearing down by converging roads on 
Centreville to gain possession of the enemy's line of communica- 
tions. Orders had been sent before 6 a.m. to the brigadiers com- 
manding at the lower fords for an early advance. But General 
Ewell, who was to have led the advance, never received his orders, 
and consequently no forward movement took place at all. Johnston 
and Beauragard vainly waited for two hours on a hill near Mitchell's 
Ford to see the movement commenced. 

At 10.30 word came from Ewell explaining the cause of delay, 
and at the same time it became plain that heavy fighting was in 
progress on the left. Beauregard was obliged to abandon his 
intended attack from the right and concentrate all his efforts upon 
repulsing the Federal advance against his left. As early as 7.30 
he had ordered Bee, Bartow, and Jackson to move their brigades 
to the left to reinforce Evans at the Stone Ikidgc, where Tyler had 
commenced his demonstration, and Bee and Bartow took up a 
position on the Henry House Hill south of Young's Branch. 
About 9.30 the Federal turning column, having advanced a mile 
from Sudley Ford, came into action against Evans on the Matthews 
Hill. 

Evans made a gallant resistance against Burnside's brigade, 
which was leading the advance, and finding himself being over- 
powered by superior numbers called on 15ee and Bartow to cross 
Young's Branch and come to his help. They hurried their troops 
across the valley of the stream and took position on the Matthews 
Hill. But the Federal attack was steadily developing itself, fresh 
brigades were coming up on Burnside's right, and Sherman, 
commanding one of Tyler's brigades, had led his troops across 
Bull Run by a ford above the Stone Bridge and was threatening 

' I Ilcndcrbuii, 174; I 15. i\: L., 206. 



July 21, 1861] BULL RUN 37 

the Confederate flank,^ The Confederates were forced to abandon 
their position and fall back to the Henry House Hill. The Federal 
artillery opened upon them with great effect as they were recrossing 
Young's Branch, and the retreat threatened to become a rout. 

But by this time (11.30) Jackson's brigade had arrived upon the 
scene and taken up its position not on the crest, but on the eastern 
edge of the Henry House Hill, some 500 yards to the rear in the 
woods, which covered the lower slopes of the hill on its eastern and 
southern faces.^ The new position was a strong one : for it was but 
little exposed to artillery fire, unless the Federal guns should cross 
Young's Branch, ascend the hill to the crest, and then come into 
action within 500 yards of the Confederate riflemen. It was behind 
Jackson's brigade, "standing," as Bee cried, "like a stone wall," that 
the retreating Confederates began to rally. At noon Johnston and 
Beauregard reached the Henry House Hill, bringing with them two 
batteries. They at once realised the very serious state of affairs. 
The first part of the Federal movement had been successfully 
executed : the right wing and centre had joined hands, whilst the 
Confederate generals found themselves surprised, their left wing in 
danger of annihilation, and no reserves within four miles,^ Both 
galloped to and fro, freely exposing themselves, whilst they tried 
to rally the fugitives and form a connected line of battle. That 
accomplished, Beauregard remained in command on the hill, and 
Johnston went back to superintend the bringing up of reinforce- 
ments. 

The whole force of Confederates on the hill at that moment 
amounted to 6,500 infantry, a handful of cavalry, and sixteen guns. 
To crush this force McDowell had available 16,000 men and twelve 
guns.* The superiority of the Federal artillery more than counter- 
balanced the greater number of the Confederate guns. Seven out 
of the eight brigades which made up McDowell's right and centre 
were on the south side of Bull Run : Schenck's brigade was still 
on the further side unable to clear away the abattis, with which the 
Confederates had obstructed the bridge, but it could have been 
brought across by the same ford by which Sherman had crossed. 
Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division had crossed the Run, but after 
a faint-hearted attack against the Confederate right marched down 
Young's Branch, apparently in the hope of turning the enemy's 
flank, and took no further part in the engagement. Howard's 
brigade of Heintzelman's division had not yet come upon the field, 
and Burnside's brigade, which had led the advance, was allowed by 
McDowell to withdraw, in order that it might rest and replenish its 
ammunition. 

' It is however stated (i B. & L., 186) that Sherman's advance had nothing to do with 
the Confederate retreat, as Sherman's brigade did not begin to cross Bull Run till noon, 
and the Confederate position on Matthews Hill was abandoned before 11.30 a.m. 

"^ I Henderson, 178. ^ I Henderson, 179. •• i Henderson, 181. 



38 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Consequently McDowell, to continue the work so successfully 
begun, had only four brigades actually to hand, numbering about 
9,000 men.^ Realising the necessity of pressing the enemy and 
giving them no opportunity to rally, and fearing lest at any 
moment reinforcements might reach them, he determined not to 
halt and reform his somewhat disorganised troops, but to continue 
the advance without pause. He made no attempt to form a 
properly connected line of battle with supports for the purpose of 
carrying the Henry House Hill. With such inexperienced officers 
and men it would have been a waste of valuable time. For the 
same reason he did not attempt to turn the enemy's flanks ; but 
deeming it all-important not to damp the ardour of his victorious 
troops by delay, sent them forward, just as they came up, to a 
direct frontal attack on the Henry House Hill. Knowing how 
great is the moral support which infantry derive from the near 
presence of artillery on the field of battle,- he ordered two of his 
batteries to cross Young's Branch, ascend the hill, and come into 
action on the south-west side of the plateau, which lies between 
the crest and the woods where Jackson's line was established. 
The two batteries, on coming into position and opening fire upon 
the Confederate batteries, which were posted on the east side of 
the plateau, found themselves exposed to a harassing rifle fire from 
the woods. A charge of Stuart's handful of cavalry put to flight 
an infantry regiment coming up in support of the batteries. One 
of Jackson's regiments moved out from the woods and, being 
mistaken for a Federal regiment advancing to support the artillery, 
was allowed to approach within seventy yards,^ when it poured in 
a point-blank volley which put the two batteries out of action. 
For the rest of the day these guns stood silent on the plateau, the 
prize repeatedly gained and lost again, for which the two armies 
contended. 

The loss of these two batteries, which occurred about 1.30 p.m., 
was a serious blow to McDowell, but by no means destroyed all 
hope of ultimate success. The Federal troops, still believing that 
victory was in their grasp, kept up a succession of assaults, which, 
though almost wholly lacking in unity, as the brigades and even 
the regiments delivered their attacks quite independently of each 
other, nevertheless gradually forced the Confederates back. Three 
times the deserted guns were taken and retaken,'' and about 2.45 
almost the whole plateau was in the hands of the Federals.^ 
Jackson's brigade was still lying sheltered in the belt of pine- 
woods ; and at this stage its commander ordered a bayonet charge. 
The Federal centre was broken. At the same moment Kirby 
Smith's brigade of Johnston's army, which had at last reached 

' I Ropes, 147. - 1 Ropes, 149. * i Henderson, i8j. 

* Nicolay, 193. * I Henderson, 185. 



July 21. 1861] BULL RUN 39 

Manassas Junction and hurried from the station to the battlefield, 
bore down upon the Federal right, and Beauregard, seizing his 
opportunity, ordered a general advance.^ The Federals were 
driven back over the crest of the hill down into the valley. 
Howard's brigade was brought into action in a vain attempt to 
change the fortunes of the day.^ Along the line of Young's 
Branch, about 3.30 p.m., McDowell made his last stand with a 
battalion of regulars forming a strong centre.^ But Early's 
brigade coming up from the lower fords of Bull Run outflanked 
the Federal right, and the volunteer army, recognising the useless- 
ness of further resistance, about 4 p.m. quickly melted away. 

It was not a panic rout ; but the men, whose martial ardour for 
so many hours of the hard-fought day had supplied the place of 
discipline,* when they saw all chance of victory gone, acted on 
their own individual judgment and left the ranks. [A]\ organisa- 
tion was lost both in brigades and regiments : here and there some 
of the officers succeeded in rallying a few of their men, and these 
small bodies formed upon the battalion of regulars, who admirably 
preserved their discipline amid the general scene of confusion. 
Thus a small rearguard was formed which covered the retreat of 
the rest of the army streaming away in the direction of Centreville 
by the roads, by which the different divisions had marched in the 
morning. The Confederates were in no condition to maintain a 
vigorous pursuit. The troops, which had been fighting all day, 
were thoroughly exhausted, and the brigades of Kirby Smith and 
Early were somewhat fatigued by the hasty march, which had 
only just brought them to the battlefield in time, and considerably 
disorganised by the sudden victory. In truth, the Confederates 
did not at once grasp the extent of their success. Beauregard was 
even afraid that McDowell might deliver a second attack and try 
to force the lower fords. 

The pursuit was left to the cavalry, who were unable to make 
any serious impression on the rearguard, although they captured a 
considerable number of stragglers.^ When, however, the Con- 
federates brought a battery to bear upon the bridge, by which the 
Warrenton turnpike crossed Cub Run, a small stream running 
into Bull Run from the north, the retreat of the Federals 
degenerated into a panic. It was at this point that the capture of 
guns and wagons was chiefly made. It was found impossible to 
make the disorganised mob rally at Centreville, as McDowell had 
intended. Without waiting for any orders the fugitives streamed 

^ I Henderson, 185. 

'■^ I Henderson, 186 ; but see i B. & L., 190 and 212, and note at end of chapter. 

^ I Henderson, 186. * i Ropes, 155. 

* Bonham's and Longstreet's infantry brigades were ordered to intercept the Federal 
retreat on the turnpike. But Bonham "found so little appearance of rout as to make 
the execution of his orders seem impracticable." (Johnston, i B. & L., 249.) 



40 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

on and knew no rest until they had again reached the fortifications 
of Washington. The division of Miles which had been left at 
Centreville stood firm, and with the battalion of regulars and 
Richardson's brigade of Tyler's division covered the precipitate 
retreat. The Federal loss was 460 killed and 1,124 wounded and 
1,312 missing; total, 2,896. The Confederates lost 387 killed, 
1,582 wounded, and 13 missing; total, 1,982.^ The Confederates 
captured 25 guns. Besides the main battle, which raged on the 
Confederate left, a sharp engagement took place on the other 
wing, where Jones' brigade crossed Bull Run at McLean's Ford, 
but was driven back by Davies' brigade of Miles' division with a 
loss of 'j6 killed and wounded.- 

Such was the battle of Bull Run, a battle which will always 
have a special interest as being the first of the Civil War, and 
because the combatants on both sides were raw and untrained 
volunteers, who had yet to learn the soldier's trade. The battle 
itself did not lead to any very important results. To the 
Northerners the unexpected reverse was a terrible shock : but it 
only served to brace them to the struggle and make them more 
determined to carry it through to the end. The very day after 
the defeat the House of Representatives voted the enlistment of 
500,000 men. To the South the victory did more harm than 
good. It gave them an exaggerated idea of the superiority of 
their own soldiers : and it caused their Government to rely more 
upon the hope of foreign intervention, as it was believed that 
the victory had greatly impressed the European Powers, than upon 
the natural resources of the Confederacy. 

It is a matter of controversy, whether the Confederate victory 
of Bull Run ought to have led to the capture of Washington. 
Later on in the year there seems to have sprung up a feeling at 
the South, that more ought to have resulted from the rout of the 
Federal army, and a somewhat unjust attempt was made to put 
the blame upon the President. General McClellan, who was 
summoned to Washington the day after the battle, considered 
that up to July 26th there was nothing to prevent even a small 
force of Confederate cavalry riding into the City, and that an 
attack might have been made with every prospect of success upon 
the Arlington Heights. On the other hand Johnston, the Con- 
federate Commander-in-Chief, stated that his army was more dis- 
organised by victory than that of the United States by defeat: 
and though it is true that a considerable part of the Confederate 
army had not been engaged, there were still the two divisions of 
Miles and Runyon, the brigade of Richardson and Sykes' battalion 
of regulars to be dealt with. These troops could have held the 
fortifications of Washington — and the Confederates would have 

' I Ropcb, 153. -■ Nicolay, 199. 



July 21, 1861] BULL RUN 41 

found storming entrenchments a very different thing to repulsing 
an attack in the open field — until Patterson's army could have 
been brought up from the Valley. It is probable that McClellan 
exaggerated the defenceless state of the capital. A more vigorous 
pursuit might perhaps have been made, but the Confederate 
generals would not have been justified in attempting a coup-de- 
tnain against the fortifications of Washington. 

NOTE ON BATTLE OF BULL RUN 

Though the various accounts of this battle present very different views 
of its details, yet its main features are tolerably clear. The first stage of 
the battle was fought out on the Matthews Hill, where Evans' small com- 
mand, subsequently reinforced by Bee and Bartow, repulsed Hunter's 
division but was forced to retire across Young's Branch, when Hunter 
was reinforced by Heintzelman's division and McDowell brought up his 
artillery. Probably also the Confederate retreat was hastened by the 
advance of Sherman's and Keyes' brigades across Bull Run. This how- 
ever is denied by General Fry (i B. & L., 186), who says that the first 
stage of the fight was over by 11.30 a.m., and that it was not till noon that 
these two brigades began to cross Bull Run. The Confederate retreat 
was covered by Imboden's battery and the Hampton Legion. 

The main feature of the second stage was the struggle for the Henry 
Hill, though McDowell's superiority in numbers caused the Federal line 
to extend beyond the Confederate left, and some fighting took place in the 
belt of wood which crossed the Sudley-Manassas road. 

The mischance which befell the two Federal batteries enabled Jackson 
with the remnants of Evans', Bee's, and Bartow's commands to hold on to 
the Henry Hill, whilst the Confederate generals were bringing up rein- 
forcements. Henderson regards Jackson's bayonet charge as the main 
factor in the Confederate success on that part of the field. Beauregard 
speaks of two bayonet charges made by his orders, and seems to regard 
Jackson's charge as part of the first general advance, which he directed. 
Most writers, however, consider Kirby Smith's advance from Manassas 
Junction along the Sudley road as the cause of the Confederate success 
in the second stage of the battle, since it turned the Federal right. 

There is considerable controversy as to the time when Howard's brigade 
was brought into action. Beauregard and Fry state that it was " put in " 
after the annihilation of the Federal batteries and that it took part in the 
struggle for the Henry Hill. Henderson, however, thinks that it was not 
brought up till the Henry Hill had been finally lost by the Federals. 

The third stage of the battle took place on the further bank of Young's 
Branch. McDowell had established a strong line in this new position, 
but the arrival of Early's brigade from the lower fords turned the Federal 
right, and the battle came to an end. 

Longstreet says that his brigade and Bonham's were ordered across 
Bull Run to cut off the retreating army from Centreville, and that their 
artillery was just going to open fire, when Major Whiting, in his capacity 
as Johnston's staff officer, ordered the withdrawal of the two brigades. 



CHAPTER VI 

McCLELLAN REORGANISES THE ARMY OF THE 

POTOMAC— DISCUSSION OF PLANS FOR 

THE NEXT CAMPAIGN 

McCIcllan appointed commander of the Northern forces in the East — Formation of a 
new army — The Southern plans — General Scott resigns, and McClellan is appointed 
commander of all the armies— Criticism of McClellan's plan — Failure of Fremont 
west of the Mississippi — Military Departments of the Missouri, under Halleck, and 
of the Ohio, under Buell, formed — Buell's view of the situation — McClellan's objec- 
tion — Northern victory at Mill Springs, January, 1862 — McClellan's moves during 
Novemlwr and December, 1861 — Lincoln commences to interfere with McClellan's 
plans — Lincoln issues orders — McClellan's plan to transport his army by sea — Plan 
approved with certain restrictions — Lincoln appoints Army Corps Commanders — The 
Merrimac and the Monitor — Modification of McClellan's plan ; his command reduced 
to the Army of the Potomac — Relations of Lincoln and McClellan — General R. E, 
Lee aiijx)inted to the Southern command in West Virginia. 

IT was inevitable after the rout of Bull Run that the Federal 
Government should seek without delay a new commander. 
On the da>' after the battle General George B. McClellan was 
summoned from West Virginia to the capital and assigned under 
General Scott to the command of all the forces in and around 
Washington. The new commander was in his thirty-fifth year:^ 
he had had a brief but brilliant military career. He had graduated 
at West Point 1st in the class of 1846: entering the Engineers, he 
had served with distinction in the Mexican War, and had been 
appointed one of a board of three officers sent to the Crimea to 
note and report upon European methods of warfare and military 
administration. In 1857 he retired from the army to take up rail- 
way work, and was residing at Cincinnati when the war broke out. 
The successes which he had gained on July nth and 13th over 
I'egram and Garnett, though small in themselves, were decisive in 
effect, and moreover were as yet the only victories which the 
Federals could lay claim to. General Scott had a very high 
opinion of him ; and under the circumstances his selection was 
natural and judicious. 

In a remarkably short time McClellan achieved the task of 
restoring confidence at Washington. Whatever may have been 

* Dorn DecemlH;r 3rd, i8j6. 



AuG.,i86i] PLANS FOR NEXT CAMPAIGN 43 

his limitations as a soldier, he was undoubtedly a first-rate organ- 
iser. The three months' militia had just been disbanded, and a 
new army had to be built up out of the three years' volunteers. 
No man was better qualified for the work than McClellan. Pos- 
sessed of extremely winning manners, he had a knack of impressing 
himself upon men.^ He very early won the confidence of his 
soldiers, and for the first few months at least possessed the full 
confidence of the Government. Profoundly convinced of the truth 
that it takes time to make a soldier, he made elaborate prepara- 
tions for training his army into a serviceable weapon of war. 
Between August 4th and October 15th at least loo.ocx) men poured 
into Washington.^ These new levies on arrival were kept in camps 
on the north bank of the Potomac, formed into provisional brigades, 
and trained, equipped, and drilled until they were sufficiently 
advanced to be transferred to the south side of the river, and there 
to take their place among the regular brigades already formed. A 
further stage was reached when the brigades were organised into 
divisions. With such a system and such an organiser, the Army of 
the Potomac grew rapidly in numbers and efficiency. 

It became plain to the commanders of the Confederate army 
encamped at Manassas that if McClellan were allowed to pursue 
his work of organisation undisturbed, the following spring at the 
latest would see a Federal army of overwhelming numbers taking 
the field, against which they would have no reasonable chance of 
contending with success. They therefore invited President Davis 
to a conference, and on October ist the President and his generals 
held a council of war at Fairfax Court House to consider whether 
any offensive movement was practicable before the approach of 
winter should put an end to military operations. All three generals 
— Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith^ — were in favour of an 
advance into Maryland : they argued that in that case McClellan 
would be obliged to take the field against them with an army as 
yet only half trained, and that it was probable that the victors of 
Bull Run would be more than a match for any such force. They 
asked, however, for a reinforcement of 20,000 trained troops, to 
bring the numbers up to 60,000.* President Davis declared himself 
unable to send them the required number of reinforcements : the 
troops already equipped could not be spared from the posts which 
they were then occupying, and there were not enough weapons in 
the Confederate arsenals to arm more than 2,500 of the raw recruits 
who were gathering at Richmond.^ Consequently the proposed 
plan was abandoned. President Davis preferred to maintain a 

^ I Ropes, 165. 2 I Ropes, 167. 

^ Beauregard commanded the 1st Corps and G. W. Smith the 2nd Corps of the 
Confederate army at Manassas, of which J. E. Johnston was Commander-in-Chief. 
* " Smith was content with a force of 50,000" (l Ropes, 196). 
^ Lee's Lee, 133. 



44 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

strictly defensive policy, with its very much smaller chances of 
success, instead of concentrating all his available troops for a bold 
stroke which mi^ht have had far-reaching results. There can 
hardly be a doubt, from a military point of view, that the Southern 
President was guilty of a grave error when he thus condemned his 
generals at the head of a victorious army to a policy of inactivity, 
which was certain as the winter advanced to act unfavourably upon 
the moral and health of the troops.^ 

At the end of October General Scott resigned his command. 
He was too old for his post ;- his experience in the field had been 
almost entirely with regulars, and unfitted him for dealing with 
volunteers ; he was plainly a drag upon the activity of his younger 
subordinate. On November 1st McClellan was appointed to the 
command under the President of all the armies of the Federal 
Government, The change of general was attended by a change of 
plan. General Scott had been in favour of making the main move- 
ment down the Mississippi. General McClellan, soon after he was 
summoned to Washington, had suggested the following plan to 
the President.^ He proposed to raise a force of 273,000 men : he 
asked for the co-operation of a strong naval force and a fleet of 
transports. With this enormous army he intended to invade 
Virginia and march through the Atlantic States, landing troops 
from the fleet at various points, and to occupy Richmond, Charles- 
ton, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans, 
to move into the enemy's country and crush the rebellion in its 
very heart. 

It is worth considering, this scheme put forward by McClellan, 
because it illustrates very well the weak side of his military 
character. With him the imagination was all-powerful ; unless 
facts impressed themselves strongly upon his imagination they 
v/ere not likely to be allowed their full significance. He had con- 
jured up the picture of an invincible army sweeping through the 
Confederacy and reducing all the towns on or near the coast. But 
even had it been practicable, such a scheme would not have 
destroyed the Southern armies — they would have withdrawn in- 
land, and the heart of the Confedcrancy would have remained 
untouched.* 

It must soon have become plain to McClellan that public opinion 
would not let him wait till he had collected his enormous arma- 
ment. At the begiiming of October the Confederates established 
batteries on the lower Potomac and practically closed the naviga- 
tion of the river. Public opinion demanded that McClellan should 
march against Johnston at Manassas, a movement which would 
compel the withdrawal of the batteries; or that at least he should 

' 1 Ropes, 170-3. ^ Born in 1787. 

* August 4tli, 1861. * I Ropes, 178. 



Oct., i86i] PLANS FOR NEXT CAMPAIGN 45 

cross the river and drive ofif the batteries. McClellan did neither. 
He knew his army was not yet fit to take the field, and his behef, 
that Johnston had just double the number of troops which he 
really had, naturally made him decline to run any risks. But he 
ought certainly to have organised an expedition against the bat- 
teries commanding the river. With the resources which he had at 
his disposal he could have ensured practical certainty of success — 
and such an undertaking was admirably adapted to test the 
efficiency of his army and to improve its vtoj'al} But he refused to 
undertake any movement at all, until his army was completely 
equipped for the execution of his own carefully matured plan. In 
the same spirit he turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of the naval 
authorities that he should send an expedition to recapture Norfolk. 
As a consequence, the Confederates were able to raise the sunken 
Merrimac and transform her into a formidable ironclad. 

As Commander-in-Chief, McClellan controlled the other Federal 
armies which were in the field. At the beginning of the war 
President Lincoln had appointed Fremont to the command of the 
Western Department, which embraced all the country west of the 
Mississippi. This was one of the political appointments which so 
richly deserved censure. Fremont had gained considerable fame 
as an explorer in the far North- West : as " the Pathfinder " he had 
been the Republican candidate in the Presidential Election of 
1856. But he had no experience of regular warfare : yet President 
Lincoln conferred upon him the rank of Major-General in the 
regular army, and put him in command of a most important 
department. The state of affairs in Missouri was critical. Governor 
Jackson, after his defeat at Boonville, had fled to South-West 
Missouri. He there received considerable reinforcements from 
Arkansas and Texas, and was enabled to take the field again 
with a force numerically superior to that of the Federals. On 
August lOth General Lyon was killed in an indecisive battle at 
Wilson's Creek.2 jj^g disagreements of the Confederate generals 

' I Ropes, 182. 

2 Battle of Wilson's Creek. (See Map IX.) After the engagement at Boonville on 
June 17th, Sterling Price abandoned Lexington on the Missouri and retreated to the 
south-west to join Governor Jackson. A small Federal force under Sigel was sent in 
pursuit to prevent the junction of the two Confederate leaders. But on July 5th Sigel 
encountered a greatly superior force under Jackson, and was forced after a sharp engage- 
ment to fall back on Springfield. On July 13th he was joined by Lyon. Whilst the 
Federal commanders vainly waited for reinforcements, which Fremont failed to send, 
Price had been reinforced by Arkansas and Texas troops. The Confederate army 
numbering from 10,000 to 12,000 men under General McCulloch assumed the offensive, 
and Lyon, who had barely half the strength of his opponents, was obliged, in the hope 
of securing an uninterrupted retreat, to take the bold step of attacking the enemy. With 
the bulk of his forces he attacked the enemy's front, whilst Sigel was sent to fall upon 
their right rear. The latter was not strong enough to make much impression, and Lyon 
in the heat of the battle was killed. The Federals then retired, but in spite of their 
leader's death made good their retreat to Rolla, the terminus of the St. Louis railway. 



4fi THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

prevented them making the most of their opportunities. But 
Fremont proved himself utterly incompetent, and on November 
2nd was relieved of his command. 

When in September Kentucky abandoned the attempt to remain 
neutral, and definitely declared herself on the side of the North,^ 
the theatre of war in the West was greatly enlarged, as the whole 
country between the Mississippi and the mountains of West 
Virginia became available for military operations. McClellan 
therefore determined to form two military Departments in the 
West. To the Department of the Missouri, which besides the 
States of Arkansas and Missouri included that part of Kentucky 
which lies west of the Cumberland, Halleck was assigned in 
command, whilst Buell was put at the head of the Department of 
the Ohio, which embraced Tennessee and the rest of Kentucky.^ 
McClellan expected Halleck to open up the Mississippi, and 
Buell to bear help to the distressed Unionists in East Tennessee. 
For in that mountainous district, just as in the neighbouring 
district of West Virginia, the majority of the inhabitants were 
staunch supporters of the Union. President Lincoln naturally 
desired that speedy assistance should be sent to them, and the 
success which had attended the Federal arms in West Virginia 
encouraged him to hope that like results might be attained in 
East Tennessee. 

McClellan readily fell in with Lincoln's wishes, because he had 
convinced himself that the success of his intended advance on 
Richmond depended upon the occupation of East Tennessee by 
a Federal force. Buell, however, took a very different and far 
sounder view of the military position. He saw that a direct 
advance into East Tennessee would involve immense difficulties.^ 
There was neither railroad nor river in that district to serve as a 
line of communications : the movement would have to be made by 
country roads, which would soon be impassable, through a more 
or less hostile territory, and exposed throughout the whole distance 
to a flank attack from the main Confederate army of the West. 
For the Richmond authorities with a just appreciation of the case 
had placed all the operations in the West under the control of a 
single leader, Albert Sidney Johnston, one of the most experienced 
and distinguished officers in the Confederate service. Buell urged 
that the defeat of Johnston's army must precede any attempt to 
reach East Tennessee. To ensure success, he recommended that 
Halleck should organise two flotilla columns to make their way 
up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers : this movement would 
strike the Confederate line, reaching from Columbus on the 
Mississippi to Bowling Green, in the centre at its most vulnerable 

' In spite of this decision on the part of the Legisl.iture, several thousand Kentuckians 
joined the Confederate cause. '•' i Ko|>cs, 197. * See M.aji VI. 



Jan., 1862] PLANS FOR NEXT CAMPAIGN 47 

point : simultaneously his own army would advance against Nash- 
ville. Not only would the Confederate line be forced, and 
Nashville, the capital of Tennessee, be captured, but, if the move- 
ment were vigorously followed up, the Federal armies might gain 
Chattanooga, and thus secure a position on the Tennessee and 
Virginia railroad which would enable them to render much more 
effective aid to the Unionists of East Tennessee. 

There can be no reasonable doubt that Buell's view of the 
situation was the correct one.^ The movement which he advocated 
was the one adopted the following year with striking success. It 
enabled the Federals to make full use of their control of the rivers, 
whose course pierced the centre of the Confederate line, and it 
compelled the Confederate Commander either to fight at a disad- 
vantage or else abandon to the enemy the greater part of the 
important State of Tennessee. But McClellan, entirely absorbed 
in the plan of campaign for his own army, could not be brought 
to see the advantages of the course advocated by Buell. The 
utmost concession that could be wrung from him was that Halleck 
might, if he could, despatch the suggested flotilla columns up the 
rivers to draw attention away from Buell, who was still to advance 
with the bulk of his forces into East Tennessee. Halleck declined 
to take any part in the movement. He had quite enough to do in 
Missouri repairing the consequences of Fremont's incompetence. 

Accordingly Buell prepared to carry out the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief, and in January ordered one of his divisions 
under General Thomas to move against a Confederate force under 
General Zollicoffer which had advanced through Cumberland Gap 
into Kentucky. The two forces encountered each other at Mill 
Springs. The Confederate army was totally defeated with the 
loss of twelve guns.^ Though the forces engaged on either side 
did not exceed 4,000 this victory, as the first success gained since 
the disastrous day of Bull Run, was received by the North with 
great rejoicing. Any further advance in that direction was, 
however, prevented by an unexpected move on the part of Halleck, 
presently to be recounted. 

It seems very doubtful whether General McClellan had any real 
intention of taking the field before the spring of 1862.^ He had 

^ For an appreciation of Buell's strategic plan, see i Ropes, 200-8. 

^ The Confederate force on the actual day of battle was commanded by General 
Crittenden. Zollicoffer, second in command, was killed during the engagement. 

^ I Ropes, 183, says that " McClellan unquestionably intended as late as the latter 
part of November, 1S61, to advance directly upon the Confederate army, whether at 
Manassas or wherever he might find it. About this time, however, he began to consider 
several plans for removing the army to the lower Rappahannock." But the Comte de 
Paris (2 B. & L., 112-22) considers that from October 21st, the day of the unfortunate 
affair at Ball's Bluff, McClellan was seized with " a fatal hesitation." It was part of 
McClellan's plan not to advance with the Army of the Potomac until the western armies 
were ready to assume the offensive. Shortly after assuming the supreme control of all 



48 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

certainly encouraged the Government to believe that he would 
move out towards Manassas Junction before the roads became 
impassable. But the large number of Confederate spies in 
Washington compelled him to keep his plans absolutely secret. 
He dared take no one into his confidence. If General Johnston 
had discovered that his position was not likely to be attacked that 
year, he would have been enabled to detach troops to various 
threatened points. As it was, the main Confederate army was 
detained at Manassas waiting for the attack, which never came, 
whilst McClellan was enabled to carry out without encountering 
any serious opposition, his plan for descents upon various points of 
the enemy's coasts. In November, Beaufort, in South Carolina, 
was occupied by a Federal force of 12,000 men, and in the following 
March a force of about the same strength under General Burnside 
took possession of Newberne in North Carolina. Both these 
movements were based upon the co-operation of army and navy. 
McClellan hoped that from Beaufort an advance might be made 
upon Charleston and Savannah, whilst Newberne was intended 
to serve as a base for a movement upon Wilmington. But in 
neither case was the land force sufficiently strong to carry out the 
contemplated movement. 

In December General McClellan fell seriously ill, and it was not 
until the middle of January that he was able to resume his official 
duties. During his illness President Lincoln took the somewhat 
irregular step of consulting with various of the most important 
officers in Washington, especially Generals McDowell and Franklin. 
The President was at the time in a state of great despondency, 
which there was really nothing in the existing state of affairs 
to justify.^ To use his own expression, " The bottom would be 
out of the whole affair," unless some important movement were 
quickly undertaken. In December the Joint Committee of Con- 
gress, consisting of three Senators and four Members of the House 
of Representatives, was created. This body was strongly infected 
with the general distrust of McClellan, which had been steadily 
growing ever since it was seen that no attempt was being made to 
reopen the Potomac to navigation, and lost no opportunity of 
pressing the President to force his reluctant general into action. 
Both McDowell and Franklin had declared themselves in favour 
of a movement upon the Confederate army at Manassas.- Public 
opinion was unanimous in demanding that the disgrace of Bull 
Run should be wiped out by a victory won on the same spot. 

the Federal armies on November 1st, he found it impossible for the western armies to 
commence operations l)cfore the following spring. The seizure of the Confederate envoys 
on Ixiard the Trettt, news of which act reachcil Washingtun on November i6th, also 
compelled McClellan to take into consideration the possibility of having to face an 
invasion of a British force ojicrating from Canada. 

' 1 Kni>c:;, Z2\. " Webb, 17. 



Feb., 1S62] PLANS FOR NEXT CAMPAIGN 49 

But McClellan, believing the reports of his secret service agents, 
had estimated Johnston's army at twice its real strength, and even 
before he was taken ill had begun to consider plans for transporting 
his army by sea to the neighbourhood of Richmond. 

On his recovery McClellan laid his new plan before the Presi- 
dent. The latter absolutely refused to accept it, and in the hope 
of forcing McClellan's hand issued on January 31st a special order 
commanding the Army of the Potomac to advance and seize a 
point on the railroad south-west of Manassas Junction. He had 
already issued on January 27th a General Order directing that 
Washington's birthday, on February 22nd, should be signalised by 
a general advance of all the Federal land and naval forces. These 
orders can hardly have been regarded by the President as final.^ 
For on February 3rd he wrote to McClellan to the effect that he 
would willingly yield his own plan, if McClellan would give him 
satisfactory answers to certain questions, and thereby prove that 
his plan was the better one. 

Answering the President's letter on the same day, McClellan 
stated his own plan at length. Its fundamental conception was 
that the mass of the army should be transported by sea to some 
point whence Richmond could easily be threatened. As to the 
exact point of disembarkation he offered three suggestions.^ The 
troops might land at Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock, where 
they would be but one day's march from Westpoint, and from 
there within two marches of Richmond,^ By this movement he 
expected to cut off a Confederate force under Magruder in the 
Yorktown Peninsula (between the York and James Rivers), and to 
capture Richmond before Johnston could come to the rescue.* 
Mob Jack Bay, an arm of the sea north of the York River, was the 
second point proposed, whilst the third, " if the worst came to the 
worst," was Fortress Monroe, at the extremity of the Peninsula. 
A very serious objection to this plan, in the eyes of the President, 
was that it would uncover Washington and expose it to the danger 
of an attack from the main Confederate army, which the President, 
accepting McClellan's information as accurate, probably reckoned 
at twice its real strength.^ 

On February 27th, after a period of hesitation extending over 
three weeks, the Government gave a general assent to McClellan's 
plan of a movement by sea without settling the actual point of 
disembarkation. Early in March the President, who was evidently 
still very uneasy, ordered McClellan to call his divisional Com- 
manders to a Council of War, and they decided on March 8th, 
by eight votes to four, in favour of the Urbana route. On that 

^ I Ropes, 229. 2 ggg Map VII. 

' I Ropes, 230. * This latter idea was " simply preposterous " (i Ropes, 267). 

^ I Ropes, 232. 



50 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

same day President Lincoln issued his third War Order, directing 
in the first place that a sufficient force should be left to garrison 
Washington ; in the second place it was ordered that not more 
than two corps should be moved from Washington until the Con- 
federate batteries on the lower Potomac had been taken ; thirdly, 
ten days only were allowed for the reduction of the batteries, as it 
was expressly stated that McClellan would be held responsible 
that the movement down Chesapeake Bay should commence on 
March i8th, and it was not likely that McClellan would undertake 
that movement with only half his army.^ 

Likewise on the same day the President, on his own initiative, 
without consulting the Commander-in-Chief, named the Com- 
manders of the four Army Corps, into which the Army of the 
Potomac had been organised.^ The appointment of these corps- 
commanders had been the subject of some correspondence be- 
tween the President and McClellan ; the latter wished, not 
unnaturally, to appoint them himself, but not until he had had the 
opportunity of seeing his officers tested by actual experience in 
the field. Lincoln's independent action in this matter showed 
how much he had lost confidence in McClellan. But the following 
day the situation was changed by the sudden withdrawal of the 
Confederate army. In such haste was the movement carried out 
that a large quantity of supplies and some of the heavy guns had 
to be abandoned. President Davis, frightened by the fall in 
Western Tennessee of Fort Henry on February 6th, and Fort 
Donclson on February 1 6th, had insisted on Johnston retiring from 
his advanced position. The Confederate authorities would seem 
to have anticipated that McClellan would make his advance by 
way of Fredericksburg, in which case Johnston's army would have 
been dangerously exposed.^ 

On the same day, March 9th, a still more dramatic event took 
place ; the Mcrrimac and the Llonitor fought their famous action 
in Hampton Roads. Thanks to McClellan's refusal to undertake 
any expedition for the recapture of Norfolk, the Confederates had 
been able to raise the Aferritfiac, a wooden vessel which the 
Federal authorities on abandoning the naval yard had sunk, and 
had converted her into a formidable ironclad. On March 8th she 
steamed out against the Federal squadron lying in Hampton 
Roads, and destroyed two of the finest wooden vessels in it with- 
out suffering any injury herself The next day the Monitor 
arrived, and a battle immediately took place between these two 
entirely different types of ironclad ; neither vessel was able to do 
the other any injury, and the net result of this trial of strength 

' I Ropes, 234-5. 

' The four Army Corps commanders were McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and 
Keycs. * Webb, 25. 



March, i862] PLANS FOR NEXT CAMPAIGN 51 

was that, whilst the James River was undoubtedly closed by the 
presence of the Merriniac, Federal naval officers considered that 
with the addition of the Monitor they were strong enough to pre- 
vent her assuming the offensive and making any fresh attempt 
against the shipping in Hampton Roads.^ 

There is some evidence to show that the Federal Government 
had finally forbidden the Urbana route and left McClellan his 
choice between the overland route and a movement by sea to 
Fortress Monroe.^ McClellan in his letter to the President had 
clearly expressed his opinion that of the three proposed landing 
places Fortress Monroe was the worst ; and it is highly probable 
that the Government hoped, by forbidding any movement by sea 
except to Fortress Monroe, to force him into adopting the overland 
route. McClellan summoned his four Army Corps commanders 
to a Council of War on March 13th, and a decision was come to in 
favour of the Fortress Monroe plan on the following conditions: (i) 
that the Merrimac should be neutralised ; (2) that adequate means 
of transport should be provided ; (3) that a naval force should be 
ready to co-operate in an attack on the Confederate batteries in 
the York River ; (4) that a sufficient force should be left to cover 
Washington.^ The force which the generals considered sufficient 
for this last purpose was, roughly speaking, about 35,000 men. 

Shortly after the withdrawal of Johnston from Manassas, President 
Lincoln had relieved McClellan of the control of all the armies of 
the United States, and confined him to the command of the Army of 
the Potomac alone.'* This step was justifiable enough in itself, as 
the Commander-in-Chief was about to lead an army into the 
field ; but the President was guilty of grave discourtesy in giving 
McClellan no intimation of his intention, and in leaving him first 
to learn of the change through the newspapers. Although 
McClellan showed no open resentment at the slight put upon him, 
it probably rendered him more than ever disinclined to pay due 
attention to the President's wishes, and led him to postpone the 
consideration of the arrangements for the defence of Washington 
until the very last moment. It was not until he was actually on 
board his steamer, and on the very point of starting for the Penin- 
sula, that he wrote to the Secretary of War, informing him of the 
arrangements which he had made. That letter must have come as 
a startling blow to the Government. McClellan was found to have 
left only 18,000 men to garrison Washington. This was barely 
half the number which the Council of War had fixed as the 
minimum, and it was largely composed of troops which were still 

' See Chapter XXVI., "Naval Operations." - i Ropes, 240. ^ 1 Ropes, 245-6. 

* When McClellan with the greater part of his army moved out to reoccupy Manassas, 
Lincoln seized the opportunity to relieve him of the supreme command of all the Federal 
armies. 



52 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

in the process of training. Of skilled artillerymen there were 
very few. It is true that McClellan maintained that besides the 
force detailed as the actual garrison of Washington, he had left a 
large number of troops^ at Manassas, Warrenton, and in the 
Shenandoah Valley, a considerable part of whom might be relied 
upon to assist in the defence of the Capital. In fact, he claimed to 
have left behind him a force of over 73,000 men. It is enough here 
to say that General McClellan's arithmetic could not stand a close 
inspection, and that in any case, whatever the number of the 
troops he left behind him, still he had evaded the President's 
distinct injunctions and the declared opinion of his own Council of 
War, and had attempted to achieve the desired end by means other 
than those prescribed.- 

It has been necessary to consider at some length the relations 
between President Lincoln and General McClellan in order to form 
a proper appreciation of the difficulties which confronted and 
baffled the latter at various stages in his conduct of the Peninsular 
campaign. To sum up. General McClellan was called to the post 
of Commander-in-Chief amid general acclamations, in which the 
Government heartily joined ; but by the line of conduct which he 
thought fit to adopt he deliberately alienated from himself the 
confidence of the Cabinet, on whose loyal support and co-operation 
he ought to have known that the success of his campaign largely 
depended. 

The Southern President for his part adhered steadily to the 
policy of standing on the strict defensive both in East and West. 
Only in West Virginia ^ did the Confederates make any attempt to 
assume the offensive. In the command of that Department 
McClellan had been succeeded by Rosecrans. The Confederates 
had four brigadiers in the field : Floyd and Wise in the Great 
Kanawha Valley, Loring and H. R. Jackson on and near the 
Staunton-Parkersburg turnpike. In order to ensure unity of action 
President Davis determined to send an officer of high rank to take 
the supreme command. He first offered the post to Joseph 
Johnston, who declined it, preferring to remain in command at 
Manassas. General R. E. Lee, who had been hitherto acting 
as military adviser to the President, was then selected for the 
command and left Richmond at the end of July. His campaign 
proved a failure. He first endeavoured with Loring's and Jackson's 
troops to crush a Federal force under General Reynolds, which was 
divided into two portions seven miles apart : one holding the 
Cheat Mountain Pass, through which runs the Staunton-Parkers- 
burg turnpike, and the other at Elkwater, on the Huttonsville 
road. But a very heavy rainstorm and a lack of co-operation 
between the Confederate wings caused his carefully devised plan 
' Map III. - I K..,)os, 263 4. 3 j^i^j, ij_ 



OcT.,i86i] PLANS FOR NEXT CAMPAIGN 53 

of attack to be abandoned. Having failed to surprise Reynolds, 
Lee next turned his attention to the Kanawha Valley, where 
Rosecrans was pushing forward towards Lewisburg, and the 
dissensions of Floyd and Wise were paralysing the Confederate 
powers of resistance. 

Rosecrans entrenched himself in a strong position on Big Sewell 
Mountain. Lee concentrated a somewhat smaller force on a 
parallel ridge about a mile distant, and also threw up entrench- 
ments. Neither general was willing to attack the other. For 
twelve days they confronted each other, each hoping that the 
other would attack. On the night of October 6th Rosecrans with- 
drew his forces. Lee's army was in no condition to pursue. With 
this second failure to strike the enemy a heavy blow Lee's campaign 
came to an end, and he returned to Richmond to his old place 
by the President's side.^ During the winter months the Confederate 
interest in West Virginia died away, and no further attempt 
was made to weaken the Federal hold on that Department. 

^ For Lee's campaign in West Virginia, see White's Lee, 114-25, and Lee's Lee, 
116-27. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE rENINSUI.AR CAMPAIGN UP TO THE 
BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES i 

Situation in the Yorktown Penin!;ula — Tiie Navy cannot co-operate — Lincoln stops 
McDowell's Corps — McClellan lingers over the siege of Yorktown — ^Johnston with- 
draws the Confederate troops — Battle of Williamsburg — Pursuit by water fails — 
McClellan's slow advance — Part of McDowell's Corps is promised him, but is not sent 
— McClellan bases himself on White House— General Johnston takes advantage 
of McClellan's position — Battle of Seven Pines — Johnston's orders — Longstreet mis- 
understands the orders, but the Confederate right is successful — The left wing is un- 
successful and Johnston is wounded — Battle is renewed on the 1st June — Lee takes 
command — Result of Battle of Seven Pines. 

ON March 17th, 1862, the embarkation of troops for the 
Peninsula commenced, and on April 2nd General McClellan 
arrived at Fortress Monroe. He found assembled there 
the best part of three Corps, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, under the 
command of Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, number- 
ing in all 58,000 men.2 For the Confederates General Magruder 
was holding the Peninsula with 13,000 men.^ He had constructed 
three lines of entrenchments across the Peninsula. The first line, 
from Ship's Point to the mouth of the Warwick River, was 
abandoned about the beginning of March, and the troops were 
arranged upon the second line, reaching from Yorktown along the 
Warwick to Mulberry Island and the James River. 

McClellan, from the outset of the campaign, was hampered 
by his ignorance of the topography of the Peninsula. He knew 
that Yorktown was held by the Confederates. But he had no 
idea that the Warwick River ran right across the Peninsula, but 
supposed that its course was parallel with the road which he 
intended to follow up the Peninsula. He imagined that the 
Confederate forces in the Peninsula would be massed in Yorktown 
and Gloucester on the north bank of the York, and that no 
provision would have been made by the enemy to prevent this 
position being turned by an advance along the roads on the south 
side of the Peninsula. This conception is an excellent illustration 
of the mental view which McClellan generally took of military 

' See Map VII. '■' Wel)b, 34. * 2 Ropes, 104. 

54 



April, 1862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 55 

possibilities. His fertile imagination only took into account his 
own operations. He seemed constitutionally incapable of allowing 
to his adversary sufficient sagacity to take even the most ordinary 
precautions.^ The very fact that Yorktovvn was, as he knew, 
strongly held, should have warned him that the Confederates would 
be certain to have a strong position on the James, and that the 
intervening space would be as securely guarded as their numbers 
permitted.^ But such an idea never crossed his mind. He intended 
to advance in two columns ; the left column, under Keyes, was 
to move straight up the Peninsula and take position at the Half- 
way House, some six miles from Yorktown ; whilst the right 
column, under Heintzelman, would advance on and lay siege 
to Yorktown. 

When in the beginning of March McClellan decided upon the 
Fortress Monroe route, he expected to have the assistance of the 
navy. His original plan was to make a combined movement of 
land and naval forces upon Yorktown, and he believed that such a 
movement would quickly lead to the reduction of the place. But 
the naval force in Hampton Roads had quite as much as it could do 
watching the Merrintac, and no vessels could be spared for a move- 
ment up the York River. Even if they could have been spared, 
they would have been powerless against the batteries at Yorktown 
and Gloucester, which were placed so high above the water as to 
be virtually unassailable by ships.^ Before he left for the Pen- 
insula, McClellan knew, or at least must have anticipated, that he 
could expect no co-operation from the navy.* He therefore deter- 
mined to lay siege to Yorktown ; for that purpose he had brought 
a siege train with him. But he also intended to land the ist 
Corps under McDowell, which had not yet sailed from Alexandria, 
on the north bank of the York, and to make short work of the 
Confederate resistance by capturing Gloucester, and flanking the 
Confederates out of the successive positions which they might take 
up in the Peninsula. The plan was based upon sound principles, 
and, if it had been immediately carried into effect, would probably 
have compelled the Confederates to evacuate the Peninsula. 

The advance commenced on April 4th : on the following day 
Keyes, commanding the left column, found his further advance 
towards Halfway House barred by the unexpected obstacle of the 
line of the Warwick evidently held in some strength by the enemy. 
The same day a second and far greater disappointment befell 
McClellan ; he was officially informed that President Lincoln had 
detained McDowell's Corps for the defence of Washington. 

^ 2 Ropes, 102. 2 Webb, 54. ' 2 Ropes, 10 1. 

* Ropes (10 Massachusetts M. H. S., 103) quotes a letter dated March 20th to 
McClellan from General Barnard sent in advance to the Peninsula to make arrangements 
with the navy, in which it is distinctly stated that the navy could do no more than cover 
a landing. 



50 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

As soon as the President learnt that McClellan had failed to 
carry out his promise, that he would leave for the defence of 
Washington such a force as his Army Corps commanders deemed 
sufficient for the purpose, he at once proceeded to provide himself 
for the defence of the capital by detaining McDowell's Corps, On 
political grounds the President was perfectly justified in taking this 
step : the fundamental understanding, on which alone the Pen- 
insular campaign had been sanctioned by the Government, was 
that the safety of Washington should be absolutely secured. Not 
even on military grounds is it clear that the President was open to 
censure. At that time the safety of McClellan's army in the Pen- 
insula did not depend upon the presence of McDowell's Corps. Its 
absence did not imperil that army : it only made its progress 
somewhat slower. The reduction of Yorktown could still be 
effected by siege operations, but it would take time.^ 

It took McClellan just a month. But for this delay he was 
largely himself to blame. He made no attempt to escape from the 
necessity of laying regular siege to Yorktown. Although it was 
obvious that the health of his troops would suffer from a protracted 
delay in an unhealthy district, he omitted to push forward a deter- 
mined reconnaissance in the hope of finding a weak spot in the 
enemy's lines. That weak spots existed was extremely probable. 
Until April loth Magruder received no reinforcements, and after 
placing adequate garrisons in Gloucester, Yorktown, and Mulberry 
Island, was left with not more than 5,000 men to hold a line five 
miles long. Nor was there lacking actual proof that such a weak 
spot could be found. For on April i6th a small force, under the 
direction of a divisional general,^ who was far more energetic than 
the Commander-in-Chief, forced its way across the Warwick, and 
held the enemy's front entrenchments for nearly an hour, until 
recalled. 

Instead of making any attempt to break through the Confede- 
rate lines, McClellan settled down to a formal siege of Yorktown, 
although it was perfectly plain that as long as the enemy retained 
possession of the line of the Warwick, it was a siege only in name ; 
for the enemy could evacuate their position whenever the}' judged 
expedient. At the same time he had not lost sight of his original 
plan of turning the Yorktown defences by a flanking column 
landed on the north bank of the York. He continued to beg the 
President and the Secretary for War that McDowell's Corps should 
be restored to his command, that at any rate two, or at the very 
least one division should be sent t<5 him for the purpose of carr}'ing 
out this flanking movement. The President, who had vainly 
urged McClellan to force the Warwick line, at last in despair 
sent him Franklin's division. Although that division arrived on 

' 2 Kopcs, 213 15. '^ General W. F. Smith. 



Mav, 1862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 57 

April 22nd, a fortnight was spent over the preUminary steps, and 
the expedition was not ready to start until the Confederates had 
rendered such a movement unnecessary by evacuating their lines.^ 

About April 14th General Johnston arrived at Yorktown, and 
took over the chief command.^ He was himself opposed to send- 
ing any reinforcements to the Peninsula, but would have preferred 
to concentrate as large a force as possible round Richmond by 
drawing in all available troops from the Atlantic coast, and so 
confront McClellan for the decisive encounter with an army ap- 
proximately equal to his own. But Johnston had been overruled 
by the President, who was supported in his decision by General 
Lee, acting at the time as his Chief-of-the-Staff :^ and during the 
second half of April the various divisions of Johnston's army were 
marched to the Peninsula and placed in the Yorktown lines. 

Johnston's intention was to hold his position until the Federals 
were ready to open the bombardment : and when he saw that their 
preparations were on the point of completion, he ordered the 
evacuation of the Confederate lines on the night of May 3rd. 
McClellan was far from expecting the withdrawal of the enemy : 
he had determined to open the bombardment on May 5th, and 
was quite taken by surprise to find that Johnston had preferred 
not to wait for that event. Consequently there was some delay in 
organising the pursuit. About noon on the 4th, the 3rd and 
4th Corps preceded by the cavalry started up the Peninsula, 
whilst McClellan himself remained at Yorktown to superintend the 
despatch of the other divisions by water to West Point, whence 
they were to strike across to the main roads leading from the 
Peninsula to Richmond, and thus intercept the retreating Con- 
federates. 

Johnston's army had, however, got a start of twelve hours ; all 
the heavy guns and a large quantity of ammunition and supplies 
had been abandoned. By noon of the 4th, when the Federal 
pursuit was just beginning, the Confederate troops had all reached 
Williamsburg. On the 5th a sharp encounter took place, known 
as the battle of Williamsburg. The Federal pursuit came up with 
Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions, which were holding the 
third line of entrenchments constructed by Magruder across the 
Peninsula, in order to cover the retreat of the rest of the Con- 
federate army. A very scrambling engagement conducted by the 
Federal commanders without any concerted plan of action ended 
without either side gaining a decided success. The Federals lost 
five guns,* and Hooker's division, which bore the brunt of the 

' 2 Ropes, 107. 

* Johnston assumed formal command on the 17th. See his Narrative, 117. 
^ Lee opposed Johnston's plan, because it would expose Savannah and Charleston 
(2 B. & L., 203). * 2 Ropes, no. 



58 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

fij^hting, was severely punished, in the night Longstreet drew 
off his troops and continued the retreat to Richmond. 

The movement by water met with no greater success than the 
pursuit by land. Not until May 6th did Franklin, with his 
division, get away from Yorktown. He disembarked at Eltham's 
Landing above West Point, and the transports were sent back for 
the next division, Franklin's orders were simply to remain where 
he was till he received further instructions. On the 7th he was 
attacked by a considerable force under General G. W. Smith. 
The object of the attack was to prevent any movement being 
made by Franklin to interfere with the trains of the retreating 
Confederates. The attack was repulsed and Franklin's division 
held its ground at the Landing. Nevertheless Smith was so far 
successful in his attempt that the Confederates were enabled to 
withdraw their whole force to Richmond without molestation.^ 

After his failure to cut off the Confederate retreat McClellan 
moved slowly forward. Forty miles from Williamsburg runs the 
Chickahominy River, which forms the northern defence of Rich- 
mond. It took the Federals a fortnight to cover those forty 
miles. In the meanwhile, on the i6th, McClellan had established 
his headquarters at White House on the Pamunkey. On the 
20th the direct advance on Richmond was resumed. Between 
that day and the 24th Keyes' Corps was crossed over the Chicka- 
hominy, and it was quickly followed by Heintzelman's Corps. 
McClellan had deliberately divided his army. Two Corps lay 
south of the Chickahominy and three were encamped on the north 
bank. Since his arrival in the Peninsula McClellan had formed 
two provisional Corps, the 5th and 6th, under Fitz-John Porter 
and Franklin. The reason why he thus divided his forces was, 
that President Lincoln had at last consented to his urgent request 
and promised to send McDowell's Corps to his assistance, pro- 
vided that Washington was not uncovered by any such move. 
McDowell had assembled his corps opposite Fredericksburg.^ He 
was less than sixty miles from Richmond and could advance to 
join hands with McClellan by the Richmond and Fredericksburg 
railroad without exposing Washington to an attack. In order to 
compensate for Franklin's division, which had been sent to the 
Peninsula in April, Shield's division of Banks' army in the 
Shenandoah Valley had been ordered to report to him, and after 
receiving that reinforcement which would bring his whole strength 
to over 40,cxx) mcn,^ he proposed to advance towards Richmond 
on May 26th. 

It was in order to co-operate with McDowell and make a joint 

' Both sides claimed lo have achieved a success in this engagement. The Federal 
loss was 186 ; the Confederates, 48. Cf. 2 H. & L., 222. 
« See Miip III. » Webb, 85. 



May, i862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 59 

movement on Richmond that McClellan had encamped his army 
athwart the Chickahominy. But on the 24th McClellan for the 
second time received the disquieting intelligence that he could 
not reckon on the co-operation of McDowell's Corps. "Stonewall" 
Jackson was in hot pursuit of Banks down the Valley, and 
McDowell had been ordered to send 20,000 men at once to the 
Shenandoah to co-operate in a movement with Fremont from 
West Virginia for the capture of Jackson's entire army.^ 

It was open to McClellan to choose either the York or the 
James as his base and depot of supplies. The abandonment of 
the Yorktown lines by the Confederates had necessitated the 
evacuation of Norfolk and the destruction of the Merriinac, which 
could not be brought up the river, and so the James lay open to 
the Federal gunboats as far as Drewry's Bluff some seven miles 
from the Southern capital. A determined attempt was made on 
May 15th by the Federal ironclads to force a way past the 
fortifications at this point, but abandoned after a four hours' 
contest.^ Before McClellan received news that he was not to have 
the co-operation of McDowell's Corps, he had determined to send 
a force against a Confederate brigade under Branch, which was 
stationed at Hanover Court House north of Richmond. The 
object of this movement was to drive Branch away from the line 
of McDowell's advance, and by destroying the bridges on the 
Virginia Central Railway to cut one great line of the enemy's 
communications. Watching McDowell in the vicinity of 
Fredericksburg was another Confederate brigade, under J. R. 
Anderson. McDowell could safely be left to deal with Anderson's 
force, and with Branch swept out of the way there would be no 
obstacle left to prevent the two Federal armies uniting. 

After McClellan learnt that the co-operative movement was 
abandoned, he determined to carry out the movement against 
Branch in order to prevent that general attacking his own line 
of communications. The Federal depot of supplies was at White 
House, on the Pamunkey, and the camp was connected with the 
depot by the Richmond and York River Railway. But the 
position of the right wing of the Federal army fronting west 
towards Richmond did not entirely cover the line of communica- 
tions from an attack coming from some point north of Richmond. 
The movement was ably carried out by Fitz-John Porter, and met 
with complete success. For a time, at any rate, McClellan felt 
quite secure as to his line of communications, and thought no 
more of transferring his base from the York to the James.^ It 
would, however, have been wiser on McClellan's part to change 
his base as soon as he heard that McDowell was for the second 
time withheld from him. As it was, his army was in a dangerous 
i Cf. Chapter IX. ^ 2 Ropes, U2. * 2 Ropes, 135. 



fiO XHE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

position, divided by the Chickahominy, a stream which, though 
insignificant in itself, was hable to be converted by heavy rain into 
an impassable obstacle. There would have been no difficulty in 
moving the supplies collected at White House by water to the 
James, and from his new position RIcClcllan would have had the 
choice of advancing on Richmond by either bank of the river. 
On the south bank Petersburg lay quite defenceless, and its 
capture would have rendered the Confederate position in Rich- 
mond untenable.^ 

General Johnston was not slow to take advantage of McClellan's 
exposed position. He saw that if Richmond was to be saved, 
McClellan must be fought and defeated before he could be re- 
inforced by McDowell. Whilst he supposed McDowell to be 
advancing south, he had prepared a plan for an attack with the 
bulk of his forces on the Federals north of the Chickahominy, 
hoping to break what was really the centre of the united Federal 
host. But as soon as he learnt that McDowell had been called 
away to the Valley, he determined upon the simpler plan of falling 
upon the Federal left on the south of the river.2 He waited until 
the left wing had advanced far enough from the Chickahominy 
to give him a fair chance of crushing it before reinforcements from 
the opposite bank could arrive. The attack was fixed for May 
31st. On that day the Confederate commander proposed to con- 
centrate the three divisions of Longstreet, Huger, and D. H. Hill 
in a combined attack on Keyes' and Heintzelman's Corps, whilst 
Whiting's and Magruger's divisions were to guard the left flank 
and prevent any reinforcements being sent across the river. 

The disposition of the two Federal corps south of the river was 
decidedly faulty. Casey's division of Keyes' Corps lay about 
three-quarters of a mile west of Seven Pines,^ which is the point 
within five miles of Richmond at which the Nine-mile road runs 
into the Williamsburg road:* about half a mile to the rear lay 
the second division of the 4th Corps, under Couch. Some slight 
entrenchments had been thrown up in front of Casey's command, 
but were in a very incomplete condition. The 3rd Corps had not 
advanced far from the Chickahominy. Kearny's division was five 
and Hooker's seven miles from Casey's front.^ Heintzelman, who 
commanded the whole force south of the river, had neglected to 
concentrate his command. Fortune was on the side of the Con- 
federates. For all through the night of the 30th such heavy 
rain fell that next morning the Chickahominy was in flood, and 
the bridges which McClellan had built over the river were in 
niumentary danger of being swept away. 

' 2 Ri)Jk;s, 113, 216-17. ' 2 K<>ik;s, 137. 

' See Map VIII., the top of which is east. 

* Wclih, 97, but Smith (2 B. & L., 220) says seven miles. 

* 2 Ropes, 138. 



May 31, 1862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 61 

Johnston had therefore an excellent chance of not only crushing 
Keyes' Corps, but of also involving the 3rd Corps in its rout. So 
confident did he feel of success, that he entrusted the command 
of the right wing to Longstreet, and himself took post with his 
second-in-command, G. W. Smith, on the left, considering that the 
task of preventing reinforcements getting across the river would 
be the more arduous work. His dispositions for the attack on the 
right were in themselves admirable. Longstreet's division was to 
move down the Nine-mile road :^ D. H. Hill was to take the 
Williamsburg road, and thus a force of over 23,000 men would 
be brought to bear upon the front and right flank of the 17,000 
men of Keyes' Corps. Huger with his three brigades was to 
follow the Charles City road, and when he had reached a suitable 
point on it to turn off to his left, and marching across the inter- 
vening country towards the Williamsburg road, to come in on 
the Federal left flank. Johnston, however, only gave verbal in- 
structions to Longstreet, although the movement by the three 
separate roads was a somewhat complicated one, and the country 
which Huger would have to cross from road to road was rendered 
very difficult by the swampy nature of the soil. Nor did he 
inform Huger that he was to consider himself under the command 
of Longstreet, who was his junior in the service.^ 

Longstreet certainly misunderstood his orders. Instead of ad- 
vancing down the Nine-mile road towards the York River railroad, 
he marched his division across to the junction of the Charles City 
and Williamsburg roads. There he had a lengthy altercation with 
Huger, and having left three of his brigades with that general on 
the Charles City road, moved down the Williamsburg road with 
the other three in support of D, H. Hill, whom he ordered to attack 
shortly after i p.m.^ Hill conducted the attack with great vigour, 
and Casey's division was quickly driven from its lines. Couch's 
division was moved up to its support, and the struggle was con- 
tinued for some hours, until the Federal centre was broken, and 
Couch found himself, with only four regiments, cut off from the 
rest of the Corps, He fell back to Fair Oaks Station on the rail- 
way, where two regiments and a battery had already been posted. 
As the Federals fell back, Kearny's division of the 3rd Corps 
came up and re-established the line of battle. One of his brigades* 
made a flank attack on the Confederates and gained ground. But 
Hill now applied to Longstreet for assistance ; R. H, Anderson's 
brigade was sent in, and the Federals were forced back until about 
6 p.m. they took up a fresh position, which they successfully main- 
tained, until the approach of night put an end to the battle.^ The 
net result of the fighting at Seven Pines was that the Federals 

^ 2 Ropes, 140. '■^ 2 Ropes, 142. ^2 Ropes, 142-3. 

* Berry's ^ Webb, 107. 



62 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

were driven back more than a mile on the Williamsburg road and 
lost ten guns. 

In the course of the afternoon the left wing came into action 
also. That wing was under the command of G. W. Smith, and 
consisted of Whiting's division ^ posted at the point where one 
branch of the Nine-mile road turns off to New Bridge, with 
Magrudcr's division in reserve, watching the bridges on the Upper 
Chickahominy. Thus Whiting's division was available either for 
defensive purposes, in case reinforcements came from the Federal 
right, or for a co-operative move with Longstreet's command 
against the Federal left. Johnston, who had taken up his position 
with Whiting's division, intended to advance it towards the York 
River Railroad as soon as the sound of musketry assured him that 
Longstreet's attack had fairly commenced. But the wind pre- 
vented him hearing the musketry, although he was only three 
miles distant from the battlefield, and he waited until about 
5 p.m., when, in answer to a message from Longstreet, begging 
him to come in on the enemy's right flank and complete the 
victory, he moved south and found himself fired upon by a Federal 
force posted a little east of Fair Oaks Station. This force Johnston 
assumed to be that portion of Couch's division which had been 
driven northward away from the rest of the 4th Corps by Hill's 
advance. He therefore turned upon it, with the expectation of 
easily crushing it. But on attacking he found it far stronger than 
he had expected. Sumner, the commander of the 2nd Corps, 
had succeeded with great difficulty in getting Sedgwick's division 
across the swollen river, and it arrived just in time to reinforce 
Couch. The Confederates, knowing that they were victorious 
elsewhere, attacked with great spirit and renewed the assault again 
and again. But the Federals repulsed every attack, and finally 
delivered a counter-attack themselves, which drove the Con- 
federates from the field. Thus the Confederate success on the 
right was counterbalanced by their failure on the left. Whiting's 
division lost heavily, including the commanders of three out of 
the four brigades engaged.- Just before the close of the fight- 
ing General Johnston was severely wounded and the command 
devolved upon General G. W. Smith. 

The Confederates prepared to renew the battle the following 
day. Although they had failed to annihilate the two exposed 
corps on the 31st, a large part of their army had not been 
engaged that day, and there was hope that a {)ropcrly combined 
movement might yet drive the Federals into the Chickahominy. 
In the meantime the Federals had been reinforced by the arrival 

' Whiting was temporarily in command of G. W. Sniitli's division. 
' llatlon killed, ilampton wounded, Pcttigrcw wounded and taken prisoner 
(2 Ropes, 146). 



June 1, 1862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 63 

of Richardson's division of Sumner's Corps, which was posted on 
the left of Sedgwick's division. Smith, judging that any advance 
of Longstreet in pursuit of the troops, which had been defeated 
the day before and had fallen back towards Bottom's Bridge, 
would expose him to a flank attack from the Federals holding the 
railway, ordered Longstreet to advance against the latter force and 
attack Richardson.^ He himself had suffered too severely the day 
before to renew the battle with Sedgwick, until Longstreet should 
have thoroughly developed his attack. Longstreet, however, 
carried out his orders in a very half-hearted manner. He made 
the attack upon Richardson's division with apparently only three 
brigades, and seems to have convinced himself that he had in his 
front the greater part of the Federal army. There was some sharp 
fighting, as is proved by the losses in Richardson's division, which 
numbered 900 ; ^ but there was nothing in the way of concerted 
movement by the Confederate forces, and all the fighting was over 
before noon of June ist. At 2 p.m. General Lee arrived from 
Richmond at General Smith's headquarters, and under an order of 
President Davis relieved him of the chief command. The new 
commander allowed the troops to remain where they were for the 
rest of the day, and at nightfall withdrew them to Richmond. 

In the two days' fighting the Federal loss was slightly over 
5,000, and that of the Confederates over 6,000.^ The latter had 
signally failed to achieve their object. Keyes' Corps ought to have 
been annihilated on May 31st, and Heintzelman's Corps at any 
rate driven back across the Chickahominy. Even on June ist a 
vigorous attack with all their forces might have succeeded, and 
the work begun the previous day might have been completed if 
Longstreet had set himself in earnest to carry out his commanding 
officer's plan of battle. As it was, the Federals could fairly claim 
the victory. The Confederate attack had been repulsed, and their 
subsequent withdrawal to Richmond was a tacit confession that 
they could not hold their own against the Federals in the open 
field. The Confederate soldiers were discouraged ; the moral of 
the Federals was improved, and their hopes of ultimate success 
rose high. 

One result of the battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, as it is 
indifferently called, was to keep the Federal army quiet for some 
time to come. The state of the weather also contributed to pro- 
duce the same result. McClellan was fully occupied with building 
bridges across the Chickahominy. He also made a fresh dis- 
position of his forces. Sumner's Corps was permanently en- 
camped on the south side of the Chickahominy, and Franklin's 
Corps was also brought across. Porter alone remained on the 
north bank, protecting, not very efficiently, as the event proved, 

J 2 Ropes, 148. 2 vv^ebb, ii6. ' 2 B. & L., 219. 



64 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the line of communications with White House, A formidable 
line of entrenchments was thrown up by the troops on the 
south side of the river, stretching from Golding's Farm to the 
White Oak Swamp/ and rendering their position practically 
impregnable. 

* Webb, Il8. Many of the details of the two days' fighting at Seven Pines have 
been the subject of much controversy. General G. VV. Smith's account of the battle 
where he was second in command on May 31st, and Commander-in-Chief during the 
morning of June 1st, is very clear, and contains several points of special importance 
(2 B. & L., 220-63). (l) Longstreet was ordered to attack tlie Federal right on the 
Nine-mile road. He misinterpreted Johnston's verbal order, and moved his troops along 
the Williamsburg road in rear of D. II. Hill's division against the Federal front at Seven 
Pines. Johnston, thinking that he was perhaps partly responsible for Longstreet's 
mistake, generously suppressed in his official report the fact of the original order. (2) 
Iluger was in no way responsible for the delay in attacking. His orders were to aid 
D. H. Hill if he found no strong force in his own front, but in any case to keep a strong 
reserve to cover the Confederate right. I^ongstrcct, after assuming command of the 
right wing, kept five brigades (three of his own and two of Iluger's division) marching 
and countermarching on the Charles City road, and struggling through the White Oak 
Swamp in the vain attempt to reach the Williamsburg road. Only five brigades of the 
Confederate right wing were engaged on May 31st, viz. the four brigades of D. H. 
Hill's division and R. II. Anderson s, of Longstreet's. (3) On June 1st the only troops 
actively engaged on the Confederate side were three regiments each of Armistead's and 
Mahone's brigades, which attacked the left of Richardson's division, but after gaining 
some ground were repulsed by a fiank attack from Birney's l^rigade, and Pickett's 
brigade, which repulsed the attack of four Federal regiments. Wilcx's and Pryor's 
brigades were also slightly engaged with part of Hooker's division on the Williamsburg 
road. 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN ^ {continued) 

General Robert E. Lee — The necessity for action— Stuart's ride round McClellan — The 
raid has little effect on McClellan — He commences to advance — Lee's plans — He 
calls up Jackson to attack the Northern right — What McClellan might do — Lee's 
knowledge of McClellan — Where Lee's plan failed — Jackson's advance is delayed — 
Fight at Beaver Dam Creek — McClellan determines to shift his base if pressed — The 
position of the Federal right — Battle of Gaines' Mill — Result of the battle — 
McClellan orders a retreat — Federal movement on the 28th June — Confederate 
plans for the 29th — Fight at Savage Station — The 30th June — Battle of Frayser's 
Farm — Absence of McClellan — Battle of Malvern Hill — Confederate defeat and 
McClellan's wasted opportunity — Federals retreat and Lee follows slowly — Reasons 
for the failure of McClellan's Peninsular campaign —The losses. 

THE new Commander of the Confederate army, General 
Robert E. Lee, was in his fifty-sixth year. He had 
graduated at West Point 2nd in the class of 1829, and 
obtained a commission in the Engineers. In the Mexican War 
he served on General Scott's Staff as his Chief of Engineers ; and 
there was no one in any branch of the service who won greater or 
more deserved renown in that war than Lee. Unlike many other 
distinguished soldiers, he did not leave the army after the 
Mexican War and return to civil life, but continued in the service, 
eventually, however, leaving the Engineers. At the outbreak of 
the Civil War he was Colonel ^ of a newly raised cavalry regiment 
quartered in Texas. General Scott, who admitted that his suc- 
cesses in Mexico were largely due to Lee's genius,^ had formed 
the highest possible opinion of him. He had hoped to see him 
commanding the army which was to crush Secession ; but Lee 
went with his native State Virginia, when she declared herself out 
of the Union, and took the post of Commander-in-Chief of the 
State Militia. President Davis, an ex-Secretary of War, knew 
well Lee's worth, and during the first months of the war kept 
him by his side as his military adviser. His campaign in West 
Virginia was a failure, and with a considerable section of 

^ See Map VHL 

^ Lee was colonel, not lieutenant-colonel, as is frequently stated. Lee's Lee, 87, 134. 

^ Lee's Lee, 42. 

F 65 



66 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Southerners his reputation suffered accordingly. Nevertheless, in 
March, 1S62, President Davis appointed him to the general 
control, under himself, of all the Confederate forces in the field, 
and when Johnston was incapacitated, immediately placed him in 
command of the Army of Northern Virginia.^ In Lee, more 
than in any other general on either side, was to be found that 
happy combination of qualities which go to make up a great 
commander.^ 

The change of commander, quite apart from any question of 
the relative military capacity of the two generals, was a great 
gain to the Confederate cause, because Lee possessed the full 
confidence of President Davis, which Johnston certainly had never 
won. 

The reinforcements from the Atlantic coast, which had been 
refused to Johnston, were hurried up to Richmond as soon as Lee 
took over the command. Fifteen thousand men from North 
Carolina, five thousand from South Carolina, and six regiments 
from Georgia reached Richmond in the first half of June.^ It was 
absolutely necessary for Lee, just as it had been for his prede- 
cessor, to strike a blow at McCIellan before McDowell's Corps 
should again become available for the combined movement on 
Richmond. He at once saw that a movement against McClellan's 
lines of communication might be attended by great results. In 
order to find out exactly how far Porter's right flank extended, 
and on what it rested, J. E. B. Stuart was despatched on his famous 
raid. 

Early on 12th June Stuart, with twelve hundred cavalry and 
two guns, rode out of Richmond. That night he bivouacked 
twenty-two miles north of Richmond, far out of the reach of any 
Federal patrols.^ Next day he turned east in the direction of 
Hanover Court House, and made his way round the Federal right. 
He quickly ascertained what he had come to find out. The 
Federal right only extended a short distance from the river, 
and rested on no natural obstacle, and could therefore be easily 
turned. Judging it safer, however, not to return by the way 
by which he had come, as the P^ederals were by this time aware of 
his presence, he continued on his way across the York River Rail- 
road, where he did much damage, on to the Chickahominy, which 
he found great difficulty in crossing, thence nearly to the James 
River, and reached Richmond early on the morning of the 15th, 

' In N>jvcnil>cr Lee had been charged witli the fortification of the Atlantic coast in 
South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. He was summoned to Richmond on March 2nd, 
and assigned to his new post on the 13th. 

' 2 Ropes, 158. 

' 2 Roj:)es, 164. This movement had commenced before Loc assumed the command 
of the Army of Northern Virginia (cf. Johnston's Nanathe^ 142). 

* 2 Henderson, 7. 



June, i862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 67 

having made a complete circuit of the whole Federal army on 
both sides of the Chickahominy. As soon as Lee received 
Stuart's report, he determined to fall upon McClellan's line of 
communications. 

McCIellan failed to realise the significance of Stuart's raid. He 
saw that his communications were insecure and that it might be 
necessary to change his base to the James. With a view to this 
possibility he ordered some transports laden with supplies to sail 
round from White House to Harrison's Landing on the James, and 
also directed that maps should be prepared of the country between 
the Chickahominy and the James. But he was so absorbed in his own 
plan of operations, which as he believed was about to be crowned 
with success, that he could not allow its full significance to Stuart's 
reconnaissance. Else he would not have lost a moment after such 
a warning, but at once have set his army in motion for the James. 
But McCIellan believed that he was at last in sight of the end ; 
he was about to deliver the long-deferred blow. In the first half 
of June, in answer to his persistent entreaties, McCall's division of 
McDowell's Corps, 9,500 strong, had been sent him : and he had 
received other reinforcements to the number of about 11,000, 
which made his whole force amount to over 105,000. After 
making the necessary deductions he could rely on having over 
90,000 men for active operations.^ 

On 25th June Hooker was ordered to push his piquet-line forward 
on the Williamsburg road. This movement brought the Federal 
outposts within four miles of Richmond : and the success was at 
once telegraphed to Washington, as indicating that the great for- 
ward movement, which should compel the evacuation of the 
Southern capital, was at last beginning. 

But even as McCIellan was preparing for the final move on 
Richmond, the storm was gathering which was about to burst with 
tremendous force on his right flank beyond the Chickahominy : 
and the Army of the Potamac, which believed that its foot was 
firmly set on the threshold of success, was about to be driven 
in hasty retreat to the James, and forced to fight, not for the 
capture of Richmond, but for its own existence. For Lee had 
resolved to take the offensive himself and deal his opponent a 
counterstroke on the largest possible scale. He proposed to bring 
Jackson's victorious army from the Shenandoah''^ Valley and hurl 
it against the Federal line of communications beyond Porter's right 
flank. He had had this movement in his mind before he sent 
Stuart on his raid. On i ith June, to mystify his opponent, he sent 
7,000 troops under Whiting and Lawton as if to reinforce Jackson 
in the Valley, but in a letter of the same date told him that the 
object was to enable him to crush the forces threatening Richmond. 

^ 2 Ropes, 159. ^ For the account of Jackson's operations, cf. Cap. IX. 



68 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

" Leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the 
passes, and with your main body move rapidly to Ashland by rail 
or otherwise, and sweep down between the Chickahominy and the 
Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's communications while this army 
attacks McClcllan in front." 

On the 1 6th, after receiving Stuart's report Lee wrote again to 
Jackson urging speed : and on the 23rd Jackson rode through 
Richmond to the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to 
attend a Council of War, which should settle the plan of battle. 
Besides Jackson, Lee had summoned to the Council Longstreet, 
A. r. Hill, and D. H. Hill. These were the four commanders who 
were to carry out a combined movement against the Federal right. 
It was Lee's intention to concentrate their forces against Porter's 
isolated corps on the north bank of the Chickahominy. Jackson 
was to outflank the Federal right and cut it off from White House. 
A. P. Hill would cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge and 
move down the stream towards Mechanicsville. His advance, 
coupled with Jackson's flanking movement, would cause the 
Federals to abandon Mechanicsville Bridge about one and a half 
miles below Meadow Bridge, and enable the forces of Longstreet 
and D. H. II ill to cross. Having crossed, D. H. Hill was directed to 
move to the support of Jackson, whilst Longstreet was to support 
A. P. Hill's advance. The four divisions would then advance en 
^clielon, Jackson leading on the extreme left. 

The immediate object of the movement was to drive Porter's 
Corps from its position, where it covered New Bridge, and thus open 
up communications with that part of the Confederate army left on 
the south bank : and the ultimate object was to force the enemy 
away from his base and drive him down the Chickahominy. The 
movement was to commence early on the 26th with Jackson's army, 
and in order to connect his command with that of A. P. Hill, 
a brigade under Branch was to cross the Chickahominy by a bridge 
some five and a half miles above Meadow Bridge, and thus form a 
link between the two forces. At the same time the rest of the 
Confederate forces, 27,000 in number, would demonstrate against 
the Federal lines south of the river and prevent the enemy either 
advancing upon Richmond or reinforcing Porter. On the north 
bank over 50,000 Confederates would be concentrated against 
Porter's solitary Corps, which was barely half that strength. If 
Jackson's appearance proved, as Lee hoped, a comj)lete surprise 
to McClellan, and Potter received no supports, then there could 
hardly be a doubt that the 5th Corps would be annihilated : what- 
ever position it took up was certain to be turned by Jackson. 

The crucial question which confronted Lee was, what would 
McC'lcllan do? He might transfer a large part of his force to the 
north side of the Chickahominy, and elect to fight a pitched battle 



June, 1862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 69 

there : or he might march the bulk of his army, the four Corps 
south of the river, straight upon Richmond : even supposing that 
he did nothing, but simply watched the destruction of his line of 
communications, he might still either march across the Peninsula 
to the James and on its banks find a new base, from which he could 
operate against Richmond, or he might admit his failure and 
retreat down the Peninsula to Fortress Monroe. Lee in con- 
centrating two-thirds of his army on the north bank of the 
Chickahominy was playing a risky game. McClellan might reply 
by launching more than two-thirds of his army, some 75,000 men, 
against the Richmond lines, which were held by a force of about 
the same strength as Porter's Corps. Supposing in both cases the 
offensive succeeded, the balance would be on the side of the 
P'ederals who would have gained possession of the hostile capital, 
and would have no difficulty in finding a new base on the James 
owing to their naval superiority : whilst at the best Lee could only 
hope to sever their communications with the Pamunkey and 
destroy one Army Corps. 

But Lee read McClellan like an open book^ They had both 
served as Engineers with Scott in Mexico : and probably there 
Lee had formed a fair estimate of the other's military character. 
Even without previous knowledge, McClellan's wait of a month 
before the lines of Yorktown argued that he was not very likely 
to assume a vigorous offensive against any fortified line, however 
weakly held : and Magruder might safely be reckoned upon to 
make the most of any force entrusted to him. It is hard to 
imagine a greater antithesis than that between Lee and McClellan : 
in the latter's case the engineer predominated over the general. 
He might be relied upon to advance against any fortified position 
like Richmond by regular approaches and with all the due 
formalities of a deliberate investment : he would never risk a 
pitched battle unless he was forced to. Lee, on the other hand, 
was ever ready to engage in a stand-up fight, which presented a 
reasonable prospect of success to counterbalance the risk. He was 
confident that McClellan would make no serious attempt to force 
the lines defending Richmond : and he did not anticipate that he 
would boldly accept the gage of battle flung down and move the 
bulk of his forces across the Chickahominy to fight a pitched battle 
for the defence of his communications. 

Thus far Lee judged his opponent accurately enough. But he 
made a decided error in assuming that McClellan, if Porter were 
crushed on the north bank, would retreat down the Peninsula, and 
not seek a new base on the James. It was because Lee expected 
McClellan to retreat at once towards Fortress Monroe, that he 
concentrated two-thirds of his army on the north bank, as in that 

* 2 Henderson, 4, 



70 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

case the Federal army on the south bank of the Chickahominy 
would be compelled to recross the river by the lower bridges in 
order to effect a retreat. The results of this miscalculation became 
sufficiently apparent in the later stages of the campaign. It is 
perhaps hardly too much to say that if Lee had not made the 
initial mistake of assuming that McClellan would, if Porter were 
defeated, retreat down the Peninsula, he would probably have 
annihilated the Federal army. 

As McClellan was telegraphing the news of Hooker's advance 
to the Washington Government, the Valley Army under " Stone- 
wall " Jackson was pitching its camp at Ashland on the Richmond 
and Fredericksburg Railroad some fifteen miles north of Rich- 
mond. At that hour Jackson's division ought to have been close 
to the Virginia Central Railway. But his troops had had a long 
spell of marching, and the road had been greatly obstructed by 
felled trees and the burning of the bridges. The Virginia Central 
Railroad was crossed at 9 a.m.^ on the 26th, but the same obstructions 
continued to be encountered, and there was constant skirmishing 
with the Federal cavalry. Sufficient precautions had not been 
taken by the Headquarters Staff to ensure the necessary combina- 
tion between the four Confederate divisions, and in consequence 
Jackson's force took no part in the fight of that day. A. P. Hill, 
after vainly waiting for some information from Branch, his connect- 
ing link with Jackson's army, at 3 p.m., fearing lest any further 
delay should upset the whole plan of action, advanced against 
Meadow Bridge. The resistance which he encountered there was 
very feeble. P'or Branch, having at last been informed of Jackson's 
approach, had crossed the river, and was moving on Mechanicsville, 
though without having given Hill information. 

The Federals, finding themselves menaced both in front and in 
rear, withdrew to the lines which Porter had constructed three 
miles back at Beaver Dam Creek, and which were now defended 
by McCall's division. Hill at once attacked without waiting for 
any co-operative movement or giving time for artillery [)reparation, 
and was repulsed with heavy loss. His casualties were nearly 
2,000, whilst those of the Federals were only one-sixth of that 
amount. 

McClellan's position on the night of the 26th was not an 
enviable one. He found himself suddenly forced to act on the 
defensive. His line of communications was already as good as 
severed : for it was now known that Jackson was on tlie extreme 
right of the P^deral position and would certainly turn it next day. 
He spent some time in consultation with P^ranklin and Porter, and 
eventually decided to do nothing. He would not risk an advance 
on Richmond, though his lieutenants urged him to take that step,^ 
' 2 Ilendersun, 19. * 2 Ropes, 174. 



June, 1862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 71 

but decided, as soon as he was forced to abandon his base at 
White House, to establish a fresh one on the James and to move 
his army thither. 

Porter held a very strong position on the north bank of the 
Chickahominy. It was in the shape of a semicircle with both 
extremities resting on the river and covering two bridges. The 
Confederates could only approach it through a broad belt of 
forest : on emerging from the forest they would have to descend 
into a valley from 500 to I.OOO yards wide, itself thickly wooded 
in most places, then cross a swampy creek which covered the 
Federal front, and finally scale a hill sixty feet high, on the top of 
which Porter had arranged his batteries.^ The assaulting columns 
would have to face a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry, 
whilst the denseness of the wood would make it very difficult for 
the Confederate batteries to come into action, or for the different 
divisions to maintain communication with each other. Early on 
the morning of the 27th McCall, at Beaver Dam Creek, was 
ordered to fall back to the main position at Gaines' Mill, which 
has given its name to the battle. 

Lee had however no misgivings. Still arguing that the Federals 
in case of defeat would retreat down the Peninsula, he calculated 
that Jackson on the right would threaten their single line of 
retreat to White House and compel Porter to weaken his centre 
and left in order to keep this road open.^ About 2,30 p.m. the 
attack was commenced by A. P. Hill, who, in spite of his severe 
repulse on the previous day, sent his troops in with great deter- 
mination. Longstreet was held in reserve on the right, and it was 
not intended that he should attack, until Jackson, who now had 
with him D. H. Hill's division, had commenced operations against 
the Federal right and forced Porter to weaken his left. No sign 
however was made by Jackson : there was a distinct lack of co- 
operation on the part of the Confederates : whilst A. P. Hill was 
vainly hurling his troops in successive attacks upon the strong 
Federal position, Jackson with his own and D. H. Hill's commands 
was quietly waiting, expecting that Longstreet and A. P. Hill 
would drive the Federals into his arms as they retreated towards 
White House. 

A. P. Hill's division was so roughly handled that Longstreet was 
ordered up to support him without waiting for Jackson's battle to 
begin. After the fight had raged for over an hour Jackson judged 
from the sound and direction of the firing that the Confederate 
plan had failed, and prepared without further delay himself to 
strike in. About 4 p.m. D. H. Hill advanced to the attack, but 
he could make no impression on the Federal right. Ewell, 
who attacked on Hill's right, was still more unsuccessful, and 

^ 2 Henderson, 32-3. ^ 2 Henderson, 34. 



n THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

his troops were quickly thrown into a state of considerable 
confusion. The other divisions under Lawton, Whiting, and 
Winder, which were to have extended the right until it got into 
touch with A. P. Hill's left, were, owing to the mistake of an inex- 
perienced staff officer, held back for a time.^ But the mistake was 
rectified and a general advance made by the whole Confederate 
army. 

Porter's troops were exhausted with their hard fighting : his 
reserves were all used up. Only one division had been sent from 
the south side of the river to his assistance. The desperate 
onslaught of Hood's Texan brigade broke his centre, and the 
Federal army thus cut in half fell back hastily to the bridges. 
Twenty-two guns were captured and 2,800 prisoners taken. But 
nightfall and the arrival of two brigades from Sumner's Corps pre- 
vented the retreat becoming a rout. 

During the night the Federal troops were withdrawn to the south 
side of the river. Their total loss was 6,837 : the Confederates, as 
the attacking side, lost still more heavily in killed and wounded, 
which together amounted to about 8,000.2 The lack of properly 
trained staff officers to keep up communication between the 
different divisions appears to have been the principal cause of the 
miscarriage of Lee's plans. 

There can hardly be a doubt that if McClellan had properly 
reinforced Porter, the latter would have held his own, and the 
Confederates would have had nothing to show for their heavy 
losses. Even as it was, they had gained only a partial success : 
Porter's Corps were very far from being annihilated. The Federals 
had been driven from the north side of the river, but as they 
intended to find a new base on the James, this was not a very 
heavy blow. Instead of definitely ordering certain forces to be 
sent to Porter, McClellan contented himself with asking the Corps 
commanders on the south of the river to send him what forces 
they could spare. In the face of the skilful demonstrations, which 
Magruder kept up throughout the day, they preferred to retain as 
many of their troops as possible. Franklin sent Slocum's division 
to Porter's aid, but the only other reinforcement, Sumner's two 
brigades, arrived too late to do more than cover the retreat. 

On that night, after the battle was over, McClellan informed his 
Corps commanders of his intention to retreat to the James. It is 
an extraordinary thing that, knowing as he did that unless he 
reinforced Porter strongly, his coinmunications with White House 
must be lost, McClellan did not give orders twenty-four hours 
earlier for his trains to get under weigh.^ 

' 2 IknilcrsMii, 41. 

■■* 2 Henderson, 52. 2 Ropes, 179, estimates the Confederate loss as at least 6,000. 

3 2 Ropes, 181. 



June, i862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 73 

As events turned out, if the movement had begun on the night 
of the 26th the Federal army would have reached the James with- 
out having any serious fighting at all on the south side of the 
Chickahominy. It was necessary to keep Porter on the north 
bank whilst the supplies at White House were being shipped 
aboard the transports. But the trains might have been set in 
motion across the White Oak Swamp early on the 27th and much 
precious time thereby saved. McClellan had had the upper bridges 
on the Chickahominy destroyed on the 26th and 27th, and on 
the morning of the 28th the lower bridges down to Bottom's Bridge 
were burnt. The old bridge across the White Oak Swamp creek 
was rebuilt the same morning, and by the evening a new one at 
Brackett's Ford was finished. Keyes with the 4th Corps led the 
retreat. 

From the Federal position on the south bank of the Chicka- 
hominy to the James was a distance of fourteen miles, but when 
once the White Oak Swamp was passed, only six miles lay 
between the army and its goal.^ By noon of the 28th the 4th 
Corps was across the creek, and advancing four miles further, took 
up a position which observed the roads coming from Richmond 
and covered the retreat of the trains and reserve artillery. 
Morell's division of the 5th Corps crossed the creek in the course 
of the afternoon, and Sykes' division of the same corps was 
across early on the 29th and was followed closely by McCall's 
division. The 5th Corps was sent across the swamp in front of the 
trains to give it as much time as possible to recover from the hard 
fighting at Gaines' Mill. The reserve artillery was all got across 
the creek during the night of the 28th. The herd of 2,500 beef 
cattle^ were crossed over the creek early on the morning of the 
29th and reached the James on the 30th. McClellan showed him- 
self at his best in conducting this retreat. He was above every- 
thing else an organiser : and organisation rather than generalship 
was what was needed just then. 

For the Confederates the 28th was a wasted day. Lee held 
a strong conviction that McClellan would either attempt to recover 
his original base at White House, or else, accepting the defeat of 
the 27th as final, would retreat down the Peninsula to Fortress 
Monroe. Apparently he did not credit his opponent with the 
courage to execute a flank march across intricate country in the 
face of a victorious foe ; and if, contrary to expectation, he did 
attempt such a move, Magruder was south of the Chickahominy, 
and was expected to give his commander-in-chief prompt informa- 
tion. 

The morning of the 28th showed no Federal soldiers north of 
the Chickahominy save as prisoners. But it was possible that 

^ 2 Henderson, 56. ' 2 Henderson, 57. 



74 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

McClellan might recross the river by the lower bridges and in that 
way attempt to regain his base on the Pamunkey. Accordingly 
Lee pushed Stuart's cavalry, supported by Ewell's division, down 
the river to watch the railway and Bottom's bridges. Stuart pressed 
on to White House and spent the 29th in destroying the large 
quantities of stores, which the Federals had not had time in their 
hurried retreat to remove. But this movement to the Pamunkey 
deprived Lee of the services of his cavalry during the pursuit : for 
it did not rejoin him again until after the battle of Malvern Hill. 
As the Federals had destroyed the bridges across the Chicka- 
hominy, the bulk of the Confederate forces was confined to the 
northern bank : and Lee still believed it possible that the Federals 
would retreat along the Chickahominy and recross yet lower down 
en route for Fortress Monroe. On the south side of the river 
Magruder could gain no information. The Federal lines in his 
immediate front were strongly held, and the intricate nature of the 
country prevented him sending out reconnaissances, except by the 
regular roads, which were securely guarded. It was not till night 
had fallen that Lee at length realised that McClellan was retreat- 
ing to the James, and on the morning of the 29th he issued his 
orders. 

It was essential that a crushing blow should be struck against 
the Federal line of retreat : if that army reached the James un- 
molested, it would find there a stronger base than that which it 
had abandoned on the Pamunkey, the heavy sacrifice of life at 
Gaines' Mill would be rendered vain, and the pressure on Rich- 
mond would be in no degree relieved. Lee, when he attacked 
Porter, had in contemplation the annihilation of the whole Federal 
army. McClellan had gained a day upon him, but he yet hoped to 
strike such a blow as would incapacitate the Army of the Potomac 
for active service for some time to come. He proposed to assault 
the enemy simultaneously on the flank and rear. INIagruder was 
directed to move out of his entrenchments and advance down the 
Williamsburg road. Jackson, with his own and D. H. Hill's troops, 
was to cross the Chickahominy at the Grapevine Bridge and move 
on Savage Station. Thus a combined assault would be delivered 
against the Federal rearguard and in such strength that success 
seemed certain. Longstreet, with A. P. Hill, was ordered to 
march up the Chickahominy and cross by the New Bridge, which 
had been repaired on the 28th, and then to get into the Darb)town 
road and advance along it till he reached the vicinity of the 
Charles City crossroads, where he was to be joined by Huger 
moving down the Charles City road. Thus a second strong force 
would be concentrated upon the right flank of the Federal army 
on its march from the White Oak Swamp to Malvern Hill. 

Neither of these combined movements was successfully executed. 



June, i862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 75 

Jackson took the whole day to repair the bridge, by which he was 
to cross : and Magruder, deprived of the other's aid, made two 
disjointed attacks upon the Federal rearguard near Savage Station, 
which were repulsed without difficulty. If Jackson had been able 
to get across the river in time, a considerable success might have 
been achieved, as Heintzelman's whole corps and Slocum's division 
had prematurely moved off in retreat, leaving Sumner and Franklin, 
who retained one division, in a very exposed position. None of 
the other Confederate divisions advanced far enough to strike 
McCIellan's line of retreat. 

By the morning of the 30th the Federal commander had got all 
his artillery and trains across the White Oak Swamp, but to secure 
their retreat to the James he was obliged to take up a defensive 
position and wait to be attacked. His preparations for the in- 
evitable battle were carefully made. Franklin with two divisions 
was to guard the White Oak Swamp Creek, the bridges having 
already been broken down. Sumner and Heintzelman with five 
divisions covered the Quaker road by which the trains were re- 
treating, and watched the Charles City, Darbytown, and New- 
market roads. Further south and close to the James was arrayed 
the 5th Corps, with the 4th Corps in support, to defend Malvern 
Hill against any attacks by the river roads. The gunboats in the 
James strengthened the Federal left, as their fire swept the 
approaches to Malvern Hill. 

The 30th was the critical day of the whole campaign. It was 
Lee's last real chance of crushing the Federal army, and again he 
had the disappointment of seeing his carefully arranged plan for 
a combined attack fail. Jackson found himself unable in the face 
of Franklin's resistance to force a way across White Oak Swamp 
Creek. The fords were commanded by the Federal artillery, and 
the dense timber close to the stream swarmed with sharpshooters. 
Some of the Confederate cavalry and infantry did succeed in 
getting across the creek, but the fords were impracticable for 
artillery, and any further advance was barred by the very strong 
position which the Federal batteries had taken up on a command- 
ing ridge of hills. The Confederate guns, being smoothbores, could 
not cope successfully with the less numerous but far more power- 
ful rifled guns of the Federal batteries. No orders reached Jackson 
to move to the head of the swamp into the Charles City road to 
the support of Longstreet.^ But when Franklin saw that no 
infantry attack was intended, he sent reinforcements, which 
materially contributed to aid the centre in repelling the fierce 
assault made upon it. On the opposite wing Holmes proved even 
more ineffective. Advancing down the Newmarket road towards 
Malvern Hill he was so daunted by the artillery fire, with which 

^ For a defence of Jackson's conduct on the 30th, see 2 Henderson, 60-71. 



76 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Porter greeted him in conjunction with that of the gunboats, that 
he precipitately retreated, leaving two guns behind, though his 
whole list of casualties only amounted to fifty-one. Nor did he 
attempt to take any part in the battle of the following day. 
Magruder, like D'Erlon at Ligny,^ marched and countermarched 
between Longstreet in the centre and Holmes on the extreme 
right without rendering any assistance to either. Huger was the 
most unsatisfactory of all : though on the very verge of Long- 
street's battle he took no part in it, because his road was obstructed 
by felled trees. Of all Lee's troops only Longstreet's and A. P. 
Hill's divisions took any active part in the assault on the Federal 
line. Out of the 75,000 men, with whom Lee proposed to deal 
IMcClellan's retreating host a staggering blow, only 20,000 were 
actively engaged, and even these two divisions did not attack 
simultaneously but successively, as A. P. Hill was at first held 
back in order to take part in the pursuit, which it was expected 
would ensue, when the combined attack all along the Federal line 
was fully developed. 

Longstreet and A. P. Hill conducted their attacks with splendid 
vigour. The Federal centre was broken : McCall's division gave 
way, and fourteen guns with some hundreds of prisoners were 
captured. But on either flank of McCall the Federals stood firm, 
fresh reinforcements were brought up from other parts of the field 
where the inactivity of the other Confederate commanders caused 
no apprehension of an attack, and the Confederates in the centre 
failed to reach the Quaker road, along which the trains were 
moving. At the close of this day's fighting, known as the battle 
of Glendale, Nelson's P'arm or Frayser's Farm, the P^ederal line 
was re-established, and Lee had lost his second and best chance 
of striking at McClellan. 

It is almost incredible, but none the less true, that McClellan 
was not present on the battlefield on this the most critical day of 
the retreat : early in the morning he had ridden to Haxall's 
Landing to confer with the commander of the naval forces, and 
still more strangely he had left no substitute in his place. The 
various Corps commanders displayed admirable harmony and 
worked excellently together, but if Lee's combination had been 
carried out and the Federal army had got the worst of the battle, 
the absence of the Commander-in-Chief from the field might have 
had the most disastrous consequences.'- 

During the night of the 30th the Federals withdrew to Malvern 
Hill, which was occupied already by the 4th and 5th Corps and 
the reserve artillery. The position had been most carefully 
examined by General Porter, and on the morning of the ist July 
the troops took up their respective stations at the points already 

' 2 Henderson, 72. - 2 Ropes, 198-9. 



June, 1862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 77 

assigned to them. The Federal position at Malvern Hill was in 
itself stronger even than that which had been occupied at Gaines* 
Mill. The hill was higher : the whole Federal army with some 
250 pieces of artillery, including the heavy guns of the siege train, 
was united there, and one flank was protected by the formidable 
fire of the gunboats. The plateau was crowned with tier on tier 
of guns, and the slopes leading down to a muddy stream swarmed 
with riflemen. The Confederates could only approach through a 
densely wooded and very swampy piece of ground, which would 
prevent the artillery being of much service in the battle, and 
would hamper all attempts at communication between the attack- 
ing columns. None the less, Lee determined to attack. Twice 
the enemy had escaped the carefully devised plan for his destruc- 
tion, and now that a last, even though desperate, chance of 
annihilating the foe offered, Lee was not the man to put it aside. 
He was playing for a big stake, nothing less than the destruc- 
tion of the Federal army : and he was prepared to make big 
sacrifices.^ 

The attack proved a complete failure. No artillery preparation 
was practicable : as soon as a Confederate battery showed itself in 
the open, an overwhelming fire was concentrated on it. If success 
was to be won, the infantry must do all the work, and that was 
only possible by a co-operative movement, which would throw an 
overwhelming force on some one point of the Federal position. 
But of co-operation there was a singular lack. On the left was 
Jackson, with D. H. Hill on the right and Whiting on the left of 
the Quaker road : his other divisions were in reserve. On the 
right stood Huger's division with Magruder's to its left rear. On 
the extreme right Holmes ought to have been ready to take part 
in the assault, but the previous day's experience had frightened 
him. Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's divisions, which had borne all 
the fighting of the 30th, were held in reserve behind Magruder. 

The Confederate plan of battle presumed that batteries could be 
established so as to rake the Federal line. Armistead, one of 
Huger's brigadiers, who was in the best position for judging the 
effect of the Confederate fire, was ordered to charge, when he 
thought that the moment for an advance had come, with a yell. 
This yell was to be the signal for D. H. Hill's and Magruder's 
divisions to join in the assault. The Confederate plan failed in 
two ways. The fire of their guns was completely swamped by the 

^ From Longstreet's own account {From Manassas to Appomattox, 143) it would seem 
that he was largely responsible for Lee's determination to attack. Lee, being indisposed, 
ordered Longstreet to reconnoitre the enemy's left and to report upon the practicability 
of an attack. Longstreet reported it was possible to place in position ico guns or more 
in the open ground beyond the belt of wooded swamp, and to bring to bear on Porter's 
batteries a cross fire which would prepare the way for the infantry attack. On this 
report Lee acted. 



78 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Federal batteries : and the yell of Armistead's brigade proved 
a worthless signal. D. H. Hill on the left, wrongly imagining that 
he heard it, about 5.30 p.m.^ sent his division to the attack. But 
it was absolutely unsupported : no movement came from the 
Confederate centre : 10,500 men were launched in a vain assault 
upon the whole Federal army very strongly posted. When Jack- 
son, having made his way through the swamp, sent up reinforce- 
ments, they arrived too late, as Hill's division had fallen back to 
the shelter of the woods after receiving very heavy punishment. 
When Hill's attack was over, first Huger and then Magruder took 
up the struggle. Their men charged with the same impetuous 
valour that Hill's division had shown, but the sacrifice was equally 
in vain. No impression was made on the Federal position : the 
batteries held their ground : the infantry line was unshaken. The 
attack of the Confederate centre lacked organisation : the brigades 
went in piecemeal, and the loss in that part of the field was even 
heavier than that of Hill's division. In all, the Confederates lost 
over 5,000 men in the short but fierce engagement: the Federal 
loss was probably not more than one-third of their opponents." 

This Confederate defeat quite altered the situation. The pursu- 
ing army had suffered a heavy reverse. Though only three 
divisions had been engaged, they had been so terribly punished as 
to be useless for any further fighting for some time. It is quite 
conceivable that if IMcClellan had risen to the occasion, and on the 
2nd July had assumed the offensive, he might have gained such 
success as would have more than counterbalanced all his losses 
during the past seven days. But McClellan himself, and probably 
the greater part of his army as well, had had enough of fighting. 
It seems clear that the process of retreating from day to day had 
had a demoralising effect upon the Federal army.'' The victory 
of the 1st July was due almost entirely to the artillery, assisted by 
the siege train and the gunboats. It afforded no proof that the 
infantry were capable of assuming a vigorous offensive. And 
McClellan was far too much engrossed with the care of his own 
army to realise the severity of the blow which had been dealt the 
enemy. The same night he gave orders for the retreat to be con- 
tinued to Harrison's Landing, where the gunboats could render 
still more effective aid in covering his position. 

In this last stage of the retreat the demoralisation of his army 
was most apparent. " It was like the retreat," General Hooker 
stated in the evidence which he gave before the Committee of 
Congress investigating the conduct of the war, "of a whipped 
army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep." 

On the 2nd the Confederates made no attemi)t to pursue. At a 

' 2 Henderson, 77. " 2 Ropes, 204. 

^ 2 Ropes, 20^, takes a difTcrciU view. 



July, i862] THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 79 

conference held between President Davis and General Lee it was 
decided not to make any movement until further information of 
the enemy's plans had been brought in by the cavalry. The roads 
were in a horrible condition, owing to heavy rain, and the troops 
exhausted with their continuous exertions of the last few days. 
The delay was most unfortunate for the Confederate cause. So 
disorganised was the Federal army that no attempt had been 
made to take possession of the Evelington Heights, a ridge com- 
manding the whole encampment at Harrison's Landing. This 
position was seized by Stuart with his cavalry early on the morn- 
ing of the 3rd, and supposing that the infantry were close at hand, 
he opened fire on the astonished Federal camp with a single 
howitzer. But the Confederate infantry was far away. Long- 
street, who led the advance on the 3rd, lost his way, and was too 
far distant to render any assistance to Stuart. The Federals, 
recovering from their astonishment, attacked the hill, and Stuart, 
after holding on to it until his ammunition began to fail, was forced 
to abandon his position, which the enemy immediately occupied 
and fortified. When the bulk of the Confederate army drew near 
to Harrison's Landing on the 4th, Lee found that the Federal 
position was practicably impregnable, stronger even than that of 
Malvern Hill. He made no attempt to attack, and after remain- 
ing three days inactive in front of the Federals, he withdrew to 
Richmond on the 8th, leaving Stuart with the cavalry to watch 
McClellan's further movements. 

The failure of McClellan's campaign is largely to be attributed 
to the action of his Government in withholding from him for the 
second time his ist Corps. If towards the end of May McDowell 
had been allowed to advance from Fredericksburg, 150,000 men 
would have been concentrated against Richmond at a time when 
the covering army did not number 60,000. The result of the 
united movement could have hardly been doubtful : the Capital 
of the Confederacy must have fallen.^ But McDowell was ordered 
to the Valley, and McClellan, who had taken up a position athwart 
the Chickahominy with a view to joining hands with him, found 
himself in serious danger, owing to this distribution of his forces. 
The Confederate attack on the 31st May ought to have been 
crowned with success, and the way in which the battle was fought 
reflected but little credit on Johnston or his chief subordinates. 
Almost a month later McClellan was preparing his final advance, 
but he had now to deal with a new and more dangerous opponent. 
Lee's counterstroke ought to have produced as its legitimate result 
the destruction of McClellan's army. But throughout " the Seven 
Days" complete success was never attained, owing to the lack of 
combination. This was due partly to the intricate nature of the 

^ 2 Ropes, 132. 



80 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

ground and the lack of reliable maps, especially of that part of 
the country lying between the Chickahominy and the James. But 
the chief cause of the repeated failure to carry out a combined 
movement was the inferior quality of the staff officers in the 
Confederate army. So great was the need of officers in that 
Service that almost all of those who had any military experience 
or training were assigned to regimental duty. Those who served 
on the Staff were lacking in experience. To mould an in- 
experienced staff into a capable body of reliable subordinates 
is a task which can only be accomplished with time, even by 
a born leader of men : and Lee, who assumed command only 
on 2nd June, had not the time allowed him to carry out the 
necessary reform. The failure of Jackson to take any part in the 
engagement of the 26th, or to do his fair share of the work on 
the 30th, must be attributed in the main to the inefficiency of 
the Staff. 

In the Seven Days' fighting the Confederate losses amounted 
to 20,000. The Federals, who were throughout acting on the 
defensive, only lost 16,000, including 6,000 prisoners.^ The Con- 
federates also captured 52 guns and 35,000 rifles, thus partially 
making good the much-felt need of modern weapons.^ 

Apart from all other considerations, the Peninsular campaign 
was of immense value to the Confederate cause, because it estab- 
h'shed on a sure basis Lee's reputation as a commander in the 
field. Before it he had been known as a profound thinker, a 
master of the theory of war : after it he was regarded as a superb 
fighter, and a determined leader in the face of the enemy. 

' 2 Ropes, 208. ' 2 Henderson, 89. 



CHAPTER IX 
JACKSON^S VALLEY CAMPAIGN i 

Importance of the Valley Campaign — Early movements of Jackson — Movement on 
Romney — Intrigues against Jackson and his temporary resignation — Advance of 
Banks — Battle of Kernstown— Effect of the attack on the Federals — Banks reinforced 
advances with caution — Jackson takes a flank position — lie pretends to leave the 
Valley and then falls on Milroy — Jackson returns to attack Banks — Topography of 
the Valley — Banks does not realise his danger — Jackson's rapid advance — Front 
Royal — Banks retreats — Jackson's pursuit — Banks defeated at Winchester — Effect of 
Jackson's campaign on McClellan's plans — Federals reinforced to capture Jackson — 
Their want of combination — Fremont's pursuit of Jackson — Jackson's plan to fight 
Shields and Fremont separately — Cross Keys and Port Republic — P'ederals fall back 
and Jackson slips away to Richmond. 

<( ^^TONEWALL" Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah 
~''^ Valley deserves special mention for two reasons : first, on 
account of the immense influence it exercised directly and 
indirectly upon the fate of McClellan's Peninsular campaign ; 
second, as an illustration of the strategical methods of one of the 
greatest of American soldiers. 

Although Jackson was not entirely emancipated from the control 
of higher authorities, yet as the commander of a detachment far 
distant from the main army he was allowed a comparatively free 
hand, and this was especially the case after Lee assumed the 
command of the Confederate forces. 

Early in November, 1861, Jackson,^ recently promoted a Major- 
General, was sent to take command in the Shenandoah Valley 
with his headquarters at Winchester. He was probably glad 
to leave the main army at Centreville : for he was bitterly dis- 
appointed at the refusal of President Davis to allow the victorious 
army of Bull Run to invade the North. He realised, as the other 

1 See Map V. 

' Thomas J. Jackson was born at Clarksburg, West Virginia, 1824. He entered 
West Point in 1842, graduating in 1846, and obtaining a commission in the Artillery. 
He served in the Mexican War, receiving brevets of Captain and Major for gallant and 
meritorious conduct at Churubusco and Chapultepec. After the war he did garrison 
duty at Fort Ilamilton on Long Island and at Fort Meade, Tampa. In 1S51 he was 
elected Professor of Natural and Experimental Science in the Virginia Military Institute, 
Lexington, and resigned his commission (Allan, 10). 



82 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

generals did, but as the central authorities did not, that the only 
true form of defence must provide for the possibility of offensive 
movements. 

About the middle of the month, his old brigade, the "Stone- 
wall " brigade of Bull Run fame, was sent him, and by the begin- 
ning of December he had under his command about 4,000 men. 
To the west lay West Virginia, his birthplace : that district was 
held by the Federal Commander, Rosecrans, with a force of 27,000 
men widely scattered. The Confederate attempts to recover West 
Virginia had been directed from Staunton in the south of the 
Valley and had all failed. Jackson wished to advance from the 
north by way of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. But rein- 
forcements could not be spared, and the scheme was abandoned. 

Although his headquarters were sixty miles distant from 
Johnston's at Centreville, he was still subordinate to the latter, 
and his troops held the extreme left of the Confederate line reach- 
ing from Winchester to Fredericksburg. D. H. Hill held Lees- 
burg and formed the connecting-link between the Valley and 
Manassas. As the President's decision had compelled Johnston 
to act strictly on the defensive, Jackson was directed to pursue a 
like policy. His duty was to observe the enemy, keep open the 
communications with Manassas, and be prepared to join the main 
army when McClellan commenced his advance. 

Facing Jackson on the north bank of the Potomac was General 
Banks with 18,000 men. His headquarters were at Frederick 
City, but the district which he commanded extended seventy-five 
miles further west as far as Cumberland. On the south branch 
of the Potomac, thirty-five miles north-west of Winchester, near 
Romney, were 5,000 troops under General Kelly.^ Jackson 
determined to attack this isolated detachment, and asked that for 
that purpose he might be reinforced by Loring's division and 
Edward Johnson's brigade, which were covering Staunton against 
any advance from the west. President Davis approved the plan, 
and whilst withholding Johnson's brigade ordered Loring's division 
to Winchester for service under Jackson. This division reached 
Winchester on Christmas Day and raised Jackson's force to 11,000 
men. Before its arrival he had found some work for the troops, 
which he already had under his command, and had done a certain 
amount of damage to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. 

On 1st January he moved from Winchester with 9,000 men. 
His advance was directed against the villages of Bath and 
Hancock on the Ikiltimore and Ohio Railroad in order to cut the 
line of communications between Banks and Rosecrans, and 
prevent the former sending reinforcements to Romney. On 
4th January he occupied Bath, but its garrison of three regiments 

' I IIen<lerson, 225. 



Jan., 1862] JACKSOxVS VALLEY CAMPAIGN 83 

escaped across the river. On the 5th he opened fire on Hancock, 
which lay on the opposite bank of the Potomac, and under cover 
of the bombardment destroyed the railway bridge over the Great 
Cacapon River and did much damage to the railroad and canal. 
On the 7th he marched twenty miles southward to Unger's store, 
where he remained some days for the purpose of rough-shoeing 
his horses and resting his men. 

On the 13th he resumed the advance, and on the following day 
entered Romney, which had been evacuated by the Federals on 
the loth. Kelly's force depended for its line of supplies upon 
Grafton seventy-five miles west, and it had been Jackson's original 
intention to push on from Romney, and break up the railway in 
that direction, so as to destroy Banks' line of communications with 
the west, in the hope that that general would then abandon the 
idea of invading the Valley.^ But his men were worn out. The 
weather had been most inclement, and the marches through blind- 
ing snow along slippery roads had tried them sorely. Discontent 
and murmuring were rife : Loring's division, which composed 
more than half the whole force, was unaccustomed to such hard 
work and rigorous discipline. Its commander, who had " ranked " ^ 
Jackson in the regular army, proved a jealous subordinate and 
encouraged the complaints of his men. Even the Stonewall 
brigade was grumbling. So Jackson abandoned the idea of 
advancing further. He put Loring's division into winter quarters 
at Romney and drew back the rest of his forces to Winchester and 
its neighbourhood. He reached Winchester on 24th January ; his 
entire loss since he marched out on ist January was only four 
killed and twenty-eight wounded.^ He had by his expedition 
won back three counties to the Confederate cause, secured the 
exceedingly fertile valley of the south branch of the Potomac as a 
source of supplies, and placed the enemy, who were prepared to 
assume the offensive, on the defensive. But his work was quickly 
undone. 

On 30th January Jackson was ordered by the Secretary of War 
to recall Loring's division from Romney. Mr. Secretary Benjamin 
had listened to the remonstrances of Loring and his officers. 
They complained that they had been put to endure all the hard- 
ships of the winter in a mountain village, which was nearer to the 
enemy's outposts than to the rest of the Confederate army at 
Winchester. They accused Jackson of favouring his own soldiers, 
and declared that the soldiers of their division were so discon- 
tented with their lot that the only chance of keeping them with 
the colours was to withdraw them at once from a position of such 
peril and hardship. On 31st January Jackson recalled Loring to 

^ I Henderson, 237. ^ American official verb for "to be senior to." 

•' I Henderson, 239. 



84 THE riVIT. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Winchester, but on the same day sent in his resignation to the 
Government. 

Only with great difficulty was he persuaded to withdraw it. It 
is possible that Jackson's action in this matter was not one of the 
least important services which he rendered to the Confederate 
cause.^ He gave the Government a much-needed lesson. He 
taught them not to interfere with a general in the field engaged in 
carrying out operations already sanctioned by the Cabinet. It is 
an interesting speculation, what might have been the result if 
McClcllan had adopted a similar line of action towards the 
t'ederal Government. 

But the mischief was done. Romney was reoccupied by the 
Federals on 7th February, and Edward Johnson's brigade was 
forced to retire from its post on the Alleghany Mountain. On 
27th February Banks commenced his advance and crossed the 
Potomac with 38,000 men and 80 guns. This advance was part of 
the general forward movement of McClellan's great host. He was 
directed to hold the road from Charlestown to Martinsburg so as 
to cover the repairing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. To 
encounter l^anks, Jackson had only 4,600 men, as Loring's division 
had at his request been ordered to another theatre of war. On 
7th March D. H. Hill withdrew from Leesburg, and on the 9th 
Johnston retired from Centreville behind the Rappahannock. 

Jackson was thus left isolated in the valley. He was sixty 
miles distant from the nearest reinforcements at Culpeper Court 
House. Johnston had originally intended, when he fell back, to 
recall Jackson's command to the eastern side of the Blue Ridge ; 
but at the latter's earnest request he left him in the Valley charged 
with the duty of holding Banks' whole force in check and prevent- 
ing him from detaching any part of it to McClellan's aid. On 
1 2th March the Federals occupied Winchester, and a week later 
Strasburg, eighteen miles south. Jackson had fallen back before 
the overwhelming numbers of Banks to Mount Jackson, twenty- 
five miles south of Strasburg, hoping to draw the Federals in 
pursuit up the Valley. 

But on 1 6th March a complete change of plan was made in 
regard to Banks' Corps, due to the fact that McClellan's plan of an 
advance upon Richmond by the Yorktown Peninsula had been at 
last definitely accepted by the Government. One division was to 
be left in the Valley to cover Harper's Ferry, the railroad, and 
canal. Banks' other division (the third division of his Corps had 
already been detached to join McClellan) was to cross the Blue 
Ridge, hold Manassas, and repair the railway there. 

On the 20th Williams' division started for Manassas, and Shields' 
division fell back towards Winchester. Jackson started in pur- 

* I Henderson, 253. 



March, i862] JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 85 

suit, and on the 22nd Ashby's cavalry came in contact with the 
Federal piquets a mile or two out of Winchester. Ashby reported 
that the force, which he had encountered, only consisted of four 
regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery. Jackson 
assumed that he only had in front of him a rearguard, and 
determined to attack in the hope of recalling the troops marching 
for Manassas. On the night of the 22nd his division, after a 
march of twenty-two miles, reached Strasburg. The next day a 
march of another fourteen miles brought them close to Kernstown, 
where the Federal force had taken position. Fearing that delay 
would enable the enemy to escape, he resolved to attack at once. 
His plan of battle was to turn the Federal right by seizing a 
wooded ridge, which ran across their line of retreat to Winchester. 
The battle commenced shortly before 4 p.m., and after three 
hours' hard fighting the Confederates fell back discomfited, and 
that night retreated to Newtown three miles south of Kernstown. 

Jackson had for once fallen into a trap. Shields, a veteran of 
the Mexican War, had cleverly concealed the greater part of his 
forces in the hope of luring Jackson on to attack. The Con- 
federates found themselves confronted by greatly superior 
numbers. They fought stubbornly, and their total loss was 
20 per cent, of the entire force.^ But though defeated on the 
field of battle, the Confederate leader had succeeded in achieving 
the object for which he fought. It was supposed by the Federal 
authorities that he would never have dared to attack unless he 
was expecting large reinforcements.^ At once President Lincoln 
and his Cabinet were filled with alarm for the safety of 
Washington. Their chief objection to McClellan's Peninsular 
campaign had been that it uncovered the Capital. The very 
event which they had feared seemed on the point of fulfilment. 
Williams' division was ordered back to the Valley. Blenker's 
division was detached from McClellan and assigned to Fremont, 
who had recently been appointed to the command of the 
Mountain Department, as West Virginia was now styled, but 
directed to report en route to Banks for temporary service in the 
Valley. Finally, McDowell's Corps was taken from McClellan's 
army and ordered to remain at Manassas; and both Banks and 
McDowell with their respective commands were withdrawn from 
McClellan's control. 

On the 25th Banks, having been joined by Williams' division, 
reoccupied Strasburg. But his advance was marked by extreme 
caution. For six days he remained at Strasburg, and then on 
2nd April moved to Woodstock. Then followed another wait of 

^ The Confederate loss was 718 out of about 3,500 men. Shields' force was at least 
7,000 strong, and his total casualties amounted to 590 (i Henderson, 321). 
^ I Henderson, 304-5. 



86 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

a fortnight, and on the 17th he resumed the advance, occupying 
Harrisonburg with his cavalry on the 22nd. Two of his brigades 
arrived there on the 26th, but the other three remained at 
Newmarket. 

Jackson had evacuated Harrisonburg on the 18th, and turning off 
to the east, moved in the direction of the Blue Ridge and went into 
camp in Elk Run Valley. There he was in communication with 
Ewell's division, which was holding the line of the Rapidan, and 
at the same time lay on the flank of any advance which l^anks 
might make from Harrisonburg to Staunton. Johnson's brigade 
had been obliged to fall back from the Shenandoah Mountain 
owing to Jackson's abandonment of the Harrisonburg-Staunton 
road, and had taken up a position at West View, seven miles west 
of Staunton. At the same time Fremont was moving slowly 
forward towards Staunton by way of Romney, Moorefield, and 
Franklin. He proposed to make a combined movement with 
]^anks on Staunton, and having there secured the Virginia Central 
Railway to push into East Tennessee and capture Knoxville. In 
pursuance of this plan Milroy's brigade had occupied McDowell, 
a village twenty-seven miles north-west of Staunton, and Schenck's 
brigade was at Franklin, thirty-four miles to the rear. 

Jackson was bound to strike a blow before Banks and Fremont 
could unite and oppose him with overwhelmingly superior 
numbers. Banks was the nearer, but his troops were the more 
concentrated. He therefore determined to turn upon the weaker 
and more scattered force and for that purpose to make use of 
Johnson's brigade, and then to unite with Ewell and crush Banks. 
It was necessary first to mislead and mystify Banks, so as to keep 
him quiet at Harrisonburg whilst the movement against Milroy 
was being carried out. On the 30th Jackson left the Elk Run 
Valley and moved along the east bank of the south fork of the 
Shenandoah to Fort Republic. Then he crossed the Blue Ridge 
at Brown's Gap. This would lead Banks to suppose that he was 
bound for Richmond. In the meantime Ewell moved his division 
into the position in Elk Run Valley, which Jackson had just 
abandoned. On the 3rd May Jackson reached the Virginia 
Central Railway at Mechum's River Station. On the 4th he was 
transferring his troops by rail to Staunton. On the 5th he effected 
his junction with Edward Johnson. 

On the 7th the combined force moved out of Staunton, west- 
wards towards McDowell. On that day Milroy learnt that 
Jackson and Johnson had united their forces and were moving 
against him. He at once sent to Schenck begging him to come 
with all speed to his aid. Schenck responded with alacrity, and 
by 10 a.m. of the iSth his brigade joined Milroy in the camp at the 
foot of Bull Pasture Mountain. By that time the Confederate 



May, 1862] JACKSON^S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 87 

advance had already reached the summit of the mountain. It had 
been Jackson's original plan not to attack till next day, by which 
time he would have placed a force marching under cover of the 
night across the Federal line of retreat. But the Federal 
generals, seeing that their position would be rendered untenable 
as soon as the Confederate batteries were established on the 
heights above them, determined to attack in order to secure their 
retreat during the night.^ The fighting commenced about 4.30 
p.m. and lasted for four hours. The Federals having been 
repulsed at every point then withdrew, and during the night 
retreated towards Franklin. Jackson followed in pursuit the next 
day, but the Federals had got a good start, and Schenck set fire to 
the forests, which still further retarded the Confederate pursuit. 
Jackson finding that it was impossible to prevent the two 
brigades from joining the main body under Fremont, abandoned 
the pursuit on the 1 2th, having advanced to within a few miles of 
Franklin. 

The Federal detachment had been driven back from Staunton, 
and Fremont's army was so much disorganised that there was a 
good chance of overwhelming Banks before he could be reinforced. 
On the 14th Jackson was again at McDowell. The same day 
Fremont arrived at Franklin, but remained there inactive for ten 
days refitting after the losses inflicted at McDowell. Jackson 
turned off from the Staunton road and moved northwards towards 
Harrisonburg, and on the 17th had an interview with Ewell. The 
two generals quickly arranged a plan of action against Banks. 

That commander was now in a position of great danger. Shields' 
division had been taken from him and sent to join McDowell's 
Corps at Fredericksburg, and he had been ordered to fall back to 
Strasburg. There he was cut off from all hope of receiving rein- 
forcements from Fremont, as the passes, through which help might 
have come, had been obstructed and rendered impracticable by a 
squadron of Ashby's cavalry .^ He was completely isolated, and 
exposed to the united attack of Jackson, Ewell, and Johnson. His 
military abilities were of the slightest. Originally a hand in a 
cotton mill, he had risen to be Speaker of the House of Representa- 
tives and Governor of Massachusetts. His had been one of the 
military appointments so injudiciously made on political grounds 
by President Lincoln at the outset of the war.^ 

The topography of the Valley was all in favour of the Confede- 
rates. The Shenandoah Valley is 140 miles long, with a breadth 
varying from 12 to 24 miles. Near Front Royal the two forks of 

^ The attack was directed against Sitlington's Hill, an isolated spur on the (Con- 
federate) left of the turnpike, which completely commanded McDowell (i Henderson, 
363). The Confederates lost 498 men out of 6,000 (of whom only 4,500 were engaged) ; 
the Federals 256 out of 2,500. 

"^ Henderson, 372. ^ i Ropes, 113 ; I Henderson, 277. 



88 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the Shenandoah unite : between these two forks runs the Massa- 
nutton range for about a distance of fifty miles. The valley of the 
south fork on the eastern side of the Massanuttons is consider- 
ably narrower than on the other side of the range. It is densely 
wooded, and gives a covered line of advance against the rear of 
any force stationed above the junction of the two forks of the 
Shenandoah. 

Banks, however, was very far from realising the peril of his posi- 
tion. He believed that he was in no immediate danger of being 
attacked. His whole force numbered 10,000 men, and was dis- 
tributed in the following manner. The bulk of the command, over 
7,000 men, was at Strasburg; Winchester was held by a garrison of 
nearly 1,500; two companies of infantry were posted at Ikickton, 
a railway station about midway between Front Royal and Stras- 
burg, and Front Royal was occupied by a force of 1,000 men.^ 
Jackson had at his disposal 17,000 men. With his own division, 
Johnson's brigade, and one of Ewell's brigades, he was moving 
along the western side of the Massanutton range, whilst Ewell with 
the rest of his command was on the eastern side advancing through 
the Luray Valley. On the 20th Jackson reached Newmarket. At 
this point the one practicable road crossed the Massanuttons ; and 
on the 2ist Jackson's army was crossing into the eastern valley, 
whilst Ashby's cavalry, thrown well beyond Newmarket, effectu- 
ally screened the movement from Banks at Strasburg. The whole 
Valley Army was thus united and pushing on towards Front Royal. 
On the afternoon of the 23rd the storm broke on the devoted 
garrison of that post. They were entirely taken by surprise, and 
only a handful succeeded in escaping to Winchester. The two 
companies at Buckton station were also captured.- The Federal 
flank was turned, and the road lay open to Winchester. 

Banks was strangely slow to realise the truth. Believing that 
Jackson was at Harrisonburg, sixty miles away, his first impression 
was that the attack on Front Royal was merely a cavalry raid. 
When informed of the true dimensions of the attacking force, he 
believed that the numbers had been exaggerated and that it was 
only Ewell's division, which was at Front Royal, and that Jackson's 
main force was still in his front. His intention was to stand fast at 
Strasburg in the expectation that reinforcements would speedily 
reach him from Washington. Not till after 10 a.m. of the 24th did 
he really grasp tiie gravity of the situation. Then he ordered an 
immediate retreat. 

Jackson had sent two regiments of cavalry to strike the Valley 
turnpike at Newtown ten miles north of Strasburg, and with his 
main force was marching on Middletown, five miles nearer Stras- 
burg. He failed, however, to cut off Banks' retreat. The Federal 

' I Henderson, 3SS. - i Henderson, 394. 



May, 1862] JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 89 

infantry had already passed Newtown when the Confederate cavahy 
reached that point. Tlie cavahy, which formed the rear of Banks' 
army, were driven off the road by the foremost brigades of the 
Valley Army, and the trains of the retreating army ought to have 
been destroyed, but Ashby's cavalry flung away a great opportunity 
through want of discipline, as the majority left the ranks to plunder. 
The Federal rearguard was handled with great ability, and Jackson 
was unable to press the pursuit beyond Newtown.^ 

On the 25th Banks stood at bay at Winchester. He held a 
fairly strong position, but was hopelessly outnumbered, having 
only 6,500 men to oppose at least 15,000. Jackson moved against 
him on the Valley turnpike, whilst Ewell came in on the Federal 
left by the road from Front Royal. By 10 a.m. Banks's army 
was in full flight for the Potomac. But Jackson had at the 
moment no cavalry with which to follow up the flying foe. 
Ashby, with the handful of followers who still kept to the 
colours, had pressed forward to the right, expecting that the 
enemy would endeavour to retreat through the Blue Ridge," and 
Steuart, commanding two regiments, refused to obey any orders 
which did not reach him through his immediate superior, Ewell. 
Jackson abandoned the pursuit five miles north of Winchester ; 
and by midday of the 26th Banks's army was safely across the 
Potomac. But by this time it was little better than a disorganised 
mob, having lost a third of its numbers and a vast quantity of 
baggage. 

Jackson, however, had done something more than drive Banks 
out of the Valley. He had completely paralysed McClellan's 
plan of campaign against Richmond. McDowell was to have 
moved forward on the 26th from Fredericksburg to take part 
in the advance of the whole Federal army. One hundred and 
fifty thousand men would have been concentrated against the 
doomed city. Now, however, owing to Jackson's triumphant 
march, McDowell was ordered to abandon the movement against 
Richmond and send at once one-half his corps to the Valley 
in order to cut off Jackson's retreat. At the same time Fremont 
was ordered to move into the Valley from the west, and co- 
operate with McDowell. It was in vain that McDowell protested 
to the amateur strategists at Washington. McClellan had to 
postpone his advance, but meantime his army occupied a perilous 
position, being disposed with a view to McDowell's co-operation, 
across the Chickahominy, and Johnston commanding the Con- 
federate army at Richmond was not slow, as related in Chapter 
VHL, to take advantage of the opportunity. 

^ Major-General G. H. Gordon commanded the rearguard. But with the remnant of 
Ashby's cavalry and the Stonewall brigade, Jackson followed the retreating Federals 
throughout the night, skirmishing at intervals, until at dawn the old battlefield of 
Kernstown was reached. ^ i Henderson, 419. 



90 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

After two days' rest Jackson resumed his advance towards the 
Potomac, and on the 29th the bulk of his army was at Halltown 
threatening Harper's Ferry. But by this time he was aware that 
the Federal forces were closing in on his line of retreat, and 
he had an immense train of captured stores, which he was loath 
to sacrifice. On the 30th the greater part of his army fell back 
to Winchester. One brigade remained at Halltown for the night 
to hold the garrison of Harper's Ferry in check. But that same 
day Shields' division, leading McDowell's advance, recaptured 
Front Royal, and Fremont had advanced to Wardensville. The 
position of Jackson's force seemed perilous in the extreme. 
Shields was within twelve miles and Frdmont within twenty of 
Strasburg, from which place Jackson at Winchester was eighteen 
miles distant, whilst the brigade at Halltown was no less than 
forty-three miles away. 

But it was no easy task to ensure unity of action between 
two columns converging from different directions on the same 
point. The two Federal generals had no understanding, and 
arranged no means of communicating with each other ; and each 
was afraid of finding himself confronted by the dreaded Jackson 
with superior forces, whilst his colleague was still far away. On 
the 31st the main body of the Confederate army moved from 
Winchester to Strasburg, and the Stonewall brigade marching 
from Halltown passed through Winchester, and went into camp 
at Newtown, having covered twenty-eight, and in some cases 
thirty-five, miles that day.^ On the Federal side Shields remained 
inactive at Front Royal throughout the 31st, and Fremont only 
advanced to within six miles of Strasburg. On the ist June 
Jackson, having waited for the Stonewall brigade to rejoin, 
reached Woodstock, and the great peril was escaped. Frtimont 
was easily held in check by Ewell, and Shields, under the mis- 
taken impression that Jackson was retiring north, put his troops in 
motion for Winchester.- The scheme of Lincoln and Stanton for 
cutting off Jackson had signally failed. 

Frdmont, having let his prey escape him, now took up the 
pursuit with vigour. On the 2nd June he occupied Strasburg, 
and his cavalry pressed hard on Ashby's rearguard ; whilst Shields, 
to whom McDowell had committed the pursuit,^ was moving up 
the Luray valley. To prevent his foes combining, Jackson de- 
stroyed the bridges over the south fork of the Shenandoah, 
and thus keeping Shields on the east bank of the river, prevented 
him from connecting with Fremont through Newmarket Gap. 
Passing through Harrisonburg he again turned eastwards to Port 
Republic. There he held the one bridge by which his pursuers 

' I Henderson, 430. ' I Henderson, 433. 

' McDowell's 2nd division under Ord was at Front Royal. 



June. i862] JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 01 

could unite, and at the same time menaced Fremont's line of 
advance if he tried to move upon Staunton. On the 6th a 
rearguard action was fought two or three miles south of 
Harrisonburg, in which Fremont's cavalry were repulsed, but 
Ashby killed. 

Jackson now determined to defeat his opponents in detail. 
If he concentrated against Shields, who was the weaker, on the 
east side of the river and burnt the bridge, Fremont's guns could 
still come into action on the high ground on the west bank 
and command the field of battle, whilst having burnt the bridge, 
it would be impossible afterwards to assume the offensive against 
Fremont. Nor was it possible to attack Fremont in such force as 
to have any chance of gaining a decisive victory, until Shields had 
been first disposed of. Accordingly Jackson detached Ewell to 
Cross Keys, half-way between Harrisonburg and Port Republic, to 
hold Fremont in check, whilst with the rest of his forces he awaited 
Shields' advance.^ 

On the 8th Fremont attacked Ewell, but the assault was made 
in half-hearted style, and a vigorous counterstroke against the 
Federal left caused Fremont to fall back. On the 9th Jackson 
was preparing to crush his foes in turn. Part of Ewell's division 
was recalled to join in the attack upon Shields. That general, in 
the eagerness of his pursuit, had his division strung out over 
a space of twenty-five miles, and only two brigades, not more 
than 4,000 strong, faced Jackson.^ The latter, being in a great 
hurry to crush Shields' isolated brigades and then recross the 
river to attack Fremont with his whole army, attacked with but 
little caution. Ultimately he drove the enemy in full retreat 
before him, but the precipitancy of his attack, without waiting 
to develop his superior strength, caused his loss to be considerably 
heavier than it need have been. Whilst this action was going 
on, Fremont, advancing cautiously, forced the small force in his 
front to fall back across the river and burn the bridge. It was 
therefore impossible for Jackson to turn against Fremont, even if 
his army had been in a fit condition for a second battle on the 
same day. 

These Confederate successes at Cross Keys and Port Republic 
cleared the upper end of the Valley of the Federals. The pur- 
suing columns had received a rude shock. Fremont fell back 
through Harrisonburg to Mount Jackson; and for the third time 
McDowell's Corps was held back from the long-looked-for advance 
on Richmond. Shields was ordered to remain at Luray, and the 
second division of the same Corps was detained at Front Royal. 
It was not till the 20th that these two divisions were permitted to 
leave the Valley for Fredericksburg.^ By that time it was too 

^ I Henderson, 451 2. ^ i Henderson, 467. ^ i Henderson, 475. 



92 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

late. On the 17th Jackson was already moving his army away 
from the Valley. On the 19th, following the line of the Virginia 
Central Railway, it was at Mechum's River Station. On the 21st 
it was at Frederickshall, within fifty miles of Richmond. The 
Federals were completely mystified as to its whereabouts, with 
such secrecy had the evacuation of the Valley been carried out. 
On the 23rd Jackson arrived in Richmond to arrange with Lee 
the details of the great counterstroke, which was to drive 
McClellan out of the Peninsula. 

History affords few instances of a small force producing such 
great results as followed from Jackson's Valley campaign. Both 
he and Lee had detected the weak spot in the Federal armour — 
the anxiety of the Cabinet for the safety of their Capital. The 
Confederate generals played upon the fears of the Washington 
politicians, and by so doing paralysed the plan of campaign of the 
Federal commander. It is hardly too much to say that the fate 
of Richmond was decided not on the banks of the Chickahominy, 
but by the waters of the Shenandoah. 



chaptp:r X 

THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 
(OR SECOND BULL RUN) 

The formation of the Army of Virginia under Pope — Government mistrust of McClellan 
— Halleck appointed Commander-in-Chief — Withdrawal from the Peninsula ordered 
— Pope's task — Pope's unfortunate orders — Jackson sent to delay Pope — Jackson 
defeats Banks at Cedar Run — Lee joins Jackson — Lee's plan miscarries owing to a 
captured letter — Second plan foiled by a flood — Stuart's raid — Lee's third plan — 
Jackson's flank march — Its complete success — Pope's schemes — Pope orders con- 
centration at Gainesville and an attack on Jackson at Manassas ; then a concentra- 
tion at Centreville — Jackson's attacks — Longstreet's movements — Position on the 
night of 28th August — Pope's plans — Jackson's position — Second battle of Manassas 
— Fitz-John Porter's movements — Pope's strong delusion ; he renews the attack on 
the 30th — The Confederate position — Porter attacks and is repulsed — Longstreet's 
counterstroke — Struggle for the Henry House Hill — Pope falls back on Centreville — 
Battle of Chantilly — Federal armies withdrawn to Washington — Pope relieved of 
command. 

WHEN McClellan took the field at the head of the Army 
of the Potomac in March, the President relieved him of 
the post which he held as General-in-Chief of all the land 
forces, in order that he might concentrate his whole attention on 
his own campaign. 

Shortly afterwards the Government organised all the other forces, 
which they had in Virginia, into three departments under 
Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, retaining in their own hands the 
general control of these armies. The unsuccessful attempt made 
by Fremont and McDowell in execution of the Government plan 
to intercept Jackson's retreat up the Valley after his pursuit of 
Banks must have convinced the Cabinet of the error of needlessly 
multiplying military departments. On the 26th June these three 
armies were formed into a single army to be known as the Army 
of Virginia, and Major-General Pope was called from the West to 
command it. The new commander was a thorough soldier of the 
old regular army. He had graduated at West Point in 1842 and 
had served with distinction in the Mexican War ; since the out- 
break of the Civil War he had held a subordinate command under 
Halleck in the West, and had won fresh laurels by the reduction of 
New Madrid and Island No. 10 in the Mississippi. 

93 



9i THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

On arriving at Washington he was called upon to act tem- 
porarily as military adviser to the Government. General Mitch- 
cock had filled that post for some time, but though his reputation 
for military ability stood high, he suffered under the disadvantage 
of never having seen active service in time of war,^ The Govern- 
ment at this time felt itself in a very awkward position : its largest 
and most efficient army — the Army of the Potomac — was en- 
camped at Harrison's Landing on the James: its commander, 
McClellan, had largely lost the confidence of the Government even 
before the campaign commenced, and any lingering belief in him 
had been dissipated by his retreat to the James. He was now 
clamouring for reinforcements : the Government were extremely 
reluctant to send any further troops to a general whose ability 
and sincerity they distrusted. They had even retained at Fortress 
Monroe the troops sent by Burnside from the Carolinas instead of 
placing them directly under McClellan's command. Their natural 
instinct was to condemn the Peninsular campaign as a complete 
failure, and to recall the Army of the Potomac for service in a 
different field and under a different commander. At the same 
time, the Government, taught by experience, shrank from the sole 
responsibility of recalling McClellan. It was therefore determined 
to summon to Washington some general officer who had displayed 
distinguished ability in the field, and keep him there as the official 
military adviser of the Government. He was, in fact, to act as 
Chief of the Staff to the President, who, by the Constitution, was 
Commander-in-Chief 

To fill this most responsible post it was decided to summon 
Halleck from the West. Under the circumstances, Hallcck was the 
natural selection. Nearly all the successes which the P"ederals 
had as yet gained had been in his department. Fort Henry, Fort 
Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth,- had all been placed to his credit, and 
were in marked contrast to the non-success, which had hitherto 
attended McClellan's operations. The Government had yet to 
learn that in the West Halleck had reaped where he had not sown : 
that the successes gained nominally under his auspices had in 
reality been won almost in spite of him. They did not know, nor 
indeed could they be fairly expected to know, that his military 
ability was of the slenderest kind, and that of military judgment 
he possessed hardly a particle.^ 

1 2 Ropes, 234. 2 cf. Cap. XIII. 

* 2 Ropes, 234-5, 260, 313. Halleck graduated at West Point in 1839 and entered 
tlie Engineers. He was not actively engaged in the Mexican War, ami retired from the 
Army in 1854. He liocame the leading memlKr of a firm of lawyers in San Francisco. 
He had gained a considerable reputation in military circles as a writer on the art of war. 
Later on he was the author of one of the best-known works on International Law. The 
high estimate formed of his military abilities is shown by the fact that he was one of the 
first batch of four majcjr-geiierals in the regular arniy appointed after the outbreak of the 
war. 



July, 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 95 

On the nth July Halleck was appointed to the post of General- 
in-Chief of the land forces of the United States. His duties in the 
West prevented him reaching the capital till the 22nd. The most 
pressing question of the moment was the future destination of the 
Army of the Potomac : and on the 25th July Halleck went to 
Harrison's Landing to hold a conference with McClellan. The 
latter strongly urged that on the banks of the James and nowhere 
else could the Confederacy be crushed, and expressed his readiness, 
with a reinforcement of 20,000 men, to undertake the capture of 
Richmond. McClellan was clearly right in his view. His army 
was still in a most favourable position for offence. He could cross 
the James and capture Petersburg, thus cutting off Richmond 
from its southern line of railway communication. 

Such a step, which at the time was quite feasible, would prob- 
ably have compelled the evacuation of Richmond.^ But as 
McClellan persisted in fixing the strength of Lee's army at 200,000 
men, and his own only amounted to 90,000, it was difficult to con- 
vince Halleck that a reinforcement of 20,000 men would be likely 
to effect much alteration in the present position. It is likely 
enough that Halleck knew perfectly well that Lee had not half the 
force with which McClellan credited him, but used the latter's ex- 
aggerated estimate as affording a plausible reason for doing — what 
the Government had always meant him to do — for recalling the 
Army of the Potomac. On the 3rd August that order was given, 
and in spite of McClellan's indignant protest, was repeated and its 
execution insisted upon. As events proved, it was many weary 
months before a Northern army was again within a few miles of 
Richmond. 

The arrival of Halleck at Washington enabled Pope to leave the 
capital and hasten to the front.^ During the past month, which 
he had spent at Washington, he had not been idle. He found that 
the Government expected three things of him — to guard Washing- 
ton from attack, to secure the Shenandoah Valley, and to create a 
diversion for the benefit of McClellan's army by threatening the 
Confederate communications at Gordonsville. His first step was 
to concentrate the scattered forces which made up his command. 
He summoned the Corps of Banks and Fremont (the latter now 
commanded by Sigel) to the east side of the Blue Ridge. They 
could guard the gaps in that range, and whilst these were held by 
the Federals, no force could advance down the Valley towards the 
Potomac without exposing its line of communications to a flank 
attack. One of McDowell's two divisions, under the command of 
King, was at Fredericksburg, and Pope was very anxious to bring 
it into line with the rest of his army, which was concentrating near 
Warrenton. But Halleck withheld this division for a time from 

^ 2 Ropes, 243. ^ See Map III. 



9fi THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Pope, because he wished to protect the line of railway running 
from r^almouth opposite Fredericksburg to Aquia Creek. At the 
same time Pope ordered his cavalry to keep continually on the 
move, and directed their commander, Hatch, to advance on and 
capture Gordonsville. Had not Hatch encumbered his march by 
taking artillery and a wagon train, he might have gained possession 
of Gordonsville, before Jackson arrived from the Peninsula just in 
time to save it from capture.^ 

Whilst Pope was infusing into the troops under his command an 
energy to which they had long been strangers, he also issued 
certain General Orders from Washington, which have done much 
to ruin his reputation. The address which he sent to his new 
army was remarkable for its bombast and execrable taste. He 
instituted an invidious comparison between the Armies of the East 
and West, and announced that he had been brought from the 
West, where nothing but the backs of their foes had ever been 
seen, to teach the Eastern armies how to fight and conquer. The 
Army of Virginia, both officers and men, must have burned with 
resentment against their new commander, Fremont had already 
resigned rather than serve under a man junior to himself in the 
Service.- It was a risky experiment calling a Western general to 
the command of an Eastern army. McDowell was on the spot 
and was a capable officer, but unfortunately the rout of Bull Run 
had destroyed the Government's trust in him. Pope's address was 
not calculated to make the relations between himself and his sub- 
ordinates any easier. At the same time he issued a variety of 
General Orders, which provoked the fiercest animosity among the 
Southerners. The general tendency of the orders was to introduce 
into the struggle a severity which, though justifiable according to 
the practice of war, had hitherto been avoided : and one order 
which compelled the peaceful inhabitants of districts temporarily 
in possession of the Federal armies to take an oath of allegiance to 
the United States Government under penalty of being driven from 
their homesteads, and in case of return of being shot, was nothing 
short of barbarous.^ 

Lee had withdrawn his army to Richmond on the 8th July, and 
on the 13th despatched Jackson with two divisions to Gordons- 
ville. The Confederate commander was in a rather difficult position. 
Although it was now impossible for the enemy to bring to 
bear upon him that combination with which they had menaced 
Richmond, when McDowell with iiis corps of 40,000 men was on 
the point of advancing from Fredericksburg to join McClellan on 
the Chickahominy, yet if McClellan and Pope simultaneously 
assumed the offensive, he would be sorely pressed for want of men. 
McClellan, however, was not likely to advance again until he had 

' 2 Ropes, 23J. - 2 Ropco, 227. * Ropes, Army utider Pope, ?o, II. 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 97 

been largely reinforced : and towards the end of the month Lee 
sent A. P. Hill with his division to the aid of Jackson, who was 
much in need of reinforcements, as with only 11,000 men he was 
confronting a force of 40,000 Federals.^ 

Pope had reached the front on the ist August, and at once 
prepared for a vigorous forward move. He could not give any 
help to McClellan directly, unless indeed his army were to be 
transported by water to the James. But indirectly he might do a 
good deal to facilitate McClellan's withdrawal to Fortress Monroe, 
where he was to embark his army for Aquia Creek. Pope was 
moreover a man of very sanguine views. He had hopes of captur- 
ing both Gordonsville and Charlottesville. He very easily forgot 
that his advance was only a part and not the whole of a general 
plan of campaign, and apparently regarded himself as undertaking 
an independent movement. Both Gordonsville and Charlottes- 
ville were positions of considerable strategic importance. The 
former was the junction of the Orange and Alexandria Railway 
with the Virginia Central, and at the latter place a branch of the 
Virginia Central ran to Staunton at the upper end of the Valley. 
Their capture would have been a very serious embarrassment to the 
Confederate communications. 

Jackson had now about 24,000 men collected in the vicinity of 
Gordonsville. From the outset Lee realised that the safety of the 
Confederate cause required that a heavy blow should be dealt 
Pope before he could be reinforced by the bulk of the army of the 
Potomac, and Jackson now saw a chance of attacking and de- 
feating Pope's army in detail. On the 7th August he commenced 
his advance towards Culpeper. That point also was of strategical 
importance, as at it met the three roads by which the different 
portions of Pope's army were advancing.^ If he could gain 
possession of it he would be in a position to deal a series of blows 
against their scattered divisions. On the 6th Pope had com- 
menced his advance with Banks' Corps, which was moved to 
Culpeper Court House with Ricketts' division of McDowell's 
Corps following in support : and Sigel's Corps was also given the 
order to advance. It seems to have been Pope's intention to 
take up a position on Robertson's River, a tributary running into 
the Rapidan from the west. This line was already piqueted by 
his cavalry and to support them against Jackson's advance Banks 
was ordered forward from Culpeper. The two forces met on the 
9th August at Cedar Run, seven miles beyond Culpeper. 

The orders given by Pope to Banks were very confused, and 
might certainly be interpreted to mean that he was to attack any 

* 2 Henderson, 97. Pope's army amounted to about 47,000 (2 Ropes, 231), but of 
this force King's division was detained at Fredericksburg. 
^ 2 Henderson, 104. 



98 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE IGNITED STATES 

force which he encountered advancing.^ Acting upon this inter- 
pretation of his instructions Banks attacked vigorously and for a 
moment gained considerable success. The Confederate left was 
broken. Their line from left to centre was rolled up, but at this 
point Jackson's reserves arrived and quickly settled the issue of 
the day. The Stonewall brigade checked the rout and held back 
the advancing Federals, whilst Hill's division delivered a counter- 
stroke with crushing effect. The Federal centre was forced back, 
both their flanks were turned, and they were driven from the 
field after a brave but ineffectual resistance with very heavy loss. 
Banks lost about a quarter of his whole force, which was 9,000 
strong,^ and the blow was so severe that his troops took little part 
in the rest of the campaign. Jackson had at least 20,000 men on 
the field, and his losses amounted to 1,300. The fighting was all 
over in an hour and a half, and Jackson pressed on that same 
evening towards Culpeper. That was his goal : his fight with 
Banks had been but an incident, for which he was only half 
prepared. But when he had advanced a mile and a half further 
and night had fallen, he found himself confronting the forces of 
Sigel and Ricketts, which had been pressed forward to the sup- 
port of Banks. It was no part of Jackson's plan to attack a 
force stronger than his own, and he fell back behind Cedar Run. 
For two days he remained in position waiting to see if Pope would 
venture to attack him, but on the night of the nth, learning that 
King's division was on the point of joining Pope, he withdrew 
across the Rapidan to his original camp near Gordonsville. He 
had by no means accomplished all that he hoped : he had aimed 
at nothing less than the breaking up of Pope's army, but he had 
dealt a crushing blow to one of its Corps, and he hoped to lure 
Pope on in pursuit and thus give Lee a chance of concentrating a 
superior force against him. 

On 13th August Lee learnt that McClellan was beginning to 
embark his troops, and that Burnside's force, which had already 
left Fortress Monroe, was on its way to join Pope. He determined 
to assume the offensive with all his might, and at once despatched 
Longstreet with twelve brigades towards Gordonsville.^ Jackson, 
partly in the hope of mystifying the enemy and partly to be ready 
in position for the flank movement which he and Lee contem- 
plated against Pope, moved away from Gordonsville to his own 
right to Pisgah Church. On the 15th August Lee and his 
lieutenants held a Council of War at Pisgah Church, and a move- 
ment round the enemy's left flank was determined on. Pope had 
placed himself in a position which was very open to a flank 
attack. Having been reinforced by King's division on the night 

' 2 Ropes, 249-50; 2 Henderson, 114, note. 
' 2 IlciiiJcrsun, 124. * 2 Kupcs, 254. 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 99 

of the nth, the next morning he crossed Cedar Run and advanced 
to the Rapidan. Finding no signs of Jackson and hearing that 
part of Burnside's command was being sent to him, he was full 
of sanguine expectations and contemplated crossing the Rapidan 
and moving on Louisa Court House. Halleck, however, who saw 
that Pope was altogether mistaking his role, which was to stand on 
the defensive until the Armies of the Potomac and Virginia should 
be united, insisted on his stopping on the northern bank of the 
Rapidan. Pope depended for his supplies on the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad, but at Culpeper that line makes a great bend 
almost at right angles turning eastwards towards Washington, and 
it would be perfectly easy for an enemy to move past the Federal 
left and strike this line of communications at Rappahannock 
Station, and by destroying the railway bridge there to cut them off 
from direct communication with Washington.^ This was precisely 
the movement which Lee and Jackson were contemplating. 

The Confederate army, 55,000^ strong, was concentrated out of 
sight of the Federal outposts behind Clarke's Mountain, within six 
miles of their unconscious foe's extreme left. Jackson and Long- 
street were ordered at dawn of the 18th to cross the Rapidan at 
the Somerville and Raccoon Fords and move on Culpeper, whilst 
Stuart's cavalry, preceding Longstreet's advance,^ was to seize 
Rappahannock Station and destroy the railway bridge, and then 
form on Longstreet's right to take part in the battle, which was 
expected to ensue in the neighbourhood of Culpeper. 

Had the scheme been carried out as originally planned, it is 
hard to see how Pope's army could have escaped destruction. It 
would have been taken completely by surprise, and its line of 
communications must have been lost. Pope would then have been 
forced to fight a battle against superior numbers, and the Federal 
army was not nearly so efficient an instrument of war as the Con- 
federate army had become with its experience in the Valley and 
Peninsula. Pope's army was, in fact, a mere aggregate of indepen- 
dent units hastily put together, which had not yet had time to 
acquire organised cohesion.^ But the Confederate plan miscarried. 
The cavalry force was not yet forthcoming for the rush upon 
Rappahannock Station. Judging this to be an essential part of 
the plan, Lee postponed the movement until the 20th, in order to 
enable the cavalry to take part in it. On the night of the 17th 
Stuart's adjutant-general was captured by a Federal patrol, and 
on him was found a letter from Lee, which disclosed the fact, of 
which Pope was till then profoundly unconscious, that Jackson 
had been largely reinforced. Early on the morning of the i8th 

1 2 Ropes, 255-6. 2 2 Henderson, 153 ; 2 Ropes, 254, 

^ Stuart was to cross further to the east by Morton's Ford. 2 Ropes, 257. 
* 2 Ropes, 253, 303-4, note. 



100 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Pope was informed by a spy that the Confederate army was pre- 
paring for an advance against his rear.^ Immediately orders for a 
retreat were issued, and by the evening of the 19th the Federals 
were in position behind the Rappahannock. Their retreat was 
not discovered until late in the afternoon of the 19th. A thick 
haze prevented the vedettes on Clarke's Mountain from seeing it 
sooner. At once a general pursuit was commenced, and by the 
evening of the 20th the Confederates were encamped on the south 
bank of the Rappahannock within touch of the Federals. 

Lee's first plan for the destruction of Pope's army had failed. 
But it was still possible to crush Pope, although the position was 
much less favourable and the time was short. At that season the 
Rappahannock was so low as not to constitute a serious obstacle. 
Jackson was directed to move up the river and find a crossing by 
which he could turn the P'ederal right. On the 22nd Jackson 
marched ten miles up the river from Rappahannock Station and 
crossed Early's brigade over the river at Sulphur Springs. But a 
second time the Confederates were robbed of success. Such 
heavy rain came down that the river was soon in flood, and Early's 
brigade was left isolated on the further bank. He, however, moved 
northwards, and took up a position behind one of the tributaries 
of the Rappahannock, which was also in flood, and thus Sigel's 
Corps, which formed the right of the Federal army, was prevented 
from attacking. On the 23rd Jackson repaired the ruined bridge 
at Sulphur Springs, and sent another brigade to the support of 
Early. On the morning of the 24th, as the enemy were advancing 
in force, the two brigades were withdrawn across the river. 

The same day that Early's brigade crossed to the north bank of 
the Rappahannock, Stuart, with 1,500 cavalry, also crossed the 
river still further up at Waterloo Bridge, and sweeping round 
through Warrenton, struck the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at 
Catlett's Station, where Pope's supply trains were parked. The 
conditions were favourable for a surprise. The rain was falling in 
torrents, and the night was very dark. Some 2,000 troops were 
guarding the trains, but they were quickly dispersed. A consider- 
able amount of spoil was seized, and the camp set on fire. But 
owing to the wet it was found impossible to destroy the railway 
bridge over Cedar Run, which had been the main object of the 
expedition. Before nightfall of the 23d Stuart was back again on 
the south side of the Rappahannock, having covered sixty miles 
in twenty-six hours, and bringing with him some 300 prisoners ;- 
but the most important capture was Pojie's despatch-book, which 
gave detailed information of the actual strength and disposition 
of his forces, and the reinforcements which he was expecting. 
These two movements across the river of Stuart's cavalry and 

' 2 Henderson, 142. ' 2 Henderson, 150. 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 101 

Early's infantry, and their subsequent withdrawal, had a further 
effect, unsuspected at the time, but with far-reaching consequences. 
Pope was convinced that the attempt to turn his right was 
definitely abandoned.^ 

Twice had Lee been baffled, and in both cases by sheer bad 
luck. The time, too, within which Pope's army was to be fought 
and beaten, was getting desperately short. Pope's captured 
despatch-book disclosed the fact that part of the Army of the 
Potomac had landed at Aquia Creek, and was marching to his 
aid : that a force was also concentrating at Washington, and that 
within a few days 150,000 men might be in line of battle on the 
Rappahannock.^ There were but two alternatives : either immedi- 
ate retreat — and such a movement seemed all the more necessary, 
as according to the present dispositions of the opposing armies the 
Federals were actually the nearer of the two to Richmond — or else 
some bold stroke which would compel Pope to fight at a disadvan- 
tage before he could be reinforced, and give Lee a chance of 
defeating the overwhelming strength of his enemies in detail. On 
the night of the 24th Lee and Jackson met in conference at Jeffer- 
son, whither the headquarters of the army had been moved that 
day. Then and there a plan was devised, perhaps the most daring 
in the history of warfare. Lee determined to divide his army 
under the very eyes of his enemy, and to send Jackson round by 
a wide sweep northward through Thoroughfare Gap, in the Bull 
Run Mountains, against the Federal depot of supplies at Manassas 
Junction. Pope would be forced, when his line of communications 
was broken, to fall back from the Rappahannock in the direction 
of Washington ; and an opportunity might and must be found of 
striking him a crushing blow in the process. Jackson, after 
destroying the depot at Manassas Junction and breaking up the 
railroad, was to manceuvre so as to keep Pope occupied, until Lee, 
following through Thoroughfare Gap with Longstreet's wing, 
could get up to combine in an attack upon the Army of Virginia. 

The risk run by this division of the Confederate army was 
enormous. Pope's army would be lying between the two wings 
of the Confederates : by holding Thoroughfare Gap he could 
prevent Longstreet coming through to the aid of Jackson, against 
whom he could still concentrate a greatly superior force ; or he 
might boldly assume the offensive, and crossing the Rappahannock, 
attack with his whole army Longstreet's isolated Corps. Both Lee 
and Jackson considered the risk, however great, worth running. 
They had no great opinion either of Pope's generalship or of the 
efficiency of his army, and Jackson felt himself quite competent 
to mystify his opponent during the critical days which must elapse 
before the Confederate army was concentrated again. The only 

^ 2 Henderson, 150. ^2 Henderson, 151. 



102 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

alternative was retreat, and Lee had not marched all the way from 
the James to the Rappahannock only to retire. The contemplated 
movement would have the effect of forcing Pope away from the 
reinforcements which were expected from Aquia Creek. At the 
time when the momentous resolution was arrived at, it was 
probably not known that part of McClellan's army was being 
transported not to Aquia Creek, but to Alexandria.^ 

No time was lost in carrying out the plan. Jackson in anticipa- 
tion of the movement had already withdrawn his command some 
way back from the river. Long before the dawn on the 25th the 
Valley army had commenced its famous march. None but the 
general himself knew its destination. It might be returning by 
way of Chester Gap to the scene of its former triumphs in the 
Shenandoah Valley : either Winchester or Harper's Ferry might 
be its objective. It was midnight when the column halted at 
Salem, on the Manassas railway, after a march of twenty-six miles. 
Short was the time allotted to repose. Again before the dawn of 
the 26th the army was once more on the march for Thoroughfare 
Gap, and the morning light soon revealed to it the exhilarating 
truth that it was being led against the communications of Pope 
himself. At Gainesville the Warrenton-Alexandria pike road was 
reached, and then Jackson turned south-east towards Bristoe 
Station. 

He was now thirteen miles in rear of Pope's headquarters and 
right across his line of communications.^ Bristoe Station was 
reached a little before sunset, after a march of nearly twenty-five 
miles. But more work was yet to be done before the whole army 
sought its well-earned rest. Some seven miles up the railway lay 
Manassas Junction, with its vast wealth of stores. Jackson had 
deliberately preferred to march from Gainesville to Bristoe Station 
rather than to Manassas Junction, in order to prevent Pope sending 
any reinforcements by the railway to save his depot. Trimble with 
two regiments of infantry and Stuart with his cavalry pressed on 
to Manassas. It was nearly midnight when they reached the 
Junction : only a feeble resistance was encountered, and with a 
loss of only fifteen wounded ^ the Confederates found themselves 
in possession of Pope's supplies. On the next morning Hill's and 
Taliaferro's divisions marched to join Stuart at the Junction, whilst 
Ewell's division was left at Bristoe Station to hold in check an}' 
force which Pope might send up the railway in pursuit. The 
troops at Manassas Junction celebrated a very carnival of pillage 

' 2 Henderson, 153, 240. The original design was to send the whole of the Army 
of the Potomac except Kcyes' Corps to Atjuia Creek. Thither Burnside's and Porter's 
Corps proceeded. Heintzciman's landed at Alexandria, and was followed by Franklin's 
and Sumner's. Keyes' was left in the Peninsula to garrison Fortress Monroe and its 
neighlviurhood. A detachment from the Kanawha Valley was also sent to Washington. 

^2 Henderson, 159. ^ 2 Henderson, 161 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 103 

on the 27th.i The roads were all watched by Stuart's cavalry: 
direct approach from Warrenton Junction was barred by Ewell's 
division strongly posted on Broad Run. After placing a guard 
over the liquor, Jackson directed that the magazines should be 
flung open to his wearied and famished soldiers. About 3 p.m. 
Ewell, who had advanced across Broad Run to destroy a bridge 
over another stream in his front, found himself confronted by 
Hooker's division, which had been ordered to move up the railroad 
from Warrenton Junction. After an hour's hot skirmishing Ewell 
withdrew his troops across Broad Run. He had been expressly 
ordered not to bring on a general engagement. Hooker, satisfied 
that Jackson's whole Corps was close at hand, made no attempt to 
cross the stream. 

Having reached Manassas Junction, Jackson had to consider his 
next move. To remain at the Junction was simply to court 
capture by the whole Federal army. He resolved upon a move- 
ment which might have the effect of completely mystifying Pope. 
All the stores of the Junction were given to the flames. As the 
night fell, the depot became one mighty blaze which reddened all 
the sky. Of that vast conflagration Pope was himself a witness 
from Bristoe Station, where he had just joined Hooker.^ As he 
watched the destruction of that gigantic accumulation of stores, he 
may have remembered in the bitterness of his soul the boastful 
utterances of his address to the Army of Virginia, in which he had 
called upon them to take no thought for their own lines of retreat, 
in order the better to study those of the enemy. 

The fire was still raging when Jackson withdrew his divisions 
from the scene of ruin. Moving shortly after midnight, Taliaferro's 
division marched north along the Sudley Springs road, and cross- 
ing the Warrenton turnpike, encamped on the right bank of Bull 
Run. Hill marched east, crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, 
and moved on Centreville : he left Centreville at 10 a.m. on the 
28th, and recrossing Bull Run at the Stone Bridge, took up his 
position north of the Warrenton turnpike, forming the extreme 
left of the Confederate line. Ewell's division was the last to start, 
as it had to be brought from Broad Run, where it was facing 
Hooker. It did not leave the Junction till dawn, and followed 
Hill's line of march to Blackburn's Ford : crossing Bull Run at 
that point, it moved up the left bank of the river, recrossed at the 
Stone Bridge, and took up a position on Taliaferro's left. Thus by 
the morning of the 28th Jackson had completed the larger half of 

^ About 7 a.m. on the 27tli a Federal brigade belonging to Franklin's Corps was sent 
by rail to Bull Run. It then advanced towards Manassas Junction, but was easily 
repulsed. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry followed in pursuit as far as Burke's Station, within 
twelve miles of Alexandria. 

'^ 2 Henderson, 169. "None, however, of the Federal reports mention seeing the light 
of this great fire." (2 B. & L. 506, note.) 



104 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

his task. He had swept right round the Federal flank, broken 
their hne of communications, destroyed their suppHes, and now 
established himself with his whole command on the north side of 
the Warrenton turnpike, within twelve miles of Thoroughfare Gap, 
and ready to reach out to his right and join hands with Lee, as 
soon as he should advance with Longstreet's force through the Gap. 
All this had been accomplished with the minimum of loss. 

But Jackson had not simply made his great march for the purpose 
of cutting up Pope's communications ; if that had been the sole 
object which Lee had in view, the same result might have been 
obtained more speedily and with less risk by sending Stuart's 
cavalry alone around the Federal flank. It was Jackson's further 
duty to detain Pope until Lee could come into line for a combined 
attack, and to force the Federals to turn and fight their pursuers 
on the right bank of Bull Run. If Pope were allowed to array his 
army behind Bull Run, within easy reach of Washington, Lee's 
difficulties would be immensely increased. 

It is now necessary to return to Pope and see what steps he 
took to cope with the new problem so suddenly set him by the 
Confederate leaders. Pope was a general of sanguine views and 
considerable enterprise, and within certain limits his military 
judgment was sound. What he chiefly lacked was the capacity 
for divining, as Wellington phrased it, " what the fellow on the 
other side of the hill was up to." When Pope reached the Rappa- 
hannock, he found his movements considerably hampered by 
Halleck's instructions. He was directed to hold the line of the 
Rappahannock at all costs and " fight like the devil." He was 
also ordered to keep open communications with Falmouth, from 
which point the divisions of the Army of the Potomac were to be 
sent to him, as they successively disembarked at Aquia Creek. 
To maintain this line of communications he was obliged to extend 
his left down the Rappahannock, and as his numbers were inferior 
to Lee's he would be unable to prevent a turning movement 
against his own right. He determined therefore to assume the 
offensive himself, and, when Jackson was marching up the river 
to find a crossing at Sulphur Springs, was preparing to cross the 
river by the lower fords and assail Lee's right flank and rear.^ 
But the same heavy rain which kept Early isolated on the north 
bank of the Rappahannock prevented Pope from carrying out his 
daring scheme. On the 24th, in consequence of Early's move- 
ment across the river on the 22nd, Pope was concentrating his 
army at Warrenton and upon the roads which led from that place 
to the bridges over the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs and 
Waterloo. As Jackson made no further attempt to cross his 
troops over the river at either of these two points. Pope came to 

' Ropes, Army under Pope, 39. 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 105 

the conclusion that the turning movement against his right had 
been abandoned, and on the morning of the 25th was issuing 
orders for a disposition of his forces on a line running north and 
south from Warrenton to Kelly's Ford.^ 

When, however, Jackson's march to some destination as yet 
unknown was discovered by the Federal look-outs owing to the 
clouds of dust, Pope decided that he was moving to the Shenan- 
doah Valley, and ordered Sigel and McDowell to force the 
Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and Sulphur Springs, and 
Reno commanding two divisions of Burnside's Corps ^ to cross below 
the bridge and make for Culpeper.^ No attempt was made, how- 
ever, to carry out this forward movement, except by McDowell, 
and he did not cross the river. By the night of the 26th it had 
become plain that Jackson was moving through Thoroughfare 
Gap, and Pope came to the conclusion that the Confederates 
designed to assail his right flank and rear at Warrenton. He 
realised that with Jackson in his rear and threatening his com- 
munications he must abandon the line of the Rappahannock, and 
on that night issued orders directing his army to take a position 
running east and west from Warrenton to Gainesville with a 
strong reserve at Greenwich.* But the news that the Confederates 
had struck the railroad at Manassas Junction caused him to change 
his plans, and on the morning of the 27th to order a concentra- 
tion on Gainesville. Heintzelman and Porter had just reported 
to him for duty with the 3rd and 5th Corps of the Army of the 
Potomac, and Reynolds' Pennsylvania division had also joined 
him and been assigned to McDowell's Corps. 

Thus Pope had now at his disposal a force of between 70,000 
and 80,000 men. The position which he had taken up on the 
morning of the 27th was a very strong one, as it lay across the 
direct line of communication between Lee and Jackson. If Pope's 
army remained in that position it would be impossible for Lee to 
join Jackson by way of Thoroughfare Gap. But the military 
situation quickly changed. 

Hooker's division of Heintzelman's Corps had been ordered to 
move from Warrenton Junction, and in the afternoon came into 
contact with Ewell at Broad Run. 

It was quite a surprise to Pope to learn that the whole of 
Jackson's Corps was across his line of communications. He had 
hitherto supposed that the Confederate force at Manassas was 
merely cavalry and the movement a repetition of Stuart's raid 
against Catlett's Station. The prospect of capturing Jackson's 
entire command disturbed his mental balance, and his subsequent 

' Ropes, Army under Pope, 46. 

'^ These two divisions were commanded by Stevens and Reno, who, though tem- 
porarily acting as Corps commander, retained direct control over his own division. 
'^ 2 Henderson, 170. * Ropes, Ariny under Pope, 52. 



106 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

mancEUvres revealed him as the victim of a strong delusion. It 
was not given to such a capacity as Tope's to fathom the far- 
reaching and daring plans of Lee and Jackson. His one guiding 
principle was that the enemy would adopt the course which he 
wished them to adopt. He made up his mind that Jackson would 
remain in the entrenchments at Manassas, and there offer battle 
to the whole Federal army. Accordingly on the night of the 
27th he ordered a concentration of all his force on Manassas 
Junction. "March at the very earliest blush of dawn," were his 
orders, " and we shall bag the whole crowd." All thought of the 
possible movement of the other half of the Confederate army 
vanished out of his mind. He ordered McDowell, whose troops 
lay between Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap, to march with 
all his forces to Manassas, and thus opened to Lee the road by 
which he could reunite with Jackson. McDowell, whose military 
judgment was far superior to that of his commander, on his own 
responsibility left a division under Ricketts to hold the all- 
important Gap. 

So convinced was Pope that he would find Jackson waiting for 
him at Manassas, that he sent no scouts to make sure of his 
intended victim's presence,^ although ]kistoe Station, where he 
had established his headquarters on the night of the 27th, was 
only seven miles from Manassas Junction. The truth did not 
dawn upon him until about noon of the 28th, when with the 3rd 
Corps and Reno's two divisions he reached the Junction only to 
find it absolutely deserted and the birds flown without leaving a 
trace behind them. 

After some hours of perplexity, news arrived that the enemy 
had been seen at Centreville : and at 4.15 p.m. Pope issued an 
order directing all his troops on Centreville. The march of 
A. P. Hill's division through that place had had the desired effect 
of completely mystifying Pope. Thus, for the Federals, the 28th 
was an entirely wasted day. Over 60,000 men (excluding Banks' 
Corps, which was guarding the trains at VVarrenton Junction), 
were marching and countermarching within easy reach of 25,000 
Confederates, who were hidden in the woods north of the VVarren- 
ton turnpike. The two armies actually came into contact in the 
course of the morning. Sigel and Reynolds marching according 
to Pope's orders from the neighbourhood of Gainesville to 
Manassas encountered upon the Warrenton turnpike a brigade 
of Taliaferro's division, which opened fire upon them. The Con- 
federates finding themselves outnumbered quickly withdrew into 
the woods, and Sigel and Reynolds continued on their way. They 
had been told that Jackson was at Manassas Junction, and 
supposed that this force, which they had just encountered, was a 

' 2 Ropes, 268. 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 107 

mere reconnoitring party. Its true significance was not realised, 
and Pope continued to march eastwards in pursuit of a foe, who 
had already withdrawn to the west. It was not until near sunset 
that the real position of Jackson was at length revealed to his 
bewildered pursuer. About that hour King's division of McDowell's 
Corps was marching along the turnpike towards Centreville. 

As the day wore on Jackson was himself in considerable per- 
plexity as to the movements of his foe. It was no part of the 
combined plan of action that Pope should be allowed to take up a 
fresh position behind Bull Run within easy reach of reinforcements 
coming from Washington. 

In the afternoon a Federal courier was captured with McDowell's 
order to all the troops under his command, practically the left and 
centre of Pope's army, to march to Manassas Junction.^ Jackson 
began to fear that Pope was retreating behind Bull Run, and for 
greater security was taking the longer route vm Manassas instead 
of the direct road along the turnpike over the Stone Bridge.^ 
When he saw King's division moving along the road he supposed 
it to be the flank guard of McDowell's Corps. The moment for 
which he had been waiting was come. He knew that Longstreet 
was forcing his way through Thoroughfare Gap.^ McDowell's 
captured order and the presence of King with his face set towards 
Centreville were sufficient proof that whatever force still con- 
fronted Longstreet would be easily swept aside. If, as Jackson 
supposed, King's command was but the flank guard of a larger 
force, then so much the better. For the larger the force which 
was attacked, the greater was the probability that Pope would be 
brought back into Lee's clutches. 

It was a strange game of cross purposes : Pope, as he imagined, 
in pursuit of Jackson, marching away from him to Centreville : 
Jackson, under the impression that the Federals were retreating, 
attacking a force which was moving in pursuit of himself. But 
whether the Federals were pursuing or retreating, it was essential 
that Pope and the bulk of his army should be brought back from 
Centreville in the direction of Gainesville. Jackson's attack on 
King was designed to that end, and proved eminently successful. 
The fight on the evening of the 28th, which raged for about an 
hour and a half a little to the west of Groveton, was carried on by 
two divisions of Jackson's Corps with two brigades of King's 
division. The Federals were taken by surprise when the batteries 
opened upon them, but imagining that they had to deal only with 
Stuart's horse artillery, quickly deployed into line and advanced 
against the hidden foe. It was not till the Federals were close to 
the woods north of the high road that the Confederate infantry 
showed themselves. The struggle which ensued was carried on 

* 2 Henderson, 177. ^2 Henderson, 179. ^2 Henderson, 178. 



108 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

with the utmost determination at close quarters, and on both sides 
the losses were heavy. No flank movement was executed, and as 
night fell the Federals, finding themselves outnumbered, drew back 
to the road. They had lost about 1,100, nearly half the whole 
number of troops engaged:^ the Confederate loss was even 
lieavier, and included among the wounded the two divisional 
commanders, Ewell and Taliaferro. 

When Jackson on the night of the 24th withdrew his command 
from the right bank of the Rappahannock, Longstreet brought 
his troops up from near the railway bridge and took the vacant 
position opposite Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, whilst Anderson's 
division took Longstreet's place at the railway bridge. 

On the 25th both Longstreet and Anderson kept up demon- 
strations against the enemy on the opposite bank. Late in the 
afternoon of the 26th Longstreet started to follow Jackson's line 
of march, and Anderson moved up the river to take Longstreet's 
place. Longstreet's marching was by no means so speedy as that 
of Jackson. He only covered thirty miles in two days. At 3 p.m. 
on the 28th 2 he reached Thoroughfare Gap and found Ricketts' 
division in position at the eastern end. After a long skirmish 
Longstreet was obliged to send three brigades over the mountain 
by Hopewell Gap, north of Thoroughfare Gap ; and Ricketts, 
finding himself in danger of being outflanked, fell back in the 
evening to Gainesville.^ 

The position on the night of the 28th was as follows : Jackson 
held a line north of the Warrenton turnpike, stretching from near 
Groveton to Bull Run, commanding the Sudley Springs Ford : 
he thus covered an alternative line of retreat northward by Aldie 
Gap, which he could utilise in case Longstreet failed to get 
through Thoroughfare Gap, to unite with the rest of Lee's army 
west of the Bull Run Mountains. 

Longstreet, twelve miles away, held the Gap, and ought to be in 
position on Jackson's right the following morning. Anderson was 
behind Longstreet. 

On the Federal side Ricketts was at Gainesville, still separating 
the two wings of the Confederate army. King's division was on 
the Warrenton turnpike, confronting Jackson's right and centre, 
and in connection with Ricketts on its left. On the right of King 
came Reynolds' division, and on Reynolds' right was Sigel's Corps. 
Pope's orders and counter-orders had failed to concentrate his 
army at Centreville, where only Kearny's division of the 3rd Corps 
and Reno's two divisions had encamped. Hooker's division was 

' 2 Henderson, 183, who cstimales tlie Feilcral force engaged at 2,800. The two 
Feilcral l)riga(les engaged were Gilibon's and Doubleday's. 2 Ropes, 272. 

^ 2 Ropes, 274. 

' Besides the three lirigades which went througli Hopewell Gap, Hood's division 
climl>ed over the mountain at Thoroughfare by a trail (2 B. & L., 517). 




Confederates 



Methum &. Co, 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 109 

still south of Bull Run. The 5th Corps was at Bristoe Station, 
and Banks was east of Warrenton Junction with the trains. A 
superior force was in front of Jackson, and Ricketts at Gainesville 
still intervened between him and Longstreet. But before the 
dawn of the 29th an alteration in the relative position of the two 
armies had taken place, which seriously prejudiced Pope's chance 
of success in case he chose to assume the offensive. About i a.m. 
King fell back to Manassas, and Ricketts, finding himself isolated, 
followed suit and retired to Bristoe Station. The road was now 
open to Longstreet to bring his Corps into line with Jackson's. 

Pope totally misread the situation. He believed that Jackson 
was retreating towards Thoroughfare Gap, and had been inter- 
cepted by McDowell. By some process of reasoning, peculiar to 
himself, he had arrived at the conclusion that there was nothing 
to fear from Longstreet's Corps during the 29th.^ On that day he 
expected to crush Jackson with overwhelmingly superior numbers, 
and ordered a general concentration of his army on the Warrenton 
turnpike. But at this stage of the campaign Pope had lost touch 
with his different Corps. He did not know that both Ricketts and 
King had fallen back to the Orange and Alexandria Railway, and 
that Hooker had not crossed Bull Run. McDowell had spent the 
night vainly looking for Pope, and during his absence Ricketts 
and King, acting on their own responsibility, had withdrawn from 
their positions. The task of holding Jackson fast, until Pope could 
bring up his right wing from beyond Bull Run, devolved upon 
Sigel, who, supported by Reynolds, formed the F"ederal centre. 

In anticipation of the coming battle (see Plan) Jackson had with- 
drawn his right from beyond Groveton towards the left, so as 
to connect with Hill's division, whose left was necessarily fixed 
near Bull Run. The line which he held was that of an unfinished 
railroad running from Sudley Springs to Gainesville.^ Its high 
embankments and deep cuttings gave admirable cover to the 
Confedcates, and constituted no inconsiderable obstacle to any 
assaulting force. Jackson's whole line only covered 3,000 yards, 
and thus he was enabled to hold back one-half of his force in 
reserve. His corps now numbered 18,000 infantry, with 40 guns, 
and 2,500 cavalry disposed upon the flanks.^ The force which 
Pope brought to bear against Jackson's position on the 29th con- 
sisted of Sigel's Corps and Reynolds' division with the 3rd Corps 
and Reno's divisions numbering about 35,000 men.* But of this 
force only Sigel and Reynolds were actually in position on the 
morning of the 29th : Heintzelman's and Reno's troops had to be 
brought from Centreville, and did not reach the field of battle until 
noon. 

1 2 Ropes, 278. 2 2 Ropes, 283. 

^ 2 Henderson, 190. * 2 Ropes, 282. 



no THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Sigel's first attack was badly managed : the disposition of his 
divisions was faulty; the assault was made piecemeal/ and prac- 
tically the bulk of the fighting fell upon two brigades which 
attacked Hill's left and were repulsed without very much diffi- 
culty. Before noon he made a second and fiercer attack, mainly 
directed as before against Hill's division on the Confederate left. 
Again the attack was repulsed ; but Hill was this time obliged to 
bring up a brigade from his reserve to support his front line.'^ By 
now the troops from Centrevillc, at least 17,000 in number, had 
arrived upon the field, and they were ordered to assault Hill's 
position under Pope's personal direction. This attack, delivered by 
Hooker's and one of Reno's divisions, was more fiercely pressed 
home than either of its predecessors. Hill's two front lines were 
seriously shaken : twice the railway embankment was lost and 
won : at last Hill put in Pender's brigade from his reserve, and the 
Federal column was driven back. But Pender pushed the counter- 
stroke too far,^ following the retreating enemy into the open ground, 
and coming under the fire of their batteries. As he fell back within 
the woods a fresh assault was delivered : Grover's brigade of 
Hooker's division was ordered forward. Advancing with the utmost 
gallantry, it struck the disordered Confederates a tremendous blow. 
Hill's division went reeling back from the railroad, and the men, 
breaking from their ranks, fled for refuge towards the guns, which 
were stationed about five hundred yards in rear of the fighting 
line. But there were no reserves to support Grover's charge ; and 
Jackson hurried into action Forno's brigade, which he had brought 
from the extreme right, where it had originally been posted to 
connect with Longstreet's Corps. Grover's brigade was disordered 
by the fury of its own charge, and when attacked in front by this 
new brigade and pressed on its left flank by an advance of Talia- 
ferro's line, was driven back after a desperate struggle, lasting only 
twenty minutes from first to last, across the turnpike with tremen- 
dous loss. 

The fifth and last assault was made about 4.30 p.m. by Kearney's 
division and Stevens' of Reno's Corps. Like the others, it was 
mainly directed against Hill's position. The Confederate left had 
suffered heavily ; all the brigades of Hill's division had been 
engaged : the men were weary, and the supply of ammunition was 
running out. When the final assault came, Hill's exhausted troops, 
still fighting desperately, were pushed back, and the Federals pene- 
trated 300 yards within the Confederate lines.* But Jackson, 
watching the battle from the ridge, where his artillery was posted, 
was ready with his counterstroke. He still had Early's brigade, 
brought like Forno's from the extreme right, in reserve, and he 

* 2 Henderson, 192. ^ Branch's brigade (2 Henderson, 194). 

• 2 Henderson, 196. * 2 Henderson, 200. 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 111 

now sent it forward, supported by two regiments of Ewell's division, 
to restore the battle on the left at the point of the bayonet. 
Early accomplished his task brilliantly: once again the Federal 
ranks, disordered by the hard struggle and the advance through 
thick woods, were unable to resist the shock of a smaller but more 
compact force. They were speedily driven back across the turn- 
pike ; and with this repulse of Kearny and Reno the battle of the 
29th, so far as Jackson's Corps was concerned, ended. 

Jackson had confronted, at any rate since noon, a force greatly 
his superior in numbers ; but in none of the five assaults, which 
were all frontal, had he to deal with a body of men stronger than 
his own command. 

Pope had proved himself a poor tactician. No attempt was 
made to turn Hill's left, and the successive assaults lacked unity. 
Pope, however, was not much troubled at first by the repeated 
failures of his right and centre to carry Jackson's position. He 
was relying upon his left wing, under McDowell and Porter, to fall 
upon Jackson's right, which he believed to be exposed to a flank 
attack. 

On the morning of the 29th Porter, with the 5th Corps, had 
already passed Manassas Junction on his way to Centreville, when 
he was turned back by a fresh order directing him to take King's 
division, as well as his own force, and march on Gainesville. He 
was presently overtaken by McDowell, and yet another order was 
received from Pope, which proved to be based on a complete 
misconception of the facts. His own and McDowell's Corps were 
directed to move towards Gainesville so as to connect with the 
rest of the Federal army on the Warrenton turnpike. As the 
point on which Pope specially insisted in this order was that they 
must be prepared to withdraw behind Bull Run that night for 
the sake of supplies, it did not seem likely that an attack on 
Jackson was contemplated, but merely an union of the two 
Federal wings with a view to retiring behind Bull Run and 
giving battle to the united forces of Lee and Jackson, which 
might be expected at Centreville by the evening of the 30th. 
When within three and a half miles of Gainesville, McDowell and 
Porter found themselves confronted by a hostile force of uncertain 
size and strongly posted ; at the same time sounds of the fierce 
struggle on the Warrenton turnpike could be heard. It was plain 
to both commanders that Pope's order had been issued under an 
entire misunderstanding of the actual situation. They were 
already confronted by Longstreet's Corps, which had arrived upon 
the scene a day earlier than Pope anticipated ; and it was equally 
plain that Jackson was not retreating, but making a firm stand. 
A despatch was also received from Buford, one of the cavalry 
generals, to the effect that a strong force of Confederates had 



112 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE TTNITED STATES 

already passed through Gainesville, and the clouds of dust rising 
in the same direction showed that the movement was still con- 
tinuing. Under those per[)lexing circumstances, the two generals 
after a consultation decided to se[wratc. McDowell marched with 
King's division to the right towards the fielii of battle, slowly 
followed by Ricketts' division from Bristoe Station. This force 
reached the field too late to take any part in the battle on the 
north side of the high-road, though King's division was sharply 
engaged towards evening, but not with Jackson's Corps. 

i'orter was left with his own Corps, numbering about 9,000 
men, confronting a Confederate force of unknown strength, but 
knowing that Longstreet could easily concentrate an overwhelming 
force against him. Accordingly he did little more than hold his 
position during the rest of the day, making an occasional demon- 
stration to prevent reinforcements being sent to Jackson's aid. 
In this object he was distinctly successful. For Longstreet, with 
a greatly superior force, allowed himself to be " contained " for the 
greater part of the day by Porter's single Corps.^ 

Lee had moved Longstreet's troops through Thoroughfare Gap 
on the morning of the 29th, and pushed forward through Gaines- 
ville to support Jackson. On that day it seemed as though the 
object of Jackson's daring tlank march was completely accom- 
plished. The two wings of the Confederate army were practically 
united ; their opponents were disorganised ; the various Corps 
had lost touch with each other, and Pope was hopelessly be- 
wildered. But Longstreet was a difficult man to move ; he dis- 
liked plunging into an engagement until he had thoroughly 
realised the position. Three times did Lee urge him to attack.- 
It was not till evening was drawing on that he could be persuaded 
to make so much as a strong reconnaissance. Hood's division was 
sent forward on the high-road and quickly came into collision 
with the division of King, which had at last arrived on the Federal 
left. The encounter was short but sharp ; the Federals were 
pushed back a mile and a half and abandoned one gun.^ But 
after midnight Hood withdrew from his advanced position. 

The night of the 29th saw Jackson firmly holding his ground 
in spite of the assaults of one-half of the Federal army, and 
Longstreet was in position on his right. A great opportunity 
had been missed owing to Longstreet's slowness ; and Lee did 
not intend to assume the offensive on the 30th. He knew that 
D. H. Hill's, JNIcLaws', and Walker's divisions had already 
crossed the Rappahannock, and were marching to his support. 
He determined, before making any fresh movement, to wait until 
these reinforcements should have joined him.^ Jackson's Corps 

' On the controversy rcc-inlinR Porter's movements on tlie 29th, see 2 Ropes, 277-82. 
■'' 2 llcmlcrson, 202. ' 2 Rojk-s, 2S4 ; 2 Ilcmlcrson, 202. * 2 Henderson, 206-7. 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 113 

was now at any rate safe, and the most pressing anxiety re- 
moved. It was to be left to Pope to settle what the next move 
should be. 

It might naturally have been expected that Pope, who in his 
Joint Order to McDowell and Porter on the 29th had insisted on 
the necessity of retiring that night behind Bull Run, would, after 
his failure to carry Jackson's position, especially as he was now 
informed that Longstreet was close at hand, withdraw behind Bull 
Run, where he might reasonably expect to be reinforced by the 
Corps of Sumner and Franklin. These he knew had landed at 
Alexandria, and Halleck had promised that they should be 
pushed forward with all speed to join him. But Pope flung 
prudence to the winds. He was furious with Porter because that 
officer had failed to fall upon Jackson's right, erroneously sup- 
posed by Pope to be " in the air." The mere fact that it was 
Porter who, amongst others,^ reported the close approach of 
Longstreet's Corps, was quite enough to make Pope disbelieve the 
information. He had already convinced himself that he was 
being sacrificed to the jealousy of the officers of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

During the night Hood's division had fallen back on the high- 
road, and Jackson's troops had also retired from the positions 
which they had held at the close of the fighting on the 29th to the 
shelter of the woods. McDowell and Heintzelman, after a per- 
sonal reconnaissance on the morning of th« 30th, reported that 
Jackson was, in their opinion, retreating.^ Pope was only too 
ready to believe this report. He knew that thus far he had been 
a failure, and that he had lost the confidence of his soldiers, but 
there was a chance of retrieving his lost reputation by a bold 
stroke. He gladly imagined that Longstreet had fallen back 
through Thoroughfare Gap and that Jackson was following him. 
Accordingly, on the morning of the 30th, he issued an order for a 
general pursuit of Jackson under the direction of McDowell. For 
this purpose McDowell had under his orders Porter's Corps and 
Reynold's division as well as his own Corps. The other Federal 
wing was to follow a road running from Sudley Springs to Hay- 
market and about a mile and a half north of the Warrenton 
turnpike.^ 

Thus had Pope delivered himself into the hands of the enemy. 
The very opportunity which Lee on the night of the 29th believed 
to have been lost, was presented again owing to Pope's determina- 
tion to pursue instead of retiring behind Bull Run. By the morn- 
ing of the 30th the whole Confederate army was in position. 
Jackson's line was that which he had held on the morning of the 

^ Reynold's and Buford also informed Pope of Longstreet's position (2 Ropes, 284). 
'^ 2 Ropes, 286. ^ 2 Ropes, 289. 



114 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

previous day behind the embankment of the unfinished railway. 
Longstreet's Corps was arrayed south of the Warrenton road. In 
front of Jackson's right there was an open space half a mile or 
more wide reaching to the woods where the Federal left wing was 
forming for attack. Longstreet had stationed eighteen guns 
between his left and Jackson's right so as to command this space. 
He had cast aside his hesitation of the previous day and was 
already preparing to turn the Federal left by the old stage road 
which runs about a mile south of the turnpike.^ 

It was soon apparent to McDowell that Jackson was not re- 
treating at all ; he recalled the troops under his command to their 
original positions on the turnpike. Reynolds on the extreme 
Federal left reported that the enemy was in force on his exposed 
flank. McDowell thereupon ordered Reynolds to fall back and 
hold Bald Hill, so as to cover the Federal left flank and rear, and 
directed Sigel and Ricketts to send troops to Bald Hill and the 
Henry House Hill respectively as a further protection to the 
Federal line of communications. In spite of the fact that the 
position quickly revealed itself as very different to what Pope had 
imagined, the Federal Commander-in-Chief was still resolved that 
Porter should assault Jackson's right. The movement from the 
outset was doomed to disastrous failure. Porter had to cross the 
open space of meadowland swept by the direct fire of Jackson's 
artillery and infantry and by the enfilading fire of Longstreet's 
batteries posted on Jackson's right ; and his supports both on the 
right and left flank were being withdrawn to protect the Federal 
rear from the attack threatened by Longstreet's whole corps. 
Human fatuity could go no further. 

Between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m.^ Porter moved out to the assault. It 
was of necessity, as prescribed by Pope's commands, a frontal 
attack. Three times was the assault renewed. So hard pressed 
was the Confederate left under Hill, which was assailed by King's 
division (now commanded by Hatch), that Jackson signalled to 
Longstreet for reinforcements.'* The latter, who had matured his 
own plans for a crushing counterstroke, sent two fresh batteries to 
join the eighteen guns already posted on Jackson's right. So 
furious a fire swept the open meadowland that Sykes, who formed 
the reserve for Porter's assault, was unable to get his troops across 
the exposed space to support the attack. Left without support, 
the assaulting divisions fell back, having suffered heavy loss. The 
P'cderal offensive movement for that day was over. It never 
ought to have been attempted. 

As Porter's troops fell back Lee saw that the time had come 
for his counterstroke. Longstreet's Corps was already moving to 
the attack in anticipation of the order. Jackson's Corps was 

> 2 Kdjx's, 292. ^ 2 Ropes, 293. * 2 Ilcnilcrson, 2i6. 



Aug., 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 115 

ordered to advance so as to cover Longstreet's left. The whole 
Confederate army bore down upon Pope. Its line of battle 
covered a front of four miles.^ Every division was in at least two 
lines, and in the centre of Longstreet's Corps eight brigades were 
massed one behind the other. Jackson's advance drove back the 
divisions of Stevens, Ricketts, Kearny, and Hooker from suc- 
cessive positions towards the Stone Bridge. South of the turnpike 
rose Bald Hill and the Henry House Hill. The former had 
originally been held by Reynolds' division, but Pope after witness- 
ing the repulse of Porter's Corps withdrew Reynolds from that 
position, and directed him to cross the turnpike and form a line, 
behind which Porter's defeated troops might rally. Thus the hill 
which protected the Federal left was only held by a single 
brigade.'^ After a desperate struggle it was carried by the Con- 
federates, and the repeated efforts of Sigel's Corps supported by 
two of Ricketts' brigades failed to retake it.^ From Bald Hill 
Longstreet's Corps swept forward to the Henry House Hill. But 
there they found themselves confronted with a harder task. The 
safety of the Federal army depended on that hill being held ; if it 
were captured, retreat over the Stone Bridge would be imprac- 
ticable. Sykes' regulars and Reynolds' Pennsylvanians were in 
position on the hill, which became the rallying point for the troops 
south of the turnpike. The divisions of Longstreet made desperate 
and repeated efforts to capture the all-important position. But 
the swift advance and the hard fighting on Bald Hill had thrown 
them into some disorder. Their attacks on the Henry House 
Hill lacked unity, and the artillery had been left too far in the 
rear to render efficient aid. An hour more of daylight would have 
enabled the Confederates to win a tremendous victory. Jackson, 
on the north of the turnpike, was already in possession of the 
Matthews Hill within 1,400 yards of the Federal line of retreat 
over Bull Run.^ With the Henry House Hill in their possession 
also the Confederates would have commanded the approach to the 
Stone Bridge from both sides. Night put an end to the battle. 
The Federal left wing still held possession of the Henry House 
Hill, and under cover of the darkness the whole Federal army 
was withdrawn across Bull Run and made its way to Centreville.^ 
The position which it held there on the morning of the 31st 
was a strong one. It was behind entrenchments with abundant 
supplies and reinforced by two fresh Corps of the Army of the 
Potomac, Sumner's and Franklin's, numbering 20,000 veterans. 
Lee determined on another turning movement : on the afternoon 
of the 31st the indefatigable Jackson crossed Bull Run by Sudley 

^ 2 Henderson, 220. * Warren's 

' 2 Ropes, 295. ■* 2 Henderson, 224. 

^ Pope's retreat is condemned as unnecessary by 2 Ropes, 299-302. 



116 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Ford, and having reached the Little River turnpike which runs 
into the Warrenton road six miles east of Centreville, advanced 
along it to Pleasant Valley. There he halted for the night, being 
within five miles of Centreville. Longstreet followed Jackson late 
in the afternoon but did not cross Bull Run that evening. 

Next day (September ist) Jackson moved slowly forward, pre- 
ceded by Stuart's cavalry. Late in the afternoon he came into 
contact with a Federal force. This proved to be Stevens' division, 
which Pope had directed to take up a position on the Little River 
turnpike, so as to cover his flank as he continued his retreat to 
P'airfax Court House. A fierce engagement ensued between 
Jackson's two leading divisions and Stevens' command reinforced 
by Kearny's division to the accompaniment of a severe thunder- 
storm. Night and the violence of the storm combined to put an 
end to the combat, which is generally known as the battle of 
Chantilly. Both sides had suffered severely and the Federals lost 
both their generals. Jackson's advance was checked, and Pope 
reached P'airfax Court House without interruption. 

By this time the Federal commander had lost all confidence in 
his troops. He represented them in his reports to Halleck as 
profoundly demoralised. He himself attributed his failure to the 
jealousy of the officers of the Army of the Potomac, especially 
Porter. To his prejudiced eye the arrival of two veteran Corps 
commanded by generals of acknowledged ability seemed only a 
source of weakness. Although his army now largely outnumbered 
that of Lee, he abandoned all idea of taking the offensive and 
urged that his troops should be withdrawn to the fortifications of 
Washington. Halleck acceded to his request, and by the morning 
of the 3rd the whole army was safe within the lines in front of 
the Capital. McClellan had already been appointed to the com- 
mand of the troops in and around Washington, and on the 5th 
Pope, who had been vainly hoping that the army would be re- 
organised under officers chosen by himself, was relieved of his 
command. With Pope's retirement the short life of the Army of 
Virginia came to an end. The name disappeared ; and the troops 
were merged in the Army of the Potomac, which shortly took the 
field under its old commander, McClellan. 

Lee's campaign had been brilliantly successful. He had driven 
his opponent from his advanced position on the Rapidan across 
the Rappahannock and Bull Run, and forced him to seek shelter 
under the guns of Washington. He had captured 30 guns, 20,000 
rifles, and 7,000 prisoners, besides inflicting on his foe a loss in 
killed and wounded of 13,500, at a cost to his own army of only 
10,000.^ This great feat he had accomplished with an army con- 
siderably smaller than that which he had so signally defeated. 

' 2 Henderson, 2ji. 



Sept.. 1862] THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 117 

After reaching the Rappahannock Pope's army, originally the 
smaller, was reinforced from the Army of the Potomac until it 
became the larger. During the fighting of the 29th and 30th the 
Federal force numbered between 70,000 and 75,000 ; the army 
which on 2nd September retired within the fortifications of 
Washington exceeded 80,000. Throughout the campaign Lee 
never had more than 55,000 men.^ 

Judging by results, the campaign was a masterpiece of offensive 
strategy. It has been criticised as overbold. To divide an army 
in the face of superior numbers and reunite it on the battlefield is 
an achievement of the greatest daring and difficulty. But Lee 
had thoroughly taken Pope's measure. Probably there was no 
other Federal general against whom he would have adopted such 
an audacious plan of campaign. Nor would he have ventured 
on such a movement unless he had had Jackson to play the 
principal part in it. The risk that Jackson ran was more apparent 
than real. Pope's captured despatch-book had revealed the dis- 
positions of his troops. He had failed to take any advantage of 
Early's and Stuart's presence on his side of the Rappahannock 
on the 22nd August. The superiority of Stuart's cavalry to that 
of the Federals, which during the later stages of the campaign 
was worn out by the heavy work which Pope had required of it 
throughout, tended to diminish considerably the risks attending 
Jackson's march : and the critical period was practically over on 
the morning of the 28th, when Jackson in position north of the 
Warrenton road had an alternative line of retreat through Aldie 
Gap, by which he could have rejoined Longstreet west of the Bull 
Run Mountains. 

^ 2 Henderson, 231. In 2 B. & L., 500, it is estimated that the Federal force 
engaged on the 29th and 30th numbered 63,000 (this does not include Banks' Corps, 
which numbered over 8,000) ; and the Confederate force is reckoned as 54,000. 



CHAPTER XI 

LEE'S FIRST INVASION OF THE NORTH— THE 
ANTIETAM (OR SHARPSBURG) 

Reasons for the invasion of Maryland — Difficulties to be faced — Jackson at Frederick 
City — Position in the Shenandoah Valley— Lee's plan for the reduction of Harper's 
Ferry — Jackson's march — Surrender of Harper's Ferry — McClellan's difficult position — 
Reasons for the slowness of his advance — "The lost despatch" — McClclIan fails to rise 
to the occasion — McClellan forces Turner's Gap — Franklin forces Crampton's Gap — 
Lee's daring resolve — His reasons for offering battle — Criticism of Lee's judgment — 
The battlefield of the Antietam — Position of Lee's forces — Lack of co-operation on 
Franklin's part — McClellan's advance — Jackson rejoins Lee — McClellan hesitates to 
attack — Advance of Hooker across the Antietam ; he is followed by Mansfield — 
McClellan's plan of battle — Hooker attacks Jackson — Hooker's repulse — Mansfield 
takes up the attack — Re]nilse of Mansfield's Corps — Position of Confederate left — Rein- 
forcements sent from the right — Advance of the 2nd Corps — Sedgwick crosses the 
turnpike — Jackson's counterstroke — Arrival of Franklin — Repulse of the Confederate 
charge — Withdrawal of Greene's division— The battle of the centre — Advance of French 
— Advance of Richardson — McClellan's failure to follow up success — Burnside on the 
Federal left — The 9th Corps crosses the Antietam — Advance on Sharpsburg — Arrival 
of A. P. Hill — Repulse of the Federal left — Losses — Lee determines to hold on — Con- 
templated counterstroke by Jackson found impossible — Lee retires across the Potomac — 
Criticism of Lee's tactics — Criticism of McClellan's tactics. 

A FTER Jackson's failure on tlie ist September to strike Pope's 
/-A line of retreat and the latter's prompt withdrawal of his army 
to the shelter of the Washington fortifications, Lee rested 
his troops for one day. 

Any attempt to attack or invest the lines of Washington was 
wholly out of the question. It remained for him either to stand 
on the defensive in Virginia, or to cross the Potomac into Mary- 
land and transfer the scene of operations to Northern soil. On 
the 3rd the Confederate army was moving in the direction of 
Leesburg. Lee had determined to carry out the movement which 
ought to have been made a year ago after the first battle of Bull 
Run,^ To remain on the defensive in Virginia was simply to 
abandon the initiative to the enemy, to allow him at his own time 
and in his own way to resume the offensive with an army whose 
moral would have been restored and numbers largely increased. 

The invasion of Maryland had much to commend it. It would 
relieve the inhabitants of Virginia of the pressure of the war upon 

* See Cap. VI. 
118 



Sept., 1862] LEE^S FIRST INVASION OF THE NORTH 119 

their fields and would enable the rich crops of the Shenandoah 
Valley and other fertile districts to be gathered in safely. It 
might open up a valuable recruiting-ground in Maryland. In any 
case the fears of the Washington Government would be so 
excited by the possibility of a rising in Maryland, that they would 
almost certainly abandon all thought of pressing on to Richmond, 
and thus valuable time would be secured for strengthening the 
fortifications of the Southern capital. It would bring home to the 
Northerner the horrors of war, when he found his own territory 
invaded : one victory gained by Lee on Northern soil would have 
a greater effect on Northern sentiment than several victories won 
in Confederate territory. At the best, Lee hoped that he might 
deal his foe such a blow as would bring the war to an end. 

His original plan was, after crossing the Potomac to move west- 
wards into Pennsylvania and draw the Federal army after him so 
far from either Washington or Baltimore that, in case of the 
victory which he anticipated, his enemy would have no chance of 
escaping the full consequences of his defeat by withdrawing, as 
he had done after Manassas, to the shelter of some impregnable 
position. A crushing defeat inflicted upon McClellan's army in 
Pennsylvania was not unlikely to turn the general feeling of the 
North in favour of peace, especially if European Powers were to 
put pressure upon the Federal Government to abandon a struggle 
which seemed hopeless. A victory won on Northern soil might 
serve as a pretext for foreign intervention. 

Far-reaching as was Lee's plan, he did not blind himself to the 
weakness of the instrument with which he was to carry it out. 
Since the battle of the Second Manassas, he had been reinforced 
by the divisions of D. H. Hill, McLaws, and Walker with Hamp- 
ton's cavalry. These reinforcements probably did not do much 
more than make good the losses incurred during the recent 
arduous campaign. The number of stragglers in the Confederate 
army had been very great, largely owing to the want of shoes. 
A considerable part of the army was marching barefoot, and the 
line of its march could be traced by the bloody marks of unshod 
feet. The insufficient food and green diet, which had been the lot 
of too many during the great flank march and subsequent days of 
hard fighting, had spread dysentery and similar diseases through 
the ranks. It is doubtful if Lee crossed the Potomac with more 
than 55,000 men.^ His transport also was bad, as the animals 
were greatly weakened by the privations and hardships of the last 
few weeks ; and especially he was afraid lest his supply of 
ammunition should run short. 

' 2 Ropes, 337, note ; 2 Henderson, 257, note. Palfrey, 68, gives the Confederate 
strength at a low estimate at 40,000. Colonel Taylor, Lee's Adjutant-General, puts it 
as low as 35,000. 



120 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

But in spite of these disadvantages Lee determined to take the 
risk. At the worst he calculated to be able to lengthen out the 
campaign in Federal territory so that no fresh movement against 
Richmond would be possible till the following spring. Having 
resolved upon the movement, he lost no time in executing it. It 
was useless to wait for further reinforcements, as President Davis 
had decided to devote his chief attention to the war in Tennessee 
and Kentucky, where for the time fortune was smiling upon the 
Confederates. Between the 4th and 7th of September the Con- 
federates were crossing the Potomac. On the 7th Jackson occu- 
pied Frederick City,^ and was quickly followed by the other 
Confederate divisions : whilst Stuart's cavalry formed an im- 
penetrable screen, which baffled all the attempts of the Washing- 
ton Government to gain information as to their enemy's plan of 
campaign. 

The Confederate invasion of Maryland necessitated a change in 
their line of communications. As long as they remained on the 
Virginia side of the Potomac they had relied for their supplies 
upon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. That line had now to 
be abandoned, and henceforth they must depend upon the Shenan- 
doah Valley for their communications. The P'^ederals held three 
fortified posts in the Valley. Some 8,000 men occupied Harper's 
Ferry, and smaller garrisons held Winchester and Martinsburg. 
Lee had expected that upon his advance into Mar)-Iand these 
garrisons would be withdrawn. McClellan urged Halleck to recall 
them and attach them to the Army of the Potomac as a welcome 
reinforcement for the forthcoming campaign. Halleck, however, 
decided to retain these garrisons in the Valley, in violation of 
every principle of sound strategy.- When Lee found that, con- 
trary to his expectation, Federal troops still remained in the 
Valley, he decided that their capture was essential to the safety 
of his communications. A year later, when for the second time 
he invaded Maryland, he judged otherwise, and left a Federal 
garrison in Harper's Ferry undisturbed.^ But he was probably 
influenced also by a very natural desire to capture so large a body 
of P"ederal troops, which Halleck's defective strategy had left 
absolutely at his mercy. To effect this object he resolved to 
divide his army once more, calculating upon McClellan's well- 
known slowness of movement to be able to reunite his forces west 
of the mountains before a pitched battle should become imminent. 

On the 9th the Confederate leader issued his orders at Frederick 
City for a movement on the following day. Jackson, with the 
three divisions of his own command was, after crossing the South 
Mountain range, to ford the Potomac at a point west of Harper's 

' See Map IV. - 2 Ropes, 331 ; Palfrey, 19. 

^ 2 Rnpes, 333, note. But see 2 Henderson, 261. 



Sept., 1862] LEE'S FIRST INVASION OF THE NORTH 121 

Ferry and advance on Martinsburg. McLaws, with two divisions, 
wiien he had crossed the South Mountain, was to take possession 
of the Maryland Heights, overlooking the Potomac and Harper's 
Ferry. Walker's division was directed to cross the Potomac east 
of Harper's Ferry and secure the Loudoun Heights, which com- 
mand Harper's Ferry from the east bank of the Shenandoah. 
The garrison in Harper's Ferry would thus be completely sur- 
rounded and cut off from all hope of escape, as Jackson, after 
getting possession of Martinsburg, was to move towards the Ferry, 
closing the roads westward. Longstreet and D. H. Hill, with the 
rest of the army, were ordered to cross the mountains and move 
on Hagerstown, Hill's division forming the rearguard. After the 
fall of Harper's Ferry the two wings would reunite either at 
Hagerstown or Boonsborough. Hagerstown is twenty-five miles 
distant from Frederick City, and the same distance from Harper's 
Ferry, whilst on the 9th McClellan's advance guard was thirty 
miles from Harper's Ferry and forty-five from Hagerstown.^ 

Jackson moved with his usual promptitude. Crossing South 
Mountain at Turner's Gap, he encamped for the night close to 
Boonsborough, having marched fourteen miles. That night he 
determined to cross the Potomac at Williamsport, which was 
further west than the other ford at Shepherdstown, in order that 
he might prevent the Martinsburg garrison escaping west, and 
might drive that force into the "blind alley" of Harper's Ferry. 
On the night of the i ith he encamped four miles west of Martins- 
burg, and the following morning moved against that post to find 
it abandoned by its garrison. In the afternoon he recommenced 
his march, and on the following day, passing through Halltown, 
came in sight of the Federal force in position on the Bolivar 
Heights. His troops in the four days had covered over sixty 
miles.2 Neither McLaws nor Walker marched with the celerity 
of Jackson. Lee had hoped that they would be in position on the 
Maryland and Loudoun Heights respectively by the morning of 
the 1 2th. But it was not till the afternoon of the 13th that 
McLaws carried Maryland Heights, which were very feebly 
defended, and about the same time Walker occupied Loudoun 
Heights without encountering any resistance. On the same night 
Jackson opened communications with his two lieutenants, and on 
the next day made the necessary arrangements for a combined 
attack. 

Harper's Ferry lies in the angle formed by the Potomac and the 
Shenandoah : to the south, across the space dividing the two rivers, 
ran the Bolivar Heights, which were strongly held by the Federals. 
In the afternoon of the 14th a heavy artillery fire was opened by 
the Confederate batteries, and Jackson's own force was gradually 

^ 2 Henderson, 262-3. ^ 2 Henderson, 266, note. 



122 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

working itself into position for an attack the next day, and by 

nightfall commanded both flanks of the Bolivar Heights. On the 
morning of the 15th, after a preliminary cannonade, the assault 
was about to be delivered, when the garrison capitulated. 
Seventy-three guns, 13,000 small arms, and 12,500 prisoners 
(including the garrisons of Winchester and Martinsburg, which 
had both retired to Harper's Ferry), were the prize of victory.^ 

McClellan's position as commander of the Army of the Potomac 
in this campaign was a singularly difficult one. When his army 
was withdrawn from the Peninsula, he found himself a com- 
mander without an army. He was never formally relieved of the 
command of his army, but as the successive Army Corps arrived 
at Aquia and Alexandria, they were ordered off to join the Army 
of Virginia under Pope. On the ist September he was verbally 
instructed by Halleck to take command of the defences of Wash- 
ington, but he was expressly told that this command gave him 
no control over the troops serving under Pope in the field. On 
the 2nd he received a verbal order from President Lincoln to 
assume command of the retreating army. Having never been 
formally relieved of his command, he was never formally rein- 
stated in it.2 But in taking the field with the Army of the 
Potomac he was acting entirely on his own responsibility. He 
fought through the campaign of the Antietam with a rope about 
his neck. His anomalous position as the commander of an army 
engaged upon an unauthorised campaign, caused him to display 
in his second and last duel with Lee ev^en greater caution and 
deliberation than in the Peninsular campaign. Nor was it only 
of himself and his probable fate, in case of defeat, that he had 
to think. His army was the only organised force left in the 
East. If it were defeated there would be nothing to prevent Lee 
marching whithersoever he chose. Washington, Baltimore, Phila- 
delphia, New York, all alike would be at his mercy.^ 

There was yet a third reason which caused McClellan to move 
very slowly. The great superiority of the Confederate cavalry 
effectually prevented his getting any information about Lee's 
intentions. He therefore judged it necessary to move with the 
greatest caution, covering Washington and Baltimore, and at the 
same time keeping his troops well in hand in order to be able 
to concentrate them swiftly for the pursuit of Lee if the Con- 
federate general invaded Pennsylvania, or to return with them for 
the defence of the capital, in case the invasion of Maryland 
proved a mere feint, and the bulk of the Confederate forces were 
directed against Washington. 

' 2 Henderson, 275. ^ Palfrey, 4, J. 

^ 2 Henderson, 286. But Ropes condemn* McClellan's view of the situation as 
exaggerated. 



Sept., 1862] LEE'S FIRST INVASION OF THE NORTH 123 

The greater part of the Federal army was at or near Frederick 
City on the 13th. On that day fortune put in McClellan's way 
such an opportunity as has rarely been vouchsafed to any general. 
A Federal private discovered wrapped round a handful of cigars 
a copy of Lee's orders to D. H. Hill, giving full particulars of 
the intended movement against Harper's Ferry, and detailing the 
positions, which the different portions of the Confederate army 
were to occupy for the next few days. Thus in an instant it 
was revealed to McClellan that his foe had divided his army, 
and that it was in his power to concentrate against either half 
an absolutely overwhelming force. He had moved out from 
Washington with an army of nearly 85,000 men,^ composed of 
the 1st Corps, now commanded by Hooker, the 2nd and 6th 
under their old commanders Sumner and Franklin, Couch's 
division of the 4th Corps,^ the 9th Corps under Burnside, and the 
1 2th under Mansfield. 

These Corps were organised by McClellan for this campaign 
into a right wing consisting of the ist and 9th Corps, under 
the command of Burnside, a centre under Sumner consisting 
of the 2nd and 12th Corps, and a left wing of Franklin's Corps 
and Couch's division under the former's command. Porter, with 
the 5th Corps, had also been ordered on the nth to report 
to McClellan, and one division of this corps reached Frederick 
City on the 13th. 

Yet this unique opportunity failed to stimulate McClellan to 
greater activity. Before him lay the South Mountain range, with 
its two passes. Turner's and Crampton's Gaps, and Lee's lost 
despatch informed him that no considerable force was holding 
these passes. A night march would have enabled him to secure 
possession of both Gaps without fear of encountering serious 
resistance. But the despatch which he sent to Franklin at 6.20 
p.m. merely ordered that general to move on Crampton's Gap 
next morning at daybreak, and directed him to cut off or 
destroy McLaws' command and relieve the garrison of Harper's 
Ferry. The despatch continued, " My general idea is to cut the 
enemy in two and beat him in detail. I ask of you at this im- 
portant moment all your intellect and the utmost activity that a 
general can exercise." 

Unfortunately the Commander-in-Chief failed to set his sub- 
ordinate a good example in the way of showing activity. During 
that afternoon the sound of McLaws' guns engaged in the fight for 
Maryland Heights was distinctly heard at Frederick City. Yet, 
though the roads were good, the weather fine, and the South 

' Palfrey, 7 ; 2 Ropes, 336. 

^ Couch's division had been summoned from Fortress Monroe, where its place was 
taken by 5,000 fresh troops. 



124 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Mountain range only twelve miles distant,^ McClellan postponed 
all movement until the following morning. 

During the night of the 13th news was brought to Lee of the 
discovery of his lost despatch and of McClellan's intention to take 
advantage of the opportunity. He at once ordered D. H. Hill's 
division, which was encamped a mile or two west of Roonsborough, 
to fall back and hold Turner's Gap, and directed Longstreet, who 
had reached Hagerstown, thirteen miles beyond Boonsborough, to 
return and support Hill.- 

No portion of McClellan's army moved before daylight. The 
action at Turner's Gap commenced about 7 a.m., and that at 
Crampton's Gap, six miles south of Turner's Gap, began about 
noon. The fighting at Turner's Gap lasted throughout the day. 
The right wing of the Federal army was there engaged by Hill's 
division and eight brigades of Longstreet's Corps. Until late in the 
afternoon, however, the fighting was rather a succession of small 
engagements than one connected battle. About 4 p.m. the Federals 
commenced their final assault with the ist and 9th Corps. When 
night put an end to the combat the Federals had practically gained 
possession of the Gap, though the Confederates still held on to the 
western side of the ridge. The Confederate position had been a 
very strong one, and if their troops had been properly handled the 
Federal attack might have been repulsed. Longstreet's troops 
took ten hours to march thirteen miles, and reached the field of 
battle in a very exhausted condition. Only four out of his eight 
brigades seem to have been actively engaged.^ Their commanders, 
instead of reporting to D. H. Hill and asking for instructions, 
posted their respective brigades where they thought fit, and owing 
to their ignorance of the ground took up faulty positions, where 
they were able to render Hill but little assistance.^ Hill's division 
bore the brunt of the fighting, and suffered heavily. 

The fighting at Crampton's Gap was by no means so severe. 
The forces in that engagement were much less equally matched. 
Franklin in his own Corps and Couch's division had 18,000 men, 
whilst the Gap was only held by a cavalry brigade reinforced by 
three brigades which McLaws sent back. Before 5 p.m. Franklin, 
after some spirited fighting, forced the Gap, and that evening his 
troops bivouacked in Pleasant Valley. The Confederate losses on 
the 14th amounted to 3,400, whilst the Federals lost 2,300,^ includ- 
ing a very able officer in the person of Reno, temporarily com- 
manding the 9th Corps, who was mortally wounded at Turner's 
Gap. 

During the night the Confederate forces at the western end of 

' 2 Ilenderson, 269. '■' 2 Ropes, 343. 

* B. & L., 579 (D. II. Hill's account of the battle). 

* Palfrey, 38. ' 2 Henderson, 278. 



Sept., 1862] LEE'S FIRST INVASION OF THE NORTH 125 

Turner's Gap, finding their position untenable, withdrew. The 
Federals had gained possession of both passes over the South 
Mountain range, and could claim a tactical victory. But strategic- 
ally the Confederates had gained the advantage, for though they 
had failed to hold the mountain passes, they had achieved their 
chief purpose of gaining time enough to ensure the fall of Harper's 
Ferry. At 8 a.m. on the 15th the garrison capitulated. Lee's plan 
of campaign had thus proved partially successful. He had taken 
Harper's Ferry, but he was by no means in the position which he 
had expected, owing to McClellan's comparatively rapid advance. 
His first thought on the night of the 14th, after the loss of the 
South Mountain passes, was to fall back across the Potomac and 
reunite his army in Virginia.^ But he quickly changed his mind, 
and determined to give battle to McClellan in Maryland and run 
the risk of having one half of his army annihilated before the other 
half could come to its support. 

Lee's policy in resolving to stand and fight behind the Antietam 
was audacious in the extreme. He was deliberately courting dis- 
aster, and but for a succession of unforeseen accidents would have 
almost certainly suffered a crushing reverse. Though his position 
for defensive purposes was a tolerably strong one, yet in case of 
defeat it afforded no line of retreat except by the Shepherdstown 
Ford across the Potomac. In the course of the battle of the 17th 
two other fords further west were examined and pronounced prac- 
ticable for infantry.^ But it is hard to see how, if defeated, he 
could have saved his guns. 

Why, then, did he accept such an enormous risk? The position 
seemed to be one in which he stood to lose everything and gain 
nothing. At the best, supposing McClellan deferred his attack 
until Jackson's half of the army rejoined Lee, the Confederate 
army could reasonably expect to do no more than hold their own 
in a defensive battle and after repulsing the enemy to retire into 
Virginia. But in that case they gained nothing by standing to 
fight, and were certain to incur heavy losses, which they could ill 
afford. It seems, however, that Lee hoped to do something more 
than merely fight and win a defensive battle. He believed that if 
McClellan gave Jackson time to get up, it would be in his power, 
after repulsing the Federal attack, to deliver such a counterstroke 
as would hurl McClellan's army back in rout towards the South 
Mountain, and, by annihilating the only army the Federals had in 
the East, would put an end to the war. It was for that object that 
Lee prepared to run an enormous risk, holding as he did that in a 
war in which one of the two combatants was so much the weaker 
in numbers and in material resources great risks must be run on the 
chance of gaining great successes. 

^ 2 Ropes, 348. ^ 2 Henderson, 297, note. 



12fi THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

But in imagining that he had a reasonable chance of gaining a 
signal success over McClellan, it is probable that Lee under- 
estimated both the ability of the op[josing general and the quality 
of his troops. The army with which the Confederates had now to 
deal was far more formidable than that which Pope had com- 
manded. The troops had unbounded confidence in McClellan : 
two Corps, the 2nd and 6th, had not been engaged at all in the 
disastrous campaign of the Second Manassas, and the whole army 
was greatly encouraged by the successes gained on the 14th. The 
moral of the Confederates had been proportionately weakened by 
their defeat and subsequent retreat. D. H. Hill's division had 
fought well, but been severely punished, whilst Longstreet's troops 
had by no means acquitted themselves with credit, and were 
exhausted by the march and countermarch. During the retreat 
to the Antietam signs of demoralisation had not been lacking. 
There had been an unusual amount of straggling during the march. 

McClellan also was a general of very different calibre to Pope. 
His military defects lay in excess of caution and a slowness of 
deliberation and of movement which lost opportunities. But for 
that very reason he was the less likely to give opportunities to a 
foe whose military genius he held in the highest respect. Lee 
had no right to expect that McClellan would repeat the blunders 
of Pope and give him a chance of delivering a counterstroke like 
that which had proved so successful on the 30th August. 

Anyhow the die was cast. On the morning of the 15th Lee 
was arraying the fourteen brigades, which made up Long- 
street's and D. H. Hill's commands, along the ridge which 
separates the Antietam from the Potomac (see Plan). West of 
the point where the Antietam flows into the Potomac, the latter 
river makes a variety of bends, so that a line of battle can 
be formed less than six miles long with both its flanks resting 
upon the Potomac.^ This was the position which Lee took up. 
Along his front flowed the Antietam Creek, a deep, slow stream, 
about sixty feet broad, with its banks thickly fringed with trees, 
whilst on either side the slope ascended sharply towards the crest 
above.^ Four bridges crossed the stream, one close to its con- 
fluence with the Potomac, the next known as the Burnside Bridge, 
below Sharpsburg : the third bridge was opposite Sharpsburg, and 
two and a half miles north was the fourth bridge. On the west 
side of the ridge the village of Sharpsburg was situated : a road 
ran south-west from the village to the Shepherdstown ford, and 
another road ran northward to Hagerstown. On this road, a mile 
north of Sharpsburg, stood the Dunker church on the edge of 
what is known as the West Wood. On the opposite side of the 
turn[)ikc, and se[)arated from it by a broad cornfield, is another 
' I'alfrcy, 48. '^ 2 llcmlcrson, 2y4. 




Methu-m&Co. 



Sept., 1862] THE ANTIETAM (OR SHARPSBURG) 127 

wood, known as the East Wood, stretching in a north-east direc- 
tion. Beyond both of these is the North Wood, which reaches 
across the turnpike. Just beyond the West Wood, about a third 
of a mile north of the Dunker church, is a small stream, and rising 
above it is a low ridge, which gave room for several batteries, and 
stretches so near to the Potomac as to cover the left flank. 

This ridge was held by Stuart with cavalry and horse artillery : 
another body of cavalry watched the southernmost bridge : along 
the ridge reaching from the Burnside Bridge, through Sharpsburg, 
to the further edge of the East Wood, the Confederate infantry 
was posted, Longstreet on the right and D. H. Hill on the left. 
The latter's troops extended about a quarter of a mile east of the 
Hagerstown turnpike, and occupied the East Wood. The ground 
on the western side of the road was decidedly more difficult than 
on the eastern side, mainly consisting of woodland, with large 
upstanding ledges of limestone, which furnished excellent cover 
for the riflemen : what open ground there was, was mainly un- 
cultivated. The entire force which Lee had in line on September 
15th was less than 20,000 men, with about 125 guns,^ 

On the night of the 14th McClellan sent orders to Franklin to 
move against and destroy whatever force he might find in Pleasant 
Valley, and, if possible, withdraw the garrison from Harper's 
Ferry. But McLaws made so brave a display with his command, 
the bulk of which he drew up in line of battle across Pleasant 
Valley, with the flanks resting on South Mountain and Elk Ridge, 
that Franklin did not venture to attack him, though his force was 
decidedly the stronger of the two. Franklin possessed apparently 
the same fault as his Commander-in-Chief of doubling the enemy's 
strength. When the cessation of artillery fire at Harper's Ferry 
made it tolerably certain that the garrison had capitulated, he 
leaped to the conclusion that Jackson would send troops across 
the river to aid McLaws, and so far from making any attempt to 
test the strength of McLaws' position, or displaying that " utmost 
activity" which McClellan had asked of him, began to beg for 
reinforcements, stating that the enemy in his front outnumbered 
him two to one. Even when McLaws began to send his trains 
across the river and withdraw his troops, Franklin made no 
attempt to interfere with him. He remained where he was, guard- 
ing McClellan's left and rear from an imaginary foe. 

At Turner's Gap McClellan had the ist, 2nd, 9th, and 12th 
Corps well closed up, and one division of the 5th Corps, About 
7 a.m. of the 15th the advance of the Federal pickets revealed the 
fact that the Confederates had withdrawn during th-e night, and 
an immediate pursuit was ordered. 

^ Ropes (ii. 349-52) adversely criticises Lee's resolve to stand and fight. On the other 
side, see 2 Ilenderson, 28 1-7. 



128 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

By 8 a.m. the Federal army was filin<:^ out of the western end 
of Turner's Gap. At that moment McClellan had at his immediate 
disposal thirt)'-fivc infantry brij^adcs. The weather and the roads 
were alike favourable for marching, and Sharpsburg was not more 
than eight miles distant. There was really nothing to prevent 
McClellan getting his army into position in front of Lee that same 
afternoon, and attacking a foe whom he outnumbered three to one. 
But McClellan failed to rise to the occasion. He could not rid 
himself of his constitutional slowness, and he argued from Lee's 
bold stand that at least 50,000 men were confronting him in line 
of battle. His march was slow : there was much unnecessary 
delay, and only two divisions were in position ready to attack on 
that day.^ After a rapid examination of the ground he decided 
to postpone the attack till the i6th. 

But the morning of that day brought a welcome reinforcement 
to Lee's army. Jackson had arrived with two divisions, having 
made a night march of seventeen miles. After a period of rest 
the newly arrived divisions were posted on the left of D. H. Hill's 
division. The Confederate left now reached from the East Wood 
across the turnpike into the West Wood. Later in the day 
Walker's division also arrived from Harper's Ferry. This force 
was posted in reserve on the right. Thus, on the iGth, Lee had 
been reinforced by between 8,000 and 9,000 men.^ McClellan's 
prospects of success were consequently not so good as on the 
15th. He still, however, outnumbered the Confederates two to 
one. But though every hour of delay was reducing the odds, 
McClellan could not make up his mind to attack on the i6th. He 
left Franklin throughout that day in Pleasant Valley to watch 
McLaws' command, which had been withdrawn across the Potomac 
the previous day. His own explanation of his extraordinary delay 
is that the enemy had shifted the position of certain of his batteries, 
and this required a rectification of his own line of battle. Having 
rearranged that, he found that there was not sufficient time left to 
do more than make the necessary preliminaries for the decisive 
battle now postponed till the 17th. For some reason he had, after 
the South Mountain engagement, changed the organisation of his 
army. Burnside was transferred from the command of the right 
wing to that of the left, but the ist Corps under Hooker was 
taken from his command and placed on the extreme right next 
to Sumner, who now commanded the right wing.^ 

» I'alfrey, 46 8. 

' 2 Ropes, 355, where 8, 000 is given as tlic strength of the ten brigades which re- 
inforced Lee on the l6th. 2 Henderson, 290- 1, estimates the effective strength of 
Jackson's two divisions, including officers and artillery, at 5,500, and of Walker's 
division at 3,500. 

" .Sumner had no direct control over Hooker, who received his orders direct from 
McClellan. 



Sept. i6, 1862] THE ANTIETAM (OR SHARPSBURG) 129 

About 2 p.m. of the i6th Hooker was directed to cross the 
Antietam by the upper bridge and neighbouring ford and try to 
turn the enemy's left flank. Hooker moved about 4 p.m., crossed 
the creek without opposition, as the northernmost bridge was out 
of sight of the Confederate lines, pushed forward to the Hagers- 
town road, and then changing front to the south moved along the 
turnpike and on both sides of it, until just before dark he en- 
countered Hood's division, which formed the extreme Confederate 
left.^ Some sharp fighting between the skirmishers took place, 
but the engagement was little more than an affair of advanced 
guards. Hooker bivouacked for the night at the point where he 
had first encountered Hood. 

During the night the 12th Corps, under Mansfield, also crossed 
the Antietam, followed Hooker's line of march, and bivouacked 
about a mile to his rear. McClellan on the evening of the i6th 
sent a despatch to Franklin, ordering him to send Couch's division 
to the Maryland Heights, and with his own Corps to join the main 
army.^ The second division of Porter's Corps arrived on the i6th, 
but McClellan had done little all that day except unmistakably 
advertise to his foe where the storm would first break on the 
following morning. 

His plan of battle was to assault the Confederate left with the 
1st and 1 2th Corps, supported by the 2nd Corps, and if necessary 
by the 6th ; as soon as ever matters seemed to be progressing 
favourably on that wing, to launch the 9th Corps across the Burn- 
side Bridge against the heights south of Sharpsburg ; and if either 
or both of these attacks proved favourable, to advance his centre 
across the Antietam with all the forces left at his disposal. The 
plan in itself was good, and if properly carried out should have 
ensured victory. But the execution was faulty in the extreme : 
instead of a single concentrated battle, a succession of disjointed 
attacks took place, which Lee was able to defeat in detail. 

Firing commenced about 5 a.m. Hooker was moving forward 
against Jackson, who late the previous night had taken Hood's 
place. Jackson's troops were drawn up right across the road with 
the flanks resting in the East and West Woods. The Confederate 
left was perpendicular to the rest of the line, and its right flank 
was enfiladed by the fire of the Federal batteries on the eastern 
ridge. After a preliminary artillery duel of about an hour's 
duration Hooker's troops came to close quarters. A desperate 
combat ensued which lasted over an hour and raged on both sides 
of the turnpike. Jackson's two divisions held their ground against 

^ Hood's two brigades were not posted on the riglit with the rest of Longstreet's 
Corps, Imt were on the extreme left extending D. II. Hill's line from the East Wood 
across the Hagerstown road and connecting on his left with Stuart's command. 

^ Palfrey, 44. 



130 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

a force nearly twice their own strenfrth.^ They were practically 
put out of action for the rest of the day, but Hooker's Corps was 
fought to a standstill. The commander was himself severely 
wounded, and by 7.30 a.m. the first assault had been repulsed and 
Hooker's Corps was falling back to the shelter of its batteries 
massed on the edge of the North Wood. It had lost 2,500- men, 
but the loss in Jackson's weaker divisions was relatively heavier : 
for not less than 1,700^ men had fallen. Ewell's division, under 
Lawton, which had held the more exposed position on the east 
side of the turnpike, was withdrawn and its place taken by Hood's 
two brigades. J. R. Jones' division, reduced to only 600 fighting 
men, held on to the edge of the West Wood.* On the extreme 
left Stuart's horse artillery, stationed on a commanding ridge, had 
done good service and inflicted considerable loss upon Hooker's 
force, whose right flank was exposed to Iheir fire. 

But no sooner had Hooker's Corps fallen back than its place 
was taken by the 12th Corps. This force, numbering about 7,000 
men, did not apparently arrive upon the field of battle until the 
1st Corps was already in retreat. Thus early did the lack of com- 
bination on the Federal side manifest itself. The Corps com- 
mander fell mortally wounded as his troops were deploying into 
line. Their advance was almost entirely on the east side of the 
turnpike, and the assault was chiefly directed against Hood's 
division and three brigades of D. H. Hill's division, which were 
posted on Hood's right facing north-east. Another desperate 
infantry combat ensued, in which both sides suffered very heavily. 
Hood's troops at last gave way and fell back across the turnpike 
to the Dunker church. The withdrawal of this division uncovered 
the flanks both of D. H. Hill's brigades on the east of the road 
and of the remnant of Jones' division on the west, and caused 
them likewise to fall back. Greene's division of the 12th Corps 
pushed through the cornfield across the turnpike and established 
itself in the West Wood about a quarter of a mile north of the 
Dunker church. But owing to lack of support it was unable to 
advance further. 

About 9 a.m. this second attack against the Confederate left 
came to an end. Like Hooker's Corps, the 12th Corps had been 
fought out. Its losses amounted to 1,500.^ As the result of 
nearly four hours' fighting the Confederates had been forced to 
abandon the East VVood and cornfield, and to take up a fresh 

' Henderson reckons the strcnglh of Jackson's forces actually engaged (excliuling 
Early's brigade) at 4,2(X), and of Hooker's Corps at 12,500. Ropes estimates Hooker's 
strength at 9,000 or 10,000, and adds to Jackson's two ilivisions Hood's two brigades 
and three of U. H. Hill's brigades. The estimate in the text is an attempt to preserve 
the balance between the two conflicting views. 

" 2 Henderson, 306. ' 2 Henderson, 304. * 2 Henilerson, 309. 

* 2 Henderson, 306. Ropes (ii. 371) slates the loss of the I2th Corps at 1,700, 



Sept. 17, i862] THE ANTIETAM (OR SHARPSBURG) 131 

position on the further side of the road under cover of the West 
Wood. Stuart's artillery had been withdrawn to a new position 
towards the left rear. 

Early's brigade at the beginning of the battle had been support- 
ing Stuart, but that force was now recalled by Jackson to reinforce 
the main body so hardly pressed by Hooker's and Mansfield's 
assaults. Jackson's command had lost enormously. One of his 
divisions had already been withdrawn, the other had been almost 
annihilated. Hood's division, which was covering his right, had 
been driven back to the Dunker church and remained out of action 
for the rest of the day. Jackson by 9 a.m. had only Early's brigade 
of 1,100 men and some 600 more, the survivors of Jones's division, 
with which to hold his line reaching from the furthest point of the 
West Wood to the Dunker church. 

But in spite of his awful losses he was still full of confidence. 
Instead of thinking only how he could hold on with his attenuated 
command, he was meditating a counterstroke. He had sent to Lee 
for reinforcements, and the Confederate Commander-in-Chief, find- 
ing that no serious attack menaced his right, sent to the left 
Walker's and McLaws' divisions. The latter, in company with 
R. H. Anderson's division, had reached the battlefield very early 
on the morning of the 17th. They had not marched with the same 
speed as had Jackson's and Walker's troops. But McClellan's 
dilatory tactics, by postponing the battle till the 17th, gave them 
time to take their full share of the fighting on that day. With 
McLaws', Walker's, and Early's troops Jackson had quite 10,000 
men at his disposal.^ He could not hurl them at once against the 
shattered ranks of the ist and 12th Corps : for Sumner's 2nd Corps 
was moving to the attack, and already Sedgwick's division had 
crossed the turnpike and was advancing through the West Wood. 

Sumner had been ordered the previous evening to have his 
Corps under arms an hour before daybreak in readiness to support 
the advance of Hooker and Mansfield. Though he had his Corps 
ready at the hour named, he received no further orders from 
McClellan till 7.20 a.m. ; ^ by which hour Hooker's Corps had 
fought its battle and was already hors de combat. Crossing by the 
fords below the upper bridge, Sumner, a gallant but too impetuous 
commander, whose long training as a cavalry officer probably 
unfitted him for the successful handling of infantry,^ hurried his 
leading division under Sedgwick with all speed to the scene of 
battle. He probably supposed that his second division under 
French was advancing in echelon on his left, but he took no trouble 
to make sure that that was the case, and, as a matter of fact, 
French's division diverged in a southerly direction as soon as the 
creek was crossed. His third division under Richardson was 

^ 2 Henderson, 308 ; Palfrey, 89. ^ Palfrey, 82. ^ palfrey, 54. 



132 THE CIVIT. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

detained by McClellan on the other side of the Antietam, and did 
not cross till some time later. 

As Sedgwick's troops swept out of the East Wood across the 
cornfield towards the turnpike, it must have seemed to them as 
though the fighting was at an end. Hooker's Corps had simply 
disappeared. Of the 12th Corps one division was retiring, the 
other was hidden from sight in the West Wood, liarly's brigade 
was also hidden in the same wood. Without encountering any 
resistance the Federals crossed the turnpike, and entering the West 
Wood at some distance north of the point held by Greene's division, 
swept right through it to the further edge. The division was 
advancing in a column of three deployed brigades, and so close 
were the successive lines to each other, that it was impossible in 
case of a flank attack to change front. There were no skirmishers 
on either wing. 

Sumner simply led his troops into a trap. As they reached the 
further edge of the wood they found themselves confronted by 
McLaws' and Walker's divisions, which were drawn up partly on 
their front, partly on their flank. Early's brigade was also on their 
flank extending towards their rear. The unfortunate Federals were 
attacked both in front and flank by a force considerably superior 
in numbers to their own. Such a contest could have but one issue. 
In a few minutes Sedgwick's division was flying, having lost over 
2,000 men in that brief encounter.^ 

Now had come the time for the Confederate counterstroke. Their 
victorious troops rushed across the turnpike through the cornfield 
against the East Wood. If they could but secure that the Federal 
batteries would be forced to withdraw to the ridge beyond the 
Antietam, if, indeed, they had time to escape : and the Federal 
right wing, consisting of two Corps and one division, which were 
already quite fought out, would be annihilated. 

But it was not to be. Franklin had moved from Pleasant 
Valley at 5.30 a.m., and his first division had already reached the 
battlefield. As McLaws' and Walker's troops rushed upon the 
East Wood, they were met by two fresh brigades- deployed in 
line of battle. The eagerness of pursuit had disorganised the 
Confederate ranks, and a fierce charge of a Federal brigade drove 
them back with heavy loss across the turnpike to seek shelter once 
more within the West Wood. By 10.30 a.m. fighting on the 
Confederate left had come to an end. Jackson still held his 
position to the west of the turnpike stretching from the Dunker 
church along the edge of the West Wood, with Stuart's force 
on the extreme left bent back towards the Potomac. But the 

' The loss was 2,200 out of a force 5,500 strong (2 Ropes, 364-5). 
^ Hancock's and Irwin's of Smith's division. It was Irwin s lirigade wliicli charged 
(Swinlon, 219). 



Sept. 17, i862] THE ANTIETAM (OR SHARPSBURG) 133 

price which he had paid was enormous. Both his own divisions, 
with the exception of Early's brigade, were virtually annihilated. 
McLaws' and Walker's divisions had lost heavily when repulsed 
after their fierce charge upon the East Wood.^ 

It is not quite certain at what hour Greene's division of the 
1 2th Corps was withdrawn from its position on the edge of the 
West Wood, north of the Dunker church ; probably it was driven 
back by Early's advance at the same time as Sedgwick's division 
was put to flight.^ 

The first stage of the battle was over. The attempt to crush 
the Confederate left had failed. The centre became the next 
scene of fighting. For three hours, from lo a.m. to i p.m., D. H. 
Hill's and R. H. Anderson's divisions were engaged in deadly 
combat with Sumner's other two divisions — French's and Richard- 
son's — and possibly two of Franklin's brigades.^ The Federal 
leaders displayed no more combination in this part of the field 
than in the earlier attacks. The two divisions engaged went into 
action at different hours and different points. 

Richardson did not cross the Antietam till an hour after French, 
and took his division into action at a point two-thirds of a mile 
south of French's line of advance. Three of D. H. Hill's brigades 
had already suffered severely in the battle with Mansfield's Corps. 
The Confederate left centre was somewhat drawn back and held a 
sunken road, known to fame as the Bloody Lane. In front of 
this road they had piled up a barricade of fence rails, and their 
position was thus rendered very strong. French's division failed 
to make much headway. Its losses amounted to over i,8oo, and 
it had not driven the Confederates from the sunken road.* 

But further to the Federal left Richardson gained more success. 
To defend his centre Lee had put in his last reserve, R. H. 
Anderson's division. This force was posted on D. H. Hill's right, 
and on these troops fell the full force of Richardson's onslaught. 
The sunken road ^ was carried, and the Federals, pressing forward, 
gained possession of the Piper house quite close to the turnpike. 
Hill's brigades on the left, finding their flank turned, fell back 

^ These two divisions lost 2,131 men (2 Henderson, 314). 

^ 2 Ropes, 367. But Greene claims to have held on till 1.30 p.m. (Palfrey, 96, who 
however, thinks that Greene probably fell back about the time when Irwin's brigade was 
withdrawn from the point of its extreme advance). 

* 2 Henderson, 316. It is by no means clear to which of Franklin's brigades 
Colonel Henderson refers. Probably Irwin's and Brooks' brigades of Smith's division 
are meant. Irwin's brigade suffered heavily, losing 349 men {2 B. & L., 599). But its 
operations were apparently confined to repulsing McLaws' attack and delivering a 
countercharge. Brooks' brigade was formed on the right of French's division, but was 
not seriously engaged, as its loss only amounted to i killed and 24 wounded. None of 
the other brigades suffered any real loss on the 1 7th. 

* Palfrey, 95. 

' The "sunken road "ran across "from the Hagerstown pike to the Keedysville 
pike in a broken line of six parts " (Palfrey, 98). 



134 THE CIVIL WAll IN THE UNITED STATES 

across the turnpike, and the Confederate centre was in imminent 
danger of being crushed. Both divisions were used up, and it 
seerns that there was nothing but some batteries hastily brought 
into position to check the Federal advance. l?ut that advance 
never took place. Richardson fell mortally wounded, and his 
troops came to a halt. Both Federal divisions had suffered 
severely ; no supports were at hand, and there was no superior 
officer on the spot to take control of that part of the field and 
secure the victory. 

McClellan refused to listen to Franklin when that officer begged 
to be allowed to put in his two divisions, one of which had 
not been engaged at all, and the other but slightly. The Federal 
Commander-in-Chief did not show himself at all upon the actual 
field of battle, but remained throughout the day at his head- 
quarters. He appears to have relied mainly upon Sumner's advice, 
and Sumner, though one of the bravest of men, had had his nerves 
so shaken by the sight of Sedgwick's division reeling to the rear, 
that he dissuaded McClellan from risking such another bloody 
repulse. It was almost certainly a grave error of judgment. For 
Lee's centre was broken, and there were no reserves left to draw 
upon. By i p.m. the second phase of the fight was at an end. 
The Confederates had lost ground, but had prevented the Federals 
gaining any foothold west of the turnpike. 

It had been a part of McClellan's original plan of battle that as 
soon as his attack on the Confederate left was seen to be pro- 
gressing favourably, Burnside, with the 9th Corps, should cross the 
Antictam, and having gained possession of the crest overhanging 
the stream, should sweep northwards along the ridge rolling up all 
the enemy's forces south of Sharpsburg. Orders were received by 
Burnside about 9 a.m.^ on the 17th directing him to assault the 
bridge in his immediate front. 

Burnside was, however, so chagrined by the alteration made in 
his command since the engagement at Turner's Gap, which 
removed him from the right wing to the left, and only gave him 
a single Corps with which to operate, that he refused to take any 
part in the actual handling of his troops on that day, and con- 
tented himself with transmitting the orders, which he received from 
McClellan, to Co.x, one of his divisional generals, whom he charged 
with the execution of them. This multiplication of commanders 
did not tend to produce rapidity of movement, and the fact that 
Cox was new to the Army of the Potomac was an additional cause 
of delay.- None of the necessary preliminaries for an attack had 

' McClellan, in his nfTicial report, stated that at 8 a.m. he ordered Burnside to 
attack the bridge. This onler is generally sujiposed to have l)een received about 9 a.m., 
but General Cox (2 li. & L., 647, note) onlends that the order was not received till 
10 a.m. 

' Cox had but recently arrived from the Kanawha Valley. 



Sept. 17, i862] THE ANTIETAM (OR SHARPSBURG) 135 

been carried out on the preceding day. The fords which crossed 
the Antietam in the neighbourhood of the bridge had not been 
located ; and such was the extraordinary ignorance of the ground 
that the leading brigade, advancing to assault the bridge, actually 
missed its way.^ Only a small Confederate force of three regiments 
and two batteries held the opposite bank.- The strength of the 
Confederate position lay in the fact that the road leading to the 
bridge ran for some 300 yards along the front of their line within 
easy rifle range. 

Though the order to attack was received at 9 a.m., and the 
opposition was confined to a single weak brigade, yet the Federals 
did not capture the bridge until i p.m., just about the time when 
the assaults of French's and Richardson's divisions on Lee's centre 
came to an end. A ford was at last discovered below the bridge, 
and the Confederates, finding their right turned, withdrew from 
the river bank and fell back upon the main body holding the ridge 
south of Sharpsburg. Two more precious hours were wasted, as 
the division which had taken a prominent part in capturing the 
bridge had to be withdrawn, and another division brought to the 
front to take its place. By some extraordinary oversight the move- 
ment of these troops was entirely confined to the bridge, and no 
use was made of the fords. 

It was not till 3 p.m. that the Federal left wing was in position 
fronting north. The only force between them and Sharpsburg 
consisted of six skeleton brigades, under D. R. Jones,^ The 9th 
Corps advanced in two columns, the right direct upon Sharpsburg, 
whilst the left was intended to be in echelon behind it. The right, 
encountering little resistance, advanced close up to the suburbs 
of Sharpsburg and captured a battery. But the left had a harder 
task before it, and the gap between the two columns steadily 
increased. It was at this juncture that A. P. Hill's division, 
which had been left at Harper's Ferry to complete all the details 
of the capitulation, arrived upon the field, having marched seven- 
teen miles in eight hours.^ No precautions had been taken by the 
Federals to guard their left flank against a sudden attack, though 
they must have known that Hill's division might reach the battle- 
field at any moment, and that its line of march would bring it full 
on the exposed flank. 

Hill, indeed, was only just in time. Jones' division was giving 
way. The Federals were on the point of capturing Sharpsburg. 
Lee's infantry were all used up. To check the further advance of 
the foe he had only his batteries to rely upon, and these had 
already been severely handled by the heavier ordnance of the 

^ Palfrey, iii. '^ Palfrey, 109, 

* According to D. R. Jones' own statement, his whole command of six brigades only 
comprised 2,430 men. But Palfrey (66, 67) concludes that Jones' estimate is at least 
2,000 too low. ■* 2 Henderson, 318. 



136 THE CIML WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Federals in the artillery duel which had raged throughout a con- 
siderable part of the day.^ 

With Sharpsburg in the hands of the Federals, Lee's line of 
retreat would have been cut. But A. P. Hill's arrival quickly 
averted the danger. Striking Rodman's division, which formed 
the left of the 9th Corps, full on the flank, he broke it, and its 
commander was amongst the killed. The victorious advance of 
the Federals was sharply checked. A fresh front had to be formed 
to meet the new foe ; and, disheartened by the sudden reverse, 
the 9th Corps abandoned the ground which it had won and fell 
back to the bridge. 

With the repulse of Burnside's attack, the battle came to an 
end. The losses on both sides had been enormous. The Federal 
loss was over 12,000, and the Confederates lost 9,500.^ Considering 
the relative strength of the two armies, the Confederate loss was 
the heavier. All their troops had been engaged, and the whole 
army was pretty well fought out. On the other hand, only two- 
thirds of the Federal army had been seriously engaged. Porter's 
and Franklin's Corps, numbering at least 25,000 men, had suffered 
hardly any loss at all. 

It seemed imperative upon the Confederates to lose no time 
in crossing to the other side of the Potomac. But Lee took a 
different view of the situation. In spite of the advice of all his 
chief officers, including the indomitable Jackson, the Confederate 
Commander-in-Chief determined to hold his position for another 
day, and give McClellan another chance of winning a pitched 
battle. He had not yet abandoned all hope of gaining such a 
victory as might bring the war to an end. 

Early in the afternoon of the 17th, when the succession of 
Federal assaults on the left and centre of the Confederate line 
came to [an end, he had directed Jackson to make an attempt to 
crush the Federal right. But Stuart, who was sent to examine the 
Federal position, pronounced it too strong to be assailed. Again 
on the 1 8th, when McClellan declined to renew the contest, Lee 
was still intent on the same idea of attacking the Federal right. 
But a careful examination of the position only corroborated Stuart's 
opinion of the previous day.^ Their rifled artillery gave the 
Federals an immense si^Dcriority over the Confederate guns, a 
large part of which were short-range smoothbores. 

' Henderson (ii. 31S) considers that "a. sufficient force to sustain the rij^lit niiplit 
have been witlidrawn from the left and centre, but Hill's approach was known, and it 
was considered inadvisable to abandon all hold of the means for a decisive counterstroke 
on the opposite fl;ink." 

'■* The Federal loss was officially stated at 12,410. Various estimates are formed of the 
Confederate loss. Henderson (ii. 322) gives 9,500. 2 Ropes, 376, quotes Allan to the 
effect that the Confederate loss "probably amounted to 8,oco or more." 2 B. & L., 
Coj, estimates their loss at over 11,000. ^ 2 Henderson, 320-1, 325-S. 



Sept. i8, 1862] THE ANTIETAM (OR SHARPSBURG) 137 

As McClellan was being reinforced and there was clearly no 
chance of dealing him a heavy blow, Lee was obliged to retreat. 
On the night of the i8th the movement commenced. The Federals 
made no attempt to interfere with the withdrawal of the Confede- 
rate army. Early on the morning of the 19th the whole of Lee's 
army was safe on the Virginia side of the Potomac. On the 20th 
a reconnaissance in force was pushed across the river under the 
direction of Fitz-John Porter, but was quickly driven back by 
A. P. Hill's division with some loss. McClellan made no further 
attempt at pursuit. 

Whatever may be thought of the wisdom of Lee's resolve to 
stand and fight at Sharpsburg, his actual conduct of the battle was 
beyond question a tactical masterpiece. He utilised every available 
soldier : throughout the day he controlled the Confederate opera- 
tions over the whole field : he fearlessly reinforced his left and 
centre from the right, when he saw that no attack was meditated 
at that point, and he never let go his central idea of making the 
battle decisive of the war. Yet with all his skill he came very near 
to defeat. Twice in the course of that one day did the neglect of 
the Federal commanders to guard the exposed flank of a division 
advancing to the attack deprive them of a great chance of vic- 
tory.^ If ordinary precautions had been adopted to protect either 
Burnside's or Sedgwick's advance, the Confederate line would have 
been rolled up. 

McClellan, unlike Lee, exercised no control over the fighting. 
He carried the " Commander-in-Chief idea " so far that he allowed 
it to prevent him showing himself on the battlefield.^ Thus the 
battle was left to fight itself The Federal attack struck first Lee's 
left, then his centre, and finally his right. But these attacks were 
successive, not simultaneous : and each separate attack might be 
divided into distinct stages, which were no less lacking in unity. 
McClellan never carried out that part of his plan which referred to 
an advance of the centre. Though he outnumbered the 39,000 
men who composed the Confederate army on the 17th by two to 
one, he kept in reserve nearly a third of his whole force, and thus 
reduced the odds to three to two. Nor did the energy of the 
subordinate commanders make amends for the inertness of their 
leader. It was on the Federal side a badly fought battle, a battle 
of lost opportunities. Yet in spite of all the shortcomings of 
McClellan and his lieutenants, Lee's great purpose had been 
baulked. He had invaded Maryland, meaning to fight a decisive 
battle. He had fought a pitched battle, but had been far from 
annihilating his foe. He might claim a tactical victory, but 
strategically the fruits of the campaign remained with McClellan. 

^ Palfrey, Ii8. ^ Palfrey, 134. 



138 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

NOTE ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE 
TWO ARMIES 

McClellan, in his official report, stated the strength of his army "present 
for duty" as 87,164. Colonel Taylor, Lee's adjutant-general, following 
contemporaneous evidence, estimates the Confederate army at 35,255. 
Colonel Henderson gives 40,000 as the strength of Lee's army. General 
F. W. Palfrey, in The Antietam and Fredericksburg^ very justly points 
out that the returns made by Federal and Confederate commanders were 
based on totally different principles. The Confederate returns only 
counted the number of muskets in the line of battle and frequently 
excluded the officers ; whereas the Federal returns of "present for duty " 
included all the men detailed for service with the Quartermaster and 
Commissary Departments, the headquarter guards and orderlies, wagoners, 
company cooks, officers' servants, pioneers, and field-hospital attendants. 
A deduction of at least 20 per cent, must be made from the Federal 
estimates of "present for duty" before the effective force of the two sides 
can be fairly compared. 



CHAPTER Xll 
FREDERICKSBURG 

McClellan's inactivity — The Emancipation Edict — Stuart makes a raid round the 
Federal lines — Important results of the raid — JMcCIellan crosses the Potomac — Lee's 
plan of campaign — McClellan relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac — 
Reasons for his removal— Fitz-John Porter shares McClellan's fate — Burnside succeeds 
McClellan — A new plan of campaign — Reorganisation of the Army of the Potomac — 
Sumner reaches Falmouth — Lee's preparations— Lee's original selection of a battlefield 
overruled by President Davis — Burnside's forward movement delayed — Reorganisation 
of the Army of Northern Virginia — Further delays on Burnside's part — Lee's position — 
Burnside crosses the Rappahannock— Capture of Fredericksburg — Burnside settles his 
plan of attack — Franklin's advice — Contradictory nature of the orders given to Franklin 
— Orders given to Sumner — Jackson concentrates his Corps — Did Burnside fall into a 
trap? — Jackson's position — Its weak point — Franklin's advance — Franklin's attack — Its 
partial success— But finally repulsed — Position of Marye's Hill— Sumner's attack — The 
decisive repulse — Franklin refuses further co-operation — Losses— Reasons why Lee 
attempted no counterstroke — Burnside anxious to renew the attack — But dissuaded by 
his officers— Further movements of Burnside — Burnside relieved of the command of the 
Army of the Potomac. 

AFTER the battle of the Antietam, McClellan made no im- 
mediate attempt to resume the offensive. In his own opinion, 
he had saved the Union by driving Lee out of Maryland. 
He was quite content to rest upon his laurels until such time as he 
had completely reorganised his army. It is quite possible that 
from a purely military point of view McClellan was right.^ A 
large part of the army with which he had carried out the recent 
campaign had been badly beaten at the Second Manassas : recon- 
struction was necessary, especially as the army had been recruited 
by a number of entirely fresh and untrained regiments; but hitherto 
it had been impossible to do much towards reorganising the army 
whilst an offensive movement was in operation. The cavalry 
especially were in a very poor condition, and remounts were 
urgently needed, whilst throughout the whole army there was a 
general lack of needful supplies.^ It is far from impossible that 
the distrust felt towards McClellan in Government circles extended 
to the supply depots in Washington, and caused the delay of which 
McClellan repeatedly complained. 

But from a political point of view the President and his Cabinet 
^ 2 Henderson, 355. ^ 2 B & L., 102-3. 

139 



140 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

were most anxious that the battle of the Antietam should be 
followed up by some decisive movement. Five days after that 
battle, on the 22nd September, Abraham Lincoln issued his famous 
Edict of Emancipation, by which he declared that in all States 
which after the ist January, 1863, should be still in a state of insur- 
rection the slaves would be recognised as free by the Federal 
Government. This proclamation was certainly a wise political 
move. Enthusiasm for the war was beginning to flag after the 
recent failures. Many held that the Union was not worth fighting 
for at all if slavery were still to be retained. Lincoln now appealed 
to a loftier sentiment and a wider audience. He exalted the war 
to the level of a crusade.^ He secured to the Federal cause 
increased support at home and general sympathy abroad. He 
won the whole-hearted enthusiasm of the Abolitionist party, which, 
principally recruited from the West, supplied the Northern armies 
with their best soldiers. But for the moment the wisdom of the 
President's action seemed doubtful. Emancipation was not popular 
with the army generally. The Democratic party was entirely 
opposed to it, and the political enemies of the President charged 
him with a violation of the Constitution. Lincoln considered that 
the best way of gaining support for his declaration would be a 
signal victory over Lee's army, and accordingly he urgently pressed 
McClellan to push across the Potomac and lose no time in forcing 
Lee to another battle. 

Nothing, however, could induce McClellan to move until he felt 
himself ready. He had indeed sent two Corps to hold Harper's 
Ferry and to fortify the heights overlooking that post. But in 
spite of his partial success at the Antietam, he still completely 
misread the military situation. He underestimated the severity of 
the blow which he had dealt Lee : he exaggerated his enemy's 
numbers. His misapprehension of the position is most clearly shown 
by the extraordinary expression that he believed that the two Corps 
at Harper's Ferry would be able to hold out until reinforced.^ 

On the 6th October the President sent him orders through 
General Halleck to cross the Potomac forthwith and march against 
Lee ; but McClellan serenely disregarded the order. On the loth 
October Lee despatched Stuart with 1,800 cavalry to make a raid 
round the P^ederal position ; and for the second time in the same 
year Stuart rode right round the Army of the Potomac. For 
fifty-six hours he was within the enemy's lines, and covered in all 
126 miles. His losses were insignificant, whilst he destroyed a 
considerable amount of Government property at Chambersburg 
(Map IV.); and he brought back the valuable information that 
troops were not being withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac, 
but on the contrary reinforcements were being sent to that army. 

• 2 Henderson, 412-13. "■* 2 Ropes, 435. 



Oct., 1862] FREDERICKSBURG 141 

Lee was thereby freed from any apprehension of a movement by 
water against Richmond for that year, and was able to devote his 
whole attention to the army immediately in his front. Stuart's 
raid had a second and still more important result. The Federal 
cavalry, which had not yet recovered from the hard work imposed 
on them by Pope, were completely worn out in their futile attempts 
to capture the Confederate detachment. It became impossible for 
McClellan to make any forward movement until he had got 
remounts for his cavalry.^ 

Not until the 26th October, more than five weeks after the battle 
of the Antietam, did he begin to move his army across the Potomac. 
His troops crossed on the east side of the Blue Ridge. McClellan 
was as slow in crossing his army over the river as in all his other 
movements. It was the 2nd November before all his forces were 
on the south bank of the Potomac.^ The bulk were concentrated 
at and near Warrenton (see Map III.). 

Lee, on the 2nd November, having thoroughly satisfied himself 
that the Federal advance was to be on the east side of the Blue 
Ridge, ordered Longstreet's Corps across the Ridge to Culpeper 
Court House. With his usual daring Lee did not hesitate in the 
face of a much superior foe to divide his army so that its two 
wings were sixty miles apart.^ His reason for retaining Jackson 
in the Valley was, that the presence of that enterprising com- 
mander would constitute a standing menace to McClellan's lines of 
communication, and keep before the eyes of the Washington 
Government the spectre of another invasion of Maryland. If 
McClellan, despite this threat, pushed on from Warrenton towards 
Culpeper, it was Lee's intention to summon Jackson up the Valley 
and reunite his two wings near Gordonsville. 

McClellan was contemplating an advance on Culpeper in the 
hope of crushing Longstreet's Corps before it could be reinforced 
by Jackson,* when on the night of the 7th November he was 
relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac, and Burn- 
side appointed to take his place. Unquestionably McClellan 
deserved better treatment at the hands of his Government. At a 
moment of great national peril he had come forward, and by his 
Maryland campaign saved the Union, if not from absolute destruc- 
tion, at any rate from a position of extreme danger. As a com- 
mander he was steadily improving ; experience was teaching him 
many lessons ; it was impossible for an intelligent soldier, as 
McClellan was, to fight many battles with Lee and Jackson with- 
out learning much from them. His Maryland campaign, apart 
from his faulty handling of his troops on the actual battlefield, was 

^ For Stuart's raid and its importance, see 2 Henderson, 3S7-6o. 

* Palfrey, 131. ' 2 Henderson, 362. 

* For a criticism of McClellan's intended plan of campaign, see 2 Ropes, 446-7. 



142 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

better conceived and executed than any of his movements in the 
Peninsula. With all his faults and limitations as a general, it 
remains probably true, that McClellan was without any exception 
the best commander that the Army of the Potomac ever had.^ 
Certainly no other general ever possessed to a like extent the 
confidence and devotion of the soldiers of that army. 

But McClellan was sacrificed to political exigencies. He had 
always been opposed to the emancipation of the slaves, and was 
likely to be the Democratic candidate at the next Presidential 
election. If he were to enter upon that contest with the laurels of 
victory on his brow, the Republican party would have but little 
chance of success. He was moreover distrusted and disliked by 
Halleck, who was conscious of his own inferiority, and by Stanton, 
whom he had not hesitated to charge with having done his best to 
ruin the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsula. 

Along with McClellan, Fitz-John Porter, the commander of the 
5th Corps, was also recalled. He had shown his worth in the 
Peninsula at the battles of Gaines' Mill and Malvern Hill : he was 
perhaps the ablest officer in the Army of the Potomac. He was 
to be made the scapegoat of Pope's failure in the Second Manassas 
campaign. He was tried by court-martial on the charge of dis- 
obeying orders, was cashiered and dismissed the service. Many 
years later he obtained a rehearing of his case, was triumphantly 
acquitted, and restored to his old rank in the army.^ It is a 
strange commentary on the methods of Lincoln's administration, 
that with such grave charges hanging over his head Porter was 
allowed to retain the command of an Army Corps during the 
Maryland campaign. The inference would seem to be that after 
Pope's disastrous failure the Government realised that McClellan, 
and McClellan only, could save them, and that he must be left to 
work out their salvation in his own way : but when once that was 
accomplished, he and his most trusted lieutenant were discarded 
by their ungrateful employers. 

It was a grave mistake to remove McClellan : it was a criminal 
blunder to replace him by Burnside.^ Of all the general officers 
serving at that time with the Army of the Potomac, Burnside was 
probably the most incompetent : in the eyes of that army he lay 
under the grave suspicion of having prevented a decisive victory 
being won at the Antietam by his inaction and mismanagement of 
the left wing. When the Civil War broke out he had been more 
than seven years out of the service. But he had gained a con- 
siderable reputation for his successful campaign in North Carolina:* 

■ I'alfrey, 135. ' In 1886 by the Cleveland Administration. 

' 2 Henderson, 368; Palfrey, 54-5. 

* The fact that Burnside was a personal friend of McClellan prohahly aided to secure 
his appointment, as it was ho]ic(i that he might tiicrefore lie acceptable to the Army of 
the rotomac. Burnside was also ne.\t in rank to McClellan. Cf. 2 Ropes, 442-3. 



Nov., 1862] FREDERICKSBURG 143 

he was a man of charming manners and of great personal fascina- 
tion : and it is probable that the Government at Washington was 
not aware of the low opinion, which those who knew his military 
capacity better, held of him. 

Burnside was conscious of his own incapacity to fill so im- 
portant a post : only with the greatest reluctance did he take over 
the command.! He determined to adopt quite a new plan of 
campaign. Instead of pressing on towards Culpeper Court House, 
in the hope of being able to deal with Longstreet and Jackson in 
detail, or at any rate of forcing the united Confederate army to 
fight for its line of communications with Richmond, he resolved to 
move his army along the north bank of the Rappahannock, to 
cross that river at Fredericksburg, and from that point to press on 
with all speed towards Richmond. It is quite probable that this 
course commended itself chiefly to him, because he would escape 
from the danger of having his line of communications threatened 
by Jackson in the Valley.^ This plan of campaign did not find 
favour with Halleck, but the President, when appealed to, gave his 
consent to it, adding that he thought it would be successful only if 
carried out with great rapidity.^ The President's sanction was 
received on the 14th November. 

Burnside had already divided his army into three Grand Divi- 
sions, a continuation of McClellan's arrangement during the Mary- 
land campaign. The Right Grand Division, consisting of the 
2nd and 9th Corps, was under the command of Sumner : the Centre 
Grand Division of the 3rd and 5th Corps was commanded by 
Hooker, and Franklin was in charge of the Left Grand Division, 
which contained the ist and 6th Corps. The 12th Corps was at 
Harper's Ferry and the nth was held in reserve. 

Sumner commenced his march on the 15th, and arrived at Fal- 
mouth opposite Fredericksburg on the 17th: he was closely 
followed by the other two Grand Divisions and the cavalry. 
Fredericksburg was found to be very feebly garrisoned, and 
Sumner was anxious immediately on his arrival to send a body of 
troops across the river and capture the town. Burnside forbade 
the movement because, as the bridges had been destroyed, he 
feared lest a sudden rise of the river, which at that season was very 
likely to occur, would leave part of his army isolated on the 
southern bank. Had Sumner's advice been followed, in all prob- 
ability the awful carnage and terrible humiliation of the 13th 
December would have been avoided. 

^ Colonel Irwin, the historian of the 19th Army Corps, states {2 B. & L., 104) that 
there is good reason for believing that Burnside had twice already refused the command, 
in August and again early in September. 

'•^ 2 Henderson, 370. 

^ According to Ilalleck, " The President's assent was given to the plan of crossing the 
Rappahannock at the upper fords, above the Rapidan" (2 Ropes, 449, note 3). 



144 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Lee had already anticipated that the change of commander 
might be followed by a change in the plan of campaign : and with 
a view to the possible advance of the Federals by way of 
Fredericksburg he had sent orders on the I2th November for the 
destruction of the railway from Fredericksburg to Aquia Creek.^ 
On the 1 8th he started Longstreet's Corps on the march to 
Fredericksburg, and the following day wrote to Jackson urging 
him to ascend the Valley and come to Orange Court House.^ 

It had not been Lee's original intention to fight on the line of 
the Rappahannock, but to fall back to the North Anna, thirty-six 
miles further south, and on its banks give battle to Burnside's 
army. By adopting the North Anna as his line of defence, he 
would have secured a position not perhaps so strong defensively 
as that which he afterwards occupied on the Rappahannock, but 
possessing the great advantage of enabling him to deliver a 
decisive counterstroke, which he could not do at Fredericksburg ; 
in the probable event of Burnside's defeat, the additional thirty-six 
miles, which he would have advanced from the Rappahannock, 
would afford an excellent opportunity to the Confederate leaders 
to assail his flank, cut his line of retreat, and destroy his com- 
munications, by which means the Federal army would very 
probably be either annihilated or forced to capitulate. But Lee's 
sound military judgment was overruled by President Davis.^ The 
latter was reluctant to relinquish unnecessarily any Confederate 
territory from which supplies could be drawn. He had never 
grasped the great military principle, that the surest means of self- 
defence is to retain the power of assuming the offensive. He was 
quite content to maintain a strictly defensive attitude at Fredericks- 
burg, though a Confederate victory won there could not lead, owing 
to the nature of the position, to a decisive success. He looked for 
ultimate success, not to the genius of his generals or the valour of 
his soldiers, but to the intervention of foreign Bowers. He there- 
fore aimed solely at protracting the struggle so as to give time for 
that intervention to take place. 

Besides the superior advantages which the North Anna position 
possessed, there was another reason why Lee had not at first 
intended to fight on the Rappahannock. He had expected that 
Burnside's advance would be made with such speed that it would 
be impossible for the Confederate army to concentrate in time to 
oppose him at that early stage of the campaign.* But though 
President Lincoln in accepting Burnside's plan of campaign had 
insisted on the necessity of speed, if it were to prove successful, by 
some strange oversight the pontoon train, which was to convey the 
Federal army across the river, was not sent up from Washington 

' 2 Ropes, 451. "^ 2 llemlcrson, 370. 

• 2 ilcmlerson, 375. * 2 Ikn.lcrsuii, 370. 



Nov., 1862] FREDERICKSBURG 145 

till the 25th November. By that date Lee had got Longstreet's 
Corps concentrated on the heights above Fredericksburg, and he 
determined to subordinate his judgment to the President's and 
offer battle there with his whole army. 

There was this further reason for fighting at P^redericksburg that, 
considering the lateness of the year, Burnside might not try to 
push his advance further, but resolve to wait for the spring before 
resuming the offensive. Accordingly Lee summoned Jackson 
from Orange Court House to Fredericksburg. 

The Confederate army had been remodelled since the battle of 
the Antietam, and was now divided into two Corps. The first, 
containing five divisions, was under the command of Longstreet;^ 
and the second, under Jackson, now consisted of four divisions, 
commanded respectively by Early, Taliaferro, A. P. Hill, and 
D. H. Hill. The 2nd Corps was stationed on the lower waters 
of the Rappahannock, Early's division twelve miles below 
Fredericksburg at Skinkcr's Neck, D. H. Hill's division at Port 
Royal six miles further down the river ; the other divisions were 
held in reserve ready to support Longstrect or the right of their 
own Corps, as occasion might require. 

After concentrating his army at Falmouth, Burnside's move- 
ments became much more deliberate. First there was the delay 
caused by the late arrival of the pontoon train ; then he was un- 
willing to move forward until the railroad to his rear, which formed 
his line of communications, was repaired : finally, when he found 
Lee prepared to dispute his further advance, he had to fix upon 
some plan of attack. It seems strange that he made no attempt 
to cross the Rappahannock by the upper fords, which was the 
route followed by Hooker in the following spring, and thus turn 
the Confederate left. His first idea was to try and turn their 
right by crossing at Skinker's Neck, but when he found that 
Early's division was there in position ready to dispute his passage, 
and that the Federal gunboats were unable to force their way up 
the river past D. H. Hill at Port Royal, he abandoned that plan. 
At length he resolved to cross the river at Fredericksburg, and 
make a frontal attack on Lee's position. Probably he was driven 
to adopt this desperate course by the impatience of his Govern- 
ment, which had not superseded McClellan in order that his suc- 
cessor might adopt the same dilatory tactics.- 

The position, which Lee held, was so strong that it seems wonder- 
ful that Burnside ventured to assault it. On the southern bank of 
the Rappahannock there ran a long, low ridge parallel to the river 
and at a distance from it varying from 1,500 to 3,000 yards.^ 
This ridge started about two miles above Fredericksburg quite 

^ Longstreet's divisions were commanded by McLaws, R. H. Anderson, Pickett, 
Hood, and Ransom. "^ Palfrey, 142, ^ 2 Henderson, 374. 

L 



146 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

close to the riv^er above the Falmouth ford and extended for six 
miles to the Massaponax River. Broken by ravines and streams 
it possessed great natural strength as a defensive position ; and 
Lee had utilised the time so liberally given him by Burnside to 
strengthen it by artificial means. Probably he had learnt a lesson 
from the Antietam, where he had made no attempt to strengthen 
his position by any kind of entrenchments. His army had been 
busily occupied at Fredericksburg with axe and spade ; and a 
fortnight's labour had made the position almost impregnable. 

Burnside gave orders that the crossing should commence on the 
nth December, Along the north bank of the Rappahannock runs 
a higher ridge known as the Stafford Heights, which completely 
commanded the river and plain below. Along these heights 147 
guns were in position,^ Fredericksburg was held by a small 
Confederate brigade. Burnside intended to cross the right wing 
of his army over the river exactly opposite Fredericksburg and 
the left wing by another set of bridges two miles further down,^ 
It was a foggy morning and the work of laying the pontoons 
proceeded but slowly. Below the town no opposition was en- 
countered, and one brigade of Franklin's command crossed that 
day. The building of the upper bridges was, however, consider- 
ably obstructed by Barksdale's riflemen in Fredericksburg. When 
about noon the fog cleared away, all the guns, which could be 
brought to bear upon the town, opened fire ; but the garrison was 
well sheltered and suffered little loss. Eventually a force was 
taken across the river in boats, 

Fredericksburg was captured after some sharp fighting, and the 
bridges were speedily completed. On that day one division and 
one brigade of the right wing crossed the river,^ During the 
following day the whole of Sumner's and Franklin's divisions were 
moved across the river. There was a dense fog, and no opposition 
was attempted by the Confederates, 

On the afternoon of the 12th Burnside settled his plan of attack 
for the next day. It is almost incredible but none the less true 
that Burnside, when he crossed the river, had no distinct plan in 
his head. With cruel justice it has been said that he hoped to do 
something, he did not quite know what, with his left, and if he 
succeeded, to do something with his right.* At 5 p.m. he came 
over to Franklin's headquarters and had a lengthy conference with 
him and his two Corps commanders, Reynolds and Smith. 

Franklin strongly urged that the main attack should be made 
upon the Confederate right with a column of at least 30,000 men 
to be sent in at dawn. In order to carry out such an attack he 
requested that two of Hooker's divisions should be brought across 

* Palfrey, 146, • 2 Ropes, 456. 

» Talfrcy, 147, * I'alfrcy, 151. 



Dec. 1862] FREDERICKSBURG 147 

the river to his support during the night.^ Certainly if any chance 
of success was still left to Burnside's army, that chance lay in a 
heavy attack upon the Confederate right. That was the least 
strong point in the whole of their line. Jackson's line might have 
been broken possibly by an attacking force of 30,000 men, and 
the Federals would then have secured a position to the right and 
rear of Lee's line. But even supposing they were so far successful, 
it is not easy to see how they could have gained any permanent 
success, as the rest of the Confederate position was so strong that 
reinforcements could have been fearlessly sent to the support of 
Jackson. Anyhow, an attack in force on the extreme right of the 
Confederate line was the only plan which presented even the 
smallest prospect of success. 

Burnside in his conference with Franklin did not come to any 
definite conclusion, but promised to let Franklin have his orders 
before midnight at the latest. Those orders did not arrive till 
7.30 a.m., and gave directions for a plan of battle very different 
to that which Franklin had recommended. He was now ordered 
to hold the whole of his command in readiness for a rapid move- 
ment down the old Richmond road, and to attack Jackson's 
position with a single division at least, taking care to keep it 
well supported and its line of retreat open. It is at once plain 
that the two parts of this order were contradictory : if Franklin 
was to support properly the division told off to try and gain a 
position within the Confederate lines, it was impossible for him 
to keep his whole command in readiness for a rapid movement 
elsewhere.2 

Sumner was also directed to make a similar tentative movement 
against the Confederate left. He was to advance one division at 
least along the Telegraph and Plank roads and endeavour to seize 
the heights on either side of those roads. Burnside's plan was 
apparently to seize with Franklin's division a point on the military 
road, which the Confederates had cut through the woods at the 
back of the ridge in order the better to connect the two wings. 
The seizure of this point would enable the rest of Franklin's 
command to move down the old Richmond road and get in rear 
of the crest held by Lee. Thus far the plan agreed with that 
which Franklin had submitted to him the previous evening. Only, 
how Burnside expected that a single division could secure the 
required position, passes understanding. He also apparently 
expected that if the two positions on the right and left were 
secured by Franklin's and Sumner's attacks with a single division 
each, the Confederates would be forced to evacuate the whole of 
the ridge between the two points. In reality the success of his 
preliminary movements would have only had the result of con- 

1 Palfrey, 150. '2 Ropes, 463. 



148 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

centrating more closely a powerful enemy between his two widely 
separated wings. 

When it became clear on the 12th December, that the bulk 
of the Federal army was crossing the river, A. P. Hill's and 
Taliaferro's divisions were ordered to come into line on the right 
of Longstreet's Corps, and at noon of the same day orders were 
sent to the other two divisions of the 2nd Corps to come up from 
the lower reaches of the river and take their position for the battle, 
which was now imminent. Again Lee succeeded in uniting his 
two wings on the field of battle just at the right moment. 

It is an open question whether Burnside realised that he was 
going to attack the whole of the Confederate army, or believed that 
he had only to deal with Longstreet's Corps.^ The latter supposi- 
tion would do something to explain away the foolhardiness of his 
frontal attack. But on the other hand it seems almost impossible 
to suppose that, if Burnside hoped to steal a march on Lee, he 
would have advertised the intended attack on the nth and yet 
delayed delivering it till the 13th, when the most distant of Jack- 
son's divisions was only eighteen miles away. 

Jackson's position was a strong one. His line was about 2,600 
yards long. On the left it rested on Deep Run, beyond which 
Hood's division of Longstreet's Corps was in position. Its right 
was at Prospect Hill, a spur jutting down from the wooded ridge 
and overlooking the Massaponax valley. His skirmish line was 
posted along the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, which 
runs parallel to the course of the river and about a mile to the 
west of it, till having passed the ridge it takes a turn southward. 
The fighting line was drawn up 150 yards above the railroad 
embankment along the crest of the ridge under cover of the forest. 
A. P. Hill's division supplied the first two lines : Early's and 
Taliaferro's troops formed the third line, and D. H. Hill's division 
was held in reserve. On both right and left batteries had been 
massed in commanding positions. The one weak point in the line 
was, that at the right centre a coppice projected beyond the edge 
of the forest and ran down the slope for more than a quarter of 
a mile beyond the embankment. Triangular in shape, its base 
faced the Federals and was 500 yards long. Although it was 
impossible to find any position from which either the approach 
to or exit from this coppice could be coinmanded, it had not been 
cleared, as the soil was so swampy and the undergrowth so thick, 
that it was believed that the Federals would be unable to {)cnetrate 
it. There was in consequence a considerable space, a quarter of 
the length of the whole line, along the Confederate front left 
undefended by direct artillery fire.'^ On the extreme right of 
Jackson's position, between the ridge and the Massaponax, Stuart's 

* 2 Ropes, 468. ' 2 Henderson, 379-S2. 



Dec. 13. 1862] FREDERICKSBURG 149 

cavalry and horse artillery, the latter under the "incomparable 
Pelham,"^ were posted. 

Franklin had placed the 6th Corps on his right holding the 
Richmond road and Deep Run, and the ist Corps on his left. 
With this latter Garps he intended to make his attack. Meade's 
division in the centre was to lead the assault, supported by Gibbon's 
division on the right, whilst the left flank was to be protected by 
Doubleday's division. Meade's division, having moved down the 
river until it was opposite the Confederate right, was formed in 
column of attack, and advanced to the assault between 9 a.m. and 
10 a.m. But no sooner was it across the Richmond road than 
Pelham's two guns opened on its left flank. For more than half 
an hour Meade's advance was arrested by their fire. When Pelham 
at length withdrew by Stuart's order, Franklin opened fire with 
several batteries, supported by the heavy guns on the Stafford 
Heights, against the Confederate position. The thick timber pro- 
tected Jackson's line against any serious loss, and his own guns 
made no reply, reserving their fire for the infantry attack. Shortly 
after 1 1 a.m. Meade's advance was again resumed, but when it was 
within half a mile of Jackson's line, the Confederate guns at length 
broke silence, and came into action with such effect that Meade's 
division retreated behind the Richmond road. For an hour and 
a half a furious artillery duel lasted, and at i p.m. Meade, with 
Gibbon in line on his right, again moved forward to the attack. 
Franklin had established two heavy batteries on the Richmond 
road to the right and left of the attacking force, which curbed the 
fire of the Confederate artillery from the ridge. 

On the left Doubleday's division was engaged with Stuart's com- 
mand, and two divisions of the 3rd Corps had been brought across 
the river, and were in reserve. Franklin had found it impossible to 
carry out Burnside's commands to the letter. Only one Corps was 
ready for the rapid move down the Richmond road. His other 
Corps was committed to the assault of Jackson's position, and the 
two divisions of the 3rd Corps were held in reserve so as to keep 
open its line of retreat. Already the task of capturing a point on 
the Confederate right was assuming proportions which it seems 
that Burnside had never anticipated. 

The attack was delivered with great determination. Meade's 
division forced its way through the coppice, and broke A. P. Hill's 
line. The two right brigades^ of the first line were thrown into 
confusion, and a third brigade^ brought up from the second line 

* Major John Pelham was Stuart's chief of horse artillery. He was very young to 
hold so important a post, having graduated at West Point in 1861. But he had greatly 
distinguished himself at Sharpsburg and added to his fame at Fredericksburg. He was 
killed in a cavalry encounter on the Rappahannock in the spring of 1863. 
^ Archer's and Lane's brigades. * Gregg's brigade. 



150 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

fared no better. But Jackson had plenty of troops in reserve, 
whilst Meade's victorious brigades had no supports. Early's and 
Taliaferro's divisions were ordered up from the third line, and 
delivered a vigorous countercharge at the point of the bayonet. 
Meade's troops, having lost their organisation whilst fighting in the 
dense wood, were in no condition to resist the attack, and with the 
loss of more than half their numbers were driven back. Gibbon's 
division was also fiercely assailed : his flank was exposed by the 
retreat of Meade's division, and soon both Federal divisions were 
flying back for shelter to the Richmond road. Contrary to Jack- 
son's orders that the pursuit should not go beyond the railroad, 
two brigades^ continued to follow the flying foe to the Richmond 
road. It was only the presence of the two divisions of the 3rd 
Corps^ which saved the Federal artillery on the left from capture, 
and prevented the repulse of the ist Corps from becoming a terrible 
disaster. The two adventurous brigades were driven back to the 
cover of the woods with very heavy loss. But the Federal left had 
lost 5,000 men, and Franklin was in no condition to resume the 
attack for some time.^ 

Burnside's attack with Sumner's Grand Division on the Con- 
federate left centre was even more disastrous. He had originally in- 
tended that Franklin's attack should precede Sumner's ; but shortly 
after 1 1 a.m., growing impatient, he directed Sumner to advance. 
The position which he was ordered to assault was one of enormous 
strength. His troops moving out along the Telegraph and Plank 
roads had to storm Marye's Hill. The front of this hill was pro- 
tected by a stone wall which, strengthened by earth piled up against 
its outer face, gave admirable cover for the troops behind who were 
drawn up in the broad road, whilst the hill rising above the wall 
was covered with sharpshooters in rifle-pits and guns in entrench- 
ments. Such a position with a front not more than 600 yards long 
was almost impregnable when held by four brigades.'* Yet for 
nearly three hours the devoted troops of the Federal right wing 
were launched in successive assaults against it. History records 
fortunately but few instances of brave men sent to destruction by 
the incompetence of their general in a more hopeless undertaking. 

The three divisions of the 2nd Corps were first sent into the 
assault. French's and Hancock's divisions led the way. They had 
to march 1,700 yards under a murderous fire before they could 
reach the enemy's front. When Couch, the commander of the 
2nd Corps, saw the effect produced upon the troops by the heavy 

^ Hoke's and Atkinson's brigades of Early's division. 

^ Birney's and Sickles' divisions. Stoneuian was in command of the 3rd Corps. 
Sickles' division was but slightly cng.aged. 

^ For Franklin's attack and repulse, see 2 Henderson, 3S6-93. 

♦ Cobb's, Kershaw's, Cook's, and Ransom's brigades. The two first belonged to 
McLaws' division, the other two constituted Ransom s. 



Dec. 13, 1862] FREDERICKSBURG 151 

fire as they deployed into line, he sent in Howard's division in 
support of Hancock. 

But numbers only served to swell the slaughter. The main line 
did not get within 100 yards of the stone wall, though some bodies 
were afterwards found within twenty-five yards of it. Hancock, 
the fiercest fighter in the Army of the Potomac, lost 2,000 men in 
his division and French 1,200; Howard, whose division came into 
action later than the other two, lost nearly 900. When the 2nd 
Corps was fought out, the 9th took its place. Sturgis' division 
lost over 1,000 men in a vain attempt to carry the wall. One 
brigade of the 3rd Corps ^ was put in to support Sturgis and was 
repulsed with loss ; and a similar fate awaited Griffin's division of 
the 5th Corps, which lost over 800. Perhaps the hardest and best 
fighting was done by Humphreys' division of the 5th Corps. His 
division consisted of two rather raw brigades. Their commander 
saw that the only chance of carrying the wall lay in ordering his 
men not to fire, but to trust solely to the bayonet. Though heroic- 
ally led, they could make no impression on the Confederate posi- 
tion, and were obliged to fall back in good order, but with a loss 
of over 1,000 men. With the repulse of Humphreys' division the 
fighting on the Federal right came to an end.^ 

As attack after attack of Sumner's wing was repulsed, Burnside 
sent urgent orders to Franklin to resume the offensive in his front 
and thus try to lessen the pressure upon Sumner. But Franklin 
had lost confidence alike in his commander and his men,^ He 
considered that a fresh assault would only lead to another bloody 
repulse, and might seriously endanger the safety of his already 
somewhat demoralised wing. He may have argued, too, that 
Burnside's ignorance of the real strength of the Confederate right 
justified him in not attempting to carry out his commands. What- 
ever may be the verdict upon Franklin's conduct — and it is a reason- 
able view to hold that an army which had the misfortune to be 
commanded by a Burnside was lucky to have so cautious an officer 
as Franklin in command of one of its wings* — the 13th of Decem- 
ber was fatal to his military reputation. He was relieved of his 
command in the following January and never employed again with 
the Army of the Potomac.^ It is a lamentable thought that the 
Federal Government did not hesitate to sacrifice such able officers 
as Porter and Franklin to hide the shortcomings of Pope and 
Burnside. The Federal losses amounted to 12,647. O^ these 
7,800 fell in the right attack. The Confederates lost 5,300, of 
which more than two-thirds belonged to Jackson's Corps.^ 

^ Carroll's brigade of Whipple's division. 

^ For the attack of Sumner's and Hooker's Corps, see Palfrey, 161-73. 
^ 2 Henderson, 393. •* Palfrey, 181. 

^ Franklin commanded an Army Corps under Banks in the Department of the Gulf for 
a time. " 2 Henderson, 404-5. 



152 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

No attempt was made by Lee to deliver a counterstroke.^ In 
the first place his position at Fredericksburg was not favourable for 
an offensive movement. The river with its six bridges secured 
the retreat of the enemy, and the batteries massed on Stafford 
Heights, as well as those which had been brought across the river, 
would have inflicted terrible loss on any force advancing across the 
open plain. In the second place Lee, seeing with what ease the 
Federal attack had been repulsed, did not realise what fearful loss 
had been suffered by his opponent, nor could he guess how great 
was the distrust felt for Burnside by officers and men alike. He 
expected that the Federals would renew the assault next day and 
was quite prepared to receive it. 

Had Burnside been left to himself, the disastrous tactics of the 
13th would have been repeated the following day. The sight of 
the awful slaughter of his troops seems to have quite upset his 
mental balance. He was with difficulty dissuaded from attacking 
Marye's Hill with the 9th Corps, which he proposed to lead in 
person.2 Throughout the 14th and the 15th the two armies lay in 
position facing each other. On the night of the 15th, under cover 
of a fierce storm, the Federal army was withdrawn to the north 
bank of the Rappahannock. 

Burnside, in spite of the disastrous failure of his first attempt 
was still determined to get to close quarters with Lee's army, and 
reverted to his original idea of turning the Confederate right by 
crossing the Rappahannock some miles below Fredericksburg. 
But on the 30th December he received a telegram from the 
President ordering him not to undertake any fresh movement with- 
out first giving him information of it. On receipt of this telegram 
Burnside repaired to Washington only to find himself unable to 
persuade either Lincoln or Halleck to authorise a forward move- 
ment of any kind. Returning to the army, he determined to act 
on his own responsibility.^ Late in January he attempted to turn 
Lee's left flank by the upper fords of the Rappahannock ; but the 
inclemency of the weather compelled him to abandon the operation 
known as the " Mud March." On the 26th of the same month* he 
was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac, and 
Hooker appointed in his place. 

* Jackson was in favour of making a nij^lil aUack Imt was overruled liy Lee 
(2 Henderson, 399). 

'^ The 9th Corps was composed of the troops whicli had served under Burnside in 
North Carolina and in the Antietnm campaign. 

" 2 Ropes, 470. * 2 Henderson, 415. 



CHAPTER XIII 

GRANT IN THE WEST— FORT DONELSON 
AND SHILOHi 

The Western theatre of war — The Confederate position — Halleck's sudden resolve — 
Advance on Fort Henry — Fall of Fort Henry — Result produced — Johnston's plan of 
campaign — Advance on Fort Donelson — Failure of the fleet — The Confederates try 
to cut their way out^Partial success of the Confederate attack — Arrival of Grant — 
Smith's successful attack — The Federals recover the lost ground — Surrender of Fort 
Donelson — Results of the surrender — Criticism of Halleck's methods — Reasons for 
Buell's failure to co-operate — Buell occupies Nashville — Evacuation of Columbus — 
The strategical position — Difference between Buell's and Halleck's views — Halleck 
appointed to the supreme command in the West — Lincoln's error of judgment — 
Halleck's plan of campaign — Johnston reorganises the Confederate army — Position 
of Grant's army — Johnston's advance — Position of Buell's army — Battle of Shiloh — 
Federal right driven back — Attack on Federal centre — Death of Johnston — Federal 
centre broken — Arrival of Buell — Beauregard calls off his troops — Criticism of soldiers 
and generals — Fighting renewed on the 7th — The Federals recover their lost camps — 
Pope's success at Island No. 10 — Halleck advances on Corinth — Beauregard 
evacuates Corinth — Evacuation of Fort Pillow — Naval battle of Memphis — End 
of the campaign. 

WEST of the Alleghanies the campaign of 1862 opened in 
the beginning of February. The Confederates under 
Albert S. Johnston held a line running from Columbus 
on the Mississippi to Bowling Green, and by holding this advanced 
position retained possession of a considerable part of Kentucky. 
Facing them were General Buell, commanding the Department of 
the Ohio, who had concentrated the bulk of his forces at Nolin in 
order to confront Johnston's main force at Bowling Green, and 
General Halleck commanding the Department of the Missouri. 
The latter had been too much occupied with restoring order out of 
the confusion which Fremont had left behind him, to be able to 
pay much attention to affairs east of the Mississippi. But one of 
his lieutenants. Grant, was in command at Cairo. It was he who, 
in September of the preceding year, had forestalled the Confederate 
general Polk by seizing Paducah, and in November had moved 
down the Mississippi with a small force, and fought an indecisive 
battle with some of Polk's troops at Belmont opposite Columbus : 
and he fully appreciated the importance of the issue which was 
about to be fought out in Kentucky and Tennessee. 

1 See Map VI. 
153 



154 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

The Confederate position was one of considerable danger. 
Although they held the interior lines, and at that time of year the 
wretched condition of the roads and the swollen streams presented 
almost insuperable obstacles to any large force operating by land, 
yet the rivers Cumberland and Tennessee afforded an easy advance 
by water into the very heart of the Confederate power in the West. 
The Confederates were painfully aware of their inferiority on water. 
The superior mechanical skill of the Northerners gave them an 
immense advantage in any combat which might be fought out on 
the Mississippi and its tributaries. In the West the Confederates 
had aimed not so much at building gunboats which might resist 
the advance of the Federal vessels as at securing strongly fortified 
positions on the rivers, which would prevent the ships of their foe 
from moving up and down at pleasure on their waters. On the 
Mississippi, above Memphis, they held strong positions at Fort 
Pillow, New Madrid and Island No. lo, and Columbus. On the 
Cumberland and the Tennessee they had constructed Forts 
Donelson and Henry to protect the waterway to Nashville and the 
Memphis and Charleston Railway. 

Buell, with a full appreciation of the military situation, had been 
throughout the winter urging upon McClellan the advisability of a 
combined movement by land and water upon Nashville. But 
Halleck had been too much occupied with his own difficulties in 
Missouri, and McClellan, partly on political grounds, favoured 
an advance into East Tennessee. Suddenly Halleck flung 
aside his old objections, and on the 30th January sent word 
to McClellan that he was ordering Grant to move up the 
Tennessee and capture Fort Henry. It is not clear why Halleck 
so suddenly changed his mind. In all probability he had been 
convinced by the representations of Grant and Commodore 
Foote, who was in command of the naval force, that a movement 
against Forts Henry and Donelson might lead to great results. 
He was a man of considerable ambition and anxious to rival the 
success of Buell, one of whose lieutenants, G. H. Thomas, had 
recently gained a victory at Mill Springs:^ and he hoped by 
despatching Grant on this expedition to force the hand of the 
Government and compel McClellan to abandon his cherished 
scheme against East Tennessee and give him all the assistance 
that he could towards effecting the reduction of the Confederate 
forts. 

These two fortified posts had been constructed in the summer 
of 1 861 by direction of the authorities of Tennessee.^ Fort Henry 
lay on the east bank of the Tennessee, and twelve miles away was 
Fort Donelson on the west bank of the Cumberland. The sites, 
especially in the case of Fort Henry, were not too well chosen, and 

' See Cap. VI. p. 47. * 2 Ropes, 13. 



Feb., 1862] GRANT IN THE WEST 155 

in both cases the fortifications were too large for defence by a small 
garrison, and rather resembled entrenched camps ^ The two posts, 
which were under the command of General Tilghman, who had 
placed a garrison of 3,000 men in Fort Henry and of 2,000 in Fort 
Donelson, guarded the bridges, by which the railroad from Bowling 
Green to Columbus, connecting the two flanks of the Confederate 
position, crossed the rivers, and their importance was fully realised 
by the Southern commanders. 

Grant received his orders on the ist February; and on the 3rd 
the expedition started from Paducah, forty miles below Fort 
Henry. Grant was in command of 15,000 men organised into 
two divisions under McClernand and C. F. Smith, and was 
supported by a fleet of seven gunboats under Foote, of which four 
were ironclads,^ By the 5th the whole force had arrived, and 
Smith's division was landed on the left bank, where it occupied a 
high bluff overlooking Fort Henry, 

Not only was the Confederate position commanded from the 
opposite side of the river, but even on its own bank there were 
heights, which once secured by the Federals would have rendered 
the position of the garrison untenable.^ Under the circumstances 
Tilghman decided to send all the infantry to Fort Donelson and 
to retain in the fort only a company of artillery. His sole object 
was to gain time for the rest of the garrison to escape. On the 
6th the fleet advanced to the attack and made short work of the 
Confederate defences. The fort was built so low that the guns 
were close to the level of the water. Various accidents befell 
some of the guns, and after an hour and a half's bombardment* 
Tilghman surrendered. The infantry made good their retreat to 
Fort Donelson. 

The news of the capture of Fort Henry produced a great effect 
both in the North and South. It was the first great success won 
by the Federals, and it had been gained with startling suddenness. 
It was hastily assumed, that in its ironclad gunboats the North 
had an instrument of warfare with which the Confederate fortified 
works were powerless to cope. Albert S. Johnston on the follow- 
ing day gave orders for the abandonment of Bowling Green. He 
determined with 14,000 men to fall back to Nashville ; at the 
same time he sent 12,000 men to reinforce the garrison of Fort 
Donelson.^ 

This latter step was a very strange one. It would probably 
have been Johnston's wisest course to concentrate as large a force 
as possible at Fort Donelson and fight Grant before he could be 
reinforced. A victory won over Grant would have been the 
surest means of protecting Nashville. For if once the Federals 

^ 2 Ropes, 14, 15. ^ For naval operations, see Cap. XXVI. 

^ 2 Ropes, 14. * 2 Ropes, i6, 17. ^ 2 Ropes, 19, 20, 27. 



156 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

got possession of Fort Donelson, Nashville itself would speedily 
be at the mercy of their gunboats. But Johnston, when he sent 
nearly one half of his army to Fort Donelson, was not con- 
templating active operations in the field. He proposed to lock 
the whole force up within the fortifications, and he relied upon the 
ability of his subordinates to extricate their troops, when further 
resistance seemed useless. It is hardly surprising that General 
Floyd, whom he placed in command of the garrison, protested, 
though vainly, against the whole proceeding. 

Grant had hoped to capture Fort Donelson on the 8th. But 
the forecast was too sanguine. The fleet had to descend the 
Tennessee and ascend the Cumberland. It had also suffered 
some injuries from the guns of Fort Henry and needed to refit. 
As the rapid success at Fort Henry had been gained by the naval 
force, Grant did not feel himself justified in advancing upon Fort 
Donelson until it was able to co-operate in the movement. Not 
till the 1 2th did he move his infantry, now reinforced by a third 
division under General Lewis Wallace. The same night they 
arrived before Fort Donelson. The next day witnessed a good 
deal of skirmishing and desultory fighting, as the Federals were 
taking up their positions, trying to gain some knowledge of the 
ground and feeling the strength of the enemy. 

On the 14th the fleet attacked, but the result was very different 
to that anticipated. The batteries, unlike those at Fort Henry, 
were placed high above the water and were virtually unassailable. 
A bend in the river just below the fort enabled all the guns to be 
brought to bear upon anything which came within range. ^ After 
a sharp action, the fleet was forced to retire. Two of the ironclads 
had their steering apparatus so damaged that they drifted help- 
lessly out of action, and the other two also received severe injuries. 
No impression whatever was made upon the fort. On the 15th 
Grant left his camp to have a conference with Commodore Foote, 
who had been wounded, and it was decided that after the repulse 
of the gunboats it would be necessary to reduce the fort by regular 
siege operations. - But on his return to his army Grant found that 
the situation had entirely altered. 

The Confederate garrison in Fort Donelson numbered 18,000 
men. But its commanders, Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, overesti- 
mated the strength of Grant's force, and believed that they were 
largely outnumbered, though they actually at the moment had a 
slight superiority in numbers over their assailants.^ Floyd had all 
along been opposed to an attempt to hold the fort ; and he had 

' Force, 34. '■• Force, 54. 

' 2 Ropes, 19, (jives the Confetlerate force as rather over 18,000 men. Force raises 
it to 20,000 (jj. 37). Grant's force at first only numbered 15,000, but it was gradually in- 
creased till at the close it amounted to 27,000 (l B. & L., 406, note). 



Feb., 1862] GRANT IN THE WEST 157 

special reasons for not wishing to become a prisoner of war, as he 
was Hable to be tried for high treason for his conduct as Secretary 
of War in President Buchanan's Administration, and was actually 
under indictment at Washington for embezzlement of public funds. ^ 
On the 14th the three generals decided to try and cut their way 
out through the Federal lines and reach Nashville. The repulse of 
the fleet that day failed to give them any increase of confidence. 

The attack was to be made on the morning of the 15th by 
Pillow's division, which was to break through McClernand's lines on 
the Federal right, and open the road to Nashville. Pillow was to 
be supported by Buckner, and the latter's division was to form the 
rearguard and cover the retreat. But no definite arrangements 
were made concerning the details of the retreat. It was not even 
settled whether it was to commence as soon as ever the road to 
Nashville should be opened, or whether the movement should be 
postponed till the night. No attempt was made to organise a train 
or provide a supply of food for the army. 

The attack proved successful. McClernand's division was rolled 
up and thrown back upon the centre, where Wallace's division was 
posted, and the road to Nashville stood open. But just at this 
point Pillow ordered his victorious troops to return to their own 
entrenchments. His idea apparently was that when the road had 
been opened, the retreat would not take place till after nightfall. 

Grant on his arrival promptly took in the situation. Though his 
right was beaten, he judged (wrongly, as a matter of fact) that the 
enemy must be a good deal demoralised by the fact that they had 
retired. 2 He immediately ordered Smith, who commanded on the 
left, to assault the enemy's lines to " save appearances," and sent 
an earnest message to Foote, begging that the gunboats would at 
least make a demonstration against the fort. Evidently he realised 
the gravity of the situation, but his admirable composure encouraged 
his subordinates. Smith advanced with great gallantry, leading 
the charge himself. The first line of Confederate entrenchments 
was carried, being but feebly defended, as the greater part of 
Buckner's division had been withdrawn to take part in the attack 
upon McClernand. The Federals found that they had gained an 
elevation which was the key to the whole Confederate position. 
Buckner returning with his troops from the scene of the earlier 
fighting made strenuous efforts to regain this all-important point, 
but without success. 

At the same time as Smith advanced to the assault Grant 
directed McClernand and Wallace to retake the ground which they 
had lost in the morning. At nightfall the Confederate position had 
changed considerably for the worse. The line of their retreat was 
again closed to them, and Smith's successful assault had rendered 

I B. & L., 401. " 2 Ropes, 30. 



158 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

their position in Fort Donelson untenable. The troops were 
demoralised and disgusted at having been recalled after their 
successful fight ; and Grant was receiving reinforcements. A 
Council of War was held that night. Buckncr declared himself un- 
able to hold his position, if the attack were renewed the following 
morning upon his second line of entrenchments. The boldest and, 
under the circumstances, the wisest course would have been to 
have made during the night all the preparations possible for a 
retreat, and in the morning to have made a second attack upon 
the enemy's right. ^ Though the Federals had reoccupied their 
old position, yet the troops on the right were still McClernand's, 
which had been so severely handled already. It is probable that 
a considerable part of the garrison would have succeeded in cut- 
ting its way out. But the Confederate leaders were in a despair- 
ing mood : they had no confidence in themselves or in their 
soldiers. Floyd turned over the command to Pillow so as to 
secure his own escape. Pillow followed his superior's example. 

But Buckner was of sterner mould, and determined to stand by 
his troops. Having accepted the command, he at once sent to 
Grant to offer to capitulate on conditions. Grant replied with a 
demand for unconditional surrender. Buckner had no alternative 
but to comply, and on the morning of the i6th Fort Donelson 
surrendered. Floyd and Pillow left by steamer before the capitula- 
tion was concluded, and with them a certain number of infantry 
escaped also. Forrest, the cavalry commander, with the greater 
part of his command, escaped by road. A considerable number 
of stragglers also got away, but the number of prisoners of war 
amounted to nearly 12,000.'^ 

The fall of Fort Donelson following that of Fort Henry within 
ten days filled the South with consternation. The disaster was all 
the more sudden, because the last news received had been a des- 
patch announcing a great Confederate victory. A cry went up 
for vengeance upon the unsuccessful generals, especially Johnston, 
the Commander-in-Chief. But President Davis staunchly refused 
to dismiss a general whom he regarded with justice as one of the 
ablest officers in the Confederacy. 

The results of the surrender of Fort Donelson, both material 
and moral, were enormous. It secured Kentucky to the T^deral 
cause : it laid Tennessee open to invasion : it necessitated the 
evacuation of Nashville and Columbus. The whole of the first 
line of Confederate defence in the West was swept away at a 

' This course was advocated by Tillow, but Floyd and Buckner decided that it was 
impracticable. 

■■' 2 Ropes, 33. Badeau {.Military History of Grant) says that 14,623 rations were 
issued to the prisoners. Buckner, in his official reiiort, stated that less than 9,000 
remained after the dL-]iarlure of Floyd's brigade, but at the time he told Grant that the 
force surrendering was from 12,000 to 15,000 men. 



Feb., 1862] GRANT IN THE WEST 159 

single blow. The South, with its feeble resources, could ill afford 
to lose the services of the thousands who had become prisoners of 
war. At the North the victory led to the expectation that the 
days of the Confederacy were numbered, and intensified the dis- 
appointment which was felt, when these earlier successes were not 
followed up. 

The double success, achieved with a rapidity which was in 
marked contrast to the methods of other Federal generals, laid 
the solid foundation of Grant's military reputation. It gained for 
him the trust and support of President Lincoln, which stood him 
in good stead afterwards. Yet for the moment it was Halleck, 
the commander of the Department, who gained the chief credit 
for the success won by his lieutenant. It secured him shortly 
afterwards the supreme command in the West. 

But brilliant as had been the results of the expedition, it was 
open to severe criticism. When Halleck suddenly made up his 
mind to let Grant carry out the scheme, which he persistently 
advocated, he did not take the trouble to secure either the approval 
of McClellan, then Commander-in-Chief of all the Federal forces 
in the field, or the co-operation of Buell. As he expected, he 
forced the hand of the Government. McClellan was obliged to 
abandon his cherished scheme of an invasion of East Tennessee. 
But he had no troops which he could send to Halleck. Buell, 
who had been led to believe that Halleck would not make any 
movement up the Tennessee, had scattered his troops so much 
that it was no easy task to collect a considerable force, which 
might be sent to Grant's aid. Halleck himself imagined that he 
could spare no troops for the purpose from Missouri. Con- 
sequently, after the fall of Fort Henry, Grant found himself 
placed, by the ill-judged precipitancy of his superior officer, in a 
position of considerable peril. It would have been quite feasible 
for Johnston to concentrate a superior force against him. Had 
Beauregard (who had come from the East to command the troops 
on the Mississippi under Johnston, with headquarters at Columbus) 
been commanding the Confederate forces in the place of Johnston, 
that would have been the course adopted ^ : and a decisive victory 
would have undone all the effects of the capture of Fort Henry. 
Halleck's inconsiderate haste had forced his subordinate to run a 
great and unnecessary risk. 

Further, it caused a great deal to be left undone which ought 
to have been done. Grant had a large enough force under his 
command at Fort Donelson to have pushed up the Cumberland in 
pursuit of Johnston. But no attempt was made to follow up the 
Confederate retreat. For ten days after the fall of Fort Donelson 
Halleck remained without any plan at all. He had totally failed 
^ I B. & L., 571-2. But this k denied by Colonel Johnston (i B. & L,, 548). 



160 THE CIVIL WAR I\ THE UNITED STATES 

to grasp the full significance of Grant's success. So far from 
pressing on into the heart of Tennessee, and thereby turning the 
Confederate positions on the Mississippi, he was afraid that Beaure- 
gard would assume the offensive against Cairo, Paducah, and Fort 
Henry. He ordered Grant not to advance, but to send back the 
gunboats. But Commodore Foote, acting on his own responsi- 
bility, pushed up the river for thirty miles to Clarksville, which he 
occupied without resistance, and Grant sent C. F. Smith's division 
to take possession of that town.^ 

Buell had taken a long time to make up his mind as to the 
proper course for him to pursue with reference to Halleck's 
demands for help. He was by no means disposed to break up his 
army and send a considerable part of it to serve under Halleck's 
command. A rigid disciplinarian, he had brought the Army of 
the Ohio to a high state of efficiency, and was particularly anxious 
that its esprit de corps, so great an essential in a volunteer army, 
should not be impaired by the withdrawal from it of divisions to 
serve in other armies under other leaders.^ When he heard that 
Bowling Green had been evacuated he determined to send one 
division by water to Grant, and with the rest of his army to march 
direct upon Nashville. There can be but little doubt that Buell 
resented Halleck's action in sending an expedition against Fort 
Henry, and then suddenly calling upon him to send reinforcements 
to take part in the movement, which Halleck himself had led him 
to suppose abandoned. He had a general's natural desire to keep 
his fine army intact. At the moment of Grant's advance he was 
preparing for an advance into East Tennessee, to follow up 
Thomas' victory at Mill Springs, and it took him some time to 
concentrate his troops again for an advance on quite a different 
line. 

On the 24th February two of his divisions were in possession of 
Nashville, which Johnston evacuated after the fall of Fort Donelson. 
The conditions of the roads and streams convinced the Federal 
generals that it was impracticable to follow Johnston, who had 
retreated to Murfrcesborough, although their united forces would 
have brought 90,000 men against the Confederate army of less 
than 20,000.^ 

On the 2nd March Columbus was evacuated by Beauregard's 
orders, and almost all the guns and a considerable part of the 
garrison were removed down the river to New Madrid and Island 
No. 10, in order to prevent the further advance of the Federal 
fleet. General Tope was sent by Halleck to attack this new 
position of the Confederates. 

As the pursuit of Johnston had been abandoned it was necessary 

* For an extensive criticism of Halleck's stratej;)', see 2 Ropes, 42-9. 
' 2 Kopcs, 41. * 2 Kt)|x;s, 52, 



March, 1862] GRANT IN THE WEST 161 

for the Federal generals to devise some fresh plan of action. The 
right strategical course to adopt was to take such a position that 
Johnston would be forced either to fight a battle to save his line of 
communications, or, if he refused to do that, to abandon the Con- 
federate cause in the West as hopeless. Above all, it was important 
to prevent Johnston at Murfreesborough from uniting with Beaure- 
gard, who was concentrating a force at Memphis and Corinth from 
the garrisons of the abandoned positions on the Mississippi. 

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad offered just such a position 
as the Federals required. If Johnston refused to fight for its defence, 
it would be possible to sever the West from the East and compel 
the Confederate forces in the West to fall back upon the Gulf States. 
At the same time the possession of the railway would enable the 
Federals to prevent the junction of Beauregard and Johnston. Both 
Memphis and the posts on the Mississippi above that city still re- 
tained by the Confederates would have to be evacuated when once 
Halleck and Buell were firmly established on the line, which con- 
nected the Mississippi with the Eastern States in the Confederacy. 
The Tennessee provided the Federals with a safe line of advance 
against the railroad. A movement up that river would bring them 
into close proximity to Corinth, a railway junction of extreme im- 
portance. At that point the Mobile and Ohio Railroad connecting 
the upper waters of the Mississippi with the Gulf States intersected 
the direct line of communication between East and West. A short 
distance west of Corinth, a second, the Mississippi Central Railroad, 
intersected the Memphis and Charleston line. The two lines from the 
south, joining at Jackson, ran northward through Humboldt and 
formed the overland line of communication, on which the Confederate 
forces in Island No. 10 and New Madrid depended for their supplies. 
At Humboldt a third line came in — the Memphis and Ohio Railway 
— which was already broken by the capture of Forts Henry and 
Donelson. Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt were three points of 
strategical importance, but the first was by far the most important, 
as its capture would compel the evacuation of the other two posi- 
tions. To the east of Corinth a tributary of the Tennessee was 
crossed by the Memphis and Charleston line near Eastport, and 
the destruction of the railway bridge at that point would seriously 
embarrass the Confederate movements. 

Buell formed a correct view of the strategical situation. He 
wished to unite his army and that of Halleck as far up the Ten- 
nessee as possible on the east bank, to cross the river and strike 
a blow in force at the railroad. Halleck, on the contrary, proposed 
to send his army up the Tennessee, but to confine its operations to 
making raids on the west bank against the Confederate lines of 
communication, with the exception of one division, which he in- 
tended to send against the railway bridge near Eastport. But 



162 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the point on which he specially insisted was that under no circum- 
stances was a general battle to be brought on ; to avoid that, the 
different expeditions were, if necessary, to retreat. He entirely 
failed to see that the true objective of all his movements ought to 
have been the Confederate army in the West, and that its destruc- 
tion was the one matter of vital importance.^ 

The consequence of these divided counsels was that after the 
occupation of Nasiiville the Federals made a very poor use of their 
opportunities. Ikiell's army remained at Nashville whilst Halleck 
made attempts against the Confederate lines of communication, 
which the condition of the roads and the inclemency of the weather 
rendered wholly unsuccessful. 

In the beginning of March, McClellan had been relieved of the 
command of all the armies of the United States in the field, in 
order that he might concentrate his attention upon the Army of the 
Potomac. On the nth of the same month President Lincoln 
yielded to the urgent entreaties of Halleck, who, ever since the fall 
of Fort Donelson, had been clamouring for the sole command in 
the West, and appointed him the commander of a new Department 
extending from Knoxville on the cast to and beyond the west bank 
of the Mississippi to be known as the Department of the Mississippi. 

This appointment placed Buell under Halleck's orders. Lincoln 
was unquestionably right to put an end to the system of dual con- 
trol established by McClellan. A single commander-in-chief in the 
West ensured a much-needed unity of movement in the Federal 
operations. But as certainly Lincoln made a grave mistake in 
selecting for the command of the new Department Halleck in place 
of Buell. 

Still, for the time, Halleck had achieved his object, and was now 
Commander-in-Chief of the Federal forces in the West. Missouri, 
which had absorbed so much of his attention during the earlier 
stages of the war, had been permanently secured to the P'ederal 
cause by the victory of General Curtis at Pea Ridge over the Con- 
federate general, Van Dorn, on the 7th and 8th March.^ Curtis 

* For the difference between the two generals' views, sec 2 Ropes, 54-5. 

' The battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern (Maps IX. and X.), was one of the most 
important fought during the war on the west of the Mississippi. Van Dorn had just 
arrived in the Trans-Mississippi from the East. His original plan was to concentrate all 
his available forces for an advance on St. Louis, in the hope of capturing that city and 
carrying the war into Illinois. But he found that the Federal general, Curtis, had 
anticipated him in taking the offensive, and was threatening to invade Arkansas. 

The Confederate force was alwut 16,000; the Federal, 10,500. Curtis, finding him- 
self inferior in numbers, took up a defensive position. But Van Uorn, by a wide turning 
movement, threw one wing of his army across the Federal line of retreat and, attacking 
on March 7lh, gained a considerable advantage. 

But in the meantime the other Confederate wing was heavily defeated, and the next 
day Curtis, renewing the battle with Van D<>rn's victi)rious wing, gained a complete 
victory. 

After his defeat at Pea Ri<lge, Van Dorn moved the bulk of his army across the 



March, 1862] GRANT IN THE WEST 163 

followed up his success by marching through Arkansas without 
encountering any serious opposition, and came out on the bank 
of the Mississippi in the following July. Halleck, in taking over 
his new command, had nothing to fear on the west side of the 
Mississippi. As his attempt to destroy the Confederate lines of 
communication on the west of the Tennessee had failed, he deter- 
mined to carry out the plan of campaign which from the first had 
been urged upon him by Buell, now his subordinate. He directed 
the Army of the Ohio to move to Savannah on the east bank of the 
Tennessee with a view to uniting with Grant's army, which was 
concentrating at Pittsburg Landing, nine miles above Savannah on 
the opposite bank. The combined armies were then to move on 
Corinth, which was twenty miles distant from Pittsburg Landing. 
The position for the Federal camp had been selected by C. F. Smith, 
who had been temporarily in command of the advance up the 
Tennessee, owing to a misunderstanding between Halleck and 
Grant. It was a strong position, as the flanks were protected by 
the Tennessee and its tributaries, and could have been rendered 
impregnable by a single night's work at entrenching. But the use 
of entrenchments had not as yet been recognised by either com- 
batant. There was, however, one cardinal defect about the position. 
It had no line of retreat. If the Confederates should concentrate 
a superior force against Grant before he was reinforced by Buell, 
the Federal army if beaten in battle would have no alternative 
except to capitulate.^ 

Johnston and Beauregard were quick to seize the opportunity. 
They saw a chance of defeating the largely superior forces at 
Halleck's disposal in detail. About the i8th March Johnston reached 
Corinth with 20,000 men, having marched from Murfreesborough 
by way of Decatur.^ He found there General Bragg, who brought 

Mississippi. Hindman, who succeeded him in command of the Trans- Mississippi district, 
exerted himself to such good purpose that in July he had collected an army of some 
20,000 men, with which he barred Curtis's advance on Little Rock (Map X.), the State 
capital. Curtis then marched to Helena, brushing aside a force sent to intercept him. 

At the end of July Holmes was appointed to the command of the Trans-Mississippi 
Department, and by his orders Hindman prepared a force for the invasion of Missouri, 
but in November was ordered to suspend this movement in consequence of the appeals for 
reinforcements which were reaching Holmes from Vicksburg. Nevertheless, Hindman 
determined, before executing this order, to advance against and drive back a somewhat 
smaller Federal force, which had been concentrated by General Blunt in North-west 
Arkansas. Blunt called up to his aid two divisions from Missouri under Herron. Hind- 
man had an excellent chance of defeating the two Federal forces in detail, but after 
getting into close contact with Blunt's force, took up a defensive position and allowed 
himself to be overwhelmed by the united forces of Blunt and Herron in the battle 
of Prairie Grove, December 7th, 1862 (3 B. &L., 441-50). 

^ 2 Ropes, 59. But it is perhaps permissible to argue with Fiske, 72, that as long as 
the gunboats commanded the river. Grant might reckon on having sufficient water 
transport to withdraw his army in case of defeat. 

" 2 Ropes, 61. The head of Johnston's column arrived about the i8th, but his whole 
force was not assembled till the 25th (i B. & L., 549), or even perhaps the 27th (l B. & L., 
579). 



164 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

a force of 10,000 men from Pensacola. Beauregard ordered his 
troops to assemble at the same point. On the 29th March Johnston 
formally assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi, as it 
was now styled, numbering about 40,000 men with 100 pieces of 
artillery.^ Apparently Johnston had lost confidence in himself 
after his repeated failures to check the Federal advance, and urged 
Beauregard, the victor of Bull Run, to assume the chief command. 
But the latter refused to supersede his superior officer. The Con- 
federate army was organised into three Corps under Polk, Hardee, 
and Bragg,^ all West Point graduates and soldiers of decided 
ability, with a reserve of infantry under Breckinridge, who had been 
Vice-President of the United States, when Buchanan was President. 

By the ist April Grant had concentrated at and near Pittsburg 
Landing about 45,000 men.^ His army was divided into six divi- 
sions commanded by W. T. Sherman, Prentiss, McClernand, Lewis 
Wallace, Hurlbut, and W, H. L. Wallace — the last named was 
commanding in place of C. F. Smith, who had injured his leg so 
seriously that he was obliged to leave his command, and before the 
end of April he died of the effects of his accident. Grant laid 
himself open to severe criticism by continuing to keep his army at 
Pittsburg Landing, after the operations against the enemy's lines 
of communication had been found to be impracticable. The Landing 
had been selected as the temporary base for the operations, but it 
was the height of imprudence to turn it into a permanent camp 
within twenty miles of the enemy, unless it was strongly entrenched. 
But throughout this part of the campaign Grant displayed a sense 
of security which was strangely out of place. His easy successes 
had made him careless and unduly contemptuous of the enemy. 
He knew that they were collecting in force at Corinth. He ought 
to have realised that his exposed position gave them an opportunity 
which such able officers as Johnston and Beauregard were hardly 
likely to let slip. Yet he had made up his mind that the Con- 
federates would not venture to assume the offensive. His own 
headquarters were at Savannah, nine miles away from his army and 
on the opposite bank of the river. No plan of battle had been 
arranged. The divisional commanders had been allowed to fix 
their camps, not with a view to mutual support, but as it suited the 
convenience of each commander. No systematic cavalry recon- 
naissances had been carried out along the roads leading to Corinth. 
There was no regular outpost line in front of the camp. Not a 
single precaution had been taken to guard against a surprise. 

It must be said that Halleck shared to the full the light-hearted- 

' 2 Uopts, 61-2 (i 1'.. cS: L., 539). 

' I'olk had, however, enterc<l the church ami was Bishop of Louisiana at the outbrc.ik 
of the war. 

' 2 Rnpcs, 57; I B. & L., 53S. 



April, 1862] GRANT IN THE WEST 165 

ness of his lieutenant. He suffered him to remain in his insecure 
position : he gave Buell no hint that the safety of Grant's army 
depended upon the prompt arrival of his forces. He proposed to 
come at his leisure to Pittsburg Landing to assume the command 
of the two armies concentrated there, and then to commence the 
advance on Corinth. He gave the Confederate generals no credit 
for enterprise or even common sense ; he believed them to be com- 
mitted to a purely defensive policy. 

Johnston was anxious to concentrate as large a force as possible 
against Grant, in order that he might inflict a crushing blow. Van 
Dorn, after his defeat at Pea Ridge, had been ordered to bring to 
Corinth all the troops that he could raise from Missouri and Arkansas. 
Johnston waited for his arrival as long as he thought safe ; but on 
the night of the 2nd April, hearing that Buell was moving rapidly 
towards Savannah, he ordered an advance the following day.^ It 
was his intention to fall upon the Federal camp in the early hours 
of the 5th, but the wretched condition of the roads and the in- 
experience of officers and men prevented the troops being in 
position at the appointed time. Forrest's cavalry had encountered 
a certain amount of opposition, whilst leading the advance. Beau- 
regard, when it became clear that the attack must be postponed, 
was in favour of abandoning the whole enterprise and of returning 
to Corinth, believing that the Federals must know of their advance 
and were decoying them into a trap. Johnston, however, resolved 
to go on. His army had come to fight and not to retreat : another 
movement to the rear would destroy the confidence of the soldiers 
in their general and fatally impair the vioral of his army. The 
attack was fixed for the morning of the 6th. 

Meanwhile Buell's army of five divisions, numbering about 
37,000 men, was drawing near.^ It had been marching steadily 
but without undue haste, and had been delayed for twelve days at 
Duck River where a bridge had to be built. How completely 
Halleck had failed to impress upon Buell the need for promptly 
joining Grant is shown by the fact that Buell asked for and actually 
received permission to take his army not to Savannah, but to a 
landing-place opposite Hamburg, a town ten miles above Pittsburg 
Landing. It was by a mere accident that the orders to that effect 
miscarried. About noon of the 5th (Saturday) the leading division 
under Nelson reached Savannah. Grant, however, declined to send 

^ Beauregard (i B. & L., 579) has a different version. He states that he urged the 
advance in consequence of the arrival of a despatch late on the night of the 2nd from 
General Cheatham, posted some twenty miles north of Corinth, to the effect that he was 
being menaced by a Federal division. Beauregard, assuming that the Federals had 
divided their forces in order to attack the Mobile and Ohio Railway, urged Johnston to 
move upon Pittsburg Landing. 

"^ 2 Ropes, 65. The division commanders were Thomas, McCook, Nelson, Crittenden, 
and Wood. 



166 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

it across the river immediately, because he thought there would be 
be no fighting ; some day early in next week would be time 
enough.^ 

About two miles out from Pittsburg Landing (see Plan), upon 
the Corinth road stood Shiloh Church. There Sherman had his 
headquarters, and his division formed the right of the Federal 
army : in rear of him McClernand had pitched his camp. The 
centre of the position was held by Prentiss' division, half a mile 
from Sherman's left, across a second road leading to Corinth, and 
behind it lay Hurlbut's division, whilst more than half a mile 
beyond Prentiss, and resting upon the river, was Stuart's brigade, 
detached from Sherman's division. W. H. L. Wallace's division 
was still further to the rear, and Lewis Wallace's was at Crump's 
Landing, some five miles further down the river. Two gunboats 
in the river served to strengthen the left flank.- 

About 6 a.m. on the 6th the battle of Shiloh commenced. At 
3 a.m. on that Sunday morning Prentiss had sent out a brigade to 
reconnoitre. This force suddenly encountered the Confederate 
advance under Hardee, and was quickly driven in. So swift was 
the onslaught that the Federals were quite taken by surprise. 
The fighting, which lasted throughout the day, was at first a 
succession of independent battles waged by the different divisions. 
The Federal front line, held by Sherman's and Prentiss' divisions, 
was promptly driven back upon the divisions in their rear. The 
ground was thickly wooded, broken by swamps and ravines, and 
naturally favourable to the defensive. The Confederates, being 
raw soldiers and led by inexperienced officers, did not keep their 
formation very accurately. A good many seem at once to have 
left their ranks in order to plunder the captured camps. The 
Federals consequently found time to form a second line of defence. 
But the lack of organisation now made itself felt. Their line was 
divided into three distinct sections at some distance from each 
other, so that the flanks of the respective divisions were open to a 
turning movement. On the right Sherman's and McClernand's 
divisions stubbornly resisted the onslaught of Hardee's and Polk's 
Corps. Their right was covered by Owl Creek, but their left flank 
was completely exposed. As the attacking line extended, the 
Federals were forced to fall back from one position to another to 
escape being driven into the Creek, on which their right rested. 
Eventually they took up a position on Snake Creek, into which 
Owl Creek runs, covering the bridge, by which Lewis Wallace's 
division was expected to arrive from Crump's Landing, and this 
they held to the close of the day's fighting. In McClernand's 
report it was stated that this was the eighth position which his 
troops had occupied since the fighting began. 

' 2 Ropes, f 6-7. "^ For the iX)sition of the Federal uriny, see 2 Ropes, 70. 



from. Crumps Landing 



BATTLE OF 

SHJIJILOHI 

■A Vi M. 



The ccuntry isth'ickly woodtd 
UiCUTtwhiJ-eshoKn... g^^ 




MeWiuMi « Co. 



April 6. i862] GRANT IN THE WEST 167 

In the centre the divisions of Prentiss, Hurlbut, and W. H. L. 
Wallace held a very strong position known as the " Hornets' 
Nest." Up the wooded slope the Confederate right, composed 
of Bragg's and Breckinridge's commands, was hurled again and 
again in unavailing charges. Johnston had left Beauregard in 
general charge of the whole field to take under his own personal 
direction the movements of the right wing. He directed a suc- 
cession of frontal attacks against the Hornets' Nest, which was 
practically impregnable to any but a flank movement. About 
2.30 p.m. he was killed, and Bragg succeeded to the command of 
the right wing. He initiated a flanking movement, which was 
rendered the easier by the withdrawal of Stuart's brigade, forming 
the left of the Federal line, about 3 p.m. Hurlbut, whose division 
formed the left centre, finding himself outflanked, fell back to the 
Landing. By his withdrawal Prentiss' left flank became exposed, 
and that general was forced to change front. He and Wallace, 
however, continued to hold their position with great resolution until 
about 5 p.m. Polk moved his corps over from the left to Bragg's 
assistance. Wallace himself was killed, but nearly all his division 
made good their retreat. The remnant of Prentiss' division, how- 
ever, was surrounded and forced to surrender. 

But this obstinate resistance had given time for the sorely 
needed reinforcements to come up. Nelson's division had been 
hurried up from Savannah to a point opposite Pittsburg Landing, 
and there was ferried across. By 5.30 p.m. the leading brigade 
was in position behind a deep ravine covering the Landing. Grant 
had got together some twenty guns to hold this last position, and 
such of his infantry as he had been able to rally. But the bluff 
overlooking the river was crowded with an ever-increasing stream 
of fugitives, whose numbers have been estimated as high even as 
15,000. 

Against this last line of the defence Bragg was advancing to 
complete the defeat of the Federal army. But the sun was 
already sinking, and Beauregard, who after Johnston's death had 
succeeded to the command, determined to draw his troops off. In 
his judgment it was too late in the day to hope to gain any further 
success, and he wished to give his soldiers a good night's rest in 
view of the hard fighting which lay before them next day. His 
orders reached one of Bragg's divisions in time to prevent its 
further advance. But the other division, moving before Beaure- 
gard's order arrived, went in to the assault with the utmost 
gallantry.^ But it had no supports : the ammunition supply ran 
short, and all its efforts were powerless to carry it across the 
ravine in the face of the heavy artillery fire and Buell's troops, 

* Of this second — Withers' — division only two brigades took part in the attack, and 
one of these brigades had not refilled its cartridge pouches. 



1G8 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

now engaged for the first time during the day. The gallant but 
useless struggle was continued until nightfall, when the Confede- 
rate division withdrew. 

The battle of Shiloh, like the First Bull Run, is typical of 
encounters between volunteer armies. It was the first pitched 
battle fought on a large scale in the West. On both sides the lack 
of discipline and the unrestrained instinct of the individual to think 
for himself and to take such steps as seem most likely to secure 
his own safety were to be seen in the large number of stragglers, 
and of men who, not from cowardice but simply from lack of 
military habit, left their ranks and moved to the rear when the case 
seemed hopeless. This was especially noticeable in the case of the 
Federals. The stream of fugitives increased with each successive 
movement of the sorely pressed divisions to the rear. It has been 
estimated that at the close of the day's fighting Grant had not 
more than 12,000 men under arms (including Lewis Wallace's 
division from Crump's Landing, which took no part in the fighting 
of the 6th). 

This feature was not so noticeable on the actual day of battle in 
the Confederate ranks, as they were acting on the offensive and 
buoyed up by the hope of winning a signal victory. And, indeed, 
the vigour with which the Confederates attacked at Shiloh con- 
trasts favourably with the methods of the Federals, when they 
were the attacking force at Bull Run. But after the fighting was 
over and it was recognised that the attemi)t to annihilate Grant's 
army, before it could be reinforced, had failed, there was a steady 
stream of fugitives anticipating on their own responsibility the 
order for a general retreat on Corinth, which reduced Beauregard's 
force for the next day's fighting to 20,000 men. 

Nor was the conduct of the commanding officers on either side 
above criticism. Grant exercised but little personal control over the 
course of the battle. He showed himself at the different parts of 
the field, and did his utmost to encourage and rally his beaten 
troops. But throughout the day on the Federal side the absence 
of a single controlling mind was noticeable. 

Johnston also failed to display any marked tactical ability in 
the handling of his troops. The original plan had been that 
the Federal left should be turned, and the whole army thus 
forced away from the river, on which their hope of reinforcements 
depended. But Johnston, by committing himself to a succession 
of frontal attacks against the almost impregnable position of the 
Federal centre, abandoned the original plan, and caused his troops 
to suffer very heavy loss without obtaining any counterbalancing 
advantage.^ 

During the night of the 6th Lewis Wallace's division arrived 

' l'"or a t^eneral review uf tlie liattle of llie 6th, see 2 Ropes, 68 86. 



April 7, 1862] GRANT IN THE WEST 169 

from Crump's Landing. Its late arrival was due to a misunder- 
standing.i Three divisions of Buell's army were also brought 
across the river, and by the morning of the 7th Grant had under 
his command 25,000 fresh troops, who had not borne the burden 
and toil of the previous day's fighting. He ordered an advance 
against Beauregard's sorely tried troops as soon as it was light, and 
by 5 a.m. the battle was renewed. Beauregard on this day displayed 
tactical ability of a high order. He never allowed his army to be- 
come involved in a pitched battle, and yet whilst steadily falling 
back lost no opportunity of striking a counterblow at any Federal 
force which pressed too closely in pursuit. His retreat never de- 
generated into a rout. 

The fiercest fighting of the day was on the Corinth road between 
the Purdy road and Shiloh Church. For nearly six hours Bragg 
held his position there with splendid tenacity, and prevented the 
Federals from cutting the line of retreat to Corinth.^ Between 
3 p.m. and 4 p.m. Grant, having regained the positions which his 
first line had held at the commencement of the previous day's 
fighting, desisted from any further attempt to crush the Con- 
federate army. There was no apparent reason why he should not 
have pressed the pursuit till nightfall. But on neither of these 
two eventful days did Grant rise to the height of the occasion. 

The losses on both sides were very heavy ; in killed and wounded 
they were nearly equal, the Federal loss being slightly over 10,000, 
whilst that of the Confederates was a few hundreds short of that 
number. But the Federal loss in prisoners and missing was much 
heavier than that of their opponents.^ In Prentiss' division alone 
2,200 were taken prisoners. 

Having abandoned the pursuit on the afternoon of the 7th, 
Grant made no attempt to resume it, but waited at Pittsburg 
Landing for Halleck's arrival. The Commander-in-Chief joined 
his armies on the nth April. He displayed no eagerness to 
advance, but preferred to wait until Pope's army should join 
him. Pope, with 21,000 men, had been sent to operate against 
the Confederate position at Island No. 10 and New Madrid, and 
after some very arduous work, including the cutting of a canal 
twelve miles long,'* forced the surrender of 7,000 Confederates on 
the 8th April. 

^ Wallace, having some of his brigades thrown out some distance upon the Purdy 
road, started upon receiving Grant's orders to march, by a road parallel to that which 
Grant intended him to follow, and which would have brought him to Snake Creek, two 
miles higher up. Being overtaken by two of Grant's staff officers, he learnt that it 
would be dangerous to follow this road, and was obliged to retrace his steps some three 
miles and take a cross road (Fiske, 80). 

2 Fiske, 96. '^ I B. & L., 538-9. 

* The length of the whole canal was twelve miles. Part of it had to be excavated 
to gain sufficient depth, and for six miles a channel had to be cut through a thick foresf 
of large trees (Force, 82). 



170 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

The only position on the Mississippi still held by the Con- 
federates above Memphis was Fort Pillow, eighty miles below 
New Madrid. Pope had been originally ordered to continue his 
movement down the river and attack this post. But before he 
had actually commenced operations against it he was recalled to 
join Halleck, which he did on the 2ist April.^ In spite of this 
reinforcement, which raised his army to 100,000 men, Halleck 
allowed another week to pass by before he commenced a very 
cautious advance on Corinth. On the ist May Beauregard was 
reinforced by 15,000 men brought from the opposite bank of the 
Mississippi by Van Dorn. The army under his command now 
numbered over 50,000, but he did not venture to give battle to 
a force double his own strength. Halleck's forward movement 
was a succession of slow approaches. He carefully entrenched 
each position, and impressed upon his lieutenants that under no 
circumstances were they to allow themselves to be drawn into 
a pitched battle. For over a month the operations against Corinth 
dragged slowly on until, on the 29th May, Beauregard, finding 
himself in danger of being hemmed in, evacuated the town in 
the night. The movement was quite unexpected by Halleck, and 
Beauregard withdrew the whole of his army in safety to Tupelo, 
some fifty miles to the south on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. 
There he had the advantage of an excellent water supply and a 
salubrious climate ; and his army, which had suffered considerably 
from sickness in its entrenchments at Corinth, rapidly recovered its 
health. 

The evacuation of Corinth necessitated the abandonment of Fort 
Pillow. The garrison was withdrawn on the 3rd June. The Federal 
fleet pushed on to Memphis, where, on the 6th, a Confederate fleet 
of gunboats and rams was encountered and destroyed, and the 
same day Memphis, from which the garrison had already been 
withdrawn, was occupied by the P'ederals. 

With the occupation of Corinth and Memphis, the spring cam- 
paign in the West came to an end. Much had been accomplished. 
The Federal army was firmly established across the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad. The Mississippi had been opened to Vicks- 
burg. Kentucky and West Tennessee were in the hands of the 
P^ederals. But there had been also much left undone. The oppor- 
tunities for destro)'ing the Confederate army had been signally 
missed. Before long that army was as strong as ever, and it was 
the Confederates who next assumed the offensive in the West. 

' 2 Kopo, 94. 



SHILOH 171 



NOTE ON SHILOH 

A keener controversy has raged over the battle of Shiloh than perhaps 
over any other battle of the Civil War. In the Federal ranks the long- 
standing jealousy between the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio finds 
free expression in the divergent accounts of the battle, which come from 
the partisans of one or other, and there has been no more damaging 
criticism of Grant's methods than that penned by Buell, commander of 
the Army of the Ohio. Similarly on the Confederate side, the admirers 
of Johnston and the enemies of Beauregard have sought to saddle the 
latter with the responsibility of the defeat, and have claimed that Johnston 
had won a victory, which Beauregard threw away after the commanding 
general's death. 

The first point at issue is the alleged surprise of the Federal army. 
Though Grant and Sherman have both denied that any surprise of their 
troops took place, yet it is impossible to ignore the overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary. It is probable enough that Bragg somewhat exaggerated, 
when he spoke (i B. 8z L., 558) of many of the enemy being surprised 
and captured in their tents, but the undeniable fact remains that the 
Federal leaders were not expecting an attack, that they had made no pre- 
parations for such a contingency, and that the scouting on the Federal 
side was so slovenly that a great army was allowed to assemble within two 
miles of Sherman's headquarters without its presence as an army being 
detected. The surprise of the nth Corps at Chancellorsville was hardly 
more complete than that of the Army of the Tennessee at Shiloh, though 
from a variety of causes the subsequent course of the fighting on the two 
fields followed different lines. Halleck, Grant, and Sherman were all 
three convinced that the enemy was definitely committed to a defensive 
policy, and that there would be no serious fighting until Corinth was 
reached. 

The initial advantage in the fight lay then with the Confederates, and 
was retained by them till almost the close of the day. The absence of 
the commanding general during the early stages of the battle, which com- 
menced before 6 a.m., whilst Grant did not reach Pittsburg Landing till 
after 8 a.m. at the earliest, combined with the total lack of preparation 
for a possible battle, as is evidenced by the fact that one of Sherman's 
brigades was encamped on the extreme left two miles from the division 
to which it belonged, prevented the Federals from forming an organised 
line of battle and enabled the attacking force to defeat their opponents in 
detail. Grant, indeed, says (i B. & L., 473) that "with the single excep- 
tion of a few minutes after the capture of Prentiss, a continuous and 
unbroken line was maintained all day from Snake Creek or its tributaries 
on the right to Lick Creek or the Tennessee on the left above Pittsburg." 

The following brief summary of events, taken from Buell's Shiloh Reviewed 
(i B. & L., 487-536), presents a different, and, it is believed, a more accurate 



172 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

account of the day's fighting. Skirmishing began with Prentiss' troops. 
Prentiss drew up his main line about a quarter of a mile in front of his 
camp, and held that position till the enemy passed him on the right to 
attack Sherman, whose left regiment immediately broke. Prentiss retired, 
renewed resistance in his camp, and then fell back in still greater con- 
fusion to the line, which Hurlbut and ^^'allace were forming half a mile 
to his rear. McClernand, owing to Sherman's left wing giving away, was 
unable to form his line until he had fallen back some 300 yards with 
the loss of six guns. Of Sherman's division Hildebrand's brigade on 
the left very soon disappeared. Buckland's brigade of the same division 
made a stout resistance of about two hours at Oak Creek, but with 
McDowell's on the right was ordered back to form a line on the Purdy 
road 400 yards to the rear in connection with McClernand's right. This 
effort was defeated ; five guns were lost, and Sherman's division as an 
organised body disappeared. McDowell's brigade was the last to go, 
about I p.m. McClernand afraid, as all connection with the left was gone, 
of being cut off from the river, retired in the direction of the Landing, and 
about 3 p.m. took up a fresh position along the River road north of 
Hurlbut's original headquarters. In the meantime Stuart's brigade on the 
extreme Federal left had fallen back to a position in prolongation of and 
on the left of Hurlbut's, Wallace's and Prentiss' line in the Hornets' Nest, 
but without having any connection with it. The Federal centre held their 
position in the Hornets' Nest from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. By 3 p.m. the right 
wing, consisting of Sherman's and McClernand's divisions and one brigade, 
sent to its aid by Hurlbut, had given way, and Stuart's brigade on the left 
had also fallen back. At 4 p.m. Hurlbut, owing to the pressure on his 
left in consequence of Stuart's withdrawal, fell back, and the Confederates, 
massing on both flanks as well as in the front of the Hornets' Nest, com- 
pelled the surrender of Prentiss and 2,200 men shortly after 5 p.m. When 
the last Confederate attack was made by Chalmers' and part of Jackson's 
brigades, Hurlbut was in line behind a battery of siege-guns posted half 
a mile from the river, but there was no organised resistance for a distance 
of 500 yards from the Landing. A rifled battery had been placed in 
position there, but the gunners were leaving their posts when Ammen's 
brigade of Buell's army arrived and repulsed the Confederate attack. The 
rifled battery could effect nothing against the attacking force, which was 
sheltered in the ravine, and the fire of the gunboats was equally harmless. 

Grant (1 B. & L., 475) states that "before any of Buell's troops had 
reached the west bank of the Tennessee firing had almost entirely ceased ; 
anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had abso- 
lutely ceased." In proof of this view he cites the fact that Buell's loss on 
the 6th consisted of two killed and one wounded, all the casualties being 
in the same regiment. Buell's contention, however, is that it was the 
presence of Ammen's brigade which prevented the final charge made by 
the two Confederate brigades from cutting off the Army of the Tennessee 
from the Landing. 

The nature of the battlefield, largely covered with wood and intersected 
by ravines, favoured the defensive and prevented the Confederates from 
utilising their cavalry for purposes of pursuit. This circumstance enabled 



SHILOH 173 

the Federals to hold on till reinforcements arrived, but those reinforce- 
ments came not from Lew Wallace's division at Crump's Landing, but 
from Buell's Army of the Ohio. 

Grant also asserts (i B. & L., 476) that victory was assured when Lew 
Wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. Apart from the 
contention that Wallace's division would have been too late to save 
Grant's army, had it not been for the intervention of Ammen, the record 
of the next day's fighting seems to show, that with only Wallace's division 
to reinforce his beaten army. Grant would have been hard put to it, even 
to hold his ground against Beauregard. On the 7th the fighting on the 
left was entirely done by the Army of the Ohio, whilst on the right the 
honours were borne off by McCook's division of the same army. 

In an elaborate argument Buell maintains that the official map mis- 
represents the position of Grant's army on the night of the 6th. He says 
that this map extends Grant's line full half a mile too far to the west, 
placing Hurlbut's division on the front actually occupied by McClernand, 
McClernand's division on and 400 yards beyond Sherman's ground, and 
Sherman within the lines occupied by the enemy. He goes on to say 
that the revision of the map made nineteen years later by Sherman is still 
more misleading, giving Grant a battle front of 2^ miles instead of one 
mile at the most, not only extending Grant's line too far to the west but at 
least half a mile too far to the south. He considers that Sherman's line 
was not more than three-quarters of a mile from the river and more than a 
mile distant from the bridge over Snake Creek, by which Lew Wallace's 
division was expected, and which it could in no practical sense be said to 
cover. 

Amidst such conflicting testimony it seems impossible to arrive at any 
definite conclusion without avowing oneself a partisan of one side or the 
other. Ropes (ii. 79, 80) expresses himself very cautiously to this effect : 
" that this attack [of the two Confederate brigades] might have succeeded 
if it had been made before the troops from Buell's army arrived, is by no 
means improbable." One may perhaps go so far as to say, that without 
Buell's reinforcements Grant would not have won the battle of the 7th, 
whilst his position on the 6th might have been one of the gravest peril. 

On the Confederate side the rival claims of Beauregard and Johnston 
have been urged with a personal animosity happily lacking in the Federal 
controversy. Not only facts but also motives are called in question, and 
no important statement made by the one side is left uncontradicted by 
the other. The first point at issue is, to which of the two generals 
belongs the credit of conceiving the offensive movement against the 
Federal army at Pittsburg Landing. Colonel Johnston, A. S. Johnston's 
son, who was not himself at Shiloh and in his account of the battle seems 
to place much reliance upon a monograph furnished him by General 
Bragg, written, as it would seem, with the express purpose of discrediting 
Beauregard, states that it was his father who fixed upon Corinth as the 
point of concentration and determined upon the offensive movement 
against Grant, whilst Beauregard, so he asserts, had all along favoured a 
defensive pohcy and wished to limit the movement upon Pittsburg Land- 
ing to a reconnaissance in force. On the other hand, Beauregard main- 



174 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

tains that from his arrival in the western theatre of war he advocated an 
offensive policy, but that Johnston was steadily opposed to it, nnd that 
only with great difficulty did he persuade Johnston to join him at Corinth 
instead of continuing his intended retreat on Stevenson. 

There is no doubt that the Confederates were a day late in making 
their attack, and if it had been made on the 5th, as originally designed, 
their chances of success would have been greater. For this delay Colonel 
Johnston holds Beauregard to blame. He states that the orders for the 
march issued from Beauregard's headquarters were not the same as those 
which Johnston had originally approved, and that the change was the 
cause of the delay. Beauregard maintains, and his contention is supported 
by the evidence of two of his staff. General Jordan, Adjutant-General of 
the army, and Colonel Chisolm, that the orders issued on the morning of 
the 3rd were those approved by Johnston on the previous night, and that 
the delay was due to the misconduct of the Corps commanders. 

Beauregard claims that as soon as fighting commenced on the 6th 
Johnston gave him general control of the field and confined his whole 
attention to the extreme right. On Beauregard's theory Johnston's death 
did not cause any appreciable lull in the combat ; perhaps there was an 
interval of fifteen minutes whilst Bragg was organising a movement to out- 
flank the Hornets' Nest. Colonel Johnston holds that his father exercised 
a general control over the whole field of battle up to his death, and speaks 
of him as being on different parts of the field at different times. He con- 
siders that Johnston's death caused a lull of over one hour in the battle, 
and that after that melancholy event there was no longer any sign to be 
found in the Confederate ranks of that unity of purpose and combination 
of movement which the presence of Johnston on the field had thus far 
ensured. 

After the capture of Prentiss and his troops Colonel Johnston states 
that "all the Corps commanders were at the front and in communication : 
a line of battle was formed, and all was ready for the last fell swoop." 
According to Bragg, that final assault was never made, as l^eauregard "at 
Shiloh, two miles in the rear," sent orders for the withdrawal of the troops. 
According to this view it was not Grant's reserve artillery or Ammen's 
infantry brigade which saved the Federal army, but Beauregard's fatal 
order issued under a misconception of the state of affairs at the front. 

Beauregard, however, contends that after Prentiss' surrender " no serious 
effort was made by the Corps commanders to press the victory. Tlie 
troops had got out of the hands either of Corps, divisional, or brigade 
commanders, and for the most part at the front were out of ammunition. 
Before the order (for withdrawal) was received, many of the regiments had 
been withdrawn out of action, and really the attack had practically ceased 
at every point." Colonel Chisolm states that he was on the extreme left 
with Hardee till almost dark, up to which time no orders had arrived to 
cease fighting. There seems, however, some doubt as to the reason which 
led Beauregard at 6 p.m. to call off his troojis. According to his own 
account he knew that liuell's advance-guard had crossed the river, and he 
therefore withdrew his troops to make preparations for the defensive battle 
which he knew would take place next day. But according to General 



SHILOH 175 

Jordan's version, a telegraphic despatch had been received at the 
Confederate headquarters to the effect that Buell was marching towards 
Decatur, and Beauregard called off his troops because he felt sure of being 
able to annihilate Grant next day at his leisure. 

Of these two utterly contradictory versions of the battle of the 6th, 
the evidence seems on the whole to favour Beauregard's. The animus in 
Colonel Johnston's narrative is very marked. General Johnston at the 
opening of the war was regarded as the ablest soldier of the South. His 
failure to hold Kentucky and Tennessee caused dismay and astonishment, 
and his friends and admirers were anxious to represent their hero as 
stricken down in the moment of gaining a victory, which would have 
retrieved all his previous disasters. For that purpose it was necessary to 
cast the blame of throwing away the victory, which was as good as won, 
upon Beauregard. 



CHAPTER XIV 
BRAGG IN THE WEST— MTTRFllEESBOROUGHi 

Position in the West after the fall of Corinth — Ilalleck's false strategy — Grant's enforced 
inactivity — Buell advances towards Chattanooga — Forrest's raid on Murfreesborough — 
Bragg prepares to assume the offensive — Biicll recommences his advance — Morgan's 
raid on Gallatin — Kirby Smith invades Kentucky — Bragg invades Middle Tennessee 
— Buell follows in pursuit — Bragg misses his opportunity — Consternation at the North 
— Buell resumes the offensive — ^Iistakes of Bragg and Kirby Smith — Battle of Perry- 
ville — Confederates evacuate Kentucky — Buell relieved of the command — Rosccrans 
succeeds to the command — Rosecrans and Ilalicck — Raids of Confederate cavalry — 
Rosecrans advances — Battle of Murfreesborough — Rosecrans' plan of battle — Bragg's 
plan of battle — Rosccrans abandons his movement against the Confederate right — 
The Federals form a new line of battle — The Confederate attack repulsed — Rose- 
crans refuses to retreat — Fighting on the east bank of the river — Bragg abandons 
Murfreesborough — Results of the campaign. 

IF Halleck had vigorously pressed the pursuit of the Confederate 
army after the evacuation of Corinth, he would have either 
forced it to fight a battle, in which the advantage of numbers 
and moral would have been on the side of the Federals, or com- 
pelled it to take shelter in Vicksburg, where the same fate would 
have befallen Beauregard which a year later overtook Pemberton.^ 
But Halleck was quite content to fix his headquarters at Corinth 
and devote his energies to repairing the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad. He had under his command three armies — the Army of 
the Tennessee commanded by Grant,'* the Army of the Mississippi 
under Pope, who, being appointed shortly after to the command 
of the Army of Virginia, was succeeded by one of his division- 
generals, Rosecrans, and the Army of the Ohio under its original 
leader Buell. 

The conditions were now favourable for carrying out the project, 
so dear to the heart of President Lincoln, of sending relief to the 

1 See Map. VI. ' 2 Ropes, 384. 

' Halleck on reaching Pittsburg Landing reorganised his army into a right wing under 
Thomas, a centre under Buell, a left wing under Pope, and a reserve under McClernand. 
Grant was virtually shelved with the honorary title of second-in-command. Four 
divisions of the Army of the Tennessee with Thomas' own division of the Army of the 
Oliio formed the right wing, whilst the other two divisions of the Army of the Tennessee 
constituted the reserve. In course of time, however, the Armies of the Tennessee and the 
Ohio were restored to their original dimensions, and the Army of the Mississippi was 
united with that of the Tennessee under the command of Grant. 

176 



June, 1862] BRAGG IN THE WEST 177 

Unionists of East Tennessee. An advance through Chattanooga 
on Knoxville was now practicable, and promised great results ; and 
the capture of Chattanooga would effectually sunder the line of 
communications between the west and east of the Confederacy. 
Halleck, urged by the President to undertake the movement, 
charged Buell and the Army of the Ohio with the task ; that is to 
say, he detailed about one-third of his entire force for the purpose, 
but neglected to make any use of the rest of his army in order 
to prevent the Confederates concentrating in superior numbers 
against Buell. 

It was quite possible for the commander of the main Confederate 
army in Mississippi, if left to himself, to send such large reinforce- 
ments to Kirby Smith commanding the Department of East Ten- 
nessee as would make Buell's task one of exceptional difficulty. 
Not only did Halleck make no attempt to interfere with Beaure- 
gard's army at Tupelo, but he hampered Buell by ordering him to 
repair the Memphis and Charleston Railway, as he advanced, and 
use it as his line of supply. 

As this line ran between the territory recently conquered by the 
Federals and that still held by the Confederates, it was liable to be 
broken up at any moment by a raid of the Confederate cavalry ; ^ 
and in the West the Confederates possessed in Forrest and Morgan 
two cavalry commanders of quite exceptional ability for that sort 
of work. To attempt an invasion of East Tennessee with the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad as the main line of supply was 
to take away at the outset most of the chances of success. Buell 
vainly petitioned to be allowed to take as his line of supply one of 
the railways running to his rear, and to make Nashville his base. 
He was condemned by Halleck's decision to waste nearly the 
whole of June. By the end of that month Halleck realised that 
he had made a mistake, and directed Buell to take Nashville in 
place of Corinth as his base. 

In July Halleck was called to Washington to act as General-in- 
Chief of all the armies in the field. Buell thereby gained an 
increased freedom of action : and Grant assumed the command of 
the Armies of the Tennessee and the Mississippi. But he was 
directed by Halleck to hold two divisions in readiness to go to the 
assistance of Buell, if required, and consequently found himself 
not in a position to assume the offensive. Throughout the summer 
he was condemned to a policy of inactivity ; and even after the 
bulk of Beauregard's army left for East Tennessee could do no 
more than act on the defensive against the forces of Van Dorn 
and Price, which then took up their position at Tupelo.^ 

By the end of June Buell had concentrated three divisions at 
Athens, in Alabama, about a hundred miles west of Chattanooga. 

* 2 Ropes, 3S5. ^ 2 Ropes, 387. 

N 



178 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

A fourth division under Mitchel was occupied in repairing the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and had advanced so far east as 
to threaten Chattanooga. 

On the 27th June Beauregard, owing to ill-health, was relieved 
of the command of the Army of the Mississippi and Bragg was 
appointed his successor. The latter immediately sent one division 
to Chattanooga to protect it against Mitchel's advance. But the 
rest of the Confederate army remained in its encampment at 
Tupelo until the latter part of July. About the beginning of that 
month Buell moved two divisions to Battle Creek, a stream run- 
ning into the Tennessee to the north of Bridgeport, and by the 
1 2th the Nashville -Chattanooga Railway was open as far as 
Decherd, and one division was at work repairing it to Stevenson.^ 
He was on the point of advancing against Chattanooga when 
a cavalry raid upon his line of communications forced him to post- 
pone that movement for a time. 

On the 13th July Forrest, with about 1,400 cavalry, suddenly 
appeared before Murfreesborough, on the Nashville and Chatta- 
nooga Railway, forced the surrender of the garrison, numbering 
1,700 men,- and besides carrying away or destroying a great 
amount of Government stores, broke up the railroad so effectually 
that it was not repaired till the 28th July. 

Time was thus secured for Bragg to concert an offensive move- 
ment with Kirby Smith. Not only was it of great importance to 
the Confederate cause to retain possession of East Tennessee, and 
that object could be best attained by assuming the offensive and 
invading Kentucky and Middle Tennessee, but also substantial 
advantages might be expected to follow from an attempt to 
reconquer the territory recently won by the Federals. Both 
Middle and West Tennessee were openly Confederate in their 
sympathies, and it was believed that many recruits to the Southern 
cause might be found in Kentucky. It was arranged that while 
Kirby Smith invaded Kentucky, Bragg should advance into 
Middle Tennessee. In the first week in August Bragg's infantry, 
which had been sent by rail via Mobile, began to reach Chatta- 
nooga : some of his troops were despatched to Kirby Smith, who 
was confronted by a Federal force holding Cumberland Gap. 

In the meantime, Buell had got the railroad repaired and was 
pre[)aring to resume the movement on Chattanooga. He had 
already sent to Grant for the two divisions, which had been promised 
him, when, on the 12th August, Morgan made a cavalry raid on 
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, captured Gallatin and 
destroyed the railway bridge and the tunnel. As Louisville was 
Buell's primary base, Nashville being but a secondary one, the 
Federal commander found himself obliged by this fresh raid upon 

' 2 Rnj->cs, 390. ' Cist, 45. 



Aug., i862l BRAGG IN THE WEST 179 

his communications to abandon all hope of taking the offensive, 
and prepared to meet the movement which Bragg was plainly on 
the point of making. 

About the middle of August Kirby Smith, whose army, with the 
reinforcements sent by Bragg, largely outnumbered the Federal 
force confronting him in Cumberland Gap, made his way through 
the Cumberland Mountains by other roads, and securing the 
Federal line of supplies forced them ultimately to abandon their 
position and retreat to the Ohio. Pressing forward into Kentucky 
he encountered, on the 30th August, a hastily raised force at 
Richmond, which he defeated with heavy loss. On the 2nd 
September he reached Lexington and established his headquarters 
there, sending out detachments to threaten Louisville and 
Cincinnati. 

Bragg had a more difficult task to face. In order to invade 
Middle Tennessee from Chattanooga he had to cross two rivers 
and two mountain ranges,^ and all his supplies had to be carried 
by wagons over country roads which were in very poor order. 
In spite of these difficulties, on the 5th September he established 
his headquarters at Sparta. Till then the mountains had served 
to screen his movements, and Buell had not ventured to move out 
any distance to meet him for fear of uncovering Nashville. At 
Sparta, Bragg had the choice of two routes. He might move 
either west on Nashville, or north in the direction of Louisville. 

On the same day as Bragg reached Sparta, Buell concentrated 
his forces at Murfreesborough on the road to Nashville. On hear- 
ing the news of Kirby Smith's invasion of Kentucky he expected 
that Bragg would move northward to join him, and made prepara- 
tions to leave an adequate garrison to hold Nashville and then to 
push north with the bulk of his army in order to cover Louisville. 
It became a race between the two generals, which should reach 
Louisville first. On the 14th September Buell had reached Bowl- 
ing Green, but on the previous day Bragg had already reached 
Glasgow, thirty miles to the east, and on the 14th attacked 
Munfordville, whose garrison of 4,000 men surrendered on the 
17th. Thus Bragg intervened between Buell and his destination. 
Kirby Smith was within 100 miles, at Lexington, and could have 
sent him reinforcements and supplies. 

Now, if ever, was the time for Bragg to fight a decisive battle, 
and by a crowning victory to win back Kentucky and Tennessee 
to the Confederate cause. But at this juncture Bragg, strangely 
enough, cast military considerations to the winds. A great 
opportunity was sacrificed to an imaginary political need. It 
seemed both to Bragg and Kirby Smith to be most important to 

^ The Tennessee and Sequatchie Rivers, and Walden's Ridge and the Cumberland 
Mountains, 



180 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

inaugurate formally at Frankfort, the State capital, a Secessionist 
governor. On the 2ist Bragg withdrew his troops from the Nash- 
ville-Louisville line and marched off to join Kirby Smith, and 
on the 25th Buell, without encountering any opposition, entered 
Louisville.^ 

The consternation excited in the North by the Confederate 
invasion had been very great. Special apprehension was felt for 
the safety of Cincinnati. On the 19th August a new department 
had been created, to be called the Department of the Ohio, 
including Kentucky and the States north of it, and General 
Wright had been assigned to the command. 

Very unjustly Buell was condemned by the Washington authori- 
ties for not having prevented the Confederate invasion. It was 
determined to relieve him and put Thomas in his place. But the 
orders for this change of command did not arrive until Buell was 
on the point of moving out from Louisville to assume the offensive 
in his turn against Bragg; and the generous remonstrances of 
Thomas caused the order to be rescinded. 

On the 1st October Buell advanced from Louisville. His army 
had been largely reinforced, and numbered 58,000 men. But the 
fresh troops were mostly raw recruits not to be compared with 
Bragg's veterans. On the same day Bragg left his army at Bards- 
town under the command of Polk, and hurried off to Lexington 
that he might take part in the inauguration of a Confederate 
governor at Frankfort, which was fixed to take place on the 4th. 
Buell sent two divisions in the direction of Frankfort to hold Kirby 
Smith in check, and with the rest of his army pushed on to Bards- 
town. Both Bragg and Kirby Smith were under the impression 
that the two divisions moving towards Frankfort were the main 
body of Buell's army, and accordingly orders were sent to Polk to 
move northward and fall upon their flank, whilst Kirby Smith was 
to attack in front. But Polk, having more accurate information, 
decided to disobey the order, and knowing the numerical inferiority 
of his own force, to fall back to a strong position fifty miles south- 
east. Bragg, however, ordered him to move to Harrodsburg with 
a view to joining Kirby Smith, who, on the 5th, was at Versailles, 
twenty miles north of that place.' 

Kirby Smith's troops had left Frankfort as soon as the inaugura- 

' Bra{:;p was hamperdl !)>• the fact that he was not the sole commander in that theatre 
of war. Therefore he (Hd not suninion to his aid Kirl)y Smith, who held an independent 
command, and he did not consider himself slronj; cnonj^h alone to attack Huell in a 
position where defeat might have meant destruction. 2 Ropes, 402-3, and Kiske, 152. 
General Wheeler (3 B. & L., 10) states that Hraf^i,' w.as eaj^er to fight, till the arrival of 
Thomas' division from Nashville, on Sei)lend>er 20th, caused him to fear that he was 
not strong enough to risk a battle. But Colonel Urquhart, of Bragg's staff, states 
(3 B. & L., 601) that the general was always opjx)sed to fighting and said to him 
emphatically, "This camjiaign must l>e won by marching, not by fighting." 

■^ 2 Ropes, 40^)- 7. 



Ocr.8,i862] BllAGG IN THE WEST 181 

tion was completed, and almost immediately after the State capital 
was occupied by the Federals. On the 7th Bragg ordered Polk to 
move from Harrodsburg on to Versailles, but learning that his left 
wing, under Hardee, was being pressed at Perryville by the 
Federal advance, directed Polk to send one division back to 
Hardee's support. 

On the following day a fierce encounter took place at Perryville. 
The Confederate force numbered about 17,000 men. The Federal 
commander signally failed to make use of his greatly superior 
numbers. The different divisions of his army were scattered over 
a considerable extent of country owing to the scarcity of water, 
and formed an irregular line six miles long. The Confederate 
attack, ably directed by Hardee, fell with great force upon the 
Federal left wing about 2 p.m. The left of McCook's Corps was 
turned, and he was forced to fall back with heavy loss, including 
that of fifteen guns. But the Confederates failed to gain any 
further success and retired during the night to Harrodsburg. The 
losses on both sides were heavy considering the number of 
troops actually engaged. The Federals lost 4,200, and the Con- 
federate loss was over 3,000.^ Three out of the four divisions of 
Bragg's army were engaged, and not more than half Buell's forces. 
The independence of McCook, who did not report that he was en- 
gaged until fighting had been in progress for two hours, prevented 
Buell concentrating his divisions for a decisive counterstroke. 

It was no part of Bragg's plan to fight a pitched battle. Hardee's 
attack on the 8th was intended to check the Federal advance, and 
give Bragg time to gather his supplies and men together and 
evacuate the State. He had had high hopes of gaining a large 
number of recruits in Kentucky, and had taken with him arms 
sufficient to equip 20,000 fresh troops ^ ; but he found himself griev- 

^ For an account of this battle, see 2 Ropes, 408-9. The battle of Perryville, though 
accidental in origin and indecisive in result, is entitled by the severity of its losses to 
rank among the major engagements of the war. Buell was not expecting a general 
engagement on the 8th, and early that day his centre Corps was considerably in advance 
of the wings. In the morning a Confederate force from Perryville attempted to recover 
possession of a small creek, on which the Federal Corps depended for its water supply, 
but was sharply repulsed mainly by Sheridan's division. No second attack was expected 
by Buell, and McCook's Corps, which had come into line on the left, was being pushed 
forward to Chaplin River, when it was suddenly attacked by Hardee. The left brigade, 
composed of raw troops, gave way, and one of the division-commanders was killed. On 
the right Sheridan's division, supported by another brigade of the same Corps, drove 
back the enemy, and finally pursued them into and through Perryville. This success 
relieved the pressure on the Federal left, which had been forced back nearly a mile, and 
the Confederates, finding their left flank in danger, eventually abandoned the battlefield. 
Three-fourths of the whole Federal loss was incurred by McCook's Corps, and only 
Sheridan's division and one other brigade in the centre Corps were heavily engaged. The 
right wing was practically not engaged at all. Buell seems to deny the loss of Federal 
artillery. He says that " the enemy captured some artillery which he did not carry off, 
though he exchanged some of his pieces for better ones" (3 B. & L., 48). Bragg severely 
censured Polk for not attacking the centre Corps with all his forces. — Cist, 69. 

'^ Cist, 70. 



182 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

ously disappointed, and decided that Kentucky was not worth 
fighting for. 

Ever since the beginning of October the situation had steadily 
altered in favour of the Federals. Having recovered his base at 
Louisville, Buell was able to draw for men and supplies upon the 
boundless resources of the north-west, whilst his opponent had to 
depend for his supplies upon the country which his troops occu- 
pied, and his retreat, if he were defeated, would have to be made by 
country roads, which, w ith the approach of winter, would quickly 
become impassable.^ 

Bragg had missed his chance when he allowed Buell to reach 
Louisville without a battle. Having thrown away the opportunity, 
it was probably not worth his while to risk a battle in which he 
had little to gain and much to lose. In view of Buell's superior 
numbers, it was essential that the Confederate forces should be 
concentrated, and on the lOth Kirby Smith joined Bragg at 
Harrodsburg. 

The Confederates remained there a few days on the chance that 
liuell might be tempted to attack them in position, but as the 
latter made no movement, withdrew into East Tennessee. Buell 
had not expected Bragg to evacuate Kentucky without a battle: 
believing that a hard struggle was in store for him with the whole 
Confederate force, he had waited for the two divisions to return 
from Frankfort before resuming his advance. Having been joined 
by one of these divisions, he moved out from Perryville on the 
nth only to find the enemy retreating before him. Though their 
retreat was steadily pressed, they could not be brought to bay, and 
at London Buell abandoned the pursuit owing to the difficulty of 
moving large bodies of men over the rough country roads. He 
then transferred his army to the line of the Nashville and Louis- 
ville Railway in the neighbourhood of Bowling Green, intending 
later on to take up a position to the east of Nashville on the Nash- 
ville and Chattanooga line with a view to resuming his advance 
upon the latter place in the spring.- 

But on the 30lh October he was relieved of his command and 
Rosecrans summoned from the Army of the Mississippi to take his 
place at the head of what was henceforth to be known as the Army 
of the Cumberland. Buell's recall was nominally due to his refusal 
to carry out Halleck's plan for a winter invasion of East Tennessee. 
But for a month the sentence had been hanging over his head. It 
can hardly be doubted that Buell was unjustly treated by his 
Government. As an organiser and disciplinarian he was not in- 
ferior to McClellan, and in strategic ability was distinctly superior 
to the equally ill-fated commander of the Army of the Potomac. 
It was his plan of campaign that Ilallcck had usurped : and had 
' 2 Ropes, 411-12. ■* 2 Ropes, 412. 



OCT..I862] BRAGG IN THE WEST 183 

Buell and not Halleck been placed in supreme command in the 
West, it is most unlikely that the movement, which opened so 
successfully at Fort Donelson, would have come to a premature 
ending at Corinth,^ It might perhaps be alleged against him that 
his long training in a military bureau unfitted him for handling 
large bodies of troops in the field.'^ Yet against that charge must 
be set his record on the second day of the battle of Shiloh. 

Rosecrans owed his appointment, for which Thomas had origin- 
ally been designed, to the successes which he had gained over the 
troops of Van Dorn and Price in the battles of luka, fought the 
19th September, and Corinth on the 3rd and 4th October. This 
latter battle resulted in a brilliant victory for the Federals, and 
established Rosecrans' reputation as a hard fighter and competent 
leader.3 

On the 30th October Rosecrans assumed command at Louis- 
ville. He announced his intention in a letter of the ist November 
to Halleck of going on to Bowling Green and then to Nashville as 
soon as the railway had been completely repaired, and expressed 
the opinion that Bragg was concentrating at Murfreesborough for 
an advance on Nashville. If Halleck looked to find in Rosecrans 
a more amenable subordinate than his predecessor had been, he 
must have been grievously disappointed. Rosecrans declared em- 
phatically against the possibility of successfully invading East 
Tennessee during the winter. The new commander had carefully 
thought out his plans for himself, and did not intend to allow any 
interference with them. He rightly judged that Bragg did not mean 
to abandon Tennessee without a struggle, and that, if he intended 
to keep a hold upon it, he must regain Nashville. Therefore, if the 
Federal army moved against him at Murfreesborough, he would be 
forced to accept battle or else admit the powerlessness of the Con- 
federacy to retain possession of a State which had seceded from 
the Union. 

But Rosecrans was determined not to advance until he had ac- 
cumulated two million rations at Nashville. Then he would, at 
any rate, for a time be independent of the railways, and could 
march against Bragg without any fear of being obliged to abandon 
the offensive in consequence of a successful cavalry raid upon his 
line of communications. But before the required amount of rations 
could be collected at Nashville, it was necessary to repair the rail- 
way from Nashville to Louisville. That work was completed by 
the 26th November, and by the 24th December the reserve supplies 

^ For an appreciation of General Buell, see I Ropes, 199, 200, and 2 Ropes, 414. 
Buell had had the misfortune to make two powerful enemies in Morton, Governor of 
Indiana, and Andrew Johnson, recently appointed military governor of Tennessee. A 
further reason for Buell's removal may perhaps be found in the fact that he was regarded 
as one of McClellan's supporters (Schouler, 254). 

2 Cist, 76. 3 See Cap. XVII. 



184 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

had been brought up, and Rosecrans felt himself in a position to 
commence his advance. Ever since he had assumed command he 
had been importuned by Halleck to display more energy and 
activity, and to do something brilliant. The unforgivable sin in 
the eyes of the Federal Government was slowness. He was dis- 
tinctly warned that if he did not move quickly he would be super- 
seded. To these remonstrances, based upon an insufficient know- 
ledge of the nature of the work to be done, and couched in language 
which was almost insulting when addressed to the commander of 
an army, Rosecrans turned a deaf car. Threats were powerless to 
move him before he was ready to advance. As he said in his 
dignified reply, he needed no other stimulus to do his duty than 
the knowledge of what that duty was : to threats of removal he 
was insensible.^ 

In the meanwhile Bragg was concentrating his army at Mur- 
freesborough, where he rejoined the force which he had left under 
Breckinridge to keep up a blockade of Nashville, when he moved 
north into Kentucky. Buell had left two divisions- to garrison 
Nashville when he hurried after Bragg, and the garrison had proved 
itself quite capable of holding Breckinridge in check. Bragg pre- 
sumed that Rosecrans would go into winter quarters, and accord- 
ingly distributed his own troops in encampments in the vicinity of 
Murfreesborough.^ He sent a considerable part of his cavalry on 
raiding expeditions against the Federal lines of communication. 
Morgan's command broke up the Nashville and Louisville line at 
Nolin, and completely destroyed the great trestle works some 
distance nearer Louisville. But the raid had not the desired effect 
of forcing the evacuation of Nashville, or of even seriously em- 
barrassing Rosecrans, owing to the accumulation of supplies already 
made at Nashville. 

Another body of Confederate cavalry under Forrest made a raid 
into West Tennessee and broke up the railway between Corinth 
and Columbus, on which Grant depended for his supplies. 

Bragg, however, retained three brigades of cavalry, which proved 
of great service in delaying the Federal advance until he had had 
time to bring up his troops from their encampments and prepare 
a line of battle. 

On the 26th December Rosecrans advanced from Nashville. 
Two miles beyond the Federal piquet line patrols of Confederate 
cavalry were encountered. The advancing columns were opposed 
by the three brigades of Bragg's cavalry supported by three in- 
fantry brigades with artillery. The Confederate troops were well 
handled, and progress was slow. On the 30th the two armies 

' 3 Ropes, 419-24. 

^ Originally three, but Thomas' division subsequently rejoined Buell's main force. 

2 Cist, 81. 



Dec, 1862] MURFREESBOROUGH 185 

were facing each other at Murfreesborough. The town lies on 
the railroad to Chattanooga thirty miles south-east from Nashville. 
It is situated on the east bank of the west branch of Stone's 
River. Both the railroad and the turnpike cross the river close to 
the town and run towards Nashville along the west bank. The 
greater part of Bragg's army was on the west bank, south both of 
the railroad and turnpike. Breckinridge's division alone was on 
the east bank. 

Rosecrans proposed to send his left wing, under Crittenden 
across the river, thus bringing two divisions into action against 
Breckinridge's one. Thomas was to press the Confederate centre 
vigorously.^ In this way Rosecrans hoped to roll up the Con- 
federate right upon Murfreesborough, to capture that town and 
secure the railroad, and so drive the whole Confederate army away 
from their line of supplies. If he succeeded he would have an 
excellent chance of annihilating Bragg's army. But to achieve 
success it was necessary that McCook, commanding the Federal 
right, should be able to hold the opposite wing in check, until 
Rosecrans had rolled up the Confederate right. The task imposed 
upon McCook was a difficult one. For his right faced the Con- 
federate centre, and their left wing, under Hardee, was overlapping 
his extreme right. There was every likelihood that Bragg would 
attempt to carry out exactly the same manoeuvre as Rosecrans 
contemplated and turn his opponent's right. McCook's line was 
badly arranged : all of it, except one brigade on the extreme right, 
was facing east. Rosecrans expressed the opinion that it ought to 
be facing more south, or else it would be in imminent danger of 
being outflanked. But he left McCook full discretion to do as he 
thought best, as being better acquainted with the nature of the 
ground. McCook, with the same cheerful optimism which he had 
displayed at Perryville, where for over two hours he fought an 
independent battle without communicating the fact to the com- 
manding general, decided that the present formation would do 
very well, and declared himself capable of holding his ground for 
three hours, the length of time that Rosecrans thought that he 
should require for crushing the Confederate right and capturing 
Murfreesborough. 

Bragg saw how the disposition of McCook's Corps invited a 
flanking movement, and proposed to turn the Federal right with 
Hardee's Corps, roll it up and force it back upon the Nashville 
turnpike : with Polk pressing the Federal centre he hoped to drive 
the whole of Rosecrans' army across the turnpike and sever it from 
Nashville. He might then reasonably hope to recapture the 
capital of Tennessee. The Federal army numbered 47,000 of all 

^ If Crittenden was successful against Breckinridge, he would gain a commanding 
ridge, from which artillery could enfilade the Confederate line on the opposite bank. 



186 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

arms, whilst Bragg's strength has been variously estimated from ^ 
38,000 to 46,000. The smaller estimate is probably nearer the 
truth. 

Soon after 6 a.m. on the 31st Hardee advanced with his two 
divisions formed in a single line against Johnson's division, which 
formed the right of McCook's Corps. The disposition of this 
division was very faulty. Although Johnson knew that an attack 
was impending, he had fixed his headquarters more than a mile 
to the rear, and had posted his reserve brigade near his head- 
quarters. At the moment of the attack one of the other brigadiers 
was absent at the divisional headquarters, and was taken prisoner 
as he was hurrying to the front. The other brigadier was mortally 
wounded at the outset of the action. The troops were left without 
any commander, and being attacked simultaneously in front and 
flank soon gave way. The onslaught next fell upon Davis' division. 
The Confederate forces were swinging round, pivoting upon the 
right of Polk's Corps. Both Polk's divisions were put in against 
Davis' left and Sheridan's right, whilst Davis' right was attacked 
by Hardee's victorious divisions. The resistance in this part of the 
field was far more obstinate, as the Federal commanders had had 
more time to prepare a line of defence ; but the impetuosity of the 
Confederate attack, backed by superior numbers, ultimately pre- 
vailed, and the whole of the Federal right and right centre was 
forced back upon the Nashville turnpike, where it took up a fresh 
position. 

It was in rallying the flying soldiers and reforming them into 
line of battle that Thomas, commanding the Federal centre, first 
displayed that intrepid courage in an emergency which became 
afterwards the distinguishing feature of his generalship. 

At 8 a.m. Rosecrans had set Crittenden's Corps in motion. One 
division quickly crossed the river without encountering any opposi- 
tion. Though he had been already informed that McCook was 
hard pressed on the right, Rosecrans had paid little attention to 
the news. It was exactly what he had expected, but he relied 
upon McCook keeping his promise to hold out for three hours, and 
merely sent him directions to hold his ground. But the fact that 
the right wing was being driven in, and was in danger of being 
utterly routed, could not long be ignored. Just as Rosecrans vyas 
sending the second division across the river, and congratulating 
himself that his turning movement was about to be crowned with 
complete success, he found himself obliged suddenly lo abandon 
the ofTensive and save his army from what threatened to be an 
appalling disaster. 

> 2 Ropes, 424-5. Cist {,'ives the Federal force at 43,400 and the Confederate at 
46,600. Rosecrans renortcil his force actually engaged at 43i400. whilst Bragg stated 
his as 37,7'2 {3 B. & L., 613). 



Dec. 31. 1862] MURFREESBOROUGH 187 

In such a crisis Rosecrans proved his worth. However much he 
may be open to censure on December 30th for decHning to take 
the responsibility of giving McCook a direct order to rearrange 
his Hne and take up a stronger defensive position, there can be 
nothing but praise for the skill and boldness with which he staved 
off disaster, and converted what seemed certain defeat into ultimate 
victory. He ordered the movement across the river to be suspended, 
and the troops which had already crossed were recalled. One 
brigade was left to watch the crossing. The rest of Crittenden's 
Corps was hurried to the support of the new line which Thomas 
had formed on the Nashville turnpike. Fearlessly exposing him- 
self as he rode to and fro along the line rallying his troops, 
Rosecrans' presence and the gallantry of his bearing did much 
to encourage his men.^ Ably seconded by Thomas and Sheridan, 
he succeeded in forming a line which all the efforts of the Con- 
federates failed to break. 

Elated by their success over McCook's Corps, and believing that 
a decisive victory was within their grasp, Bragg's soldiers rushed 
again and again to the assault with all the impetuosity and daunt- 
less valour of the Southerner. Four brigades of Breckinridge's 
command were brought across the river and put in against the left 
of the Federal line, where Palmer's division was holding the 
" Round Forest," regarded as the key of the whole position.^ Here 
the fighting was as fierce as in any part of the field. There were 
few battles in the war in which greater bravery was displayed by 
the soldiers on both sides. But the gallantry of the assault was 
met by a resistance of inflexible stubbornness ; and when darkness 
descended upon the field the Federals still held the Nashville 
turnpike. 

The troops of both armies bivouacked where they had fought. 
Some of the Federal officers urged an immediate retreat upon 
Nashville. But Rosecrans refused to make any retrograde move- 
ment. He determined to hold his ground and accept battle if 
Bragg renewed the attack on the following day : and if the Con- 
federates did not give battle, he intended himself to assume the 
offensive. 

But Bragg was in no condition to attack on the ist January, 
His losses the previous day had been too heavy. He held his 
ground close to the Federal line in the hope that Rosecrans would 
order a retreat. But he knew if Rosecrans refused to retire, he 
himself was powerless to drive him from his position. The Con- 
federate army had shot its bolt on the 31st December. 

A division of Crittenden's Corps was moved across the river 

1 Cist, 128. 

'^ The object of the Confederate leaders was now to break through the Federal left and 
take Rosecrans' new line in flank. 



188 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

during the afternoon of the 1st. The next day Breckinridge 
assaulted this division with great fury and drove it back across the 
river, but only in his turn to be driven back by another Federal 
division, which crossed the river and held its position for the rest 
of the day. This position on the east bank of the river enabled 
the Federal artillery to enfilade Polk's lines on the opposite bank. 

Accordingly on the night of the 3rd Bragg withdrew his dis- 
heartened and worn-out soldiers from the battlefield, and retreated 
through Murfreesborough to Tullahoma on the railroad, where he 
went into winter quarters covering Chattanooga. Rosecrans 
occupied Murfreesborough, but made no attempt to pursue ; his 
heavy losses, the exhaustion of his troops, and the wretched con- 
dition of the roads rendered it imperative to cease active hostilities 
till the winter was over. 

The Federals lost over 9,000 in killed and wounded, as well as 
3,700 prisoners and twenty-eight pieces of artillery. Bragg's 
losses in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to over 10,000.^ 
But the substantial fruits of victory remained with Rosecrans. 
The Confederates had little to show for their heavy losses. The 
Federal hold on Tennessee had not been shaken, and Nashville 
was still theirs. 



NOTE ON MURFREESBOROUGH 

Both generals had conceived preci3ely the same plan of attack. But 
Bragg gained the initial advantage by being the first to attack. As at 
Shiloh, the Federal right was surprised. When Johnson's division had 
been driven from the field to be followed presently by Davis', Rosecrans 
was obliged to abandon his own offensive and devote himself to forming 
a second line of battle, on which he might stand on the defensive. It 
was mainly owing to Sheridan, commanding McCook's left division, that 
the necessary time was gained for taking up a defensive position. After 
repulsing in conjunction with part of Davis' division two fierce assaults, 
Sheridan was obliged by Davis' withdrawal to fall back and form a fresh 
line in a dense cedar thicket on the right of Negley's division of Thomas' 
Corps. Here some of the most desperate fighting of the day took place. 
Three times did four Confederate divisions attack this position, until 
Rousseau's division was sent up by Thomas, who had been holding it in 
reserve, to take Sheridan's place, and the latter having been fiercely 
engaged for more than four hours, and having lost over a third of his 
division, withdrew to the new position which Rosecrans had taken. 
Sheridan's retreat compelled Negley's division to fall back, and shortly 
after Rousseau's division, finding itself assailed on both flanks, also retired. 
But by noon Rosecrans had established his second line of battle, and the 

* 2 Ropes, 433. In 3 B. & L., 611-12, the Federal loss is given at 13,249, and the 
Confederate at 10,266. 



MURFREESBOROUGH 189 

Confederates, failing to gain fresh ground on their left and centre, devoted 
their chief energies to a desperate assault on the Federal left, held by 
Palmer's division and two of Wood's brigades — all of Crittenden's Corps. 
Van Cleve's division and Wood's third brigade had been placed on the 
right of Rousseau, and the extreme right of the new line was held by 
McCook's Corps, which had been reformed. Bragg had been calling 
upon Breckinridge for reinforcements since an early hour. But Breckin- 
ridge was very slow in complying with this order, and the four brigades 
which he eventually sent across the river came up in two detachments 
about two hours apart, and were hurled by Polk in two separate attacks 
upon Palmer's position. The first of these attacks was made about 
2 p.m. ; with the failure of the second the Confederate offensive came to 
an end. Bragg laid the blame for his failure to achieve complete success 
upon Breckinridge. Nevertheless he believed that the victory was his 
and that the Federals would be obliged to retreat. 



CHAPTER XV 
CHANCE LLORSVILLE 

Hooker's appointment to the Army of the Potomac— Lee standing on the defensive — 
Hooker's plan of campaign — The Federal movement begins — The Rappahannock 
crossed — The Rapidan crossed — Concentration of Federal right wing at Chancellors- 
ville — Movement of the Federal left wing— Movements of the Federal cavalry — Lee 
waiting for information — Stuart rejoins Lee — Lee moves to meet Hooker — Position 
of the two armies on May 1st — Jackson advances towards Chancellorsville — Hooker 
advances towards Fredericksburg — Hooker recoils before Jackson — Sedgwick's in- 
action on the 1st — Hooker still confident of success — Federal council of war — Position 
of Federal right wing — Lee and Jackson in council — Jackson commences his flank 
march — Jackson's march detected — Sickles' advance — Line of Jackson's march — 
Fitzhugh Lee's reconnaissance — Jackson strikes — Unpreparedness of the lith Corps 
— Hooker partly to blame — Rout of the nth Corps — Jackson's success — Jackson's 
intended plan of action — Jackson's fall— Stuart takes command of the 2nd Corps — 
Sickles' movements — The Federals strengthen their position during the night — 
Position on May 3rd — Hooker's fatal mistake — Stuart occupies Hazel Grove — The 
Confederates renew the attack — The Chancellorsville position carried — Hooker 
wounded — Hooker's lost opportunity — New position of the Federal right wing — 
Sedgwick defeats Early— Sedgwick moves towards Chancellorsville — Encounters 
McLaws — Sedgwick repulsed — Lee concentrates against Sedgwick — Sedgwick retreats 
across the Rappahannock — Lee prepares to concentrate against Hooker — Hooker 
retreats across the Rappahannock — Review of the campaign — Losses — Jackson's death. 

THE spring of 1863 found the Armies of the Potomac and 
Northern Virginia still confronting each other on opposite 
banks of the Rappahannock. The Federal army was no 
longer led by Burnside. On the 26th January he had been relieved 
of the command and Hooker put in his place. It was plainly not 
without misgivings that President Lincoln appointed Hooker to 
command the Army of the Potomac. He had gained for himself 
a well-deserved reputation as a hard fighter. His record as com- 
mander of the 1st Corps in the battle of the Antietam was still 
fresh in men's memories. He had the confidence of the soldiers 
and had, or at least seemed to have, unbounded confidence in him- 
self. But he had been tlic leader of the cabal which did so much 
to render Burnside's position at the head of the army impossible : 
and it was a dangerous precedent to reward intrigue and insub- 
ordination with the chief command. It was, however, rightly 
judged unwise to bring a general from the West to command the 
army of the East. Pope's campaign had been a lesson not easily 

190 



April, i8'53] CHANCELLORSVILLE 191 

forgotten. Within the ranks of the Army of the Potomac no one 
possessed a higher reputation or seemingly greater quahfications 
for supreme command than "Fighting Joe" Hooker.^ The 
administration at Washington sorely needed a victory. Their 
emancipation policy was not popular among the soldiers ; the 
number of enlistments was falling off, and Lincoln feared that an 
attempt to carry out the enforced draft which was required to 
recruit the ranks, would be met with open resistance, unless the 
Government had behind it the prestige of a victory. 

Hooker on taking command found that his first task was to 
reorganise the army. The Army of the Potomac under Burnside's 
command after the bloody reverse at Fredericksburg and the farcical 
failure of the "Mud March" was degenerating into a mere dis- 
organised rabble. This, it is true, was largely due to the spirit of 
discontent which Hooker himself had been instrumental in 
fostering. Desertion was rife. Nearly 3,000 officers and over 
80,000 of the rank and file were found to be absent, and the 
greater part of these were absent from reasons unknown.^ Hooker 
proved himself an able organiser. Desertion was stopped by a 
judicious system of granting furloughs. The confidence of the 
soldiers in themselves and their general was quickly restored, and 
by the beginning of April Hooker found himself at the head of an 
army which he boastfully proclaimed to be the finest on the planet. 
One of his most important reforms was the consolidation of the 
cavalry into a separate Corps, although the inefficiency of the 
officer selected to command it deprived the experiment of the 
success which had been reasonably anticipated.^ Burnside's cum- 
brous system of Grand Divisions was also abandoned, and a return 
made to the old Corps organisation.* 

* The appointment of Burnside's successor caused the Government very great anxiety. 
It was not judged expedient to go outside the Army of the Potomac in search of a com- 
mander. Otherwise Halieck and Stanton would have favoured the appointment of 
Rosecrans. To restore McClellan for the second time to the command of the army 
which he had created, would have been equivalent to setting up a military dictatorship. 
Sumner was disqualified for supreme command by reason of old age and physical 
feel^leness. Franklin was under a cloud, having been made the scapegoat for the defeat 
of Fredericksburg. The choice lay between Hooker, the senior major-general in the 
army after Sumner and Franklin, Meade and Reynolds. Halieck sounded Reynolds as 
to his willingness to accept the command if offered him. But Reynolds asked for a 
greater freedom of action than the military authorities were prepared to concede. 
Halieck preferred Meade to Hooker. Stanton was utterly opposed to Hooker, and 
thought that under no circumstances ought he to be appointed. But at this juncture 
Hooker's friends formed an alliance with the political faction, which was supporting 
Mr. Chase as Lincoln's successor, and the President yielding to political pressure, gave 
Hooker the command (3 B. & L. , 239-40). ^ 2 Henderson, 506. 

' Hooker in his official report censured his cavalry commander Stoneman. Cf. Lee's 
Lee, 255. 

* The 9th Corps had been withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac, but the nth 
and 1 2th Corps were now incorporated with that army. The ist and 2nd Corps were 
still commanded by Reynolds and Couch. Sickles was placed in command of the 3rd, 
Meade of the 5th, Sedgwick of the 6th, and Howard of the ilth. Slocum was in 
command of the I2th Corps. 



192 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

On the south side of the Rappahannock the Army of Northern 
Virginia was still led by its old commander, and the 2nd Corps 
was under the command of Jackson. But Longstreet and three 
divisions of the 1st Corps had been taken from it. The continued 
pressure of the war rendered Wilmington and Charleston (Map I.) 
as the ports for the blockade runners of vital importance to the 
Confederacy. They and the railroads connecting them with Rich- 
mond were threatened by the presence of a Federal force at 
Newberne, in North Carolina. President Davis had once again 
resumed the supreme control of the operations of the Confederate 
armies, and at the War Office General Randolph had been 
succeeded by Mr. Seddon,^ Both these statesmen favoured a 
policy of standing on the strict defensive, and of dispersing the 
troops at their disposal instead of concentrating for an offensive 
movement. 

Shortly after the victory at Fredericksburg, D. H. Hill had been 
detached to take command of the forces which protected the rail- 
road communication between Richmond and its two ports. In 
January Ransom's division followed, and in February Longstreet 
was sent with Hood's and Pickett's divisions to cover Richmond 
against an advance on the south bank of the James. Strict in- 
junctions were given by Lee to his subordinate so to dispose his 
forces that he could at a moment's notice bring them back to the 
Rappahannock. But in April Lee had been obliged to yield an 
unwilling consent to the movement of Longstreet and his two 
divisions against a Federal force at Suffolk, 120 miles away from 
Fredericksburg. He was still further weakened by the absence of 
two cavalry brigades. Consequently he found himself not strong 
enough to take the offensive until Longstreet's command should 
rejoin. Had he had his full force concentrated at Fredericksburg, 
he had intended to carry out the movement with which he after- 
wards commenced the Gettysburg campaign, and by entering the 
Shenandoah Valley to force Hooker's army to the north bank of 
the Potomac- But, situated as he was, he could only wait for 
Hooker to develop his plan of campaign, and, instead of con- 
trolling, let himself be guided by events. 

Hooker had a sufficiently difficult task before him.^ To attempt 
to cross the Rappahannock in the face of Lee's army would be to 
court a second and greater reverse than that which Burnside had 
suffered. From Banks' Ford to Port Royal the Confederate army 

' Lcc, on assuminp; command of the Army of Northern Viri^inia, had insisted upon 
being relieved of the (^'eneral control of the Confederate armies. Mr. Seddon's appomt- 
nient marked a return to that civilian control of military operations, which, in the hands 
of Mr. iJenjamin, had already been proved a mistake. Randolph had l>een Secretary of 
War from March 17th to November 17th, 1862. 

' See his letter of April i6lh to Mr. Davis (2 Henderson, 509). 

» Sec Map III. 



April, 1863] CHANCELLORSVILLE 193 

occupied a strongly fortified line, which the engineer's art had 
rendered far more formidable than when Burnside crossed the 
river in December. Lee's lines of communication were the 
Fredericksburg and Richmond Railway directly in his rear, and 
the roads leading through Orange Court House to the depots on 
the Virginia Central Railway. The problem before Hooker was 
how to strike those communications. The nature of the ground 
and the increasing width of the Rappahannock rendered any 
attempt at a flanking movement on the Federal left impracticable. 

It remained, therefore, to turn Lee's left by crossing the upper 
fords of the Rappahannock. As Banks' Ford and the United 
States Ford were held by the Confederates, it was necessary, in 
order to turn Lee's left, to cross not only the Rappahannock, but 
also the Rapidan. Hooker's plan for carrying out his great flank 
movement unquestionably displayed strategical ability, such as 
hardly had been looked for in the commander of the ist Army 
Corps. He proposed to move three Corps twenty-seven miles up 
the river to Kelly's Ford, to push them across the Rapidan by the 
Germanna and Ely's Fords, at the same time uncovering the 
United States Ford, by which another Corps was to cross, and then 
to concentrate his right wing of four Corps at Chancellorsville. 

In the meantime Sedgwick was to cross below Fredericksburg 
with two Corps, and hold the Confederate army fast in its en- 
trenched position. A third Corps was to remain in reserve below 
Falmouth, ready to reinforce either wing of the army, as might be 
required. The cavalry Corps under Stoneman, 10,000 strong, was 
also to cross by the upper fords and fall upon Lee's lines of com- 
munication. Their principal object was to be the Fredericksburg 
and Richmond Railway, and when Lee, finding his communications 
cut, fell back, as Hooker anticipated he would do, towards Rich- 
mond, the cavalry was to concentrate behind the Pamunkey and 
cut off his retreat. Stoneman had been ordered to cross the 
Rappahannock on the 13th April. But a sudden rise in the river 
prevented the movement : and eventually the cavalry crossed with 
the rest of the right wing. 

On the 27th the march commenced. The 5th Corps under 
Meade, the nth under Howard, and the 12th under Slocum on 
that day started up the river. Slocum was placed in charge of 
the movement. On the night of the 28th and morning of the 
29th the Rappahannock was crossed at Kelly's Ford. The nth 
and 1 2th Corps pushed on towards the Germanna Ford, and the 
5th marched on a parallel road towards Ely's Ford. 

Both columns were across the Rapidan early in the morning of 
the 30th. The advance of the 5th Corps uncovered the United 
States Ford. Two Confederate brigades, which had been guard- 
ing it, finding their position turned by Meade's advance, fell back 



194 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

to Chancellorsville, and the road was now open for two divisions 
of the 2nd Corps to cross by this ford and join the rest of the 
Federal right wing. Early in the afternoon of the 30th Slocum 
had concentrated his three Corps at Chancellorsville, and the 
divisions of the 2nd Corps were crossing the Rapidan six miles off. 
Hooker had left it to his lieutenant's discretion either to push 
straight on and get clear of the Wilderness, or, in case he 
anticipated serious resistance on his forward march, to wait at 
Chancellorsville until further reinforcements reached him. It was 
of great importance that Banks' Ford should also be uncovered, 
as that would bring the two wings of the Federal army several 
miles nearer to each other. But Slocum was content with having 
effected the concentration at Chancellorsville, and Hooker, assum- 
ing command in person at Chancellorsville on the evening of the 
same day, was quite satisfied with the success of the movement. 
That night he issued a general Order, stating that " the operations 
of the last three days have determined that our enemy must 
ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences and give us 
battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. 
The operations of the 5th, nth, and 12th Corps have been a 
succession of splendid achievements." 

The left wing of the Federal army had been placed under the 
command of Sedgwick. With his own Corps, the 6th, and the 1st 
under Reynolds, he commenced on the 29th to cross the Rappa- 
hannock below Fredericksburg, at the point where Franklin had 
crossed in December. By the 30th both these Corps were con- 
centrated on the south bank. On that night the 3rd Corps under 
Sickles was detached from the left wing and sent to join Hooker 
at Chancellorsville, as Jackson's Corps facing Sedgwick showed no 
signs of taking the offensive. 

The cavalry Corps had crossed at Kelly's Ford on the 28th. 
One division of 4,000 sabres under Averell was detached to hold 
in check W. H. F. Lee's two regiments, whilst Stoneman, with 
the main body, pressed on to Louisa Court House, which was 
reached early on the 2nd May, and the work of destruction was 
at once commenced on the Virginia Central Railway. 

Meanwhile Lee had been unable to do anything but wait for 
Hooker to make plain his plan of campaign. It was impossible 
to reply to it with a counterstroke against the Federal lines of 
communication, for they were guarded by the Rappahannock, 
and Hooker's superiority in numbers was so overwhelming that 
he could leave a sufficient force to hold the river and prevent any 
attempt on Lee's part to cross it, whilst further downstream the 
Federal gunboats barred all possibility of passage. Lee fully 
expected that Hooker would attempt to cross the ui)pcr fords of 
the Rappahannock and turn his left. Stuart's cavalry stretched 



April, 1S63] CHANCELLORSVILLE 195 

across country from the United States Ford to Culpeper with 
posts at all the fords. But his total command only amounted to 
2,400 sabres, an altogether inadequate force to contend with Stone- 
man's Corps. On the night of the 28th Stuart reported that a 
strong force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was moving towards 
Kelly's Ford. 

Early on the morning of the 29th the sound of firing down- 
stream warned Lee that Sedgwick was advancing, and about the 
same time he received news that on his other flank a strong force 
had crossed at Kelly's Ford. It would certainly seem as if Stuart 
at any rate expected that Hooker's flank march was directed 
against Gordonsville. With view to such a move he had posted 
his main force at Brandy Station. This perhaps accounts for the 
fact that his reports were so long in coming. It was not till 6.30 p.m. 
on the 29th that Lee was informed that the Federals had crossed 
the Rapidan in force both at Germanna and Ely's Fords. Ander- 
son was at once despatched with one brigade to Chancellorsville. 
There he was joined by the two brigades of his division which 
had been on guard at the United States Ford. Finding that the 
Federals were advancing in overwhelming strength, he fell back 
and took up a strong position near the Tabernacle Church cover- 
ing Banks' Ford, where the other brigades of his division were 
stationed, and set to work to entrench his line.^ 

On the 30th, Stuart finding that the turning column was moving 
eastward, left W. H. F. Lee with two regiments to hold Stoneman 
in check, and with Fitzhugh Lee's brigade attacked Slocum's right 
flank and fought his way across the Federal front until he regained 
touch with Lee, bringing with him information of the greatest 
value as to the strength of the Federal advance.^ 

When Sedgwick's two Corps were arrayed on the south bank 
of the Rappahannock, Jackson had proposed to fall upon them 
with all the forces available. Hooker had divided his forces in 
the sight of the enemy, and it was now possible to deal with him 
in detail. Sedgwick's force was the smaller and the nearer ; and 
it might reasonably seem the right course to overwhelm it, before 
the rest of Hooker's army had disentangled itself from the Wilder- 
ness. But Lee judged otherwise : the same reasons which had 
caused him not to attack Franklin's Grand Division when occupy- 
ing a similar position now led him to decide to leave a containing 
force to watch Sedgwick, and with the bulk of his army to turn 
against the Federal right wing. It can hardly be doubted that 
Lee was right. The success of an attack against Sedgwick could 

^ R. H. Anderson's division of five brigades was watching the upper fords of the 
Rappahannock. Two brigades had been posted at the United States Ford : two were 
watching Banks' Ford : with the fifth, Anderson himself marched to Chancellorsville. 

* 2 Henderson, 515. 



196 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

only have been bought at such a cost as would hav^e left the Con- 
federate army in no fit condition to encounter the larger wing 
under Hooker's immediate command. Sedgwick's movements 
convinced Lee that only a feint was intended on that flank, and 
the report brought in by Stuart confirmed that belief. That night 
IMcLaws' division was ordered to march to Anderson's support, 
and Jackson's Corps was directed to follow. Only Early's division 
of the 2nd Corps and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division were 
left to occupy the PVedericksburg Heights and hold Sedgwick in 
check. McLaws reached Anderson's position in the early hours 
of the 1st May, and Jackson's Corps arrived at 8 a.m. 

On May ist the position was as follows. The Federal right wing 
under Hooker himself was at Chancellorsville. 70,000 men, in- 
cluding Sickles' Corps, whose leading brigade reported to Hooker 
at 9 a.m., were concentrated almost within sight of their goal. 
The left wing, 40,000 strong, was encamped on the south bank 
of the river below Fredericksburg, eleven miles from the other 
wing. One division held Falmouth. Facing Sedgwick were 10,000 
Confederates under Early on the Fredericksburg Heights, and 
between 45,000 and 50,000, with Lee and Jackson at their head, 
were in position holding Anderson's lines by the Tabernacle 
church. It has been asserted, and with some show of reason, that 
the rapidity of Hooker's movement had taken Lee by surprise, 
and that if Slocum on the afternoon of the 30th, or Hooker 
himself on the same night had boldly pushed on, Anderson's force 
would have been swept out of the way, Banks' Ford uncovered, 
the Wilderness left behind, and the Federal army enabled the 
following day to deliver battle in such a position as would allow 
their superior numbers to be used to the greatest advantage. It is 
true that the turning columns marched with a speed hitherto 
unknown in the history of the Army of the Potomac.^ But it is 
very doubtful whether any advance of the Federal right wing on 
the 30th would have broken Anderson's lines, especially as he 
could have been reinforced by McLaws' division in case of need.^ 

Jackson, on reaching the Tabernacle church, immediately ordered 
the work of entrenching to cease and an advance made towards 
Chancellorsville. Shortly before 11 a.m. the Confederate army 
was in motion. On the turnpike McLaws' division marched with 
three of Anderson's brigades : Jackson's Corps followed the Plank 
road with Anderson's other two brigades leading.^ After advanc- 
ing for about a mile the Federal cavalry were encountered, and it 

' 2 lIoivlcrsMn, 513. 

^ If llic view is hcM that Lee was not taken by surprise by Hooker's turning move- 
ment (3 B. tS: L., 233), it seems to follow that Hooker's chance of breaking through 
Anderson's lines on the 30th was but a small one. 

' McLaws' cnlunin was led by one of Anderson's brigades (2 Hender.son, 51S). 



May I, 1863] CHANCELLORSVILLE 197 

quickly became plain that Hooker was advancing in force. The 
Federal Commander-in-Chief had been in no hurry to advance. 
He had waited not only for Couch's two divisions, but also for 
Sickles' Corps to join him. He did not anticipate encountering 
any serious resistance, and had sent word to Sedgwick that he 
hoped " to be on the heights west of Fredericksburg at noon, or 
shortly after, or if opposed strongly, at night." 

At II a.m. on the ist. Hooker commenced his advance (see 
Plan). Two Corps moved along the Plank road : two divisions 
were on the turnpike, and two more on the river road leading to 
Banks' Ford, whilst one division was ordered to turn off to the 
right and advance towards Todd's Tavern.^ The 3rd Corps was 
held in reserve at Chancellorsville. Thus far Hooker's plans had 
worked admirably, but his subsequent movements were about to 
be hampered by his want of information and the weakness of his 
cavalry force. He had only retained with the main army one 
small brigade under Pleasanton. This was not strong enough to 
guard his flanks as well as his front. For his information he was, 
in the absence of an adequate cavalry force, dependent upon 
signal stations, observatories, and three balloons.^ But during the 
early hours of May ist so dense a fog rose from the river, that 
balloon and signal stations were alike rendered useless. When, 
accordingly, whilst still entangled in the Wilderness, Hooker 
encountered the advancing columns of the Confederates, he was 
afraid that the whole of Lee's army was- before him. 

Jackson handled his troops with his usual vigour, and threatened 
to outflank the Federal columns on both the turnpike and Plank 
road. Hooker lost his nerve ; the responsibility of supreme 
command paralysed the fighting spirit, for which as a subordinate 
he had been famous. Fearing to risk a battle against unknown 
numbers in the intricate depths of the Wilderness, he ordered all 
his columns to fall back to Chancellorsville, where with prudent 
foresight he had caused his camps to be strongly entrenched. The 
Confederates followed up the retreating columns of the enemy, 
but progress through the forest undergrowth was slow. The 
afternoon was far advanced when they arrived within sight of 
Hooker's strongly fortified position at Chancellorsville. 

Throughout the 1st May Sedgwick's two Corps remained inactive 
below Fredericksburg. Although it was plain, as soon as the sun 
dissipated the mist, that a considerable part of the Confederate 
army was moving in the direction of Chancellorsville, and the 
sounds of battle were shortly after heard, Sedgwick, over-estimating 
the strength of the force immediately in his front, made no move- 
ment. Early with his small force made so brave a show that 
Sedgwick failed to detect any signs of diminished strength in the 

^ Doubleday, li. ^2 Henderson, 515. 



198 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

lines confronting him. Deserters, as they styled themselves, reported 
that the divisions of Hood and Pickett had arrived from Richmond.^ 
No definite orders reached him from Hooker, and, thus isolated, 
he feared to take the responsibility of acting on his own initiative. 
Reynolds, commanding the ist Corps, fully coincided with Sedg- 
wick's view. 

In order to secure rapid communication between the two wings 
a line of field telegraph had been laid between Falmouth and the 
United States Ford, and General Butterfield, Hooker's chief of the 
Staff, had been stationed at Falmouth to keep up the connection 
between Hooker and his lieutenant. But the telegraph broke 
down, and an order despatched by Hooker at 11.30 a.m., directing 
Sedgwick to make a brisk demonstration, did not reach its destina- 
tion till six hours later, when it was too late to attempt a diversion.^ 

Hooker, who had so blithely started out in the morning expect- 
ing to encounter little or no resistance, found the tables turned 
upon him. It was he who was now standing on the defensive; it 
was for Lee to take the next step. But at the same time Hooker 
had no serious misgivings : only for the moment had he resigned 
the initiative to Lee, and it did not seem as if that general would 
be able to make much use of it. 

To secure himself against attack, and at the same time to 
strengthen himself for a resumption later on of his offensive move- 
ment, Hooker sent orders that night that Reynolds' Corps should 
be despatched to Chancellorsville. On that night a Council of War 
was held at Chancellorsville. Some of the general officers were in 
favour of attacking the Confederate forces and fighting their way 
out of the Wilderness towards Sedgwick. But Hooker decided to 
cling to his camp, and let Lee assume the offensive if he would. 
At this council he expressed the opinion that on the right the lines 
should be more contracted, but did not press the point when assured 
by the officers commanding on that wing that they were perfectly 
confident of repulsing any attack that might be made upon them. 

Hooker's army was strongly posted. On the left was the 5th 
Corps, resting on the Rappahannock and covering the River and 
Mine roads. The 2nd Corps held the turnpike. The 12th Corps 
formed the centre of the line and covered Chancellorsville. The 
3rd Corps held Hazel Grove, a bare plateau to the south : one of 
its divisions under Berry acting as a general reserve. To the right 
the line was extended by the nth Corps, whose breastworks 
covered the Orange Plank road.^ 

Though Hooker's advance had been sharply checked, the position 
on the night of the ist was full of peril to the Confederates, 
Neither Lee nor Jackson had any thought but to attack Hooker, 
but the question was at what point were his lines vulnerable. 

' 2 IleiiiJcrsoii, 523. '■' 2 Henderson, 527. ^ 2 Ilemlerson, 526. 



May2, iS63] CHANCELLORSVILLE 199 

Reconnaissances showed that the Federal centre and left were 
impregnable. But presently Stuart brought the news that the 
Federal right could be turned. Its entrenchments had been con- 
structed solely with a view to an attack from the south. If a 
turning column could reach a position on its right flank the whole 
line of Federal defences could be taken in reverse. McLaws was 
ordered to entrench a position facing the Federal centre and left, 
and endeavours were made to find some route by which Jackson 
could make a flank march. In the early hours of the morning of 
the 2nd one of Jackson's Staffs brought the welcome information 
that a private road had been opened through the woods in the 
required direction for the purpose of hauling wood and ore to the 
Catherine Furnace. Lee and Jackson were seated in council at 
3.30 a.m., when the Staff officer joined them with a map, on which 
he had traced this road. Jackson at once proposed to lead his 
whole Corps along it, and Lee, after a moment of reflection, assented. 

By 4 a.m. Jackson's Corps was on the march. With 26,000 men 
he started to make a fourteen-mile march through an intricate 
country round the enemy's right flank, whilst Lee, with Anderson's 
and McLaws' divisions, some 17,000 men in all, undertook to find 
employment for Hooker during the progress of Jackson's move- 
ment.^ 

Such a division of the Confederate forces was a desperate 
expedient : but considering the disparity of force Lee was only 
running one of those risks which the weaker side must be willing 
to accept, if it hopes to achieve final success. Nor was the danger 
so great as it seemed. The Wilderness with its trees in full leaf 
and its dense undergrowth formed an excellent screen for Jackson's 
movement, and the operations of the previous day had shown Lee, 
that neither Hooker nor Sedgwick was likely to assume a vigorous 
offensive. Once again, as in the Second Manassas campaign, the 
Confederate leader read accurately the military character of the 
generals facing him and dared to take risks which he would not have 
ventured with a more circumspect opponent. The all-important 
point was, that Jackson's destination should be kept a secret from 
the Federals: as otherwise it would be a simple process for 
Howard to entrench his right flank so as to hold Jackson at bay, 
whilst Hooker with the bulk of his army fell upon the two divisions, 
which alone Lee retained, Jackson's march exposed the left flank 
of the force left behind, and a vigorous offensive on Hooker's part 
would have compelled it to fall back along the Fredericksburg 

^ Major Hotchkiss. See 2 Ileiidersun, 531, 532, where a letter of Major Hotchkiss 
is quoted. 

^ 2 Henderson, 508. This estimate of Jackson's strength only includes the infantry. 
Stuart brought with him four cavalry regiments and four batteries of horse artillery, and 
some part, at any rate, of the corps artillery accompanied the march. 



200 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

roads, where each step in retreat would take it further away from 
Jackson's isolated column. Jackson's Corps moved in a single 
column with Rodcs' division leading, followed by Colston's and 
A. P. Hill's bringing up the rear. In advance of the front division 
Fitzhugh Lee led the way with a single cavalry regiment, whilst 
squadrons from the other regiments covered the right flank and 
aided to screen it from the observation of the Federal skirmishers. 
The column was ten miles long, and as it was crossing a clearing 
on some rising ground to the west of the Furnace came into full 
view of the Federal troops posted on Hazel Grove.^ It seems 
strange that, considering the supreme importance of secrecy, 
Jackson should have followed a route which revealed to the enemy 
the fact that a movement of some sort was in progress. But it is 
possible that he was not aware that the road that he was following 
would expose his column to view, or that he hoped that the dis- 
covery of his movement would mystify the enemy and lead them 
to suppose that he was retreating. Moreover, he was anxious to 
cover as long as possible the left flank of the force left with Lee. 

At 8 a.m. Sickles' outposts on Hazel Grove detected Jackson's 
march and watched the long column defiling southwards.^ The 
movement must be either a flank march with Howard's right flank 
as its objective, or else a retreat towards Gordonsville. In view of 
the former contingency Hooker, at 9.30 a.m., sent an order to the 
generals commanding on the right to be prepared for a flanking 
attack. They were warned to throw out piquets, to keep a sharp 
look-out, and generally to strengthen their position, which Hooker 
now pronounced not so strong as he could wish. At an early hour 
the Federal Commander-in-Chief had ridden round his lines and 
expressed his complete approval of the strength of the entrench- 
ments. But at that hour he was not expecting a turning movement 
and imagined that any attack against his right would come from 
the south. Now the news from Sickles caused him to fear an attack 
against his unguarded flank, and accordingly he sent orders to 
Howard and Slocum to rectify their lines and to take the necessary 
precautions.^ 

About II a.m. Sickles' batteries opened fire on the Confederate 
column and the trains were withdrawn to another road further 
south, which was sheltered by the woods. An hour later Sickles 
advanced with two divisions to clear up the situation.* As he 
approached the Furnace he encountered a regiment guarding the 
cross roads, and at the same time Anderson's division from the 
Plank road assailed his left. Two brigades of A. P. Hill's division 
and an artillery battalion were sent back to guard the passage of 

* Hamlin (p. 13) says: "For several hours the procession moved in sight of and 
within reach of the guns of the Fe<leral army, seemingly in contempt of their foes." 
'^ 2 Henderson, 534. * Hamlin, 20. ■• 2 Henderson, 534. 



May 2, 1863] CHANCELLORSVILLE 201 

the trains: and though the single regiment guarding the cross roads 
was very severely handled, Sickles, finding himself threatened in 
front and on the left flank, sent back for reinforcements. Hill's 
two brigades, when once the trains of the column were in safety, 
pushed on after the main body, leaving Anderson to deal with 
Sickles. 

Jackson's column, after passing the Furnace, very soon entered 
the private road, which ran in a westerly direction parallel to, but 
south of the Brock road for some distance. It then entered the 
Brock road, which latter road running in a northerly direction 
crossed first the Plank road and then the turnpike leading to 
Chancellorsville. At 2 p.m.^ Archer's and Thomas' brigades were 
resuming their march after the rest of Hill's division. Jackson 
himself at the head of the column had reached the Plank road. 

It was his intention to march down that road against Howard's 
flank. But he was now met by Fitzhugh Lee, who had been 
scouting further along the Brock road and brought the news that it 
was perfectly possible to advance the Corps to the turnpike and 
attack on that road, by which means Floward's position would be 
taken in reverse. Fitzhugh Lee guided Jackson to a hill, from 
which he could look down upon the i ith Corps spread out beneath 
in complete ignorance of the impending blow. Jackson immedi- 
ately ordered Rodes to push on from the Plank road to the turn- 
pike, whilst the cavalry supported by the Stonewall brigade was 
moved down the Plank road to screen the movement of the rest of 
the Corps.2 Rodes having reached the turnpike, moved about a 
mile down it and then formed in line of battle. 

At 6 p.m. Jackson gave the order to attack. His line of battle 
reached across the turnpike for about a mile on either side. Four 
hundred yards in front of Rodes' line of battle were the skirmishers, 
200 yards behind Colston's division formed the second line, and 
Hill's division was held in reserve, part in line of battle and part 
still in column. Six guns of the horse artillery accompanied the 
attacking force.^ The nth Corps lay absolutely at their mercy. 
Both Howard, the Corps commander, and Devens, commanding 
the first division on the extreme right, were obstinately convinced 
that the enemy were in full retreat. Though the pickets sent in 
from time to time reports that a strong force was massing in the 
woods on the right flank, the warning fell upon deaf ears. No 
precaution was ordered to be taken by the Corps commander 
against a possible attack from the west. Barlow's brigade, the sole 
reserve of the Corps, was allowed to be taken without a word of 
remonstrance from Howard, and sent to the support of Sickles, 
who was hunting an imaginary foe in the forest beyond the Furnace: 
and so little was Howard concerned for the safety of his own 

^ 2 Henderson, 536. ^ 2 Henderson, 538. ^ Hamlin, 18. 



202 THE CIVIL WAll IN THE UNITED STATES 

position, that he actually accompanied the brigade on its march, 
to see how Sickles was getting on. 

Hooker must divide with his lieutenant the responsibility for the 
complete surprise of the right wing. He shared Howard's belief 
that Jackson was in full retreat. For at 4.1 o p.m. he sent a telegram 
to Sedgwick to the effect that the enemy was retreating, hotly 
pursued by Sickles. Moreover, Hooker was solely responsible for 
the fact that there was no supporting Corps ready at hand to help 
Howard. It is difficult to conjecture what were the precise plans 
of the Federal commander on May 2nd. He had summoned to 
his aid Reynolds' Corps and Averell's cavalry division ; and it 
would seem that he was quite content to sit still until these re- 
inforcements reached him. 

As soon as Jackson's movement commenced, Lee began a series 
of demonstrations against different points in the Federal line in 
order to draw Hooker's attention away from his right wing. But 
Sickles' discovery of Jackson's march must have enlightened 
Hooker as to the real strength of the force immediately in his 
front. Apparently he waited for Jackson's movement to develop 
itself: and as the hours wore on and no attack was made against 
his right, he decided that the column must have been retreating. 
When Sickles advancing in the direction of the Furnace sent back 
for reinforcements, Ilooker felt so confident that there was no 
danger of an attack upon his right that he sent his only cavalry 
brigade and the reserve brigade of the iith Corps to reinforce 
Sickles. He hoped by this movement to cut the Confederate army 
in two. But that process had already been voluntarily performed 
by the Confederate leaders themselves. Sickles advancing south- 
ward through the forest fondly imagined that he was pushing 
Jackson back, when that commander was several miles away on 
the point of annihilating Howard's Corps. 

Jackson's assault at 6 p.m.^ fell like a thunderbolt upon the 
nth Corps. In was approaching supper-time: the Federal soldiers 
regarded the day's work as done : the men were smoking, playing 
cards, preparing the evening meal:- ambulances, wagons, beef 
cattle were scattered about close to the front line.^ About 1,000 
yards east of Jackson's position rose a hill on which stood Talley's 
I'^arm. Jackson had ordered that this hill must be carried at all 
costs, as it was supposed that it commanded the ridge running 
north from Dowdall's Tavern, where the i ith Corps was expected 
to make its last stand. 

' 2 Henderson, 544. Ilaiiilin, 64, gives 5.15 p.m. as the mumeiit when the signal fur 
attack was given. 

'■^ 2 llendersun, 537. But Ilainlin, 15, (lucstiuns the statement that llic Federals were 
playing cards. 

•* Cf. Warren's evidence before the Congressional Committee. Swinton, 2S6, note. 
But Hamlin, 163-4, charges Warren with lack of candour and malevolence. 



May 2, 1863] CHANCELLORSVILLE 203 

The Confederate advance swept away the piquet line, and in ten 
minutes the first Federal brigade was in full flight. The second 
brigade of Devens' division held the important hill. But the 
Federals were too much taken by surprise to be able to offer a 
protracted resistance. Nearly all the regiments were facing south, 
and before they had time to get fairly into position the wave of 
triumphant Confederates swept over them. In another quarter 
of an hour the hill had been carried, and then through the forest ^ 
past the Wilderness Church towards Dowdall's Tavern the Federals 
streamed in flight with their foes upon their heels. Schurz's division 
was thrown into disorder by the retreat of their comrades and was 
quickly involved in the general flight. 

The ridge at Dowdall's Tavern was held by one brigade of 
Steinwehr's division: the other brigade at this critical moment was 
miles away with Sickles looking for Jackson beyond the Furnace. 
On the ridge a shallow line of rifle-pits had been dug and a brief 
stand was made. But Colston's division rushed forward from the 
second line, and side by side the men of the two divisions carried 
the breastwork, and the last remnant of the nth Corps was driven 
in full flight towards Chancellorsville. 

It was now 7 p.m. ; in an hour the nth Corps had been driven 
off the field : and thanks to Hooker's faulty dispositions Jackson 
was in a position to reap the full harvest of success. Within a 
mile and a half lay Chancellorsville and Hooker's headquarters ; 
within half a mile was the White House road leading to the 
United States Ford, Hooker's sole line of retreat. Between Jackson 
and his goal next to nothing in the way of an organised force 
intervened. Sickles, who should have supported Howard, had been 
isolated by his advance southwards and was in danger of being 
cut off entirely from the main body. Two brigades of the 12th 
Corps held Fairview Cemetery and constituted the only force 
protecting Chancellorsville. Berry's division of the 3rd Corps, 
which had been held in reserve, was north-east of Chancellorsville, 
and both the 2nd and 5th Corps and the remainder of the 12th 
Corps had their hands full ; for on the sound of Jackson's battle 
McLaws had by Lee's orders renewed his demonstrations against 
Hooker's left centre with increased vigour. A mile south of Chan- 
cellorsville Hazel Grove was only held by a few batteries and a 
handful of infantry. Hooker despatched messengers to bring back 
Sickles with all speed, and ordered Berry to advance his division 
to Fairview Cemetery and supported him on the right with a 
brigade from the 2nd Corps. 

After carrying the ridge at Dowdall's Tavern the Confederate 
advance was much slower. Rodes' and Colston's divisions were 

^ Between the hill on which stood Talley's Farm and the open fields round the 
Wilderness Church there intervened a patch of forest (2 Henderson, 541). 



204 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE IGNITED STATES 

inextricably mixed up together, and the advance through the 
dense forest in the fast failing light intensified the confusion. At 
the point where the road to the United States Ford joined the 
turnpike the two front divisions were halted. But Jackson had no 
intention of ceasing his advance until his work was completely 
finished. He ordered the front divisions to fall back and reform 
their ranks, and directed Hill's division to take their place and 
push straight forward. His plan was to drive the enemy still 
further back and entirely cut him off from the United States Ford. 
Across the road leading to that ford he intended to take up a 
strong position and compel Hooker to attack him there in order to 
recover his line of retreat. Having given his orders to Hill, he 
rode to the front till he nearly reached his own skirmish line, to 
see for himself what forces were in his front. More than once this 
habit of making his reconnaissances in person had brought Jack- 
son into danger ; and on this occasion it was destined to prove his 
destruction. As he was riding back a company of the i8th North 
Carolina infantry, mistaking his small party for a body of Federal 
cavalry, fired into it, and Jackson fell pierced by three bullets. 

With his fall the Confederate advance came to an end. Hill, 
after seeing his chief taken to the rear, was hastening to the front 
to take the command, when he too was wounded. No one knew 
what Jackson's plans were : the Staff officer who had been deputed 
to show Hill the road to the White House, by which the Federal 
retreat was to be cut off, had been killed by the same volley as laid 
Jackson low. It was determined to send for Stuart to take com- 
mand of the Corps ; but the cavalry commander was at Ely's Ford 
observing the division of Averell, which was moving to Hooker's 
support, when the disaster befell Jackson ; and it was not till 
10.30 p.m. that the summons reached him.^ He at once hurried to 
the scene of action and took over the command ; but on sending 
back to the hospital to learn Jackson's plans, he found that the 
Corps commander was so seriously injured as to be incapable of 
concentrated thought. He was accordingly left to do the best he 
could for himself. For the time being the initiative passed to the 
Federals.2 

Sickles, on receiving the order of recall, had moved back to- 
wards Hazel Grove. Anderson's division was too weak to prevent 
him from retiring from his position near the Furnace. Orders 
were then sent by Hooker to Sickles to assail the Confederate 
right flank and recover the lines where Howard's Corps had made 
their last stand. About midnight Sickles advanced Birney's 

' Lee's Z«, 252. 

' The account given in the text of Jackson's flank march, attack, and fall is based 
almost entirely upon Colonel Henderson's narrative. For further details, see the note at 
the end of the chapter. 



May3,i863] CHANCELLORSVILLE 205 

division to the attack, but the Confederates were fully prepared 
and an ill-directed assault was easily repulsed by Lane's brigade. 
The Plank road remained in the hands of the Confederates. The 
chief result of Sickles' attack was to cause Stuart to anticipate 
that it might be repeated, and therefore to abandon all idea of 
making a night attack himself.^ 

The Federals made good use of the hours of darkness. The 
1st Corps, which had bivouacked on the south bank of the river 
at the United States Ford and reached the battlefield late at night, 
was posted on the extreme right, where it secured their line of 
retreat : and the position on Fairview Heights was considerably 
strengthened. Hooker sent a telegram to Sedgwick, directing him 
at once to fight his way through the Confederate forces holding 
the Fredericksburg Heights, and by dawn to fall upon Lee's rear 
by the Plank road. 

On the morning of the 3rd May the position was by no means 
unfavourable to the Federals. Jackson's flank march had routed 
one Corps, but Hooker held a strong position, and the arrival of 
Reynolds' Corps made him stronger in numbers than on the 
preceding day. The two wings of the Confederate army were 
still separated, and there seemed a fair chance of crushing Lee's 
army in detail. But Jackson's attack had done more than rout 
Howard's Corps : it had beaten the Federal Commander-in-Chief, 
and knocked all the fighting out of him. Though the orders 
which he had sent to Sedgwick imposed upon that general a very 
dangerous task, and required that for the success of his movement 
he should receive the fullest co-operation from the main army, 
Hooker had abandoned all idea of taking the offensive. 

His one thought was to contract his lines so as to make the 
defence stronger. With that object in view he directed Sickles 
early on the morning of the 3rd to evacuate Hazel Grove and fall 
back to the lines constructed in front of Fairview. He also 
instructed his engineer officers to lay out a second line of defence 
to the north of Chancellorsville, covering the United States Ford. 
The control of the battle had passed from Hooker's nerveless 
hands to Lee and Stuart. The latter was quick to see the mistake 
committed by Hooker in evacuating Hazel Grove. That eminence 
was, in fact, the key to the whole position. Not only did it separ- 
ate the two Confederate wings, but artillery on its crest would take 
in flank any advance of the Confederates along the main road 
against Fairview. 

Stuart crowned the summit with thirty pieces of artillery, and 
the enfilading fire that these guns brought to bear upon the 
Federal lines at Fairview virtually rendered that position unten- 
able. The Federal forces covering Chancellorsville were drawn 

^ 2 Ilomlcison, 562. 



206 THE CIVIL WxVU IN THE UNITED STATES 

up in the shape of a V. The western face was held by the 3rd 
Corps, with one division of the 2nd Corps in support on the right 
and one division of the 12th Corps on the left. On the eastern 
face Hancock's division of the 2nd Corps and Geary's division of 
the 1 2th were in position. 

Stuart had spent the night in bringing up batteries, posting his 
troops for an attack, and opening up shorter lines of communication 
with Lee. At sunrise on the 3rd the Confederates rushed from 
w^est, south, and east on the Federal entrenchments in front of 
Chancellorsville. With wild shouts of " Remember Jackson," the 
indomitable veterans of the 2nd Corps assailed Sickles' position, 
whilst McLaws and Anderson pressed hard on the Federal left. 
The fiercest fighting was done by Stuart's Corps ; again and again 
the lines were carried, only to be retaken by the Federals, who 
fought with dauntless courage. 

But the repeated assaults of the Confederates and the deadly 
fire of Stuart's guns on Hazel Grove combined to break down the 
dogged resistance of their opponents. After five hours of the 
fiercest fighting^ Stuart's men carried the last of the Federal 
positions in front of Chancellorsville. By this time the Federal 
army was without a leader. A solid shot from one of the guns on 
Hazel Grove struck a pillar close to the spot where Hooker was 
standing, and part of the pillar was flung with great force against 
him.^ He fell stunned, and although on recovering consciousness 
he made an attempt to carry on the command, the pain which he 
was suffering was so excruciating that he was obliged to send for 
Couch to relieve him. Couch, however, was afraid to assume the 
responsibility of deviating from his superior's plan of battle, and 
the temporary change of commander brought no advantage to 
the Federals. 

There were actually three Corps — the 1st, 5th, and i ith — holding 
the second line of defence nearer the river within easy reach of the 
scene of battle. But Hooker refused to call up any part of them 
to succour his hard-pressed troops in front of Chancellorsville : 
37,000 men were standing in their ranks waiting eagerly for the 
order to advance, which never camc.^ Had Hooker put in either 
the 1st or 5th Corps on Stuart's left flank the result of the battle 
would probably have been different. But he was possessed of one 
idea only, and that was to secure his retreat. All thought of 
striking a bold blow and retrieving the position had been abandoned 
by him when he ordered the evacuation of Hazel Grove. 

The capture of Chancellorsville brought the two wings of Lee's 
army, so long separated, together again. The three Federal Corps 

' 2 TIcnflcrson, 567. 

"^ Lee's Lee, 253. According to another account Hooker was loaning against the 
pillar when it was struck (3 B. & L., 167), * Doublcday, 53. 



May 3, 1863] CHANCELLORSVILLE 207 

which had taken part in the desperate struggle made good their 
retreat to their new position, which was in the shape of a semi- 
ellipse with the flanks resting upon the Rapidan and Rappahannock 
and its centre at Bullock's House about three-quarters of a mile 
north of Chancellorsville.^ 

Strong as was this position, and great as had been the exertions 
of the Confederates, Lee was preparing to assault it when news 
reached him that Sedgwick had carried the Fredericksburg Heights,^ 
and was moving along the Plank road towards his rear. He at 
once abandoned the idea of attacking Hooker again that day and 
despatched McLaws to hold Sedgwick in check, whilst with the 
2nd Corps and the bulk of Anderson's division he took up a position 
in front of Hooker and commenced to entrench.^ 

Hooker's order, which reached Sedgwick about 1 1 p.m. on the 
2nd, directed him to be in position for an attack on Lee's rear by- 
daylight. Hooker, however, imagined that the greater part of the 
6th Corps was on the north side of the river, whereas the whole of 
it was on the south bank, three miles below Fredericksburg. 
Shortly after midnight Sedgwick advanced in the direction of the 
town, which after some skirmishing was occupied by the Federals 
about 3 a.m.* In order to reach Lee's rear it was necessary that 
the Confederates should be driven from the heights which com- 
manded the road to Chancellorsville. Near the river the atmosphere 
was thick and misty ; in consequence, the attack was postponed till 
sunrise. Sedgwick, finding it was impossible to carry out Hooker's 
order to the letter, made the necessary preparations in somewhat 
leisurely style; and it was not till after ii a.m. that the 
Fredericksburg Heights were carried and the road opened to 
Chancellorsville.^ 

The Confederate force which held Marye's Hill and the adjoin- 
ing ridge apparently only consisted of Barksdale's brigade. For 
Early, owing to a mistake of one of Lee's Staff who misinterpreted 
an order, had marched in the direction of Chancellorsville, and 
though as soon as the sound of the Federal attack was heard he 
countermarched, he was not in time to prevent Sedgwick from driv- 
ing Barksdale's small force from its position. He fell back along the 
Telegraph road, prepared either to check Sedgwick's advance if he 
moved on the direct road to Richmond, or to recover the Fredericks- 
burg Heights if Sedgwick marched towards Chancellorsville.^ 

^ Doubleday, 52. '^ See Map III. ^ 2 Henderson, 569. 

* Doubleday, 56. ' 3 B. & L., 228. 

^ This statement as to Early's movements is taken from White's Z^ij, 274. Some such 
explanation seems necessary to account for the ease with which Sedgwick succeeded 
where Burnside had so lamentably failed. It seems quite clear that Marye's Hill was 
only defended by Barksdale's brigade. Early had also detached one of his four brigades 
to support Barksdale, but it was diverted to another purpose and took no part in the 
defence of the hill (Doubleday, 59). The fact that Early assumed the offensive on the 
following day tends to show that his division was not seriously engaged on the 3rd, 



208 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

The Federals had suffered severely in the struggle with 
Barksdale, and Sedgwick judged it expedient to bring up Brooks' 
division from below Fredericksburg, and to reorganise his com- 
mand. It was not till 3 p.m. that the movement towards Lee's 
rear was commenced.^ Wilcox's brigade, which had been hurried 
up from Banks' Ford to support Barksdale, fell slowly back 
before Sedgwick's columns, and considerably delayed the Federal 
advance. 

By 2 p.m. McLaws had taken up a position along a wooded 
ridge close to Salem Church. Entrenchments were hastily thrown 
up, and Sedgwick found himself obliged for the second time in the 
day to assault a force holding a strong position. The attack was 
gallantly made by Brooks' division, and had it been supported by 
the other divisions, McLaws' line would have been broken. The 
Confederate centre was driven in, and for the moment the church 
and schoolhouse, which formed the key to the position, fell into 
the hands of the Federals. But a vigorous counterstroke drove 
them back. The other divisions were not within supporting dis- 
tance, and after Brooks' repulse no attempt was made to renew the 
attack.2 

Sedgwick found that he was opposed by a force stronger than 
he had anticipated, and like Hooker resigned the offensive, and 
that night took up a defensive position, covering his line of retreat 
to Banks' Ford. The next morning found him in a position of 
great danger. Early had reoccupied the Fredericksburg Heights, 
and was moving along the Plank road to attack his left flank ; 
McLaws' division was in his front, and Lee himself arrived with 
the three 3 other brigades of Anderson's division, determined to 
drive Sedgwick into the river. Hooker, less than seven miles 
away from Banks' Ford, had nearly 70,000 men, including two 
Corps — the ist and 5th — which had practically taken no part in the 
fighting of the last three days, in his fortified lines protecting 
the United States Ford. But he had made no attempt on the 
previous day to advance to his lieutenant's support ; and Lee there- 
fore on the 4th left only Stuart's Corps to hold the lines which 
confronted Hooker, and marched with Anderson's division to crush 
Sedgwick. 

The latter's position with either Hank resting upon the river was 
six miles long and only weakly defended by a force which now did 
not number more than 20,000, whilst Lee had concentrated at least 
25,000 against it.* The Confederate attack, however, on this day 
lacked vigour. Much time was spent in reconnoitring the enemy's 
line and in getting the troops in position for the attack, and it was 

» D..iil)letlay, 59. ^ Doublctlay, 60, 61. 

* One of An'k-rson's brigades had accompanied McLaws on the Srd, and another had 
been watcliing Banks' Ford. * DoiiMcday, 65. 



May4,i863] CHANCELLORSVILLE 209 

6 p.m. before the assault was actually delivered. Sedgwick found 
himself assailed simultaneously from three sides; but the attacking 
columns had not the fire and dash which the 2nd Corps had dis- 
played on the 2nd and 3rd May, only on Sedgwick's left was the 
assault really pressed home. There Early drove Howe's division 
back to a second line of defence, though he failed to turn the Federal 
left or cut it off from the river.^ 

At nightfall Sedgwick withdrew his whole force to a second 
position nearer the river, and as it seemed hopeless to depend upon 
Hooker for any support and his Corps had lost heavily, under cover 
of the night he withdrew his troops across the river. When the 
crossing was already in progress an order arrived from Hooker 
calling upon Sedgwick to hold his ground, but it was then too late. 
Hooker afterwards blamed Sedgwick for the precipitancy of his 
retreat, declaring that it was his intention to cross to the north side 
of the river with his own force and recrossing at Banks' Ford to 
unite his two wings on the south side of the river, and thus attain 
the object of his original movement. 

Sedgwick, however, having been called by his commander to a 
position of great danger and then finding himself entirely left in 
the lurch, can hardly be censured for resolving to secure at any rate 
the safety of his own corps. 

When on the morning of the 5th Lee found that Sedgwick had 
made good his retreat, he countermarched with the greater part of 
his forces to Chancellorsville, intending to make another attack 
upon Hooker's main army. Heavy rain fell that day and prevented 
the attack being made, and that night Hooker withdrew his army 
across the river. 

The movement which had commenced with such high hopes on 
April 27th was ended by the morning of May 6th. The two 
armies were again confronting each other on either side of the 
river, and Hooker's great scheme for Lee's destruction had igno- 
miniously failed. 

Thepe are not many campaigns so rich in dramatic incident as 
the nine days' marching and fighting which made up the campaign 
of Chancellorsville. First, there was Hooker's flank movement, 
skilfully planned and admirably executed, which on the evening of 
April 30th seemed on the point of being crowned with complete 
success. Then came the unexpected check on May ist, and 
Hooker, belying his reputation as a fighting general, fell back to 
Chancellorsville. 

On the 2nd Lee risked the desperate expedient of dividing his 
forces in the presence of the enemy. Success justified the venture. 

^ The brunt of the fighting was borne by Anderson's and Early's divisions. McLaws 
was prevented by the gathering darkness from perceiving the success of their attack. 
Lee's Lee, 255 ; Doubleday, 64-6. 



210 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

However the blame is to be apportioned between Hooker and 
Howard, the Federal right wing was completely taken by surprise 
and rolled up by Jackson's onslaught. At 9 p.m. on that night 
it seemed as if nothing could save Hooker's army from an appalling 
reverse, but Jackson's fall prevented the Confederates from follow- 
ing up their success. The advance was checked, and May 3rd 
found the Confederate army in a critical position with its two wings 
still separated. 

It was within Hooker's power at any period either on the 3rd 
or the 4th to assume the offensive with good hopes of gaining a 
great victory. But whether he had lost his nerve^ or had not 
recovered from the effects of his injury, he made no attempt to 
direct the subsequent course of the battle. He evacuated Hazel 
Grove, the key of the position. He allowed three of his Corps to 
be driven from their lines at Fairview without making the slightest 
effort to assist them, though he had at his disposal three more 
Corps eager to join in the fray. 

On the 4th the extraordinary spectacle was presented of an army 
twice the strength of its opponent clinging to two entrenched 
positions within seven miles of each other, whilst the enemy in 
spite of his inferior numbers was endeavouring to destroy these 
two bodies of troops in detail. On the afternoon of the 3rd 
Hooker, with between 60,000 and 70,000 men, had allowed himself 
to be held in check by a force le.ss than half the size of his own, 
and on the 4th, though confronted by a force barely a third of his 
own numbers,- he still made no attempt to force the fighting. 
When he had regained the northern bank of the Rappahannock he 
issued a characteristic order to his army, informing it that " in with- 
drawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before deliver- 
ing a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed 
evidence of its confidence in itself." It is precisely this failure to 
deliver a general battle which justifies the severest strictures upon 
Hooker, who with an army double the size of his opponent's 
allowed himself to be beaten in detail and driven across the river. 

On both sides the losses were very heavy ; the Federals lost 
17,000 and the Confederates 13,000. On the Federal side these 
losses were very unevenly distributed. The ist and 5th Corps 
together lost less than 1,000. Sedgwick's Corps suffered most 
.severely, losing nearly 5,000, and Sickles' Corps, which bore the 
brunt of the fighting on the 3rd, lost over 4,000. In the Con- 
federate ranks the losses were more evenly distributed, though the 
heaviest punishment was suffered by the three divisions which 

' The crxliinmious statement tli.Tt Honker was drunk during the battle of Chancellors- 
ville is refuted liy the evidence. He exercised a rigorous self-control during the campaign, 
and it is possible that this unwonted restraint reacted unfavourably upon his nervous 
system. "^ 2 Henderson, 571. 



May, 1863] CHANCELLORSVILLE 211 

accompanied Jackson on his flank march.^ Stoneman's cavalry 
raid against Lee's lines of communication, on which Hooker had 
based great hopes, proved quite ineffective, and had no influence 
at all upon the fortunes of the campaign. 

In a way the battle of Chancellorsville proved the turning-point 
of the war, in as much as it was won at the cost of Stonewall 
Jackson's life. Lee's great lieutenant breathed his last on May 
loth. His loss was simply irreparable to the Confederate cause. 
Lee, writing to Jackson after his wound, thus expressed himself: 
" Could I have directed events, I should have chosen for the good 
of the country to be disabled in your stead." 

There is no need to go into the question whether Lee or Jackson 
would have served the Confederacy better in its struggle against 
overwhelming odds. The two great captains, as long as they 
fought side by side, were invincible, two thunderbolts of war. 
The great flank marches in the Second Manassas and Chancellors- 
ville campaigns are the lasting monuments of their united genius 
and daring. Either had implicit faith in the other. Lee said of 
Jackson, "Such an executive officer the sun never shone on. No 
need for me to send or watch him. Straight as the needle to the 
pole, he advances to the execution of my purpose," and Jackson 
said of Lee, " I would follow General Lee blindfold." But Jackson 
was more than an " executive officer." His Valley campaign 
proved that he could plan as well as carry out far-reaching 
designs. Had he had a wider field on which to show his strategic 
ability, it is impossible to say what successes he might not have 
attained. His fall converted the hard-won victory at Chancellors- 
ville into a barren triumph. Never again after his death did Lee 
venture on those great flanking movements which decided two 
campaigns. Jackson was but thirty-nine when he died. In two 
short years of warfare he won for himself an abiding place among 
the great soldiers of all time. By his death the South suffered a 
loss which she never recovered. 



NOTE ON THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 

An account of the battle of Chancellorsville must include some refer- 
ence to Lieutenant-Colonel Hamlin's monograph on the operations of 
May 2nd. His narrative may be regarded as the official version of the 
nth Army Corps. A careful perusal of his work will probably upset 
many of the reader's previous notions about the battle. It has been the 
usual custom in the North to lay the blame of the defeat upon the nth 
Army Corps. This Corps, which was generally regarded as a foreign 

' 2 Henderson, 576, where the Confederate loss is estimated at 12,277. But the 
official estimate of the Confederate loss is probably a good deal less than the actual loss. 



212 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

organisation, was on ttiat account made a scapegoat. The West Pointers 
of native American origin looked with contempt upon its German officers 
and united in a crusade to blacken its fame. " Probably three-fifths " of 
the Corps were, however, Americans by birth, and many other members 
of it were naturalised citizens. The Corps had served with distinction in 
the Second Manassas campaign, when it was known as the ist Corps of 
Pope's Army of Virginia. It joined the Army of the Potomac after the 
battle of Fredericksburg, and was then under the command of its popular 
and trusted leader Sigel ; but in April that officer resigned his command 
and was succeeded by Howard. Other changes took place. Devens was 
appointed commander of the ist division and Barlow assigned to the 
command of a brigade in the 2nd. 

These changes were resented by the Corps as unnecessary, and were not 
calculated to increase its confidence or improve its fighting capacity. 
Hamlin contends that those officers of the Corps who had fought against 
Jackson in the Valley and at the Second Manassas expected that Jackson 
was marching round their flank, but neither Howard nor Devens would 
listen to the repeated representations made to them. Schurz, command- 
ing the 3rd division, had proposed on the receipt of Hooker's 9.30 a.m. 
order to withdraw the ist division and part of his own and form a new 
line facing west on the eastern bank of Hunting Run, but the Corps 
commander would not listen to him, and contented himself with causing 
a shallow line of rifle-pits to be dug on the Dowdall Farm. " There is 
abundant proof of a picket line well established and on the alert," and 
numerous urgent reports were sent in from the exposed flank, but Howard 
and Devens had so completely adopted Hooker's view that Lee was 
retreating, that they received the officers, who made the reports, with 
incredulity and even taunts. 

Their historian claims for the 1 1 th Corps that it made as good a fight 
against overwhelming odds as any trooi)S could have done under like 
circumstances. For an hour and a half (he makes the attack commence 
as early as 5.15 p.m. and puts the capture of the Dowdall Farm at 7 p.m. 
or thereabouts) the unequal struggle was maintained against a greatly 
superior force, which attacked them in detail, in rear and flank, with a loss 
to the Federal Corps of 1,500 killed and wounded and 1,000 prisoners. 
The last stand was made in the line of rifle-pits on the Dowdall Farm, 
and when that was carried Buschbeck's brigade retreated in perfect order 
and unpursued to Fairview, whilst Schurz with five regiments and the 
fragments of some others took position in the woods north of the Plank 
road covering the Bullock road. 

The one thing, in Hamlin's opinion, which robbed Jackson's attack of 
complete success, was the blunder of Colquitt. That officer was in com- 
mand of the right brigade of Rodes' division. As he was advancing 
through the woods between the Plank and the Pike roads he encountered 
a strong piquet line ; at the same time seeing some cavalry on his right 
front (these were apparently some of Stuart's men dressed in Federal 
uniforms) he imagined that Sickles was returning from the Furnace to fall 
upon his flank, and halting his brigade, changed front to the south. He 
made Ramseur, who was following him, do the same with his brigade. 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 213 

Stuart's cavalry and the Stonewall brigade, which were on the Plank road, 
were also obliged to halt, until Colquitt, who had the right of way, resumed 
his march. By this blunder seventeen infantry regiments were kept out 
of action for from forty to sixty minutes, and took no part in the battle 
until they came in on the left flank of the Federal force making its last 
stand on the Buschbeck line. "There is certainly reason to believe that 
if Colquitt had followed his orders with the same alacrity which the rest 
of his associates did, Devens' division would have been captured almost 
to a man, and that Schurz's division would have been rolled up before it 
could be fairly formed, and that Jackson would have been in the field in 
the rear of Chancellor's House before Sickles knew of his attack." 

The scene of Jackson's death is placed on the Mountain road. "The 
Mountain road is an old road which comes out of the Plank road about 
half a mile from Chancellor's and runs parallel with and north of it from 
sixty to eighty yards distant, and again comes into it together with the 
Bullock road opposite to the road from Hazel Grove." Jackson's ob- 
jective was not Fairview, but the White House, and, therefore, he was not 
riding along the Plank road, as usually represented. 

The extraordinary inventions of General Pleasonton about what 
occurred late in the evening at Hazel Grove are forcibly exposed. The 
famous charge made by Major Peter Keenan with the 8th Pennsylvania 
cavalry is reduced to its true proportions. The regiment was commanded 
not by Major Keenan, but by Colonel Huey. It was not ordered by 
Pleasonton to charge in order to give him time to get his artillery into 
position, but had been sent to report to Howard at the Dowdall Tavern, 
and had started on its way before Pleasonton returned to Hazel Grove. 
Marching in total unconsciousness of its danger, it had almost reached the 
Plank road, when it suddenly encountered the victorious Confederates. 
Huey ordered a dash to be made for the road, intending to turn to the 
right and cut his way through to Chancellorsville. But finding the road 
to the right blocked by the enemy, he turned to the left and rode down 
the road. When he had gone about loo yards a volley was poured in by 
some troops concealed in the woods, which killed Keenan and some 
thirty others. Keenan, instead of being "impaled on the bayonets of 
the enemy," was killed by a musket-shot about a mile away from the spot 
where the famous charge is represented as taking place. 

Pleasonton's claim that with twenty-two guns he checked Jackson's 
victorious advance and saved the Federal army is also condemned as a 
fabrication. Hamlin points out that Pleasonton's guns were more than 
1, 600 yards distant from the Plank road, on or near which nearly all Jack- 
son's Corps was halted by the Dowdall Farm and the Wilderness Church. 
The only Confederate troops which approached Hazel Grove were two 
small parties of foragers belonging to the 4th and 21st Georgia regiments, 
and they made haste to retreat as soon as the artillery fire ceased. 

The wild rout, which swept across Hazel Grove past the Chancellor 
House, where it encountered Hooker and his Staff, was not composed of 
the nth Corps, but consisted of the reserve anamunition train of the 3rd 
Corps with other impedimenta belonging to the force which had advanced 
under Sickles to the Furnace. Few, if any, of the nth Corps took part 



214 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

in this rout, as the retreat of the Corps was already over and the greater 
part of it was again in line of battle either on the Bullock road or at 
Fairview. 

Sickles' midniglit charge is also exposed as a great exaggeration. The 
attack was easily repulsed by two regiments of Lane's brigade without the 
Federals reaching the Plank road or getting within a mile of Howard's 
entrenchments, whilst Sickles' right column came into collision with 
Williams' division of the 12th Corps, and the Federals suffered consider- 
able loss from their own fire. Hamlin also shows that Berry's division of 
the 3rd Corps, which generally shares with Pleasonton's artillery and 
Keenan's cavalry the honour of checking Jackson, did nothing of the sort. 
A space of at least 700 yards, densely wooded, intervened between Berry's 
line and that of Pender's brigade, which faced it, and no attack was made 
by the Confederates during that night on Berry's division. 

Colonel Hamlin holds that the disaster of May 2nd was due to Hooker 
abandoning his original policy of a strict defensive and allowing Sickles to 
make his reconnaissance, which stripped the nth Corps of its supports. 



CHAPTER XVI 
GETTYSBURG 

A temporary lull — Reasons why Lee assumed the offensive — Reorganisation of the Army 
of Northern Virginia — Lee commences his advance — Lee's object in invading the 
North — Ewell drives the Federals out of the Shenandoah Valley — Hooker withdraws 
from the Rappahannock — The Confederates cross the Potomac — Cavalry encounters 
between the two armies — Lee committed to an invasion of Pennsylvania with his 
whole army — Invasion of Pennsylvania — Hooker relieved of the command of the 
Army of the Potomac — Succeeded by Meade — Lee orders a concentration at Cash- 
town — Stuart's raid — Disastrous results of the raid — Disposition of the two armies — 
Federal cavalry occupy Gettysburg — Confederates march on Gettysburg — Battle of 
July 1st — Arrival of Howard — Arrival of Ewell — The Federals defeated — The Con- 
federates fail to follow up their advantage — Lee committed to an offensive battle — 
Confederate delay on the 2nd — The Federal position — Faulty formation of Sickles' 
Corps — Longstreet attacks the Federal left — The Confederates fail to capture the 
Round Tops — The Federal centre temporarily broken — The Confederate left wing on 
the 2nd — Johnson secures a footing on Gulp's Hill — Early's attack on Cemetery Hill 
repulsed — Results of the day's fighting — Lee determines to renew the attack on the 
3rd — Federal Council of War — Lee's plan of attack — Johnson driven from Gulp's 
Hill — Longstreet's delay — A great artillery duel — Pickett's charge — Longstreet fails 
to support Pickett — Meade's failure to deliver a counterstroke — Cavalry engage- 
ment — Lee stands at bay on the 4th — The Confederate army retreats — Lee recrosses 
the Potomac — Criticism of the campaign. 

FOR just a month the two armies remained facing each other 
on opposite sides of the Rappahannock. Hooker, after his 
costly failure at Chancellorsville, was not disposed to resume 
the offensive. The next move must come from Lee. It has been 
said that Lee's hesitation to make that move was owing to the 
heavy losses which he had suffered at Chancellorsville.^ But heavy 
as those losses had been, they had been made good by the arrival 
of Hood's and Pickett's divisions of the ist Corps. His real reason 
for not moving sooner was the reluctance of his Government to 
abandon its defensive policy. After Chancellorsville high hopes 
were entertained in the Government circles at Richmond that 
peace would quickly ensue.^ It was expected that the peace party 
at the North, or Copperheads, as they were termed by their political 
opponents, would soon be strong enough to force President Lincoln 
into recognising the independence of the South, and it was believed, 
too, that foreign intervention might shortly be looked for. Holding 
^ Doubleday, 76. ^ 2 Henderson, 577. 

215 



216 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

these views, President Davis and his Cabinet were not disposed to 
make any attempt to improve the victory just gained. A second 
reason which detained Lee on the south side of the Rappahannock 
was his weakness in cavalry. He was not willing to undertake an 
offensive campaign until he had gathered together a sufficient force 
of that arm. 

From a military point of view there was every reason why Lee 
should take the initiative. A purely defensive war, if fought out to 
the bitter end and converted simply into a struggle of endurance, 
must result disastrously to the weaker side. Only by taking great 
risks and winning great victories was there any chance of forcing 
the North into conceding peace. An invasion of the North would, 
as in the previous year, do much to lighten the strain upon the 
Confederate commissariat, and would bring home to the Northerner 
in visible shape the horrors of war. There was another reason, 
which perhaps weighed even more with the Confederate Govern- 
ment than with Lee. The fate of Vicksburg was trembling in the 
balance : an invasion of the North might possibly have the effect 
of recalling Grant's army from the Mississippi, and if its fall was 
inevitable, then it was highly desirable that some brilliant success 
should be gained in the East as a set-off to so heavy a blow in the 
West.i 

By the end of May Lee's army numbered over 68,000 men ready 
for duty." More than 9,000 cavalry were under Stuart's command. 
The artillery of the army had been carefully reorganised, and after 
attaching to each Corps its appointed number of batteries, the 
whole of the reserve artillery was placed under the command of 
General Pendleton. The Army of Northern Virginia was now 
divided into three, in place of the old arrangement of two Corps. 
Longstreet continued in command of the ist Corps, and Ewell 
and A. P. Hill were appointed to command the 2nd and 3rd. 

Ewell was the senior major-general in the army ; he had been 
Jackson's second in command during the Valley campaign, and 
had but just rejoined the army after losing a leg at the Second 
Manassas. He was universally popular as a good soldier, though 
eccentric, and a hard fighter. But over the appointment of A. P. 
Hill there was a certain amount of sectional jealousy. He was a 
young man, having graduated at West Point in 1847, and in the 
Army of Northern Virginia both D. II. Hill and McLaws ranked 
him. Lee has been accused of recommending him for promotion 
because he was a Virginian. But some months earlier, after the 

' It may, however, be fairly argued that the best way of relieving Vicksburg would 
have been to send some portion of the Army of Northern Virginia to the West, as was 
actually done later in the year, when Bragg had been manoeuvred out of Chattanooga, 
(See Johnston's Narrative^ 225-6; 3 B. & L. , 245, 639, note.) 

- Lee's Lety 260. This estimate does not, however, include ten artillery batteries or 
6,116 officers " present for duty." (3 B. l\: L., 440.) 



June, 1863] GETTYSBURG 217 

Maryland campaign Lee, when writing to President Davis upon 
the subject of organising the army into Corps, had spoken of A. P. 
Hill as the best officer of his grade in the army.^ 

On June 3rd the Confederate movement commenced. It could 
only be round Hooker's right. On that day the divisions of McLaws 
and Hood started for Culpeper (see Map HI.). Ewell's Corps 
followed the next day. Hooker, finding that some movement was 
going on in the opposite lines, had bridges laid at the old crossing 
place below Fredericksburg, and on the 5th one division of the 6th 
Corps crossed the river to find out what was left in its front. On the 
7th General Pleasonton, who had superseded Stoneman in com- 
mand of the cavalry, was sent to make a reconnaissance in force in 
the direction of Culpeper. As soon as Lee saw that the Federal 
movement was a mere feint, he directed Longstreet and Ewell to 
resume their march, which for the moment had been interrupted, 
and the two infantry Corps were concentrated at Culpeper on 
June 8th. 

Pleasonton on the 9th moved his three cavalry divisions, sup- 
ported by two infantry brigades, across the Rappahannock under 
the impression that Stuart was concentrating his cavalry force at 
Culpeper. His information was, however, defective. Stuart had 
already concentrated his whole force at Brandy Station and, 
defeating two of his divisions in detail, forced him to recross the 
river. He claimed, however, to have inflicted such damage upon 
the Confederate cavalry that Lee was obliged to abandon his 
original scheme of invading the North on the east side of the Blue 
Ridge, as Stuart's Corps would no longer form a sufficient screen 
for his movements in the open country.^ 

But there is very good reason for holding that Lee had never 
meditated crossing the Potomac on the east side of the Blue 
Ridge. Even before Chancellorsville, as is shown by his letter to 
President Davis on April i6th, he had been thinking of entering 
the Valley and driving the Federal force holding Winchester 
beyond the Potomac.^ Pennsylvania, not Maryland, was the 
destined theatre of operations. He hoped to strike terror into the 
population of the North by capturing some of their great com- 
mercial cities. Harrisburg was to be the first victim, and if his 
plans worked smoothly, Philadelphia itself might be expected to 
fall next. At the same time, he desired, as in his previous 
invasion, to draw Hooker so far from Washington or Baltimore 
that a victory won in Pennsylvania might be followed by the 
annihilation of the Army of the Potomac and peace be wrested 
from the Federal Government by a crushing blow inflicted upon 
their one army in the East. The further north he could draw 
Hooker the better would be his chance of achieving that object : 
^ 3 B. & L., 355. '«' Doubleday, 84. * 2 Henderson, 509. 



218 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

and for that purpose the Cumberland Valley presented more 
advantages to an invading army than if the line of the Monocacy 
were followed (Map IV.). 

On the loth Ewell's Corps, now leading the advance, resumed 
the march to the Valley by the Front Royal road. The Federal 
force holding the northern part of the Valley was concentrated at 
Winchester under Milroy, and numbered about 10,000 men ; one 
detachment was posted at Berryville (Map V.). On the 13th 
Ewell, with Early's and Johnson's divisions, was moving direct on 
Winchester, and Rodes' division was advancing on Berryville. The 
detachment at the latter place made good its retreat to Winchester, 
though hotly pursued by the Confederate cavalry. Rodes kept on 
to Martinsburg. 

To have fallen back immediately from Winchester would have 
compelled Milroy to sacrifice the Berryville detachment, which was 
exhausted with its thirty-mile march. There was some sharp 
fighting round Winchester on the 14th, and on that night Milroy 
found himself in a position of great peril. Ewell had skilfully 
disposed his Corps so as to intercept the Federal retreat. 

Milroy spiked all his guns, destroyed his ammunition, left his 
sick and wounded in Winchester, and in the early hours of the 15th 
started to cut his way through the forces which blocked his line of 
retreat. The attempt to force the main road proving unsuccessful, 
the Federals lost their cohesion and made for the Potomac in 
isolated bodies. Milroy claimed to have brought off 5,000 of his 
command,^ and the Confederates claimed 4,000 prisoners.- 

The Federals were completely expelled from the Valley, and 
the garrison of Harper's Ferry was drawn across the river to the 
Maryland Heights. Milroy's resistance, as some compensation for 
his heavy loss, had gained time for the Federal Government to 
make preparations to meet the threatened invasion.^ The Presi- 
dent called upon the Governors of West Virginia, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, and New York for 120,000 men for temporary 
service. Two new military departments had been created in 
Pennsylvania : that of the Monongahela, under the command of 
General Brooks, with its headquarters at Pittsburg (Map I.), and 
that of the Susquehanna, under General Couch, with headquarters 
at Carlisle. Couch was succeeded in the command of the 2nd 
Corps of the Army of the Potomac by Hancock. 

On the 13th Hooker at last abandoned his position at Falmouth, 
and moved off towards Washington. As Lee had foreseen, his 
advance into the Valley was certain to draw the Army of the 
Potomac northwards. Hooker would have preferred to let Lee's 
movement develop itself and then to cross the Rappahannock, and 
either by weight of superior numbers crush Hill's isolated corps, or 

' Doubletlay, 94. ^ 3 B. & L., 265. ^ Doubleday, 95. 



June, 1863] GETTYSBURG 219 

by a turning movement march straight on Richmond, But neither 
Lincohi nor Halleck would hear of Hooker crossing to the south 
side of the Rappahannock when Lee was threatening to reach the 
north bank of the Potomac. The old fear of the Federal Govern- 
ment for the safety of the capital demanded that Hooker's army 
should be brought back to cover Washington. 

As soon as the Federal army left its lines at Falmouth, Hill 
marched away towards Culpeper (Map V.), and on the 15th Long- 
street's Corps, whose place was now taken by Hill's, moved to 
occupy Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps in the Blue Ridge. On that 
same day Ewell's vanguard crossed the Potomac, and Jenkins' 
cavalry brigade on the same evening entered Chambersburg (Map 
IV.). Pressing forward, Jenkins succeeded in occupying Carlisle 
before Couch could reach it. 

Lee's movements were made with great caution. He was 
anxious about his communications, on which he depended for his 
supply of ammunition. For though, after crossing the Potomac, 
he might be able to find subsistence for his army in Northern 
territory, yet for ammunition he was dependent upon his line 
of communications being preserved intact. It seems probable that 
his object in moving Longstreet's Corps from Culpeper towards 
Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps was to induce Hooker to leave the 
strong position which he held about Centreville and Manassas in 
order to attack Longstreet.^ But Hooker refused to be drawn 
from his post in front of Washington. 

On the 1 6th Stuart's cavalry left the Rappahannock, where it 
had been watching the fords, and moved along the eastern base 
of the Blue Ridge to protect Longstreet's right flank. On the 
next three days a succession of encounters took place between 
Stuart and Pleasonton. It was the former's object to secure and 
hold the Gaps in the Bull Run Mountains in order to screen com- 
pletely the advance of the Confederate army and to leave Hooker 
in doubt as to its ultimate destination. 

But the cavalry engagements resulted in favour of the Federals, 
and Stuart was forced back to Ashby's Gap, where he took shelter 
behind Longstreet's Corps. Pleasonton's success enabled Hooker 
to move further west, whilst still covering the capital, and to take 
up a strong position at Leesburg and the Gaps of the Bull Run 
Mountains, and left Lee no choice, even had he desired otherwise, 
save to cross the whole of his army over the Potomac on the west 
side of the Blue Ridge. As Hooker still refused to be drawn from 
his defensive position, Longstreet's Corps was withdrawn to the 
west bank of the Shenandoah, and Stuart's cavalry was left to 
hold the Blue Ridge Gaps. 

Lee had now finally made up his mind to invade Pennsylvania 

^ Doubleday, 99. 



220 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

with his whole army. Ewell's operations had made it plain that 
there would be no difficulty in getting supplies, and it seemed as 
though nothing short of a direct invasion of the North would draw 
Hooker across the Potomac. At the same time he was fully con- 
scious of the risk which he was running, and earnestly begged 
President Davis to allow a second army, " even in effigy," to be 
organised under Beauregard at Culpeper, in order that part of the 
Federal army might be detained south of Washington, and to that 
extent the pressure upon his own forces lightened. But the Presi- 
dent was in no mood to send reinforcements to Lee. He was at 
the moment greatly concerned for the safety of Richmond, which 
was being threatened by demonstrations from Fortress Monroe, 
where General Dix was in command of a considerable force. He 
refused to allow Beauregard or any of the troops which were 
garrisoning the Atlantic coast defences to be sent north. 

On the 23rd, Rodes' and Johnson's divisions reached Chambers- 
burg : Early's division was marching in the direction of York, 
hoping to capture the railway bridge over the Susquehanna at 
Wrightsville. 

On the 24th, Longstreet's and Hill's Corps were crossing the 
Potomac at Williamsport and Shepherdstown. The next day these 
two Corps reunited at Hagerstown and moved forward to Cham- 
bersburg, which they occupied on the 27th. On the same day 
Ewell with two divisions entered Carlisle, and Jenkins' cavalry 
reached Kingston within thirteen miles of Harrisburg, and on the 
same night Early took possession of York.^ Pushing on to 
Wrightsville, Early hoped to capture the railway bridge over the 
Susquehanna. If successful in that object, he intended to cross 
the river, destroy all railway and telegraphic communication 
between Philadelphia and the West, and then to march up the 
north bank of the river, capture Harrisburg, and rejoin Ewcll at 
Carlisle. He was not, however, in time to prevent a force of militia 
setting fire to and destroying the bridge, and after this fell back 
to York and waited for further orders. 

On the 25th Hooker, seeing that Lee was fully committed to 
the invasion of Pennsylvania by the Cumberland Valley, determined 
himself to cross the Potomac and march along the eastern base of 
the South Mountain range parallel to Lee's line of advance, and 
at the first favourable opportunity attack his line of communica- 
tions. On the following day his headquarters were at PVederick 
City, where three Corps were concentrated. Three other Corps, 
forming the left wing under the command of Reynolds, were further 
west at Boonsborough and Middlctown. The 12th Corps was sent 
to Harper's P'erry to co-operate with the garrison of that post in 
attacking Lee's line of communications. 

^ Douljleday, 1 1 2. 



June, 1863] GETTYSBURG 221 

Hooker's general idea was to advance with his Corps spread out 
in the shape of a fan towards the Susquehanna with the left wing 
covering his flank in case Longstreet's and Hill's Corps turned 
east, whilst Slocum with the 12th Corps and the Harper's Ferry 
garrison threatened Lee's rear.^ But Hooker no longer retained 
the confidence of the Washington authorities, either military or 
political. By his failure at Chancellorsville he had forfeited 
Halleck's support. Rightly enough he had demanded that all 
forces within the actual theatre of operations should be placed 
under his control. He had no sympathy with the excessive 
solicitude which kept a large force within the fortifications of 
Washington,^ when the Army of the Potomac was already safe- 
guarding the capital : and Halleck's refusal to allow him to dis- 
pose of the garrison of Harper's Ferry caused him to send in his 
resignation. It was promptly accepted by the Government, who 
appointed General Meade, one of the Corps commanders of the 
Army of the Potomac, to the chief command on June 28th : and 
Meade with some reluctance, knowing that the army was looking 
to Reynolds as Hooker's successor, accepted the appointment.^ 

George G. Meade, the fifth commander that the Army of the 
Potomac had had within the last ten months,* was in his forty- 
eighth year. He had graduated at West Point in 1835 as an 
engineer, and served in Mexico on General Patterson's staff. He 
had not very long been a Corps commander, having been appointed 
to the command of the 5th Corps when Hooker was reorganising 
the army. During the campaign of Chancellorsville his Corps 
had taken very little part in the fighting. As a division com- 
mander he had seen some hard fighting both at the Antietam and 
Fredericksburg. He must be reckoned a meritorious rather than 
a brilliant commander.^ On assuming command he had no choice 
but to carry out in the main Hooker's plans. He abandoned the 
idea of threatening Lee's line of communications and recalled 
Slocum's Corps to the main army. His general idea was to inter- 
vene between Lee and Philadelphia, in case the Confederates 
continued to march north, between Lee and Baltimore or Wash- 
ington, if they turned back.^ 

^ Doubleday, 1 1 4. 

^ Heintzelman commanded the Department of Washington with a force of about 
36,000 men (Swinton, 321). 

' Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck had all agreed after Chancellorsville that under no 
circumstances must Hooker be allowed to command in another battle. But the 
political influence of Hooker's friends was so great that the Government, instead of 
directly relieving Hooker of the command, adopted the tortuous method of forcing 
him to resign (3 B. & L., 241). 

* Of these five commanders Pope is reckoned as the first. Though he was not 
technically in command of the Army of the Potomac, yet a considerable part of that 
army came under his command during the Second Manassas campaign. 

* Palfrey, 55. « Doubleday, 115. 



222 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

It was not till the evening of the 28th that Lee was informed 
that the Army of the Potomac, which he had supposed to be still 
south of the Potomac, was concentrated in the neighbourhood 
of Frederick City. He at once scented danger for his communi- 
cations and determined to prevent any movement against them by 
threatening Baltimore.^ Orders were immediately sent to his 
Corps commanders to fall back and concentrate at Cashtown, near 
the eastern foot of the South Mountain range. His intention was 
to fight a defensive battle near that range, so that in case of defeat 
he might be able to withdraw his army and trains through the 
Gaps without fear of an effective pursuit. 

Meade for his part also wished to fight a defensive battle, and 
had fixed upon the line of Pipe Creek, about twelve miles south- 
east of Gettysburg, as the position which he would hold. It may 
be doubted, however, whether Lee would have attacked him in 
that position, or whether the Federal army standing on the 
defensive on that line could have prevented the Confederates from 
plundering Pennsylvania at pleasure, and capturing Harrisburg, 
and even Philadelphia.'^ 

Lee was seriously handicapped by his want of information. 
Hooker had crossed the Potomac on the 25th, but Lee was not 
informed of that fact till three days later. This lack of informa- 
tion was due to Stuart's absence. With three brigades he had 
made a movement round Hooker's rear, crossed the Potomac on the 
27th between Hooker and Washington, on the 28th captured a 
supply train at Rockville within a few miles of Washington, and 
on the 29th broken up, as well as the limited time at his disposal 
allowed, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He then made for 
York, where he expected to find Early. But threatened by the 
superior numbers of the Federal cavalry, and hampered by 
keeping with him the captured train, he did not reach the neigh- 
bourhood of York until Early had already evacuated that town 
under orders recalling him to Cashtown. On the night of the 
30th, whilst pushing on for York, he passed within seven miles 
of Early's division, marching towards Gettysburg, but neither 
force was aware of the presence of the other.^ Hearing that 
Early had left York, Stuart pushed on to Carlisle only to find that 
place also occupied by Federal forces. It was not till the after- 
noon of the 2nd July that he reached Gettysburg and by that time 
the men and horses of his command were completely exhausted. 

Stuart has sometimes been blamed for making this raid, and an 
attempt has been made to put the whole responsibility for the 
defeat of Gettysburg upon his shoulders. But the responsibility 
must be shared with Lee and Longstreet. It was left to the 
cavalry commander's discretion by Lee either to cross the Potomac 

* DouMcday, ii6. * Doubleday, 120. ^ Doublcday, 121. 



Tune, 1863] GETTYSBURG 223 

at Shepherdstown, or to make a sweep round Hooker's rear and 
cross the river to the east of the Federal army ; and Longstreet 
was opposed to crossing at Shepherdstown on the ground that it 
would too clearly indicate the Confederate plans to their opponents.^ 

Two of the Southern cavalry brigades had been left to guard 
Gaps in the Blue Ridge. Jenkins' brigade was far in advance of 
the main army, and skirmishing within four miles of Harrisburg,^ 
when Ewell received his orders of recall ; and Imboden's brigade 
had been sent westward to break up the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road, and prevent any attack from that direction being made upon 
the Confederate communications. 

Consequently Lee found himself, partly by his own fault, stripped 
of his cavalry. The eyes of the army were absent. The Con- 
federates stumbled blindly upon their opponents, and the result 
was that Lee, in place of fighting a defensive battle at Cashtown, 
where his line of retreat would have been secure, was forced into 
fighting an offensive battle at Gettysburg about eight miles further 
east. As Lee was moving south-east in order to cover his com- 
munications, and Meade was advancing north-west to get touch of 
the enemy, a collision was inevitable. 

On the night of June 30th the disposition of the two armies 
was as follows. The ist Federal Corps was at Marsh Creek between 
Emmetsburg and Gettysburg, the i ith Corps was at Emmetsburg. 
Two other Corps, the 3rd and the 12th, were within supporting 
distance on the west side of Pipe Creek, the other three were 
spread out in a fan shape behind Pipe Creek. On the Confederate 
side Rodes' and Early's divisions, marching respectively from 
Carlisle and York, were near Heidlersburg. Johnson's division had 
taken a more circuitous route with the trains and was west of the 
mountains. Hill had two divisions at Cashtown, but Anderson's 
division was in the rear at the mountain pass on the Chambersburg 
road. The whole of Longstreet's Corps was west of the mountains, 
and Pickett's division was at Chambersburg guarding the trains. 

On the 30th Buford's cavalry division had by Pleasonton's 
orders occupied Gettysburg, and on the same day Pettigrew's 
brigade of Hill's Corps, pushing forward towards Gettysburg, in the 
hope of replenishing the Confederate stock of shoes, had come in 
contact with Buford's outposts and fallen back to Cashtown. 
Early on July 1st Hill sent Heth's division, supported by Pender's, 
to Gettysburg to find out what was in his front (see Plan). At 
the same time Reynolds was advancing the 1st Corps to Gettys- 
burg, and had ordered the nth to follow. At 9 a.m. Heth came 
into contact with Buford's skirmishers.^ After about an hour's 
fighting Reynolds, with Wadsworth's division of the ist Corps, 
reached the scene of battle. The chief fighting took place on 

* 3 B. & L., 251-2. « Doubleday, 118, » Doubleday, 126. 



224 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the banks of Willoughby Run, and on a ridge to the east of that 
stream and about a mile from Gettysburg.^ Early in the action 
Reynolds was killed, but Archer's brigade, which formed the right 
of Heth's line, was driven back across the Run with heavy loss, 
and Archer himself was taken prisoner. When Pender came up 
to the support of Heth the ist Corps, now under the command of 
Doubleday, found itself outnumbered. 

At 11.30 a.m. Howard arrived on the field, and by right of 
seniority assumed the command of the left wing. He ordered the 
1st Corps to hold its ground, sent back for the nth Corps to 
advance with all speed, and also sent to the commanders of the 
3rd and I2th Corps asking for assistance. The nth Corps came 
up about I p.m. Two divisions were hurried forward to take their 
position on the right of the Federal line, whilst the third division 
was held in reserve on Cemetery Hill. 

By this time, however, Ewell with his two divisions was nearing 
Gettysburg, and Howard directed his two leading divisions to 
change front so as to face Ewell's advance. Consequently there 
was a considerable gap left between the right of the ist and the 
left of the nth Corps. About 2.30 p.m. Rodes' division was 
engaging Howard, and at 3.30 p.m. Early's division struck the 
nth Corps on the right flank. 

His arrival decided the day in favour of the Confederates. The 
nth Corps, finding its right enveloped, was obliged to abandon its 
position across Seminary Ridge, and retreat through the town. 
The retreat of the nth Corps uncovered the right of the ist, and 
the pressure upon it by Hill's two divisions and several brigades of 
Rodes' division grew too heavy to be resisted.^ Howard refused 
either to withdraw the ist Corps or to send it reinforcements.^ 
Pender's division overlapped the left of the ist Corps by a quarter 
of a mile, and great difficulty was experienced in extricating that 
Corps from its perilous position. A sturdy resistance was offered 
on Seminary Ridge, but an advance of Confederate troops on the 
right threatening to cut off the line of retreat to Cemetery Hill at 
length compelled Doubleday to withdraw his exhausted men 
through Gettysburg to the new line of defence. 

At 3 p.m. Hancock reached the field,^ having been sent by 
Meade to supersede Howard in the command. He promptly realised 
the importance of holding Cemetery Hill, and sent a division of 

' McPhcrson's Rulf^e. 

' Four out of Rodes' five lirigades seem to have been cng.aged with the ist Corps at 
one time or another on that afternoon. 

* Doubleday, 146. Howard in his Official Report says that he sent orders to the ist 
Corps to retreat, but the order was not sent till Doubleday's left had l)cen turned, and the 
Ist Corps was already retreating, and it is very doubtful if Doubleday ever received it. 
3 B. & L., 288; Doubleday, 149. 

* Hancock's Official Report. 3 U. iV L., 2S7. 



July i, 1863] GETTYSBURG 225 

the 1st Corps to the right of the nth to hold Gulp's Hill. The 
Federal force holding the hills was very weak. The ist Corps had 
been very much cut up, and the i ith Corps was much demoralised. 
Had the Confederates at once followed up their success, they might 
have carried the position. Probably not more than 6,000 Federals 
were holding it,^ and four strong Confederate divisions were in the 
field. 

Lee, on reaching Seminary Ridge and seeing the state of affairs, 
sent to Ewell to press the attack, and, if possible, capture Cemetery 
Hill. At the same time, however, he warned him not to bring on 
a general battle. For none of Longstreet's Corps had yet arrived, 
and both the 2nd and 3rd Corps were minus a division. 

A false report, that a Federal force was threatening his left 
flank, caused Ewell to postpone the attack until Johnson's division 
should have arrived. It marched on to the battlefield about 6 p.m., 
but by that hour the 12th Corps and part of the 3rd had reinforced 
the Federal lines. Ewell was unwilling to attack so strong a 
position unless Hill could co-operate in the assault. But both of 
Hill's divisions had lost heavily in the earlier fighting, and that 
commander would make no movement until the arrival of Ander- 
son's division. It came up at sunset, but by that time it was too 
late to make the attack. So ended the first day of the battle of 
Gettysburg. Nearly 50,000 men had been engaged,^ and thus far 
the Confederates had gained a decided success. 

Lee now found himself, as a result of Hill's reconnaissance in 
force, committed to an offensive battle. Being ten miles east of the 
South Mountain range he was reluctant to retreat for fear of en- 
dangering his trains : and the impossibility of collecting supplies 
prevented him remaining on Seminary Ridge, and standing on the 
defensive. It would have been possible for him to manoeuvre, and by 
making a flank movement to the right to get between the Federal 
army and Washington, and so force Meade to deliver an offensive 
battle. This was indeed the course advised by Longstreet, and 
various able military writers have maintained that this is what 
should have been done.^ But on the night of July ist Lee was in 
great hopes of destroying his foe in detail. The Cemetery Hill 
was held by the ist and nth Corps, which had both been 
severely defeated, and by the 12th Corps. The 3rd Corps was 
within supporting distance, but Meade's other three Corps were 
some distance off The 2nd Corps went into camp on the night of 
the 1st, four miles from the battlefield : the 5th Corps was nine 

^ White's Lee, 294. But General Hunt (3 B. & L. , 284) considers that a Confede- 
rate assault was not practicable before 5.30 p.m., and that by that time the Federal 
position was perfectly secure. 

" Lee's Lee, 271, note. 

^ Hamley's Operations of War, 420. But Hunt (3 B. & L., 293) denies that this 
move would have produced the desired effect. 

Q 



226 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

miles off, and the 6th Corps, which was the largest in the army, 
was twenty-five miles away, having already marched nine from 
Manchester.^ Had the Federal lines been attacked at dawn on 
the 2nd, it is hard to see how the four Corps in position could have 
escaped destruction. For the 3rd Corps would on advancing have 
found itself involved in the rout of the other three, and all four 
could have been cut off from the rest of the Federal army. 

Meade was just as unwilling to fight at Gettysburg as Lee had 
been.2 But his hand also had been forced, first by Reynolds' 
advance to Gettysburg and then by Hancock selecting the 
Cemetery Hill and Ridge as the position to be finally held by the 
whole army. 

As to the cause of the delay of the Confederate attack on the 
following day, a bitter controversy rages. The general opinion lays 
the blame upon Longstreet. He was with Lee on the Seminary 
Ridge at 5 p.m. on July ist. After sunset Lee rode through 
Gettysburg, and met in conference Ewell, Early, and Rodes. His 
original wish was that the Federal right should be attacked next 
morning. But the commander of the 2nd Corps and his two senior 
divisional commanders dissuaded the Confederate leader. They 
pointed out that the weak point in the Federal line was its left, 
where a gentle slope led from the one ridge to the other, whilst its 
strongest point was the right. 

Lee's next suggestion was that if he attacked with the right 
wing, Ewell should move his Corps round on to the Seminary Ridge, 
as the Confederate line was long and thin, and Lee feared lest the 
Federals should make an attempt to break it at some point. But 
the three officers of the 2nd Corps were not only sure that they 
could hold their ground against any attack, but were confident 
that they could carry Gulp's Hill, and by crowning that height 
with artillery enfilade the Federal right centre. The conference 
broke up with the understanding that Longstreet would be ordered 
to attack Meade's left as early as possible on the following morn- 
ing, and that as soon as the sound of his guns was heard the 
2nd Corps would assault the Federal right, whilst Hill's Corps 
would demonstrate against the centre.^ 

Lee had another interview with Longstreet after returning from 
Gettysburg, and it was then, according to General Pendleton, Lee's 
Chief of Artillery, that Longstreet was ordered to attack at sunrise 
next morning.* As his two divisions were encamped within four 
miles of the battlefield, there was no reason why they should not 

^ This distribution of Meade's forces is taken from W. S. Reyall's " Battle of Gettys- 
burg," United Services Magazine, vol. xv. Two brigades of tlie 3rd Corps encamped at 
Emmctsburg, and did not reach tlic field till 9 a.m. on the 2nd (3 B. & L., 294). 

'^ See note at end of chapter. 

* I*V)r this conference between Lee and the chief officers of the 2nd Corps, cf. White's 
Lee, 296-7. * Ice's f ee, 276. 



July 2, 1863] GETTYSBURG 227 

have been ready to engage at that hour. Longstreet, however, 
denies that any such order was given him. He was vehemently 
opposed to attacking the Federal Hnes, and wished instead to 
manoeuvre Meade's army out of its position. He seems to have 
been under the extraordinary impression that Lee was distinctly 
pledged to him, his subordinate, only to fight a defensive battle. 
His view of the relation which should exist between a commander- 
in-chief and his lieutenant was a violation of all military discipline. 
It would almost seem as though he thought that Jackson's death 
had in some way altered the position in which he stood to Lee. 

There is some doubt as to the hour at which the two divisions 
of the 1st Corps reached the Seminary Ridge on the 2nd. Hood 
speaks of being on the ground soon after daybreak, and says that 
his division shortly followed him. But it seems more probable that 
the two divisions did not arrive before 8 a.m.^ Longstreet had been 
with Lee since daybreak arguing in favour of a movement round 
Meade's left. As Lee watched the steady stream of Federal rein- 
forcements pouring in, he knew that no time must be lost, if a 
victory was to be won. He overruled Longstreet's objections, and 
as he now had both of his divisions on the ground, gave him orders 
to attack as soon as possible with that portion of his command 
which was then up. But Longstreet, on his own responsibility, pre- 
ferred to wait until Law's brigade of Hood's division reached him. 
It was a great misfortune that during this battle Lee issued no 
written orders.^ It is probable that Longstreet would not have dis- 
regarded a direct order in writing. But an order issued by mere 
word of mouth he seems to have regarded as little more than a 
suggestion, which it was within his discretion to act upon or not. 

It was not till noon that Law's brigade, having marched twenty- 
four miles that r orning, arrived upon the scene.^ In the mean- 
while Lee, having given what he regarded as sufficiently definite 
orders to Longstreet, directed Hill to join in the attack in concert 
with Longstreet's left, and then rode on to Gettysburg to confer 
with Ewell. He found the 2nd Corps anxiously awaiting the signal, 
which was to be given by Longstreet's guns. He again expressed 
his anxiety lest Meade should attack his left wing, and clearly 
favoured a contraction of his lines by withdrawing Ewell's Corps 
from its exposed position to the Seminary Ridge, where it could 
connect with Hill's Corps. But he did not press the point, when 
he saw how confident Ewell and Early were of being able to carry 
the Federal lines in their immediate front. Growing impatient at 
Longstreet's delay, he rode again to the right wing to seek a reason 
for the failure to carry out his orders. On arrival he found Long- 

^ White's Lit, 301, note. 

^ " It was never Lee's practice to issue definite orders to his corps commanders." 

^ White's Lee, 303. 



228 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

street getting his column into motion. It was already i p.m. ; 
more time was spent in marching and countermarching in an en- 
deavour to conceal from the Federals the intended point of attack. 
It was 4 p.m. before Longstreet's two divisions were at length in 
line of battle waiting for the order to charge. 

The Federal position was a strong one ; it was in the shape of a 
fishhook. The ridge along which their lines were drawn up, at its 
northern extremity, makes a bend around to the south-east to Gulp's 
Hill. The southern end of the ridge terminates in a rugged hill 
called Round Top, and just north of this peak is another of less 
elevation known as Little Round Top. Apart from the hills at 
either extremity the ridge was of no great height, separated by an 
undulating valley from the Seminary Ridge a mile distant. On 
the rising ground between the two ridges the Emmetsburg road 
runs. The 12th Corps held the extreme right of this line, occupying 
Gulp's Hill and the ground to its south, so as to cover the Federal 
right rear. One division of the ist Corps held the northern 
side of Gulp's Hill. Then stretching from right to left came the 
iith Corps and two divisions of the 1st holding the Cemetery 
Hill, with the 2nd Corps extending the line along the ridge. The 
3rd and 5th Corps formed the extreme left, with the 6th Corps 
held back as a general reserve in rear of Round Top.^ 

The last division of the 5th Corps had reached the battlefield 
about noon, and the 6th Corps came up about 4 p.m.- Sickles had, 
on his own responsibility, deployed the 3rd Corps in advance of 
the rest of the line. His centre at the Peach Orchard touched the 
Emmetsburg road, along which his right was extended. His left 
was bent round and refused so as to cover Little Round Top. Thus 
a salient angle at the Peach Orchard was presented to the enemy's 
attack. The formation was a very disadvantageous one, as the 
troops holding the angle could be enfiladed by batteries on either 
flank, and when once the centre was broken both the right and 
left would be outflanked.^ Except for Sickles' faulty formation 
Meade's position was well adapted for an army standing on the 
defensive. Its convex shape gave the Federals the great advantage 
of being able to operate on interior lines, and thus enabled them 
to bring up reinforcements to any threatened point in considerably 
less time than it took their opponents to concentrate troops on 
their more extensive line. 

^ Doublcday, 162. 

' 3 B. & L., 294. Bill Doubleday, 159, makes the 6lh Corps arrive an hour, and 
Swinton, 343, two liours, earlier. Sykes, commanding the 5th Corps, reached the field 
with two divisions at 7 a.m. 

' General Hunt (3 li. & L., 302) says of Sickles' position : " It was, in my judgment, 
tactically the better line of the two, provided it were strongly occupied, for it was the 
only on'- on the field from which we cf>uld have passed from the defensive to the offensive 
witli a prospect of decisive results. But General Meade had not, until the arrival of the 
6th Corps, a sufficient ni»ml)er of troops to risk such an extension of his lines." 



July 2, 1863] GEITYSBURG 229 

Nevertheless, Meade was by no means satisfied with the Cemetery 
Ridge as a defensive position. He had reached the battlefield very 
early on the morning of the 2nd, and his first idea after inspecting 
the ground was to attack Lee's left. Exposed though Ewell's 
Corps was, it would have been very risky to attack it until the 
5 th and 6th Corps were up and ready to take part in the battle. 
The 5th Corps was at first posted on the right in reserve on the 
Baltimore road, partly to rest itself, partly with reference to Meade's 
proposed plan of attack. When dissuaded from assaulting the 
Confederate left, Meade next considered the advisability of attack- 
ing their right.^ So strong was his objection to Gettysburg as a 
defensive position that, in his opinion, the choice lay between 
attacking Lee and falling back to the line which he had previously 
selected behind Pipe Creek. A Council of War was sitting at 4 p.m., 
when Lee settled the question by assailing the Federal left with 
Longstreet's Corps. 

When once Longstreet got into battle he was a hard fighter, 
and on July 2nd his Corps fought with splendid valour. Hood's 
division was on the right and McLaws' on the left. Lee was 
apparently deceived by the formation adopted by Sickles, and 
imagined that the Federal left rested upon the Emmetsburg road, 
whereas the 3rd Corps was nearly a mile in front of the rest of the 
Federal line, and the 5th Corps, which had been moved from its 
original position on the right, lay behind Sickles and held the true 
line of defence.2 Longstreet's two divisions were formed, by Lee's 
special direction, perpendicular to the road, and were expected to 
turn the Federal left, and, driving it northward along the Cemetery 
Ridge, to force it back upon the centre, and thus roll up the whole 
of Meade's line. 

The faultiness of Sickles' formation was soon made apparent. 
The angle at the Peach Orchard was carried after a succession of 
assaults upon its two sides by Barksdale's and Kershaw's brigades. 
Hood's division outflanked Sickles' left and pushed on to gain the 
Round Tops. Two Alabama regiments reached the summit of Big 
Round Top, which had not yet been occupied by the Federals, and 
rushed down the other side to assail Little Round Top. Had some 
experienced Staff officer been on the spot artillery might have been 
brought up to the crest of the hill and the Federal position on 
Little Round Top rendered untenable.^ 

Hood had fallen wounded in the first twenty minutes, and Law 
succeeded to the command of the division. He directed his assault 
upon Little Round Top. No provision had been made by the 

^ "Warren and Slocum having reported an attack against Lee's left as unadvisable, 
Meade began to post troops on our left with a view to attack the enemy's right" 
(Doubleday, 157). But see note at end of chapter. 

"^ Doubleday, 167. * Lee's Lee, 282. 



230 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Federal leaders for holding this hill, the key to their whole position. 
It was only when Sickles' Corps was already giving way that 
General Warren, Meade's chief engineer, seeing the importance 
of the position, took the responsibility of detaching one brigade 
from the 5th Corps to hold it. This brigade only just reached the 
summit in time to forestall the Confederates. Law's troops made 
desperate efforts to gain possession of it. The Federal brigade 
was outnumbered, and must shortly have given way, when another 
brigade of the 5th Corps dashed up to the rescue, and the Con- 
federates were driven with heavy loss down the side of the hill.^ 

In the centre Birney's division was steadily pushed back by 
McLaws. Two divisions of the 5th Corps and one of the 2nd in 
succession were thrown into the battle in the attempt to check 
McLaws' advance. But though these counter-attacks were made 
with great bravery, and one Federal brigade charged right up to 
the Confederate batteries, all their efforts were in vain, as the 
Confederates, having once pierced the salient angle of Sickles' 
formation, were able to take in flank any force advancing to meet 
them. McLaws' brigades had now reached the main Federal line : 
they had driven their opponents out of a large wheat field and 
were close to the base of Little Round Top. But a brigade of 
Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves of the 5th Corps charged 
McLaws' force and drove it back out of the wheat field. Darkness 
was fast coming on : two brigades of Sedgwick's 6th Corps had 
taken up a position to the right of and below Little Round Top, 
and Longstreet, who, after Hood's fall, had come forward to lead 
his troops in person, decided that any further attempt to storm the 
Top would be vain.- Fighting ceased after Crawford's successful 
charge. 

Meanwhile Sickles' right had been equally hard pressed. When 
the salient angle was carried, Humphreys' division was attacked 
on one flank by Barksdale's brigade, while Anderson's division of 
Hill's Corps assailed its front. Struck in front and flank at the 
same moment that he was trying to change front in order to 
connect with Birney's division, he was forced back to the ridge. 
Hancock, who had general control of the ist, 2nd, and 3rd Corps, 
hurried up what reinforcements he could. But Wright's brigade 
pierced the Federal centre, and for a moment established itself on 
the ridge and turned one of the abandoned guns on the Federals. 
But a vigorous charge by Webb's brigade, of the 2nd Corps, 
recovered the guns, and Wright, finding himself isolated, fell back. 
Wilcox's brigade also charged home and almost reached the crest 

' A third brigade — Fisher's — of the 5th Corps reinforced tlie other two on Little Round 
Top, but did not arrive till after the repulse of the Confederate attack. Throui^hout the 
struggle one Federal battery was engaged, having been dragged up to the suainiit by 
almost superhuman exertions (3 B. & L. , J09). '^ Doubleday, 174. 



July 2. 1863] GETTYSBURG 231 

of the ridge, but finding troops concentrated against it from all 
sides, retired, suffering severely in the process. Wright and 
Wilcox claimed that by their charge they gained temporary 
possession of twenty-eight guns. Had their attack been better 
supported, the Federal line would have been cut in two. Two 
other brigades of Anderson's division and the whole of Pender's 
should have been within supporting distance.^ But Hill handled 
his Corps feebly throughout the day, and the opportunity was lost. 

Though Ewell's Corps had been in position since sunrise, ready 
to attack the northern end of the Federal line, its battle did not 
commence until Longstreet's attack was almost over. Johnson's 
division, which formed the left, was to assault Culp's Hill, whilst 
Early was to storm the northern face of Cemetery Hill, supported 
on his right by Rodes issuing from Gettysburg. Earlier in the 
day Meade had withdrawn the 12th Corps from its position on the 
right to reinforce his left. He yielded so far to Slocum's 
entreaties as to leave one brigade of the Corps on Culp's Hill. 
Johnson's attacks against Wads worth's division of the ist Corps 
and Greene's brigade of the 12th were easily repulsed. His 
batteries were unable to lend him any efficient support, but his 
left entered the works which Slocum had abandoned, and having 
no opposition to face, established itself there about 9 p.m. The 
darkness compelled Johnson to postpone any further advance till 
the following day. 

Early attacked about sunset. His signal was the opening of 
Johnson's batteries. But in this attack the want of concert was 
very marked. Two of his brigades, Hays' and Hoke's, fought their 
way up the side of Cemetery Hill. Hays' brigade on the right 
reached the crest of the hill and got in among the batteries of the 
nth Corps. But no support came to its aid. Gordon's brigade, 
which should have supported the other two brigades, failed to reach 
the position, which Hays had won. Hancock, owing to the in- 
activity of Rodes and Pender, who ought to have kept him fully 
employed, was able to send reinforcements to Howard's aid ; and 
Hays' brigade, after a gallant resistance, was forced to retire by the 
pressure of overwhelming numbers with heavy loss. Rodes was 
unable to co-operate in Early's attack, whose right flank he should 
have covered, because he had to move his division out of Gettys- 
burg by the flank, then change front and still march twice as far as 
Early. Before he was in position to attack, Early's assault had 

^ Doubleday, 175, 176. Perry's brigade of Anderson's division took part in the 
attack on Humphreys, but was driven back by the Federal fire. As his brigade was 
between Wright's and Wilcox's, his retreat uncovered their flanks. Pender was in a 
position in which he might have supported either Anderson's attack on his right or 
Ewell's on his left. Apparently he had been ordered to cover Ewell's right flank. Hill 
must then be blamed for not having modified his orders so as to make Pender's division 
available, if necessary, as a support to Anderson. 



232 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

been repulsed.^ Pender, on Hill's left, waited for Rodes to advance, 
and as he made no movement, himself remained inactive. 

Though the results of the day's fighting were very far from being 
what Lee had a right to expect when he surveyed the Federal lines 
at dawn, yet he was not discouraged. Both on the right and left 
the Confederates had gained ground. On the right Longstreet 
held the Emmetsburg road, where the batteries could find an 
advantag20us position for opening fire on the Federal line. Beyond 
the road his troops occupied Devil's Den, a rocky depression 500 
yards west of Little Round Top, and were close to the bases 
of both Tops. On the left Johnson had effected a lodgment within 
the enemy's lines, and menaced their line of retreat by the Balti- 
more Pike. Both Wright and Early had broken the Federal line 
and reached the crest of the ridge, but had been prevented by want 
of support from establishing themselves permanently in the posi- 
tions which they had gained. Pickett's division, the flower of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, had reached the field, and Stuart with 
his cavalry had also rejoined. Lee therefore determined to renew 
the attack the following day. As he put it in his official report, 
" The result of this day's operations induced the belief that with 
proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the 
positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render 
the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was 
accordingly determined to continue the attack." 

There was nothing like the same confidence to be found among 
the Federal generals. On the night of the 2nd a Council of War 
was convened at Meade's headquarters. The general opinion of 
the generals was in favour of continuing to hold their position, as 
they had the advantage of superior numbers, and on the whole had 
successfully repulsed the Confederate attacks. But Meade himself 
could not get over his antipathy to the Gettysburg position ; and 
though the majority of voices was against retreat, there is good 
reason for believing that he had decided to set aside the opinion 
of the Council of War, and had even perhaps issued the order for 
retreat, when the arrival of Captain Dahlgren with a captured 
despatch of the utmost importance induced him to change his 
mind.2 

A veil of the deepest mystery envelops the story of Dahlgren 
and the despatch, which he is alleged to have captured. It is 
stated, and apparently with strong evidence to bear out the state- 
ment, that the despatch was a letter written by President Davis to 
Lee, in which he declared that it was impossible to assemble an 
army under Beauregard at Culpeper as a menace to Washington. 

^ Lee's Lee, 284. 

* See Reyail's article on Gettysburg in the United Services Afatfazinc, already referred 
to. White's lee, 310, note, and Doubleday, 179. 



July 2, 1863] GETTYSBURG 

It is easy to understand how after reading this letter, Meade 
would be encouraged to stand fast, because he now knew that 
no Confederate force threatened Washington except that im- 
mediately in his front, and that even if Lee were successful in 
carrying Cemetery Ridge, his army would be too worn out by 
hard fighting to constitute a serious menace to the safety of the 
Capital. Anyhow, Meade finally decided to hold on to his 
position at Gettysburg. He still had two Corps, the 6th and 12th, 
practically intact. The 2nd Corps had been only partially 
engaged, though one division of it had suffered severely in trying 
to recover the position which Sickles had lost.^ The other four 
Corps had all suffered heavy loss on one day or the other. 

Lee's original intention was to continue the tactics of the 
previous day and make a simultaneous attack upon the two 
extremities of the Federal line.^ But after examining the ground 
on his right he decided that it was impracticable to resume the 
assault upon the Round Tops, which were strongly held by the 5th 
Corps with the 6th in support. He therefore decided to assault the 
Federal centre. This attack was to be simultaneous with Evvell's 
against the extreme right of Meade's line. Lee had at first meant 
Longstreet to attack with the whole of his Corps. But upon 
Longstreet's remonstrance he allowed him to hold back the 
divisions of Hood and McLaws, in order to protect the right of 
the line from an attack coming from the direction of the Round 
Tops, and ordered him to form an attacking column with Pickett's 
and Heth's divisions (the latter now under Pettigrew's command), 
placed Anderson's division of Hill's Corps at his disposal, and 
gave Hill general orders to support the attack with further rein- 
forcements, if required. On the extreme left Johnson's division 
had been reinforced by two brigades from Rodes' division and one 
(Smith's), from Early's. But Lee's plan for a simultaneous attack 
upon the Federal extreme right and left centre was thwarted by 
the Federals themseJves assuming the offensive against Johnson. 

The position which Johnson had gained on the night of July 
2nd on Gulp's Hill not only threatened the Federal line of retreat, 
but would have enabled a strong column to break in upon Meade's 
right rear and capture the reserve artillery. It was necessary, if 
the safety of the Federal army was to be secured, that Johnson 
should as soon as possible be driven from his position within their 
lines. Preparations had been made during the night for attacking 
him at daybreak. Batteries had been placed in position, and 
Geary's division of the 12th Corps had been brought back from 
the left. As soon as there was sufficient light to distinguish 

1 The rest of the 2nd Corps had been employed on the 2nd in "patching" the line 
on Cemetery Ridge against Anderson's attack. One brigade had taken part in the 
repulse of Early. 2 White's Lee^ 310-11. 



234 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

objects, the Federal batteries opened fire. Johnson, owing to the 
difficult nature of the ground, had been unable to bring up any 
artillery, and seeing that it was impossible to remain where he 
was under the heavy fire to which he was exposed, charged uphill 
in the hope of gaining better ground and driving off the Federal 
batteries. The attack was gallantly made and obstinately resisted. 
For four hours a desperate engagement raged on the slopes of 
Gulp's Hill. But the inactivity of the rest of the Confederate 
army enabled Meade to concentrate an overwhelmingly superior 
force against Johnson. The other division of the I2th Corps was 
brought up and assailed his left flank, and a brigade (Shaler's) 
even was brought up from the 6th Corps on the left. Johnson, 
unable to hold his own against such odds, was driven out of the 
lines which he had occupied on the previous night, and forced to 
withdraw to his original position. By 1 1 a.m. the struggle for 
the possession of Culp's Hill was at an end and the battle of 
Ewell's Corps was over.^ 

All chance of combined attack had vanished, but Lee still 
determined to persevere in his attempts to break the Federal 
centre, though the chances of success were greatly reduced by 
Johnson's repulse. Longstreet's attack was to be made by two 
divisions, Pickett's on the right and Pettigrew's (late Heth's) on the 
left. Wilcox's brigade was to cover Pickett's right flank. Two 
brigades of Pender's division formed a supporting line behind 
Pettigrew. The charge was to be preceded by a tremendous 
artillery preparation. Nearly 140 guns were in position along the 
Confederate front.^ It was hoped that their concentrated fire 
would shake the Federal infantry and silence the batteries, which 
General Hunt, Meade's Chief of Artillery, had ranged along the 
Cemetery Ridge. The comparative shortness of the Federal line 
prevented more than seventy-seven guns being put in position to 
answer the fire of the Confederate artillery.^ 

By 9 a.m. the infantry divisions, which were to form the attack- 
ing column, were in position under cover in the woods behind the 
ridge.* But Longstrcet displayed the same reluctance to attack as 
on the preceding day. He had received his instructions soon after 
sunrise. The sound of the battle raging on Culp's Hill called him 
to immediate action. The artillery were ready to open fire by 
10 a.m.^ But for three hours Longstreet made no move. He 
believed that Pickett's charge was certain to end in failure and was 

1 Doubleday, 187. Lee in his Report says that Johnson retired to his original 
position about i p.m. Lee's Lee, 286. 

* The Confederate artillery was massed in two great batteries, one of seventy-five guns 
on the Emmetsburg road under Colonel Alexander of the 1st Corps, and the other of 
sixty-three guns on the Seminary Ridge under the command of Colonel Walker of the 
3rl Corps (3 B. & L., 362). 

•» 3 B. & L., 371. ■• White's Lee. 315. ' 3 B. & L., 362. 



July 3, 1863] GETTYSBURG 235 

reluctant to give the signal which should send so many gallant men 
to their death. 

At I p.m. the long line of Confederate batteries opened fire.^ A 
tremendous artillery duel ensued. Over 200 guns were hurling 
their projectiles across the narrow valley. Grand though the scene 
was, the damage done on cither side was but slight. The infantry 
were too well sheltered to suffer much loss. The chief result was 
that the Confederate batteries exhausted their ammunition before 
the infantry attack was made. 

Longstreet had entrusted to Colonel Alexander, who that day had 
been placed in command of the seventy-five guns massed on the 
Confederate right, the great responsibility of giving Pickett the order 
to charge, when he thought that the Confederate fire had produced 
sufficient effect. As Alexander could not see the Federal infantry, 
who were hidden from sight, the only way in which he could judge 
of the effect of the fire of his batteries was by watching to see if 
the Federal fire slackened. General Hunt, anticipating that the 
serious work of the day was yet to come, after thirty minutes' 
cannonade ordered his batteries to cease fire in order that the guns 
might have time to cool and that he might husband his ammuni- 
tion.- By this time Alexander had exhausted almost all his 
ammunition. The Federal batteries were ceasing fire, whatever 
the cause. He sent to Pickett saying, " If you are coming at all, 
you must come at once." Pickett turned to Longstreet and asked 
if he should advance. But Longstreet was too overcome with 
emotion to speak. He could only bow his assent, and Pickett 
ordered his men forward to the charge. 

The Confederate infantry swept over the crest of the ridge and 
advanced across the 1,400 yards of undulating ground which 
separated them from the Federal lines on Cemetery Ridge. ^ 
Pettigrew's division on the left had further to go, and though 
really continuing Pickett's line appeared to the naked eye to be 
moving in echelon to it. Half the distance had been covered 
before the fire of the Federal artillery became serious.* A battery 
stationed on Little Round Top raked the flank of Pickett's advance.^ 

It was just at this crisis in the struggle that the Confederate 
artillery failed to perform its part. Lee had intended that the 

^ 3 B. & L., 363. But one account gives 1.30 p.m. as the moment at which Long- 
street's order to open fire was received (3 B. & L., 362, note). 

'^ 3 B. & L., 364. There is a distinct difference of opinion as to the length of time 
devoted to the cannonade. Colonel Alexander states that the signal was given at i p.m., 
and that Pickett's advance commenced before 1..40 p.m. Other accounts represent the 
artillery duel as lasting for two hours. Doubleday, 189, says that the firing began at 
I p.m. and lasted till 3 p.m. The mistake may have arisen in the following way. Hill's 
batteries opened fire soon after 11 a.m. "Over a hundred guns were engaged and a 
tremendous roar was kept up for quite a time" (3 B. & L., 362). But Alexander's 
evidence is decisive as to the length of Longstreet's cannonade. 

2 White's Z^e, 315. ■* White's /f<?, 315. * Doubleday, 193. 



236 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

infantry charge should be supported by the artillery. In his 
official report, he says, " The batteries were directed to be pushed 
forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks and support 
their attacks closely." The ground was not unfavourable for the 
movement of artillery, being nearly level though slightly un- 
dulating with a gentle slope to the crests of the ridges. The 
strength of the Federal position lay in the stone walls, behind 
which their first and second lines of infantry were arrayed. 
Alexander had kept nine howitzers in reserve, which he intended 
to take in advance of Pickett's force up almost to within musket 
range. But when he wanted them he could not find them. There 
were fifteen or eighteen guns which still possessed ammunition, 
and these Alexander advanced behind Pickett's division. ^ But 
practically the Confederate batteries during the great infantry 
charge were silent. 

It was indeed a magnificent charge. Under a tremendous fire 
from both artillery and infantry the Confederates, without pausing, 
pressed dauntlessly on. A Federal brigade moving forward poured 
a destructive fire into the right flank of Kemper's brigade on 
Pickett's right. Unable to change front and powerless to defend 
itself against the deadly flank fire, the brigade crowded in on 
Garnett's brigade, which formed the left of Pickett's front line. 
For a moment the advance faltered. Then Armistead, who had 
been in the second line, rushed his brigade to the front, and with 
one final effort Pickett's division swept forward to the stone wall, 
where the first line of the Federal centre was posted, and carried 
it. Meade's line was broken in two. Pickett had won the crest, 
but when he looked round for supports, none were at hand. 

Beyond the first stone wall was a second with a second Federal 
line behind it, and between the two walls were some P^ederal guns, 
Armistead, waving his hat on the point of his sword, led a handful 
of determined followers on to seize the guns. For an instant the 
batteries were captured. But the heavy fire from behind cover of 
part of Webb's brigade checked Armistead's advance, and a 
desperate charge of two regiments, led by Colonel Hall, one of 
Hancock's brigadiers, drove the Confederates back behind the first 
stone wall.^ Pickett was obliged to order a retreat. The fury of 
the charge had spent itself. Pettigrew, on his left, had already 
fallen back. His division had had a greater distance to go, and had 
suffered very severely from the artillery fire.^ Wilcox's brigade on 
Pickett's right failed to render efficient aid. It would seem that 
Pickett in his advance, when within 500 yards of the Federal line, 

' 3 B. & L., 365. '■^ Doubleilay, 195. 

^ It is, however, claimed for Pettigrew's division that two of its regiments "made 
the first breach in tlie Federal works on Cemetery Hill, and were the only organised 
regiments that entered into and beyond the enemy's walls" (3 B. l\: L., 354). 



July 3, 1863] GETTYSBURG 237 

changed direction obliquely about forty-five degrees towards his 
left. This change of direction was not noticed by Wilcox, who 
kept straight on, and thus a broad gap was made between Pickett's 
right brigade and Wilcox.^ It was this gap which caused Kemper's 
brigade to be exposed to an attack on its right flank. Wilcox's 
flank was exposed also to a similar attack. He had not been 
ordered to advance till Pickett's division had already gone some 
distance : and finding himself exposed to a heavy cross-fire and 
being unable to see what had become of Pickett, he fell back. 

Wright's brigade was sent forward to cover the retreat, but it 
was only the disorganised fragments of the force, which had gone 
so bravely to the attack, that returned to the Confederate lines. 
In Pickett's division out of 4,500 men, 3,393 men were killed, 
wounded, or prisoners : of the fifteen regimental commanders, ten 
were killed and five wounded.'^ Of the three brigadiers, Garnett 
and Armistead were killed and Kemper wounded. Pettigrew's 
division sufi'ered nearly as severely, and the Federals claimed 
2,000 prisoners from it alone. ^ 

It had been expected by Lee that Longstreet would use Hood's 
and McLaws' divisions to make a vigorous demonstration against 
the Federal left and thus create a diversion, whilst Pickett was 
breaking in the Federal centre. But these two divisions took no 
part in the attack, being held in check by Kilpatrick's cavalry 
division, which, making a vigorous charge against Longstreet's right 
flank and rear, threatened the safety of his ammunition train.* 
Longstreet had also Anderson's division of Hill's Corps placed at 
his disposal for the purpose of attack. But only two brigades — 
Wilcox's and Wright's — took any part in the fighting : and only 
two brigades of Pender's division of the same corps were engaged.^ 
It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that Pickett's charge 
was robbed of whatever chance of success it had from want of 
proper support : and for that failure Longstreet, as having been in 
general charge of the attack, must bear the blame. 

When the fragments of Pettigrew's and Pickett's divisions 
struggled back to the Confederate lines, Lee set himself to work as 
far as possible to repair the disaster. He showed himself inde- 
fatigable in his efforts to form a new line, anticipating that Meade 
would follow up his success by a counter-attack. Fortunately, for 

^ Doubleday, 192. 

^ 3,393 is the figure given by Reyall. In 3 B. & L., 437-8, the loss of Pickett's 
division is given as 2,888, of which 1,499 were "missing." Reyall states Pickett's 
strength at 4,500 ; other accounts make it 4,900 (3 B. & L., 345-54). 

■* Doubleday, 197. Swinton, 361, speaks of 4,500 prisoners taken in all. 

* Doubleday, 198. Tlie Federal cavalry were in position by noon, but the actual 
attack was not made till after 5 p.m. (3 B. & L. , 393). 

' Perry's brigade of Anderson's division was also slightly engaged, having moved for- 
ward in support of Wilcox. White's Lee, 318. The two brigades of Pender's division 
(commanded by Trimble) were Lane's and Scales'. 



238 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the safety of the Army of Northern Virginia, Meade took no such 
step. 

Though it must have been plain on the 3rd that Lee was going 
to make a great effort to drive in the Federal centre, Meade made 
no attempt to organise a reserve force, which might in case of need 
be sent to the support of the menaced portion of his line. There 
seems no sufficient reason why Meade should not have brought up 
the 6th Corps and part of the 12th, after the repulse of Johnson 
from Gulp's Hill to form a general reserve in case the centre were 
broken. Such a force would have delivered a crushing counter- 
stroke after Pickett's repulse. To stand on the defensive without 
making preparations for dealing an effective counterstroke is to rob 
an army of any chance of gaining a decisive victory. It can hardly 
be doubted that an advance of the 6th Corps would have split the 
Confederate line in two. The ammunition of Lee's batteries had 
run very short, and there were barely sufficient troops left to hold 
the centre against a vigorous assault. But Meade had not risen 
above the conception of acting on the strict defensive. The repulse 
of Pickett's charge found him without any plan for a counterstroke: 
and it was too late, after that charge was over, to attempt to 
organise a counter-attack. The greatest opportunity that any 
Federal commander ever had of destroying the Army of Northern 
Virginia was lost.^ 

Though there was no active fighting on the main line after 
Pickett's repulse, a fierce cavalry encounter was being fought out to 
the right rear of the Federal position. When Johnson was driven 
from Culp's Hill and it was made plain that Ewell could not 
co-operate with I'ickett's long-deferred attack, Lee, in the hope of 
still creating a diversion on the P^ederal right, sent Stuart witii his 
cavalry to attack the right rear of Meade's army.^ Stuart had 
reached the scene of battle the previous day and almost immedi- 
ately after his arrival had been fiercely engaged with Kilpatrick's 
cavalry division, which had started to make its way round the 
Confederate left to strike its left rear. The timely arrival of Stuart 
obliged Kilpatrick, after a sharp engagement, to fall back and 
abandon his design. Now on the 3rd Gregg's division was on the 
watch to prevent Stuart in his turn assuming the offensive. Charge 
succeeded charge as fresh brigades were thrown in on either side. 
Neither could claim a victory, and the two opponents exhausted by 
the dcs()erate fighting fell back to their original positions. But 
before the combatants parted, Pickett's charge had been defeated 
and Stuart had been thwarted in the object with which he had 
made the attack. 

' Doulilcilay, 202-3. ^^^ ^^'^ n*^'^ ^' ^"^^ ^^ cha])ter. 

' If rickett's charge proved successful, Stuart would be in position to cut the Federal 
line of retreat by the IJaltimore road. 



July, 1863] GETTYSBURG 239 

The Federal loss in the three days' fighting at Gettysburg 
exceeded 23,000. The Confederate loss is estimated by Southern 
writers as over 20,000. Federal writers put it as high as 30,000.^ 

On the 4th the two armies were still confronting each other on 
the opposite ridges. Meade, however, had no intention of attacking 
Seminary Ridge. The great opportunity had been missed the 
previous afternoon, and he rightly judged that there was nothing 
to be done but wait until Lee retreated. On that morning the 
Confederate trains were started in retreat under the escort of 
Imboden's cavalry brigade. Progress was necessarily slow, as the 
trains when on the march covered fifteen miles, and a large number 
of prisoners as well as Confederate wounded had to be removed. 
The weather also was very bad, and the rain rendered the roads 
unfit for the passage of large bodies of troops along them. Meade 
at first imagined that the retreat now commencing was a device on 
Lee's part to lure him from his strong position and gave pressing 
instructions to the officers whom he sent out in charge of recon- 
noitring parties, on no account to bring on a battle. 

On the 5th, as there was no longer any possibility of doubt that 
the whole Confederate army was retiring, Sedgwick was ordered 
to follow in pursuit. After an eight-mile march he came up with 
Early, whose division formed the Confederate rearguard, but made 
no attempt to press him. On the 6th Lee's army reached Hagers- 
town (Map IV.), and his trains were at Williamsport. But the 
recent rain had swollen the river. A detachment sent from 
Harper's Ferry had destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters, and 
Lee was forced to wait till the river subsided. He took up a 
strong position, covering the river from Williamsport to Falling 
Waters, and skilfully entrenched himself. Meade, who had taken 
a different route, about twice as long as that followed by Lee 
through Frederick City and Middletown, did not arrive on Lee's 
front till the 12th. Lee had made the most of the six days' 
respite, and Meade was in no hurry to attack his formidable-look- 
ing lines. 

Urged on by Lincoln and Halleck to fight Lee before he could 
recross the Potomac, Meade devoted the 13th to a careful inspec- 
tion of his adversary's position, having made up his mind to 
attack on the 14th. But during the night of the 13th Lee 

^ The total loss of the Federal army was 20,003 (3 B. & L., 437). That of the 
Confederates is given as 20,451 (3 B. & L. , 439). Phisterer's Statistical Record gives 
the Federal loss at 23,186, the Confederates at 31,621. The Confederate accounts seem 
to have greatly underestimated their loss in prisoners. As for the actual strength of the 
two armies engaged at Gettysburg, Colonel fjenderson (ii. 616) gives the Federal force at 
93,000 and the Confederate at 70,000, an estimate in close agreement with that given in 
3 B. & L. , 440. The Comte de Paris gives Federals 82,000, Confederates 73,500 
(Doubleday, 123). Colonel Walter Taylor, Lee's adjutant-general, increases the Federal 
strength to 105,000 and reduces the Confederates to 62,000, 



240 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

succeeded in crossing the whole of his army, trains and all, over 
the river, and Meade found on the 14th that again his opportunity 
was gone. 

Lee's second invasion of the North had been even less success- 
ful than his first. There were several points of resemblance be- 
tween the two attempts. In the first the garrison of Harper's 
Ferry was captured : in the second a large part of Milroy's com- 
mand at Winchester was taken prisoner. In both campaigns Lee 
was forced to fight a battle for which he was not fully prepared. 
In that of 1862 the "lost despatch" to D. H. Hill found at 
Frederick City compelled Lee to stand on the defensive when 
a considerable part of his army was still far from the scene of 
battle. In 1863 the lack of information due to the absence of his 
cavalry obliged him to fight an offensive battle, which he would 
have gladly avoided. Because the Gettysburg campaign was a year 
later, the failure to win a decisive success was the more heavily 
felt at the South. The pressure of the Federal superiority in 
material resources and in numbers was slowly yet surely telling 
upon the Confederacy. On the same day that Lee was preparing 
to retreat from the Seminary Ridge, Vicksburg, the Gibraltar 
of the West, surrendered to Grant. Once more the Mississippi 
" ran unvexed to the sea," and the Confederacy was split in half. 

The loss of Vicksburg, combined with Lee's failure at Gettys- 
burg, must have convinced President Davis and his Cabinet that 
the sands of their Government were running out. Had Lee won 
a great victory in the North, the loss of Vicksburg might have 
been counterbalanced. But when he was forced to recross the 
Potomac, it was plain that the tide had turned and the highwater 
mark of Southern success had been reached. Lee had hoped, 
when he invaded Pennsylvania, to win a great victory which would 
compel the North to grant peace. It is because he failed to win 
that crowning victory that the battle of Gett)'sburg has come to 
be regarded as the turning-point of the war. And because it is so 
regarded a bitter controversy has raged as to the person at whose 
door the responsibility for the defeat must be laid. The general 
consensus of opinion at the South seems to lay the blame on 
Longstreet. 

It is true that his political conduct, after the war was over, 
alienated his former brothers-in-arms, and that they were only too 
ready to cast the stone at one whom they regarded as having 
proved himself false to the traditions of the South. Yet it must 
be admitted that there seems very good reason for making Long- 
street the culprit. Lee was not in any way bound to conduct the 
campaign in Pennsylvania on defensive lines. ^ He was going to 
fight a battle and win a great victory by whatever methods seemed 

' As Lonijslrccl seems to have tlioiight (? 15. i\: I,., 216). 



July, 1863] GETTYSBURG 241 

at the moment to be best adapted to that end. On July ist a 
severe defeat had been inflicted upon two Corps of the Army of 
the Potomac. General Hancock bears witness that when he 
reached the scene of battle that afternoon there was very little in 
the shape of organised resistance to be found on the Cemetery 
Ridge. He speaks of some 1,000 or 1,200 men as drawn up in 
position. These constituted part of the division which Howard 
had placed in reserve. Apparently the ist Corps and the other 
two divisions of the nth had been too severely handled to be 
reckoned of much service in defending the ridge. The four 
divisions of Ewell's and Hill's Corps must have numbered 17,000 
men.i Had Ewell pressed on with his victorious troops, the 
remnants of the ist and nth Corps must have been driven from 
the ridge, and Meade would the next day have been forming his 
five remaining Army Corps behind Pipe Creek. 

There is no question that Ewell missed a great opportunity on 
the afternoon of the ist. Yet it must be said on his behalf that 
Lee had left the question of pressing the attack to his discretion, 
and had charged him not to bring on a general engagement before 
the whole Confederate army was concentrated for the battle. 

The charges brought against Longstreet for his conduct on the 
two following days are of an altogether different kind. Admitting 
that the order to attack at sunrise on the 2nd was never directly 
given him, the fact remains that though the position was one in 
which (to use an expression of his own), " time was mightier than 
cannon balls," he postponed his attack until 4 p.m. The charge 
against him is not that he actually disobeyed orders — it was not 
Lee's habit to issue written orders to his chief subordinates — but 
that when he found that his commander had resolved upon a 
course of action of which he did not personally approve, he failed 
to render a whole-hearted and ungrudging support to his chief in 
carrying out the plan which had been finally adopted. Instead 
of getting his troops into position to attack at the earliest possible 
hour, which was a step he surely ought to have taken even without 
orders to that effect, he was arguing with his commanding officer 
at sunrise and trying to persuade him to change his plan. 

There is doubtless much to be said in favour of Longstreet's 
contention that it was better to manoeuvre than fight. But in 
estimating the charges brought against him, any argument on that 
point is quite beside the question. He had suggested an alterna- 
tive, which after due consideration 'had been rejected; and it was 
his duty loyally to carry out the plan on which his commanding 

^ Lee's Lee, 273. Fitzhugh Lee states that besides the troops of the nth Corps 
alUuled to by Hancock, " 2,450 men, the shattered remains of the ist Corps, were there 
too, and Buford's cavalry were drawn up on the plain, making a total of 6,000 troops." 
The I, coo or 1,200 men of the nth Corps were apparently one of Steinwehr's two 
brigades, the other having been pushed out to cover the retreat (3 B. & L., 288). 



242 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

officer had decided. There is no need to produce arguments that 
I.ongstreet did the exact opposite of what he ought to have done. 
Directed to attack with all the forces he then had up, he took it 
upon himself to postpone the attack for several hours until Law's 
brigade had joined him. An attack made before 7 a.m. (and it 
must be remembered that Longstreet's two divisions encamped on 
the night of the ist only four miles from the field, and that sun- 
rise in the beginning of July is about 4.30 a.m.) would have found 
less than 27,000 Federals on Cemetery Ridge.^ No attempt 
would have been made at all to hold Little Round Top, which 
was the key to the whole position. But Longstreet let hour after 
hour slip by, whilst the 5th and 6th Corps were marching on to 
the battlefield as well as two brigades of the 3rd Corps and the 
reserve artillery.^ And those precious hours were wasted because 
Longstreet was waiting for a single brigade to join him. One 
cannot but re-echo Lee's words, " If I had had Jackson at Gettys- 
burg I should have won the battle, and a complete victory there 
would have resulted in the establishment of Southern indepen- 
dence." The judgment is not exaggerated. Had Stonewall Jack- 
son been in command on the right wing, four Federal Corps would 
have been annihilated in the early hours of the 2nd, and Meade, 
with the remaining three would have had no alternative but to fall 
back and cover Washington. 

Gettysburg was for the Confederates essentially a battle of lost 
opportunities.^ The engagement on the ist was brought on by 
accident, but so far as it went was a victory for the Confederates. 
Had Ewell made the most of his chance there would have been 
no battle of Gettysburg at all; but Lee, with his army concentrated, 
would have encountered Meade on the line of Pipe Creek. Yet 
Ewell's hesitation proved of the utmost service to Lee, for it gave 
him a grand chance of destroying Meade's army in detail. But Long- 
street's obstinacy and procrastination robbed him of that chance. 

On both the 2nd and the 3rd Lee's plan of battle was to hurl 
converging columns on a central force. To achieve success con- 
certed action was absolutely necessary, but on neither day was 
any sign of it visible. On the 2nd Longstreet's refusal to attack 
till Law came up disarranged the whole plan of battle. The right 
and left wings fought quite separate engagements, and so fatal 
had been the effect of the long hours of delay, that on the left 
wing there was no concerted action between the divisions of 
Ewell's Corps. Johnson and Early fought independently, and 
Rodes did not fight at all. 

' White's Lee, 298. 

" Two divisions of the 5th Corps arrived with the Corps-Commander Sykcs as early 
as 7 a.m., but the third division was not up till noon (3 B. & L., 294). 
^ 2 IIen<lerson, 600. 



GETTYSBURG 243 

On the 3rd the chances of a combined attack on the Federal 
position were destroyed by the Federals themselves attacking 
Johnson on Gulp's Hill. But on that day Longstreet proved as 
hard to move as on the previous day. He allowed eight hours to 
elapse between the time when he received his orders and his 
attempt to execute them.^ And his method of execution calls for 
the gravest censure. Because he disapproved of Lee's policy and 
despaired of its success, he virtually washed his hands of the 
whole business. He resigned all responsibility to Pickett and 
Alexander, and made no attempt whatever to support the former's 
charge, thereby dooming it to inevitable failure. He preferred to 
prove himself a true prophet rather than a loyal lieutenant. 
Gettysburg was lost because " someone had blundered," and the 
blunderer was Longstreet. 



NOTE ON BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

The importance of the battle of Gettysburg justifies a brief examination 
into the causes of the Confederate defeat. Lee invaded the North in 1863 
with the purpose of ending the war by a decisive victory. He hoped by 
threatening the principal cities of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg the State 
capital and Philadelphia the second city in the United States, to force the 
Army of the Potomac to give him battle. He naturally would have pre- 
ferred to fight a defensive battle on ground of his own choosing, as he had 
a sufficient force to enable him to deliver a telling counterstroke. But if 
an opportunity presented itself of striking an offensive blow, it was within 
his discretion to make the most of it. 

There was no reason to apprehend any difficulty about subsisting his 
army in Pennsylvania, but the need of maintaining a sufficient supply of 
ammunition caused him to keep an anxious eye upon his ever-lengthening 
line of communications stretching all the way back to Staunton in the 
Upper Valley. 

A chance collision fixed Gettysburg as the battlefield. The position 
was not one which Lee would have deliberately chosen. It was too far 
away from the South Mountain, in case he should be obliged to retreat, 
and it was decidedly favourable to that army, which stood upon the 
defensive. 

Lee on July ist had a choice of three alternatives : he could either 
attack, retreat, or manceuvre. To retreat without a battle would involve 
a sad loss of prestige to the army fresh from the victories of Fredericksburg 
and Chancellorsville, and would have been an open confession of the weak- 
ness of the Confederacy. To manoeuvre was the course urged by Longstreet. 
But there were two grave objections to such a course. First, the absence 
of his cavalry rendered it extremely perilous to advance further into a 
hostile country in the presence of an army numerically superior to his own ; 
secondly, to manceuvre round Meade's left flank and place himself between 
^ Longstreet received his orders soon after sunrise. 



244 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the Federal army and Washington or Baltimore would not necessarily com- 
I)el Meade to fight an offensive battle ; whilst Meade's army lay unbeaten 
in his rear, it was impossible for Lee to attack either city, and such a 
movement, as Longstreet advocated, would expose his line of communica- 
tions, on which he depended for his ammunition. 

The necessity of keeping open his line of retreat similarly prevented 
him from standing on the defensive along the line of Seminary Ridge. 
In a "waiting game" the advantage must lie with the Federals. Accordingly 
Lee determined to attack. 

At the outset Fortune declared herself on his side. Ewell's failure to 
capture Gulp's Hill on the ist was really a stroke of good luck for Lee. 
It gave him an unique opportunity of crushing his foe in detail. Had 
Longstreet attacked at daybreak he would have found in his front only 
Geary's division of the 12th Corps, and by 5 a.m. that force had been 
withdrawn to the right and the Federal line from the left of the ist Corps 
was entirely undefended (the 2nd Corps did not get into position till about 
7 a.m.). But when once the Federal forces on Cemetery Ridge reached 
numerical equality, the disadvantage of Lee's position became apparent. 
His plan of attack was based upon hurling converging columns against a 
central position, and his own line was so drawn out that it was extremely 
difficult to ensure unity of movement. Probably Lee would have done 
better to contract his lines and to insist upon his left wing moving round 
into closer contact with his centre. As it was, Heth's and Pender's divisions 
of Hill's Corps, Rodes' division and Gordon's brigade of Ewell's Corps 
took no part in the fighting of the 2nd. 

On the 3rd, with Meade's whole army in position, the difficulties of Lee's 
task were immensely increased. To manceuvre, as Longstreet still advised, 
was impossible after the armies had been in such close contact. To retreat 
was almost as perilous as to attack. Supposing that Lee carried Cemetery 
Ridge, he could no longer hope to gain such a victory as had been possible 
on the previous day. His army was certain to be so fought out as to 
render an advance on Baltimore or Washington out of the question. But 
the bare fact of winning a victory on Northern soil might have a far- 
reaching effect. The spectacle of the Army of the Potomac driven from 
its position would strengthen the hand of the Peace party in the North, 
and might afford a convenient occasion for the intervention of European 
Powers. Lee had never disguised from himself the necessity of the weaker 
side taking great risks. In a mere struggle for existence the superior re- 
sources of the North must ultimately prevail. So he determined to con- 
tinue the policy of assaulting with converging columns with this difference, 
that the main attack was now directed not against the extreme left, but 
against the left centre of the Federal host. But Meade by driving 
Johnson's division from the position, which it had gained the previous 
evening on (Gulp's Hill, broke up the plan of a combined attack and threw 
the whole burden of tlie fight on the central column. 

It seems quite clear that the attack, as ultimately made under Long- 
street's supervision, was not carried out as Lee had intended. The 
" proper concert of action " on which he relied for success was conspicuous 
by its absence. A smaller force was engaged in the attack on the afternoon 



GETTYSBURG 245 

of the 3rd than on either of the two preceding days. Hood's and 
McLaws' divisions took no part in it, though it is plain that Lee expected 
from them, if not actual co-operation, at least a vigorous demonstration 
against the Round Tops. Hill's Corps had been placed at Longstreet's 
disposal. But four of its brigades were not utilised. 

In a second point, too, Lee's anticipations were in all probability 
grievously disappointed. It is not likely that he intended the great attack 
to be made by infantry alone. The slope between the two ridges was not 
unfavourable for the advance of artillery, and it is reasonable to suppose 
that Lee expected a large number of the guns in position on the Seminary 
Ridge to accompany the infantry column. He was not informed that there 
was a lack of ammunition on the fighting line, and at the critical moment 
when the advance commenced the Confederate guns stood silent. Had 
they been properly provided with ammunition (and for this failure Long- 
street, who was in general charge of the attack, must be held ultimately 
responsible) they could have been advanced into close action, and even 
had the horses been shot down they might still have been run forward by 
hand. 

Lee has sometimes been blamed for not putting some other ofificer than 
Longstreet in charge of the attack on the 3rd. But on the 2nd Longstreet 
had committed no open act of insubordination. Lee by Hstening to his 
arguments had condoned his delay. When once he got into action, 
Longstreet on that day, as on many another occasion, proved himself a 
hard and staunch fighter. Pickett's division was bound to form part of 
the attacking column on the 3rd, and to have placed it under any other 
Corps commander than its own would have been most invidious and almost 
certainly would have led to sectional jealousies. 

On the other hand, the general feeling at the North seems to be that 
Lee attempted the impossible, or as Ropes (ii. 352) puts it, "Lee seems to 
have been unable to discriminate between successes obtained against poor 
troops, and successes obtained against good troops — poorly led." 

But such a view seems to ignore the fact that Lee, after the battle of 
the 2nd, was committed to a renewal of the attack next day, if only to 
cover his retreat, and can only find ground for condemning Lee's decision 
to attack on the 2nd (the crucial point of the controversy) by accepting 
as satisfactory Longstreet's explanation of his own conduct on that day. 

Meade's conduct of the Gettysburg campaign has also been exposed to 
severe criticism. The main charge against him is, that he never reconciled 
himself to the adoption of Gettysburg as a battlefield, and on the 2nd was 
in favour of retreating even after the repulse of Lee's attack. Meade 
himself emphatically denied that he ever entertained such an intention. 
The evidence adduced in support of this charge rests chiefly upon the 
testimony of Generals Butterfield (Chief of the Staff), Pleasonton (Chief of 
the Cavalry), and Slocum (commanding the 12th Corps). It is sufiicient 
here to say, that the evidence of Butterfield and Pleasonton, even if abso- 
lutely accurate, merely shows that Meade was only taking justifiable pre- 
cautions in case military contingencies, as yet unforseen, should necessitate 
the withdrawal of the army, and Slocum's statement as to Meade's dis- 
satisfaction with the Gettysburg position at the Council of War held on 



246 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the night of the 2nd was not made till 1883, nearly twenty years after the 
battle. 

On the other hand, Southern writers have claimed that there is good 
evidence to show that the chief officials at Washington at any rale believed 
that Meade was only induced at the last moment to change his mind and 
hold on to his position on Cemetery Ridge in consequence of the capture 
of an important despatch by Captain Dahlgren. 

The second charge against Meade lies at the root of the Meade-Sickles 
controversy (3 B. & L., 413-19). Sickles, commanding the 3rd Corps, 
accuses Meade of having been so absorbed with his right wing, that he 
paid no attention to his left, and consequently in his ignorance of the real 
situation issued orders to Sickles impossible of fulfilment, and claims that 
it was his own action in placing his Corps on his own responsibility in 
advance of the rest of the Federal line, which alone prevented Little 
Round Top, the key to the Cemetery Ridge position, from falling into the 
hands of Longstreet. Meade blames Sickles for disregarding his orders 
and taking up a position, which exposed Little Round Top, the very point 
which, according to Meade, Sickles had been expressly ordered to occupy 
with his left. 

Finally, Meade is blamed for failing to organise on the afternoon of the 
3rd a counterstroke after the repulse of Pickett's charge. His critics point 
out that the losses of the 6th Corps, numerically the strongest in his army, 
only amounted in all to 242. In the light of that fact, Halleck's eulogy of 
Meade for having brought all his forces into action at the right time and 
place as no previous commander of the same army had done, seems some- 
what misplaced. Southern critics, with the notable exception of Longstreet, 
argue that, had Meade pursued the broken divisions of Pickett and Pettigrew 
with the 6th Corps and other available troops, he would have found a gap 
of at least a mile in the Confederate line, might have cut Lee's army in 
half and captured the artillery, which had exhausted most of its ammuni- 
tion. But so sound a military critic as General Hunt, Meade's Chief of 
Artillery, maintains that "to have made such a change to the offensive 
on the assumption that Lee had made no provision against a reverse, 
would have been rash in the extreme" (3 B. & L., 376). Whilst on the 
one hand it may be argued that the Seminary Ridge was no Marye's Hill 
to be held by infantry alone, on the other it must be conceded that Meade 
had sufficiently effected his object by repulsing Lee's attack, and that the 
defeat of an attempted counterstroke might have endangered the success 
already won. 

Doubleday throughout his narrative is distinctly hostile to Meade. 
This may, perhaps, be explained by the fact that on July ist Meade relieved 
Uoubleday of the command of the ist Corps, to which he had temporarily 
succeeded on Reynolds' death, in favour of Newton. There was also a 
decidedly cold feeling between Meade and Butterfield, who had been 
Hooker's Chief of the Staff. Meade took the first opportunity of getting 
rid of him. 



CHAPTER XVII 
THE CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI— VICKSBURG i 

Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi in l86i — The Mississippi opened from 
Cohimbus to Vicksburg — Fall of New Orleans — Farragut before Vicksburg — The 
Confederates fortify Port Hudson — Halleck suffers the initiative to pass to the 
Confederates — Grant obliged to stand on the defensive — Battle of luka — Battle 
of Corinth — Van Dorn relieved by Peniberton — Grant assumes the offensive — The 
first movement to the rear of Vicksburg — Choice of alternatives — Sherman starts 
down the river — The Confederate cavalry destroy Grant's line of supplies — Grant 
retires to Grand Junction — Sherman defeated at Chickasaw Bluffs — Sherman super- 
seded by McClernand — Capture of Arkansas Post — McClernand recalled to the 
Mississippi — Organisation of Grant's army — Unsuccessful attempts to get in rear 
of Vicksburg — The canal plan — The Lake Providence plan — The Yazoo Pass plan — 
The Big Sunflower plan — Grant prepares a movement on Grand Gulf — Porter's fleet 
runs past the Vicksburg batteries — Federal concentration at Hard Times — Pemberton's 
disposition of his forces — Attack on Grand Gulf — McClernand crosses the Mississippi 
— Fighting on May ist — Federals occupy Port Gibson — Grant determines to "cut 
loose " from his base — Grant advances — Federals occupy Raymond — Federals capture 
Jackson — Grant proposes to defeat the Confederates in detail — Anomalous position 
of J. E. Johnston — Pemberton disregards Johnston's orders— Battle of Champion's 
Hill — Federals capture the Big Black bridge — Pemberton withdraws his forces into 
Vicksburg — Pemberton again disolieys Johnston's orders — Grant's first unsuccessful 
assault— Grant's second unsuccessful assault — Grant commences siege operations — 
Johnston's feeble attempts to relieve Vicksburg — Fall of Vicksburg — Pursuit of 
Johnston — Fall of Port Hudson — Unsuccessful attempts to relieve Vicksburg from 
the West — The turning-point in Grant's career. 

IN order to appreciate the full importance of Grant's campaign 
against Vicksburg, which ended in the surrender of that 
fortress on July 4th, 1863, it is necessary to summarise briefly 
the operations which had taken place along the Mississippi since 
the beginning of the war. 

It was the general policy of the Confederate Government to 
stand on the defensive, not to aim at the conquest of the North, 
but to prove to the Washington Cabinet that it was unable to 
crush the South. Both combatants fully realised the importance 
of the Mississippi, and busied themselves during the winter of 1861 
with providing a fleet which might operate upon its waters. But 
the Confederates, seeing that their inferiority in mechanical re- 
sources and material appliances would prevent any naval force 
which they might be able to organise from coping on equal terms 

^ See Maps VI. and X. 
247 



248 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

with that of their opponents, proceeded to strengthen their position 
on the river by fortifying a succession of strong posts, which were 
intended to close the river to the Federal vessels. Their most 
northern post was Columbus, which in violation of Kentucky's 
neutrality had been seized by Polk early in September, i86i. 
I'^ulher down the river fortifications had been raised at Island 
No. lo and New Madrid and at Fort Pillow. Below Fort Pillow 
no favourable ground for fortification could be found until Vicks- 
burg was reached. New Orleans, at the mouth of the river, was 
defended by Forts Jackson and St. Philip : between these forts and 
Vicksburg no strong posts had been established on the river during 
the early part of 1862,^ 

General Albert S. Johnston, commanding all the Confederate 
forces in the West, at the beginning of 1862 held a line running 
cast and west from Columbus on the Mississippi to Bowling Green, 
thus covering the capital of Tennessee, Nashville. But the victory 
of Thomas at Mill Springs in January turned his right flank, and 
Grant's advance up the Tennessee and capture of Fort Henry broke 
through his centre. 

Johnston was obliged to abandon this line, and the capture of 
Fort Donelson on the Cumberland rendering it impossible to hold 
Nashville, he adopted as his second line of defence the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad. Fort Pillow, some eighty miles above 
Memphis, which was unsuitable for fortification, formed an 
advanced post on the extreme left of the line. The abandonment 
of the first line of defence led to the evacuation of Columbus and 
the capture by Pope of the Confederate forces in Island No. 10 
and New Madrid. An attempt to assume the offensive and crush 
Halleck's armies in detail resulted in a Confederate defeat at 
Shiloh and the death of Johnston. Beauregard, who succeeded 
Johnston in command, evacuated Corinth on May 30th. The 
abandonment of this second line of defence necessitated the 
evacuation of Forts Pillow and Randolph, and in a fierce battle 
fought just above Memphis the Confederate fleet was annihilated. 
The Mississippi was now open to the Federals as far south as 
Vicksburg. 

David G. Farragut, commanding a Federal fleet in the Gulf of 
Mexico, on April 24th ran past the batteries of Forts St. Philip 
and Jackson, and on the following day appeared off New Orleans, 
which was formally taken possession of for the P^ederal Govern- 
ment by General Butler on May ist. 

Pushing up the river without encountering any opposition, the 
advanced division of Farragut's fleet appeared off Vicksburg on 
May 1 8th. Farragut himself soon followed, bringing with him 

Twelve miles l)clow P'orl Pillow was a smaller work, Fort Randolph. No 
attempt was made to fortify Vicksburg till April, 1862 (Greene, 20). 



June. 1862] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 249 

some 1,500 troops under General Williams, As Williams pro- 
nounced his own force too small to be able to render any effective 
co-operation, it was decided not to attempt to reduce the place, 
and Farragut with part of his fleet returned to New Orleans and 
Williams with his troops to Baton Rouge at the end of the month. 
The fortifications of Vicksburg were at the time far from com- 
pleted. They had not even been begun till the latter end of 
April, and were not finished till the middle of June, and it was 
not till the end of that month that the place was adequately 
garrisoned.^ 

On June 25th Farragut again appeared before Vicksburg, having 
this time with him the whole of Williams' brigade, numbering 
about 3,000 men. Williams landed his troops on the west bank 
and commenced digging a canal across the peninsula opposite the 
town, and on the 28th Farragut with seven of his ten vessels ran 
past the batteries and joined Davis' fleet, which had come down 
from Memphis. It was quite plain that the navy could do no real 
damage to the batteries, and Farragut declared himself satisfied 
that it was impossible to reduce Vicksburg without a land force of 
at least 12,000 men.- On the night of July 15th Farragut ran 
back past the batteries in a vain endeavour to destroy a big Con- 
federate ram, which had taken refuge under their guns, and re- 
turned to New Orleans on July 29th. 

Encouraged by the failure of the Federal navy before Vicks- 
burg, Van Uorn, who had assumed the chief command there, 
detached a force to attack Baton Rouge, whither Williams had 
returned. The Confederates were beaten off with considerable 
loss,^ and then proceeded to establish batteries at Port Hudson, 
thirty miles above Baton Rouge, by which they effected their 
purpose of closing the Red River to the Federals. The possession 
of this river was of vital importance to the Confederacy, as by 
it supplies were brought from Western Louisiana, Texas, and 
Arkansas to the eastern shore of the Mississippi. The Con- 
federates were left in possession of the Mississippi from Helena to 
Baton Rouge, which was evacuated by the Federals shortly after 
Van Dorn's attack. Batteries had been established commanding 
the river at Port Hudson, Natchez, Grand Gulf, and Vicksburg, 
and a fort built some miles up the Arkansas River, from which 
gunboats could dash out into the Mississippi.^ 

On June ist Halleck was at Corinth with 100,000 men, but he 
made no attempt to follow up the advantage which he had already 
gained. Instead of initiating a vigorous campaign, which should 
have had for its object the destruction of Beauregard's army and 
the reduction of either Vicksburg or Chattanooga, he consumed 
five weeks in doing little more than slowly repair the railways. 

' Greene, 21. ^ Greene, 23. ^ August 5th. * Greene, 28. 



250 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

When he left for Washington to take up the post of General-in- 
Chief, the only offensive movement for which he had given direc- 
tions was an advance by Buell's army upon Chattanooga, and that 
movement was seriously hampered by the order that Buell should 
repair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as he advanced along 
it. Halleck's policy of inaction suffered the initiative to pass out 
of his hands into those of Bragg, who had relieved Beauregard of 
the command of the Confederate army. Bragg seized his oppor- 
tunity, and dividing his forces, with one portion of them assumed 
the offensive, and drew Buell after him in a stern chase to Louis- 
ville and the Ohio, whilst the other portion, consisting of Van 
Dorn's and Price's commands, was left to operate against Grant 
Van Dorn had been charged with the protection of the Mississippi 
whilst Price was guarding the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. 

Under Halleck's instructions Grant had no alternative except to 
stand strictly on the defensive and prepare as best he could to meet 
the blow, which he saw to be imminent. Price received directions 
from Bragg to keep Grant occupied and prevent him from detaching 
any forces to the aid of Buell. Price accordingly proposed to Van 
Dorn a joint attack upon Corinth, where Grant's largest detachment 
under Rosecrans was stationed. As Van Dorn's forces were so 
scattered that he could not at once take part in the proposed 
movement. Price determined to operate on his own account against 
Rosecrans, and on September 14th seized luka, to the east of 
Corinth.^ Grant saw an opportunity of crushing Price before he 
could be reinforced by Van Dorn, and directed a concerted attack 
to be made upon him by Ord advancing along the railway from 
Corinth, and by Rosecrans, who was to secure the roads by which 
Price could retreat west or south. Grant thus hoped to drive Price 
up against the river Tennessee and destroy him. But the co-opera- 
tive movement failed : there was some sharp fighting on the 19th 
on the Jacinto road between one division of Rosecrans' force and 
one of Price's divisions, and during the night Price withdrew his 
whole force by the Fulton road, which Rosecrans had failed to 
reach. Grant's attempt to deal with his enemy in detail had failed, 
and he was obliged to resume the defensive and wait for the next 
attack, which would now be delivered by the combined forces of 
the two Confederate leaders. 

On October 1st 22,000 Confederates were concentrated twenty 
miles north-west of Corinth.^ Van Dorn's object was to attack 
Rosecrans from the west and north-west and drive him back to 

' According to Colonel Sncad, Price's Chief of the StafT, that general, under pressing 
orders from Uragg, was preparing to march to Nasliville to join Bragg, when he was 
informed on the night of the i8th that he had been placed under Van Dorn's command, 
and was preparing to fall back in order to co-operate with Van Dorn against Corinth, 
when he was attacked by Rosecrans (2 B. & L., 730 2). '•' Greene, 43-4. 



Oct., i862] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 251 

the Tennessee, thus sundering him from the rest of Grant's army. 
This move, if successful, would probably oblige Grant with his 
other troops to abandon West Tennessee.^ Fighting commenced 
on the 3rd> and was in favour of the Confederates. Rosecrans was 
driven back for two miles into the line of entrenchments immedi- 
ately covering the town.^ But when on the following day the 
Confederates tried to carry these entrenchments and fight their 
way into Corinth, they were repulsed with heavy loss. The fight- 
ing in and around Corinth only lasted on the 4th for about an hour, 
and by noon the Confederates were in full retreat.^ Grant had 
hoped to intercept their retreat by sending Ord forward from 
Bolivar. But Rosecrans considered his soldiers too exhausted to 
press the pursuit, and Van Dorn's army was too strong to be held 
in check for long by Ord's small force. In this battle the Federal 
loss was 2,359: the Confederates gave theirs as 4,838, but probably 
it was much heavier.^ 

On hearing of Van Dorn's defeat. President Davis sent Lieu- 
tenant-General Pemberton to relieve him of the supreme command. 

The battle of Corinth is important as marking the point at which 
the wave of Confederate reaction began to recede from the Missis- 
sippi. About the same time Lee was forced to withdraw from 
Maryland, and Bragg's invasion of Kentucky was checked. In all 
the theatres of war the Confederates were again thrown on the 
defensive.^ 

At the end of October Grant had an army of 48,500 men,^ and 
he was encouraged by the promise of reinforcements and the repulse 
of Van Dorn from before Corinth to take the offensive. His own 
idea was to reduce Vicksburg by a movement against its rear along 
the Mississippi Central Railroad. Earlier in the year the advance 
up the Tennessee from Fort Henry to Florence had turned all the 
Confederate positions on the Mississippi from Columbus to Mem- 
phis, and he now hoped by a similar movement to flank Pemberton 
out of Vicksburg. Halleck, however, favoured a movement against 
Vicksburg by the river, and directed Grant not to repair the rail- 
road south from Memphis.'^ A discreditable intrigue was going on 
at Washington, by which McClernand, one of Grant's divisional 
commanders, hoped to gain from President Lincoln and the Secre- 
tary of War charge of an independent expedition down the Missis- 

^ Greene, 45. ^ Greene, 48. ^ Greene, 51. 

* Greene, 53, thinks that it may have exceeded 9,000. 

' Greene, 54. Rosecrans' force at Corinth was probably not less than 20,000 
(2 B. & L., 760). Rosecrans, in his account of the battle (2 B. & L. , 737-57), minim- 
ises the success gained by the Confederates on the 3rd, states that with one hour more of 
daylight he would have won a victory on the 3rd, and blames Grant for not following up 
the success gained and capturing Vicksburg. * Greene, 55. 

^ Halleck seems to have really been in favour of Grant's plan, but felt himself pre- 
vented from approving of it by the support which Lincoln and Stanton were giving to 
McClernand's counter-proposition (Greene, 61). 



252 THE CIVIT. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

sippi against Vicksburg. Grant, who was ready to take the field in 
the first week in November, was delayed by telegrams from Halleck 
which left him in doubt as to what he was expected to do and 
how far he could exercise control over the forces nominally under 
his command. 

On November 24th Sherman moved out from Memphis towards 
the Tallahatchee River, and on the 27th McPherson advanced south- 
ward from Grand Junction along the Mississippi Central Railroad. 
On the same day a force which had been brought across the river 
from Helena under General Hovey advanced towards Grenada. 

Pemberton, to meet Grant's advance, had nearly 40,000 men. 
The main body, about 24,000 strong, under Van Dorn, was near 
Holly Springs and Oxford, on the line of the Tallahatchee; a 
garrison of 6,000 held Vicksburg, and 5,500 were in Port Hudson, 
whilst a small force occupied Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, 
where Pemberton had fixed his headquarters.^ 

Pemberton did not consider that Van Dorn's force was strong 
enough to cope with Grant, and ordered him to fall back from the 
Tallahatchee and hold the line of the Yallabusha at Grenada. On 
December 5th Grant reached Oxford, whilst Sherman was a few 
miles to the north-west. His line of communications reached from 
Holly Springs to Columbus, a distance of 180 miles over a single- 
track railroad •} and he considered that it would be impossible to 
advance beyond Grenada and at the same time maintain his pre- 
sent line of communications. Having received on December 7th 
discretionary authority from Halleck to do what he thought best 
with his troops, he held a consultation with Sherman. 

Two courses were open to him : either to send Sherman back to 
Memphis, where he might organise an expedition to go down to 
the mouth of the Yazoo, land there, and attack Vicksburg in the 
rear, whilst Grant himself should hold fast the Confederate troops 
on the Yallabusha, and if they retreated, follow them up even to 
the gates of Vicksburg : or to concentrate his whole command at 
Grenada, establish a depot there, and repair the railway back to 
Memphis, and having thus secured a line of supplies to move 
against Jackson and the rear of Vicksburg.^ 

Grant decided in favour of the first course, because it would give 
the Confederates less time in which to bring up reinforcements. 
The course adopted depended for its success upon two things. 
Sherman's movement against Vicksburg must be a surprise, and 
Grant's force must be able to co-operate.* Neither of these con- 
ditions was fulfilled, and in consequence the first attempt against 
Vicksburg proved a failure. 

On December 9th Sherman started back with one division to 
Memphis, which he reached on the 12th. Out of the reinforce- 

' Greene, 62. '^ Greene, 63. ^ Greene, 64. * Greene, 74, 



Dec, 1862] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 253 

ments which McClernand had sent to Memphis, and the troops 
from Helena, he organised a force of 32,000 men/ with which he 
started down the river on the 20th under the escort of the gunboat 
fleet. 

On that same day, however, Van Dorn, who had started on the 
1 8th with all the cavalry in his army, about 3,500 in number, on 
a raid round Grant's left flank, captured Holly Springs and de- 
stroyed the Federal depot there. At the same time Forrest with 
2,500 cavalry was sent by Bragg to make a raid against the 
northern end of Grant's line of communications, and destroyed 
the railroad for sixty miles between Jackson^ and Columbus. 

These two destructive raids against Grant's communications 
forced him to retreat to Grand Junction and abandon all idea of 
co-operating with Sherman. He was no longer able to hold fast 
the Confederate force on the Yallabusha, and was unable to com- 
municate the fact to Sherman in time to prevent him taking his 
force up the Yazoo. 

Sherman's expedition reached Milliken's Bend, twenty miles 
above Vicksburg, before daylight of the 25th.3 One division was 
disembarked there to break up the railroad which runs to Vicks- 
burg from the west. The rest of the force continued on its way to 
the mouth of the Yazoo, ascended that river thirteen miles, and 
was then disembarked, being rejoined by the detached division on 
the 27th. 

Sherman's object was to gain possession of some point of the 
Walnut Hills (Map XL), which run south-west of Haines' Blufl" 
towards Vicksburg. Holding such a position he could supply his 
troops by water, and if he felt himself strong enough, could advance 
direct on Vicksburg, or else wait till Grant was near enough to 
give him a helping hand. But the success of the expedition de- 
pended upon its secrecy, and the Confederates had been receiving 
information of its progress through their spies ever since it started 
from Memphis. Pemberton was enabled, owing to Grant's with- 
drawal from his front, to concentrate 12,000 men in a very strong 
position against Sherman.* The latter made his assault on the 
29th, but was repulsed with considerable loss. The ground proved 
most unfavourable for any combined attack, being low land inter- 
sected by a number of bayous and swamps, with only five lines of 
approach to the bluffs.^ Most of the fighting on the Federal side 
was done by two brigades and one other regiment, less than a fifth 
part of the whole force.^ In this battle of Chickasaw Bluffs the 
Federal loss was 1,929, whilst the entire Confederate loss, including 

^ Greene, 73. 

^ Jackson in Tennessee (Map VI.), not to be confounded with the capital of Mississippi 
(MapX.). ' Greene, 73. * Greene, 75. 

' Greene, 76. Pemberlon's report says four (3 B. & L. , 463). ^ Greene, 79. 



254 THE CIVIT. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

that incurred in the skirmishing of the two previous days, only 
amounted to 187.^ 

After this repulse Sherman determined to send 10,000 men 
under cover of the night further up the Yazoo to make an attack 
upon Haines' Bluff. But the atmospheric conditions rendered 
this movement impracticable, and on January 2nd he re-embarked 
his troops and returned to the mouth of the Yazoo, where he found 
McClernand waiting to relieve him of the command. 

McClernand had been so far successful in his intrigues at Wash- 
ington that he had secured a secret order from the Secretary 
of War, authorising him to organise and take command of an 
expedition against Vicksburg for the purpose of opening the 
Mississippi. Sherman first heard from McClernand of Grant's 
retreat, and as no news had been received from Banks, who was 
expected to co-operate with Grant from New Orleans, it seemed 
plain that the operations against Vicksburg had, for the time 
being, come to an end. Accordingly, Sherman proposed^ to 
McClernand to make an expedition up the Arkansas River against 
the Arkansas Post. The reduction of this fort would be a great 
advantage to the Federals in their further operations against 
Vicksburg, as their vessels would be no longer exposed to sudden 
attacks from Confederate gunboats and rams dashing out of the 
Arkansas into the main river. 

On January 5th the whole force left Milliken's Bend and pro- 
ceeding up the Arkansas River for fifty miles on the evening of 
the 9th, came in sight of the Arkansas Post, a foursided bastioned 
work armed with seventeen guns and occupied by a garrison of 
5,000 mcn.^ 

On the nth the Confederates surrendered, as the artillery of the 
fort was no match for the heavy guns of the seven gunboats which 
accompanied the expedition. The total Federal loss was just 
over 1,000, but they captured the whole garrison and everything 
in the fort.^ McClernand, greatly elated at his success, now pro- 
posed to push on up the Arkansas to Little Rock and initiate 
a campaign in the interior of Arkansas in conjunction with General 
Curtis, commanding the Federal troops in that State, by way of 
creating a diversion for the troops operating in Missouri. 

On the 14th, however, he received peremptory orders from 
Grant recalling him to the Mississippi. Grant rightly feared that 
McClernand would try to carry out an independent campaign of 
his own, which would take off 30,000 men from the force intended 
for service against Vicksburg, and completely disarrange his plans 

* Greene, 79. In 3 B. & L., 471, the Federal loss is stated at 1,776, and the Con- 
federate loss, according to General Teniherton's estimate, at 207. General Morgan, 
who commanded one of the Federal divisions, considered that had Sherman managed 
the attack properly, Vicksburg would have fallen (3 B. & L., 462-70}. 

' Greene, B4. ^ Greene, 88. 



Jan., i863] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 255 

for the reduction of that place. He had already telegraphed to 
Malleck that " McClernand had gone on a wild goose chase" up 
the Arkansas and was promptly authorised by the General-in- 
Chief, who, for sound military reasons, disapproved of McCler- 
nand's independent command,^ to relieve McClernand of the com- 
mand of the expedition against Vicksburg, and either take it 
himself or hand it over to the next in rank. McClernand had no 
alternative but to return to Milliken's Bend, though he bitterly 
complained in a private letter to the President of Grant's inter- 
ference with what he had supposed to be an independent command. 

The failure of his operations at the end of 1862, and the instruc- 
tions of Halleck compelled Grant to adopt the river route for his 
next attempt against Vicksburg. By orders from the War Depart- 
ment his army was organised into four Corps under the command 
of McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson. Hurlbut's 
Corps — the i6th — was left to hold the line from Memphis to 
Corinth, and protect the railways running behind it to Columbus. 
The 13th and 15th Corps, under McClernand and Sherman, were 
at Milliken's Bend, and McPherson was directed to encamp the 
17th Corps at Lake Providence, about sixty miles above Vicksburg 
on the western bank. One of Grant's greatest difficulties was to 
find solid ground on which to encamp the different portions of his 
army. 

To move direct across the low lands of the Yazoo delta and 
strike the Yazoo above Haines' Bluff, thus turning the right flank 
of the Confederate position, was at that time of year impossible 
owing to the floods. Yet the only way to reduce Vicksburg was 
to get in its rear by turning either the right or left flank. During 
the months of February and March four unsuccessful attempts 
were made, two to turn the right flank and two to turn the left. 
Grant in his memoirs says that he never had much confidence in 
these attempts, but regarded them as worth making, mainly 
because they provided occupation for his troops and drew the 
attention of both the Governments away from another plan, which 
he himself considered to be the most likely to lead to success. 
This plan, which he ultimately carried out, was to move his troops 
by land from Milliken's Bend to some point on the river, well to 
the south of Vicksburg and then having crossed the river to 
operate against the railroad connecting Vicksburg with Jackson. 
But to execute this plan time was required : the troops could not 
be moved by land until the floods had subsided, and in the mean- 
time it was necessary to be carrying on some operations, if only to 
satisfy the demands of the Washington Government. 

Grant's first attempt was to cut a canal across the Peninsula 
opposite Vicksburg (Map XI.) and so turn the Confederate left flank 

^ Greene, 60. 



256 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

by landing an army on the east bank below Vicksburg. Sherman's 
Corps was set to work on the construction of the canal, which 
followed the line begun by Williams in the previous year, and 
continued to labour at it from January 22nd to March 7th.^ 
Grant, after a personal examination, satisfied himself that very little 
could be hoped for from this undertaking, as the southern outlet 
was commanded by batteries, which the Confederates had estab- 
lished below Vicksburg at Warrenton. A sudden flood on March 
7th drove the troops out of the canal bed and though the work 
was continued for two weeks longer by dredge boats, the batteries 
at Warrenton got their range so accurately that they had to be 
withdrawn and the whole scheme abandoned.^ 

The second attempt to turn the enemy's left was by means of a 
passage from Lake Providence through two bayous into the 
tributaries of the Red River, then down the Red River into the 
Mississippi and up that river to some point below Vicksburg. It 
would have been a long route covering some four hundred miles, 
but might have proved useful for sending reinforcements to Banks. 
The initial difficulty consisted in having to clear a channel through 
Bayou Baxter, a small stream running out of Lake Providence, 
which lost itself in a cypress swamp. The work of clearing this 
channel was very arduous, as the stumps of the trees had to be cut 
beneath the surface of the water. McPhcrson's Corps was em- 
ployed on this work throughout March. By the end of the month 
a channel navigable for boats having a draught of six feet was 
almost ready: but by that time Grant had determined to move his 
troops by land from Milliken's Bend.^ 

The first attempt to turn the Confederate right was by way of 
the Yazoo Pass (Map X.). The Pass is a bayou about ten miles long, 
running from the Mississippi nearly opposite Helena into the 
. Coldwater River. An expedition entering the Pass would descend 
the Coldwatcr into the Tallahatchee and Yazoo Rivers and reach 
Yazoo City, thus turning the Confederate right at Haines' Bluff. 
The distance to be traversed by this route was 7P_o_^miles.^ This 
had been the old route from Memphis to Yazoo City, but some 
years before the outbreak of the war a levee of substantial pro- 
portions had been built across the Pass as a protection against 
floods. The levee was cut on February 3rd by exploding a mine 
in it and the water rushed through to resume its old course.^ 

The next step was to clear the Pass of the felled trees, with 
which the Confederates had obstructed its channel. By February 
2 1 St the channel was clear into the Coldwater : and on the 23rd 

> Greene, 94. ^ Greene, 95. 

* Greene, 96, 97. In order to pet sufHcicat water in the channel, it was found 
necessary to cut the levee and let in the Mississippi. This was done on March iSlh. 

♦ Fiske, 216. * (;r(.ene, 97. 



March, i863] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 257 

Ross' division started from Helena, and making its way slowly 
through the Pass, reached the Coldwater on March 2nd.^ This 
expedition was accompanied by several vessels of Porter's fleet. 

Finding that the route was practicable, Grant sent orders to 
McPherson to hold his whole Corps in readiness for a movement 
through the Pass as soon as a sufficient number of transports could 
be obtained. The Confederates were kept well informed by their 
spies of the Federal movements. Loring, with 20,000 men,^ was 
stationed at Grenada to defend the Yazoo, and when news reached 
Pemberton that Federal vessels were entering the Coldwater, he 
sent orders to his lieutenant to proceed to the mouth of the 
Yallabusha. Loring constructed Fort Pemberton on the narrow 
neck of land which separates the Tallahatchee from the Yazoo.^ 
It was impossible for the Federal expedition to pass out of the 
Tallahatchee into the Yazoo, unless this fort were first reduced. 
On the nth Ross arrived before it : the floods which covered the 
ground in its front confined his operations to the naval forces. 
On the nth and 13th the gunboats vainly attempted to silence 
the guns of the fort."* As it was plain that further progress down 
the Tallahatchee was impossible, the expedition started to return. 
But on the 2ist^ it was met by Ouinby, one of McPherson's 
divisional commanders, coming down the Tallahatchee with one 
brigade of his division, and Quinby, as senior officer, determined 
to renew the attempt. 

The Federals reappeared before Fort Pemberton on the 23rd. 
Quinby, seeing that it was impossible to force a way past the fort, 
determined to move round to the east of it, to cross the Yallabusha 
by a pontoon bridge, and by thus cutting its line of communica- 
tions to compel the fort to surrender.® He had sent back to 
Helena for bridge materials, when orders reached him from Grant 
directing him to return with all speed to the Mississippi. It had 
been found impossible to provide sufficient light-draught vessels to 
transport McPherson's Corps by that route into the Yazoo, and 
the expedition was recalled in consequence. 

Whilst the expedition was in progress Grant, learning that 
Pemberton had sent troops from Grenada to the Yazoo, became 
alarmed lest overwhelming forces should be concentrated against 

^ Greene, 98. Mahan, 143, says the vessels entered the Coldwater on February 2Sth. 
^ "About 20,000 men (15,590 for duty)" (Greene, 100). 

* "The Tallahatchee sweeps sharply to the east, and then returns again, forming a 
horseshoe bend thirteen miles long, the two parts of the stream approaching each other 
so closely that the neck of the enclosed peninsula is less than a quarter of a mile wide. 
It is in this bend that the Yallabusha enters, the river then taking the name of Yazoo ; 
so that the works erected across the neck were said to be between the Tallahatchee and 
Yazoo, though the stream is one" (Mahan, 144). 

* A third unsuccessful attempt was made on the i6th (Mahan, 146). 
' Greene, lOi. Mahan, 146, says the 22nd. 

' Greene, 102. 



258 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Ross, and partly by way of creating a diversion for him, partly in 
the hope that he might find a route by which he could land a 
arge force on the banks of the Yazoo, below Fort Pemberton, 
gave orders for the Steele's Bayou expedition. This was the fourth 
and last of the unsuccessful attempts to gain a position in the rear 
of Vicksburg.^ The route lay up the Yazoo to Steele's Bayou, 
forty miles up it into a cross creek, thence into Deer Creek, thirty 
miles up it into another cross creek, called Rolling Fork, and 
through it into the Big Sunflower River. A voyage of fifty miles 
down the Big Sunflower would bring the expedition into the 
Yazoo River below Fort Pemberton, midway between Yazoo City 
and Haines' Bluff.- 

On March i6th Porter started up the Yazoo with nine war-vessels, 
and Sherman accompanied him with a force of four regiments. 
The chief difficulty which the expedition had to encounter was in 
the cross creeks, whose very narrow channels were easily obstructed 
by felled timber. The Confederates had accurate information of 
the projected movement, and sent a brigade of infantry and several 
pieces of artillery up the Big Sunflower.-' Porter, advancing slowly 
and with great difficulty, had almost reached the junction of 
Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower when, on the 19th, he found 
himself in the presence of the enemy.'* It was found impossible 
to push on under the fire of the sharpshooters, who swarmed in 
the woods, and at the same time the Confederates were seeking to 
obstruct his line of retreat. Porter, realising the gravity of the 
situation, sent back to Sherman to beg him to come to his aid with 
all speed. The infantry was brought by boat as far as the first 
cross creek, and then disembarked to continue the advance on 
land. They pressed forward as fast as they could, marching by 
night with lighted candles through the cane-brake, and arrived 
in time to secure Porter's line of retreat. But it was plain that 
further progress was impossible, and the expedition withdrew. 
On March 27th Sherman's troops were back again in their camp 
opposite Vicksburg. 

Having now tried and failed four times to place his troops in 
rear of Vicksburg, Grant judged that the time had come to put 
into execution that plan, in which from the first he seems to have 
placed his chief hope. He intended to move part of his army by 

* These different attempts were simult.ineous rather than successive. 
'■* Greene, lOj. 

' Greene, 105. It was not till the night of the I7lh that the Confederate officer 
commanding the district first heard, at his headquarters on Deer Creek, that the Federal 
gunLioats had entered that creek. He at once sent a battalion of sharpshooters and 
some artillery in a steamer down to Rolling Fork, and was lucky to get there before the 
gunboats (Mahan, 148-9). 

* The Federal expedition failed apparently to enter Rolling Fork. The dist-ince 
from Rolling Fork into the Big Sunflower is only four miles. 



April, 1863] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 259 

land to New Carthage (Map XI.), and make a landing on the 
opposite bank in the neighbourhood of Grand Gulf, some thirty 
miles below Vicksburg. Porter was requested to run past Vicksburg 
with his fleet, so as to co-operate with the land force in an attack 
upon the batteries of Grand Gulf. At the same time Grant pro- 
posed to open up a series of circuitous bayous from Milliken's 
Bend and Young's Point, and by that route to bring troops and 
supplies on flat boats and barges to his encampment at New 
Carthage.^ In order to fill the bayous with water a canal was to 
be cut from Duckport. 

This plan was full of danger : only success could justify it, and 
a failure to achieve success would probably mean the complete 
annihilation of the whole land force. Sherman, on sound military 
principles, was opposed to so desperate a venture, and advocated 
a return to Memphis and the recommencement of a campaign along 
the Mississippi Central Railroad. 

But Grant saw that the political necessities of the moment 
required an advance and would not permit of any movement 
which looked like retreat, and determined to carry out his original 
plan. McClernand's Corps led the way in the march across the 
Peninsula; and on April 6th the leading division arrived at New 
Carthage.2 By the 20th the whole Corps was concentrated at that 
point. 

On the night of the i6th Porter's fleet ran past the Vicksburg 
batteries. Seven warships and two transports safely made the 
passage ; one transport was lost.^ The attempt to open up a 
route by the bayous proved a failure, for a sudden fall in the river 
rendered the canal useless.* All the troops had now to march 
by land, and part of the supplies had to be brought past the 
Vicksburg batteries in transports. On the night of the 22nd five 
out of the six transports succeeded in running past the batteries. 
But on reaching New Carthage himself on the 23rd, Grant found 
that it was still surrounded by water and wholly unsuitable for 
the concentration of a large force.^ McClernand had already 
discovered a road which ran round a bayou and reached the river 
at Perkins' Plantation eight miles further down. This road was 
repaired and the cross bayous bridged, and on the 27th McCler- 
nand's Corps was assembled at Perkins' Plantation. But after a 
careful reconnaissance of the batteries at Grand Gulf, Grant and 
Porter decided that it would be too venturesome to try and reduce 
them from so distant a point (Perkins' Plantation being more than 
twenty miles above Grand Gulf), and that another point must 

' Greene, 109. 2 Greene, no. 

" Each warship was accompanied by a coal-barge secured on the starboard side. 
Two of these barges seem to have been lost (Mahan, 156), 
■* Greene, 114. ^ Greene, 115. 



260 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

be looked for further down the river, McClernand discovered 
another road running from Perkins' Plantation round a bayou to 
Hard Times, a hamlet almost opposite Grand Gulf. On the 
29th McClernand's whole Corps and two divisions of McPherson's 
Corps were concentrated at Hard Times and ready to cross the 
river.^ 

In the beginning of March Pemberton had stationed Bowen's 
brigade and four batteries at Grand Gulf. But he imagined that 
his right flank was the point most menaced, and also believed 
that Grant was about to retire to Memphis.'- Some of his troops 
were accordingly sent to reinforce Bragg, to whom nearly all the 
cavalry under the command of Van Dorn had been sent in 
February. When the passage of Porter's fleet below Vicksburg 
showed that the left flank was in danger, Pemberton despatched 
another brigade to reinforce Bowen. 

But Grant took measures to mystify his opponent. Steele's 
division of Sherman's Corps had been sent 150 miles up the river, 
\ and after disembarking had marched as far down as Rolling Fork to 
^ divert Pemberton's attention from the movement against his left 
flank. On April 17th Colonel Grierson with three cavalry regi- 
ments left La Grange (near Memphis, Map X.) and made a very 
successful raid round the rear of Pemberton's forces. Eventually 
he reached Baton Rouge on May 2nd, after having ridden right 
through the State of Mississippi and done considerable damage to 
the railways connecting Vicksburg with Meridian, and Jackson 
with New Orleans. His own weakness in cavalry prevented Pem- 
berton from keeping in touch with Grierson's force, and his in- 
formation of the strength and intentions of that force was 
necessarily defective. Grierson's raid distracted the attention of 
the Confederate commander at a very critical moment. On 
April 29th Sherman went up the river with Blair's division and 
eight gunboats left by Porter above Vicksburg, and made a 
vigorous demonstration against Haines' Bluff", which still further 
diverted Pemberton's attention from his left flank.^ 

On the same day at 8 a.m. Porter's fleet opened fire on the 
batteries at Grand Gulf (Map XI.), and for five or six hours kept 
up a fierce cannonade, whilst 10,000 troops of McClernand's Corps* 
embarked on such transports and flat boats as were available, and 
waited for a favourable moment for crossing the river. ]kit the 
fire of the gunboats failed to silence the batteries effectually, and 
the attempt to land the infantry had to be abandoned. They were 

' Greene, 1 15-16. McClcrnaml's Corps was taken down the river by the transports. 
MclMierson's divisions marched by land. 

* Greene, 1 18. 

' Sherman's demonstration occupied April 30th and May 1st. 

* < luirch, 160. Greene, I2J, says three divisions. 



April. i863] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 261 

disembarked, and during the night marched across the tongue of 
land facing Grand Gulf to De Shroon's plantation, three miles 
down the river. The fleet and transports also moved down the 
river during the night, and by dawn on the 30th the troops were 
re-embarking. The landing-place finally selected was at Bruins- 
burg, six miles below Grand Gulf, whence a good road led to Port 
Gibson. 

By noon McClernand's whole Corps, numbering 18,000 m.en, was 
on the east bank of the Mississippi.^ The bluffs, which at this 
point ran some three miles back from the river, were occupied 
without resistance, and Carr's division pushed on during the night, 
until about i a.m. a force of the enemy was encountered four miles 
out from Port Gibson, and the division halted till daylight. 

On the night of the 30th the Confederates had four brigades at 
or near Grand Gulf Pemberton, for the defence of the line from 
Vicksburg to Jackson, fifty miles long, had over 50,000 men under 
his command. But this force was very much scattered. Hearing 
from Bowen on the afternoon of the 30th that the Federals were 
crossing in force at Bruinsburg, he ordered his various detachments 
from Grenada, Columbus, Meridian, and other points to concen- 
trate with all speed at Jackson, whilst he himself went to Vicks- 
burg.'- 

Port Gibson was connected by a short line of rail with Grand 
Gulf, and its occupation by the Federals would compel the evacua- 
tion of Grand Gulf It was also the nearest point to the Missis- 
sippi at which the Bayou Pierre could be crossed. 

On the morning of May ist the Federals found themselves con- 
fronted by two brigades holding the two roads which lead to Port 
Gibson.^ To drive this force from his path Grant had the whole 
of the 13th Corps, and two divisions of the 17th were crossing the 
river and could be relied upon to render assistance later in the 
day.* The Confederates were presently reinforced by another 
brigade and a half-brigade,^ and held their ground stubbornly till 
nearly sunset, when their right flank was turned and the troops on 
both roads forced to retreat. The ground was very favourable to 

^ Greene, 125. 

^ Greene, 127. The four Inigades at Grand Gulf were Tracy's, Baldwin's, Green's, 
and Cockrell's (Cockrell was in temporary command of Bowen's brigade, whilst the 
latter commanded the forces at Grand Gulf). Of these four brigades Green's had 
moved out to Port Gibson on the afternoon of the 30th. Greene, 117, estimates the 
effective strength of Pemberton's forces at the end of March at about 50,000. But this 
estimate includes the garrison of Port Hudson, over 16,000 strong. By the beginning 
of May only 6,000 men remained in Port Hudson, the rest having been recalled to 
Vicksburg, and troops both from Beauregard in South Carolina and Bragg were on 
their way to Pemberton's aid. Grant (3 B. & L., 495) estimated Pemberton's strength 
at nearly 60,000. 

"* Green's and Tracy's. ■* Greene, 127. 

^ Baldwin's and three regiments of Cockrell's. 



262 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the side acting on the defensive, as the roads ran along ridges with 
thickly wooded sides, separated by ravines, whose dense under- 
growth was almost impenetrable. 

The Federals occupied Port Gibson on the morning of the 2nd, 
but the Confederates had destroyed the bridges over the two forks 
of the Bayou Pierre. Bowen abandoned Grand Gulf on the 2nd 
and determined to retreat across the Big Black River in order to 
keep open his line of communications with Vicksburg. He moved 
up the left bank of the Big Black to Hankinson's Ferry, where he 
found reinforcements from Vicksburg awaiting him, which raised 
the total Confederate force to 17,000 men.^ But the troops were 
worn out either with fighting or marching, and the retreat was 
continued, the river being crossed that evening. 

The Federals on the 2nd constructed a bridge over the south 
Fork of the Bayou Pierre and McPherson's division advanced eight 
miles to the North Fork and commenced to repair the bridge there.- 
On the 3rd McPherson pushed forward to Hankinson's Ferry. A 
Confederate rearguard had been posted on the left bank to protect 
the crossing. But McPherson pressed them so closely that though 
the Confederates made good their retreat across the river, they 
had not time to destroy the boat bridge. Grant established his 
base at Grand Gulf, whilst McPherson's divisions encamped at 
Hankinson's Ferry and McClernand's Corps at Willow Springs. 
The troops remained in bivouac for three days awaiting the arrival 
of Sherman's Corps and supplies of ammunition and rations. 

Grant's original plan had been, after securing Grand Gulf as a 
base, to send McClernand's Corps to reinforce Banks against Port 
Hudson, and after the reduction of that post to unite Banks' force 
with his own in the campaign against Vicksburg. But he now 
heard from Banks that he could not be ready to commence opera- 
tions against Port Hudson till May loth, and that his field force 
only numbered 15,000 men. To wait for Banks' co-operation 
would give the Confederates a month at least in which to 
strengthen their position and get up reinforcements, which would 
in all probability outnumber the force which Banks would be able 
to bring with him after the fall of Port Hudson.^ Accordingly 
Grant determined to act independently of Banks, to cut loose from 
his base at Grand Gulf, to strike at once at the rear of Vicksburg 
and cut it off from Jackson, and to feed his army off the country 
till he could get to the north of Vicksburg and establish a new 
base on the Yazoo. 

On the 7th the advance was resumed. Sherman had arrived with 
two divisions and a wagon-train loaded with rations. Grant's 

' Greene, 133. 

"^ The bridge over the north Fork was found burning, and the fire was put out. 

1 Greene, 139; 3 B. & L. , <^o\. 



May, t863] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 263 

general idea was to advance by parallel roads, keeping a careful 
watch upon the ferries over the Big Black River, by which his left 
flank might be threatened, and intervene between the Confederate 
forces concentrating at Vicksburg and Jackson, and defeat them 
in detail. The 13th and 15th Corps were moved forward so as to 
hold a line parallel to the railroad, as it ran through Edward's 
Station ; McPherson's Corps was thrown forward in advance on the 
right flank so as to reach Jackson as quickly as possible ; one division 
of the 13th Corps covered the left flank. 

On the 1 2th McClernand and Sherman, after sharp skirmishing, 
secured the crossings over Fourteen Mile Creek, which ran parallel 
to and seven miles south of the railroad. McPherson, moving 
towards Raymond, encountered about two miles from that place a 
Confederate brigade and two batteries.^ A sharp fight took place 
for two or three hours between this brigade and Logan's division, 
but when McPherson's second division reached the scene of fight- 
ing the Confederates, seeing themselves completely outnumbered^ 
hastily retreated to Jackson.'^ 

McPherson encamped that night in Raymond. Grant judged 
from the fight at Raymond that a larger force was gathering at 
Jackson than he had expected. He therefore determined, before 
continuing his movement against Pemberton's force collecting at 
Edward's Station, to concentrate his whole army against Jackson. 
It might prove too strongly held to be captured by McPherson's 
Corps unaided, and, if left in the possession of the enemy, would 
constitute a grave menace to Grant's flank and rear. McPherson's 
and Sherman's Corps were moved forward against Jackson by two 
roads coming into Jackson from different points,^ which McCler- 
nand's Corps followed, so disposed as to be able to support either 
line of advance. 

General Joseph E. Johnston, Commander-in-Chief of the Con- 
federate forces in the West, reached Jackson on the night of the 
1 3th. He found it garrisoned only by two brigades, one of which 
had been severely handled by McPherson on the 12th. Two more 
brigades were expected to arrive next day. But already McPher- 
son's Corps was on the railroad at Clinton, cutting off all direct 
communication with Pemberton ; Johnston despaired of being able 
to hold Jackson. He telegraphed to Richmond that he had arrived 
too late, and posted the two brigades behind entrenchments to 
hold the enemy in check and give himself time to remove the 
stores and valuable property in the town by train to Canton. 

About 10 a.m. on the 14th McPherson and Sherman moved to 
the attack. Sherman met with a very feeble resistance from the 

' Gregg's brigade from Port Hudson. ^ Greene, 143. 

^ McPherson moved by way of Clinton, and Sherman advanced through Mississippi 
Springs. 



264 THE CIVIL WAR LN THE UNITED STATES 

brigade which had been engaged on the I2th. On the other road 
a stouter resistance was offered to McPherson. The two Federal 
columns entered Jackson about the same time in the afternoon. 
Thirty-five guns, with a considerable number of prisoners and the 
possession of the State capital, were the fruits of a victory gained 
at the cost of only 300 casualties.^ 

Having captured Jackson and driven Johnston off the direct 
line of communication with Vicksburg, Grant next prepared to 
attack Pcmberton's force at Edward's Station before Johnston 
could come to his aid by circling round in a north-westerly direction. 
His task was made considerably easier by the differences of opinion 
existing between the two Confederate leaders as to the right course 
to be followed. 

Johnston held a very anomalous position. Towards the end of 
1862-he had been appointedCommander-in-Chicf of theConfederate 
forces in the West. As such he exercised a general control over 
the tvv^o armies under Bragg and Pemberton, the one operating in 
Tennessee and the other at Vicksburg.^ But it was impossible to 
direct the movements of armies so far apart with any satisfactory 
result. At the time that Grant was crossing the Mississippi John- 
ston was with Ikagg's army. Notified by I'emberton of the 
Federal movement, he sent him instructions to unite all the forces 
available and fight a pitched battle with Grant. 

Pemberton, however, took an entirely different view of the 
situation. He did not believe that Grant would be able to feed 
his troops for any length of time off the country, but expected 
that he would in a few days be forced to return to the river. He 
thought it probable in the meantime that a raid might be made 
against Jackson. He therefore ordered the reinforcements coming 
from Port Hudson and South Carolina to stop at Jackson, whilst 
he placed three divisions in line along the Big Black River from 
the railway bridge to Warrenton. 

When, however, it became plain that Grant could maintain his 
troops with supplies gathered on the spot, he ordered the three 
divisions to concentrate at Edward's Station, where he expected 
Grant to strike his first blow.* On the same day that Pemberton 
was concentrating at Edward's Station Grant, however, was march- 
ing with all his forces upon Jackson. 

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent an order to Pemberton 
to re-establish his line of communications and co-operate with the 
forces in Jackson in an attack on Grant's rear at Clinton. But 

^ Greene, 147-8. But Johnston, 177, says lliat the Federal reports exaggerated what 
was only a trifling skirniisli into a heavy engagement. 

' November 24th. 

' Johnston also was placed in command of Kirby Smith's department of East 
Tennessee. * Greene, 144-O. 



May, i863l CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 265 

Pemberton did not regard Johnston's instructions as definite 
orders, but only as advice, which it was in his own discretion to 
follow or reject. He considered himself as directly responsible to 
his Government for the safety of Vicksburg, and objected to taking 
any step which would leave it defenceless. Instead, therefore, of 
carrying out Johnston's orders he called a Council of War, and 
eventually decided to move against Grant's rear in the direction of 
Raymond and cut his line of communications.^ Thus, whilst 
Johnston was moving north-west, Pemberton was advancing south- 
east on a wild-goose chase against a line of communications which 
did not exist. 

On the night of the 15th Grant had massed seven divisions 
along a line eight miles long between Bolton Station and Raymond 
within easy supporting distance of each other, and two of Sherman's 
divisions had been left in Jackson to destroy the railroad and all 
public property. 

Pemberton made but little progress on the iSth,^ and on the 
following morning, having received another order from Johnston to 
join him north of the railroad,^ abandoned his own plan, and 
ordered his troops to countermarch to Edward's Station. But it 
was now too late : skirmishing had already commenced between 
the advanced guards of the two armies. The only course left to 
him was to arrange his troops in line of battle across the roads 
leading to Edward's Station, and await attack. Three roads led to 
Edward's Station, one from Clinton just south of the railway, and 
two from Raymond. Along the Clinton road Hovey's division of 
the 13th Corps was advancing, closely followed by McPherson's 
Corps, and on the two Raymond roads McClernand was moving 
forward with four divisions. 

Champion's Hill, from which the battle of the i6th (called by 
the Confederates the battle of Baker's Creek) takes its name, is a 
small hill, round whose eastern slope: the Clinton road runs to join 
the Middle road.* It was on the northern and eastern slopes of 

' The majority of this Council of War was in favour of carrying out the movement 
towards Clinton ordered by Johnston. But a minority, including the two senior major- 
generals, Loring and Stevenson, preferred a movement, the object of which was to cut 
off the enemy's supplies from the Mississippi. Pemberton favoured neither proposition. 
He was opposed to any movement which would draw him away from Vicksburg. Be- 
lieving that Johnston's plan for an advance on Clinton was impracticable, he accepted 
the movement towards Raymond, advocated by the minority, as the best way of carrying 
out the spirit of Johnston's order (Johnston, i86 ; Greene, 149, 150). 

■■^ His troops did not commence the march till i p.m., and only advanced three miles 
from their starting-point. They actually covered twice that distance, as they were unable 
to follow the direct road over Baker's Creek owing to a flood. 

' Johnston sent two letters to Pemberton on the nights of the 13th and 14th respec- 
tively. On the 15th at 8.30 a.m. he wrote: "Our being compelled to leave Jackson 
makes your plan [of a movement towards Raymond] impracticable. The only modet)y 
which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, and informing me, that we may 
move to that point with about six thousand" (Greene, 152). * Greene, 155. 



266 THE riVIT. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

this hill that the fiercest fighting of the day took place. Steven- 
son's division, reinforced by Bowen's from the centre, held the 
position for several hours against the attacks of Hovey's and 
Logan's divisions. But when the Federals were reinforced by 
McPherson's second division, he Confederate left wing gave way. 
Stevenson's division was completely routed, but Bowen's retired in 
better order. Loring's division, which formed the right of the 
Confederate line, had been holding back McClernand's timid 
advance along the two Raymond roads. If McClernand with his 
four divisions had displayed the same energy as the Federal 
leaders on the right, the whole of Pemberton's army would prob- 
ably have been annihilated. For McClernand could have swept 
Loring's one division out of his path, and intercepted the Confede- 
rate line of retreat.^ As it was, the left wing made good its 
escape, but Loring found his retreat cut off, and was forced to 
march south. Being unable to return to rejoin the rest of Pem- 
berton's forces, he ultimately made his way north and joined 
Johnston at Canton. 

The battle of Champion's Hill was the most important in the 
Vicksburg campaign : the Federal loss amounted to 2,408, and the 
Confederate was reported as 3,839 : twenty-four pieces of artillery 
were captured by the victors.- 

Pembcrton made his last stand at the railway bridge over the 
Big Black River. He had constructed a tite de pent in front of the 
bridge, and directed Bowen's division to hold it. It had been in- 
tended that Loring's division should hold the west bank, but 
Loring's division had disappeared. Stevenson's division was 
thoroughly demoralised, and in full retreat for Vicksburg. Con- 
sequently Bowen's division, which after its losses on Champion's 
Hill numbered less than 5,000 men,^ was left to hold a line of en- 
trenchments three-quarters of a mile away from the river on open 
ground without any supporting force on the further bank. It was 
impossible to defend such a position against the greatly superior 
numbers which the P'ederals brought up. 

On the morning of the 17th McClernand's Corps was leading the 
pursuit, and three divisions advanced against Bowen. The Con- 
federates made but a brief resistance, and fled across the river when 
the Federals charged. All their guns and one-third of the entire 
force were captured ; but the fugitives succeeded in destroying the 
bridge which had been previously prepared for the purpose.* The 

' Greene, 159-60. 

" Greene, 160-1. Johnston, 182, blames reinhcrlon for having; remained passive 
before a single P'edcraJ division (Hovey's) for alioiil five hours. In 3 B. & L. , 549, the 
Federal loss is given at 2,441. 

* Greene, 163. Hnwcn's division had been reinforced by one brig.ade from Vicksburg, 
but the whole force in the trenches did not make more than 5,000. 

* Greene, 164. 



May, i863] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 267 

fighting was over soon after 9 a.m., and the rest of the day was 
spent by the Federals in constructing bridges. On that day 
Sherman's Corps marched to Bridgeport, north of the railway, with 
the only pontoon train which the army had, in order to flank the 
enemy out of their entrenchments at the Big Black Bridge, if they 
offered a protracted resistance. 

During the 17th Pemberton withdrew all his troops into Vicks- 
burg, twelve miles distant, and posted them at different points 
along his line of fortifications. Haines' Bluff was abandoned. The 
position was rendered untenable when once the line of the Big 
Black was lost. Sherman was the first to cross the river with his 
Corps, and at daybreak on the i8th was pressing on towards Vicks- 
burg by the Bridgeport road. When he crossed the Benton road, 
and thus interposed between Vicksburg and Haines' Bluff, he sent 
a regiment of cavalry against the rear of the batteries at the latter 
place.^ The Confederates had already evacuated the post, and 
fourteen heavy siege guns were captured there. 

By the occupation of Haines' Bluff the Federals regained touch 
with the Mississippi above Vicksburg, and within a fortnight after 
cutting loose from all communications, Grant established his base 
on the Yazoo River at Chickasaw Bluffs. On the evening of the 
1 8th Sherman took up his position across the Graveyard road, 
extending his right towards the Mississippi. 

On the night of the 17th Johnston had sent orders to Pemberton 
to abandon Vicksburg and march to the north-east. He regarded 
the position at Vicksburg as hopeless, and his own object was 
now to save, if possible, the troops. Pemberton, however, instead 
of carrying out the order, whilst there was still time, summoned a 
Council of War, which decided that it was impossible to withdraw 
the troops in such a way as to preserve their efficiency as a fight- 
ing force, and sent word to Johnston of his determination to hold 
Vicksburg to the last. 

Grant hoped to be able to carry the place by a coup de main. 
He believed that the troops inside the fortifications were thoroughly 
demoralised by their successive defeats, whereas if he settled down 
to a deliberate siege, Johnston would gain time to collect an army 
in his rear, and he would himself be obliged to send for reinforce- 
ments. Accordingly on the 19th he ordered an assault. Sherman's 
Corps was the only one near enough to the enemy's works to carry 
out actively the order. The Confederates had had time during the 
17th and 18th to recover from their demoralisation, and fought 
well behind entrenchments. Sherman's attack was repulsed with 
considerable loss. 

Grant directed the attack to be renewed on the 22nd. All three 
Corps took part in this assault. In each case the ditch was reached, 

^ Greene, 166-7. 



268 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

and the l-'cdcral flacj planted upon the parapets, but they could get 
no further. A misleading report from McClernand caused Grant to 
order a second attempt to be made. But the result was only to 
swell the list of killed and wounded. The Federal loss in the 
assaults of the 19th and 22nd amounted to over 4,000.^ After 
the failure of the 22nd, Grant had no course but to commence 
siege operations. 

The Confederate position at Vicksburg was a very strong one. 
On the land side it was defended by 128 guns, and the water 
batteries were armed with 44.^ The nature of the ground lent 
itself very readily to the construction of defensive works. A 
ridge ran round Vicksburg, with its extremities resting on the 
Mississippi above and below the town.^ The ground was very 
broken, and the plateau was cut into deep ravines. The approaches 
to the crest of the ridge were few and difficult. To cover these 
approaches the Confederates had constructed redans, and at some 
points closed redoubts, and between the salients an almost con- 
tinuous line of entrenchments, eight miles long, had been made.* 

Besides pushing siege operations, it was necessary for Grant to 
raise a covering force to hold Johnston in check and prevent him 
falling upon the Federal rear. Reinforcements were promptly 
forthcoming. Ilurlbut sent up three divisions from Memphis: 
Schoficld sent one from the Department of Missouri, and Burnside 
two from the Department of the Ohio for temporary service with 
Grant. Over 70,000 men were collected round Vicksburg, Seven 
divisions were placed under the command of Sherman to form 
the covering force.* The Federal works covered twelve miles, and 
were armed with 220 guns arranged in 89 batteries." 

]?y the beginning of June Johnston had organised an army of 
over 30,000 men in the neighbourhood of Canton.'^ The Richmond 
authorities from the very beginning of the siege were constantly 
pressing him to attack Grant, and at almost any risk seek to 
relieve Bcmberton. Delay would only add to the disparity in 
numbers. But Johnston from the first despaired of saving Vicks- 
burg. He was not prepared to run any risks in so desperate a 
cause, and to all the suggestions made by his Government he 
brought forward grave objections. On other fields he proved 
himself a master of the art of defensive warfare : but in the 
Vicksburg campaign, where a bold offensive was necessary if 
Pemberton was to be relieved, he was unequal to the occasion. 

' Greene, 185. = Greene, 176. ' 3 B- & L-. S^i. 

* Greene, 175-6. * Greene, 193. 

* Greene, 197. Besides the 220 guns in position there was also a battery of heavy 
guns belonging to the navy (3 B. & L., 522). 

^ Greene, 190. But Johnston, 199, says on June 4lh that his forces numbered less 
than 26,000. 



June, 1863] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 269 

On June 21st Pemberton sent a message to Johnston, proposing 
that he should attack Grant to the north of the railroad, whilst 
the garrison tried to cut its way out on the south to Hankinson's 
Ferry. But no answer to this proposition was ever received in 
Vicksburg.^ On June 28th Johnston issued orders to his army to 
advance. Moving forward slowly and cautiously, on July ist it 
was within a few miles of Vicksburg, and the next three days 
were spent by Johnston in making cautious reconnaissances on 
the north side of the railroad to see if there were any points in 
Sherman's lines which might be successfully assailed. Finding 
none, he proposed to cross the railroad and repeat the same 
process on the south side. But on the night of the 4th he re- 
ceived news of the surrender of Vicksburg, and at once retired 
towards Jackson. 

Pemberton's position had been daily growing more desperate. 
The Federal gunboats prevented any attempt to escape to the 
opposite bank of the Mississippi : supplies were running short, and 
Grant's works were steadily approaching the Confederate line of 
entrenchments. On June 25th a mine was exploded on the Jack- 
son road with great effect, and another was exploded on July ist. 
On that day the Federal approaches were within from five to one 
hundred yards of the enemy's works-: and a final assault was 
fixed to take place on the 6th. But on the 3rd Pemberton, finding 
that his troops could no longer be relied upon to try and fight 
their way out, sent to Grant, offering to surrender. After some 
discussion as to the terms, the capitulation was effected on the 4th. 
The total force which surrendered was about 31,000 men.^ 

Directly after the surrender of Vicksburg, Grant despatched 
Sherman with two-thirds of his whole army in pursuit of Johnston.* 
Sherman pressed the pursuit with great vigour, and on the 9th 
arrived before Jackson, behind whose fortifications Johnston had 
placed his troops. Sherman proceeded to partially invest the 
place, knowing that Johnston was not likely to have sufficient 
provisions to stand a siege, and hoping to fall upon him as soon 
as he recommenced his retreat. But on the night of the i6th 
Johnston skilfully withdrew his troops out of the city across the 
river Pearl and was well on his way before the movement was 
detected. Further pursuit by Grant's orders was abandoned ; and 

' The last despatch received from Johnston in Vicksburg was dated June 22nd. 
Johnston, 195, says that this was in reply to Pemberton's despatch of the 21st. Greene, 
however, says that it was in answer to a despatch of the 15th. At any rate, it gave no 
definite instructions in regard to the movement proposed by Pemberton. All it says is, 
"I will have the means of moving towards the enemy in a day or two, and will try to 
make a diversion in your favour ; and, if possible, communicate with you, though I fear 
that my force is too small to effect the latter." 

■•^ Greene, 198. 3 Greene, 207. 

* Greene, 194. Sherman's force consisted of twelve divisions, about 48,000 men. 



270 TOE CIVIT. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

after destroying the railroads so effectually that for the rest of the 
war Jackson ceased to have any strategic importance,^ Sherman 
withdrew his troops to Vicksburg. 

The fall of Vicksburg was followed by the surrender of Port 
Hudson (Map X.). On May 24th General Banks with about 
30,000 men arrived before Port Hudson and invested the place, 
which was held by General Gardner with a force of about 7,000.^ 
Two attempts were made to carry the fortress by assault on May 
27th and June 14th. In both attacks the assailants were repulsed 
with heavy loss, amounting for the two days to nearly 4,000 men. 
On July 7th news reached Banks of the surrender of Vicksburg, 
and Gardner, being informed of the fact, expressed his willingness 
to surrender. On the 9th the garrison, which had been reduced 
to great straits for want of food, formally capitulated.^ 

The Mississippi was now open throughout its entire length to 
the Federals, and the main artery of the Confederacy had been 
severed. During the progress of operations on the east bank of 
the river the Confederate generals in the Trans-Mississippi 
Department had attempted by various diversions to relieve the 
pressure upon the two beleaguered garrisons. In June an attack 
was made by about 4,000 Confederates on the small force which 
Grant had left at Milliken's Bend to guard his trains ; but the 
attack was easily repulsed.* A more serious attempt was made 
by Lieutenant-General Holmes, who attacked Helena on the very 
day that Vicksburg surrendered, with a force of about 10,000 men.^ 
General Prentiss was in command of the Helena garrison, which 
numbered 4,000, and beat off the assailants with very heavy loss. 

The Confederate General Taylor, who commanded a force in 
the Red River country, also attempted a diversion against Banks' 
rear by threatening New Orleans, But this expedition had no 
effect at all on Banks' operations at Port Hudson, and Taylor was 
forced to retreat, when Banks came down the river against him." 

The fall of Vicksburg, coinciding with the retreat of Lee from 
Gettysburg, was the turning-point of the war, but it was also the 

* Greene, 196. ^ Greene, 22S. 

' "The garrison was literally starving. With less than 3,000 fannshed men in line, 
powerful mines beneath the salients, and a last assault about to be delivered at ten 
paces, what else was left to do?" (3 B. & L., 597, account of Colonel Ir\\in, Banks' 
Assistant Adjutant-General). 

* The Confederate force was J. G. Walker's division sent from Arkansas by General 
Kirby Smith, connnanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, and placed under the 
orders of General Taylor. 

* Holmes, in his report, returned his strength at 7.646. The officers (not included 
in that estimate) would raise the whole force to between 8,000 and 9,000. The Federal 
staff rated it as high as 15,000 (Greene, 234). 

" Greene, 231-3, admits that the situation created by Taylor's movement was a 
serious one, and that the general commanding at New Orleans wrote to Banks that he 
must make his choice between New Orleans and Port Hudson. Taylor's Destruction 
and Rtcomtruction, 1 40-7, gives a somewhat highly coloured account of this movement. 



July, i863] CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI 271 

turning-point of Grant's military career. Early in 1862 he had 
won the first great Federal success by the capture of Fort Donel- 
son. But more than a year had passed, and he had not added to 
his laurels. Other Federal generals had begun well only to fail 
afterwards disastrously, and a failure before Vicksburg would have 
been fatal to Grant's reputation. To win the success which he 
saw that the political situation required, he deliberately ran a 
great risk. Sherman counted the risk too great and advised 
against it. Halleck did his best to prevent Grant from carrying 
out his plan of campaign. At the moment, when on the morning 
of May 17th the Confederates were flying across the Big Black 
River, a telegram was handed to Grant from Halleck, which, 
despatched on the nth, directed him to abandon his operations 
against Vicksburg and go down the river to co-operate with 
Banks against Port Hudson.^ But Grant, when he cut loose from 
his base, at the same time freed himself from the interference of 
the Washington authorities. Therefore to Grant belongs the 
entire credit of the campaign which reduced Vicksburg. The 
methods by which he conducted that campaign to a successful 
issue deserve the highest praise. At the outset of the campaign 
on the east bank of the river Pemberton had a rather larger force 
than Grant.2 Yet the Confederates were repeatedly beaten on 
their own ground by the smaller army. Grant keeping his troops 
well in hand, succeeded in concentrating a superior force at every 
decisive point. At Port Gibson, at Raymond, at Jackson, and at 
Big Black Bridge the Federals had an overwhelming superiority 
in numbers. At Champion's Hill Pemberton did succeed in 
putting into line of battle 23,000 men, but Grant outnumbered 
him by nearly two to one.* Within eighteen days Pemberton 
was driven into the fortifications of Vicksburg with a total loss in 
fighting of over 10,000 men,* whilst the whole of Loring's division, 
8,700 strong, was cut off from him and took no part in the actual 
defence of the town. For eighteen days the Federal troops lived 
on five days' rations and whatever supplies they could find in the 

* 3 B. & L., 515, When Port Hudson had fallen, Grant and Banks were to conduct 
a combined campaign against Vicksburg. 

^ Greene, 136. He estimates Pemberton's force at over 50,000, and states that 
Grant began the campaign on the east bank of the river with about 41,000, and at no 
time prior to the siege had over 45,000 available. Grant says that on May '/th he had 
about 33,000 men, and that the enemy had a force of nearly 60,000. In 3 B. & L., 549, 
it is stated that the effective Federal force ranged from 43,000 at the beginning to 75,000 
at the close of the campaign. 

^ Grant's actual force in the battle of Champion's Hill was seven divisions, 32,000 
men. But two divisions of Sherman's Corps were within supporting distance. 

* Grant claimed to have captured over 6,000 of the enemy and to have killed and 
wounded as many more (3 B. & L., 519). Greene, 170, note, estimates the Confederate 
loss at over 8,000, but it is not clear whether he includes in that estimate 4,500 prisoners 
sent to Memphis. Apparently, however, he does, in which case Grant's estimate is a 
decided exaggeration. 



272 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

neighbourhood. A very important fact was thereby demonstrated, 
that it was perfectly possible for a Federal army in certain portions 
of Confederate territory to feed itself off the country. Sherman 
in his campaign of the following year showed how thoroughly he 
had mastered the lesson taught by Grant's campaign in rear of 
Vicksburg. 

[For a more detailed account of the naval operatioas during this caaopaign, see 
Cap. XXVI.] 



NOTE ON THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN 

The fall of Vicksburg led to a bitter controversy between General 
Johnston on the one side and Lieutenant-General Pemberton and President 
Davis on the other. 

Pemberton virtually maintained that it was Johnston's order of May 
13th that caused the disastrous battle of Champion's Hill and the 
consequent siege and fall of Vicksburg. He also reproached Johnston 
with underestimating the importance of Vicksburg to the Confederacy. 
Johnston asserts that the value of Vicksburg was gone, when once it was 
demonstrated that the Federal vessels could run past its batteries, and 
argues that it was Pemberton's failure to carry out either the letter or the 
spirit of all his orders that led to disaster. 

It is quite clear that Pemberton regarded himself as directly responsible 
to his Government for the safety of Vicksburg, and did not consider 
Johnston's orders as absolutely binding. Johnston, both on May ist and 
2nd, ordered Pemberton to concentrate his forces and beat Grant in the 
open field. Pemberton might have brought a superior force against Grant 
on May ist when the Federal army was crossing the Mississippi, or have 
attacked McClernand's and McPherson's Corps on the Big Black River, 
where they waited for Sherman from May 3rd to the 7th, or have fallen 
upon McClernand's Corps on the 13th, when the other two Corps were 
advancing on Raymond and Jackson. The order of May 13th Pemberton 
flatly disobeyed, and accepted instead the advice offered by a minority in 
his Council of War "in opposition to his (Pemberton's) previously ex- 
pressed intentions and to the subversion of his matured plans." Again, 
on the night of May 17th Johnston ordered Pemberton to evacuate 
Vicksburg, " if it is not too late," and march to the north-east. On 
receipt of this order Pemberton called a second Council of War. The 
unanimous opinion of this Council was "that it was impossible to with- 
draw the army from this position with such tnoral and material as to be of 
further use to the Confederacy." 

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Pemberton took upon him- 
self the responsibility of disobeying his superior oftlcer's orders with 
disastrous consequences. It also seems equally plain that Johnston with 
the forces immediately under his command had but little chance of 
breaking Grant's lines of investment and tliat a defeat with the Big Black 
River in his rear would have meant the loss of the whole of Mississippi 
and of Alabama. On the other hand, President Davis charged Johnston 



July, 1863] VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN 273 

with a grave military error in supposing that his assignment on May 9th 
to the immediate command of the forces at and near Vicksburg reheved 
him of the control over Bragg's army which he had exercised since 
November 24th, 1862. In effect, the President said that it was Johnston's 
own fault that he had not a sufficient force to break Grant's lines, because 
he neglected to call upon Bragg for reinforcements. From the first 
Johnston was opposed to weakening Bragg, who was confronted by 
Rosecrans with superior forces. He himself urged a concentration on 
the east bank of the Mississippi of Holmes' forces in Arkansas, a proposal 
which the President overruled. Convinced that the President would not 
allow troops to be drawn from the only quarter from which Johnston 
thought that they could be safely spared, viz. Lee's army in Virginia, he 
despaired of saving Vicksburg. In order to raise a sufficient force with 
which to extricate Pemberton from the position in which his own muddling 
had placed him, it was necessary to summon detachments from Bragg's 
army. Johnston knew that in the previous winter, when contrary to his 
advice, Stevenson's division was withdrawn from Bragg and sent to 
Vicksburg, Rosecrans had immediately seized the opportunity to march 
on Murfreesborough. He saw that in all probability to save the Mississippi 
it would be necessary to abandon Tennessee, and though it is probable 
enough that technically Johnston remained in control of Bragg's army, he 
rightly judged that the choice between two such alternatives could not 
be settled by a general whose whole attention was absorbed by one 
department, but must be decided by the Executive Government, 

The difficulties of the military position, great in themselves, were 
aggravated by the fact that there was no real confidence between Davis 
and Johnston, that there was a marked divergence of opinion between 
Johnston and Pemberton as to the methods of warfare to be adopted, and 
that the President was far more in sympathy with the views of Pemberton 
whilst endeavouring to put upon Johnston the responsibility for ultimate 
failure. The worst that can be alleged against Johnston is that he 
perhaps inclined too much on the side of caution, that he might have 
made a more strenuous effort to falsify his own predictions, and that he 
ought to have forced from the President a definite declaration of the 
policy which was to be pursued on political as well as military grounds 
under extremely critical conditions. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE STRUGGLE FOR EAST TENNESSEE 
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA ^ 

Enforced inactivity of the Army of the Cumberland — The Confederate position — 
Cavalry operations — Rosecrans' view of the situation— Rusecrans drives Bra^g into 
Chattanooga — Rosecrans jirepares to cross the Tennessee — The theatre of war — 
Rosecrans crosses the Tennessee — The Federals occupy Chattanooga — Rosecrans' 
l)erilous position — Bragg prepares to assume the offensive— Bragg attempts to turn 
the Federal left — Arrival of Longstreet — Battle of Chickamauga — Wood's fatal 
mistake — Rout of the Federal right — Rosecrans cut off from Thomas — Thomas, 
"the Rock of Chickamauga" — Losses of the battle— The Confederates invest 
Chattanooga — Reinforcements sent to Rosecrans — Grant jjlaced in supreme com- 
mand in the West —Rosecrans relieved by Thomas — Changes in the Confederate 
army — New line of supplies opened for the Federal army in Chattanooga — Sherman 
advances towards Chattanooga — Burnside at Knoxville — Grant's plan of battle — 
Disposition of the Federal forces — Thomas' opening success — Sherman crosses the 
Tennessee — Hooker's "battle above the clouds" — Sherman attacks the Tunnel 
Hill — Thomas attacks Bragg's centre — The Confederate line broken^Retreat of the 
Confederate army— Relief of Burnside — Importance of the battle of Chattanooga. 

THE Army of the Cumberland, after its victory at Murfrees- 
borotigli, did not resume the offensive for several months. 
The railroad from Nashville to Louisville had been greatly 
damaged by Morgan's raid, and the line forward from Nashville 
to Murfreesborough also required repairing. It was with the 
greatest difficulty that Rosecrans guarded his extensive lines of 
communication against the raids of the Confederate cavalry, vvho 
greatly outnumbered the mounted troops in the Federal army. 
If the lines of communication were to be guarded by a force 
mainly consisting of infantry, so many troops of that arm would 
be required for the purpose that there would not be a sufficient 
force left to carry on an offensive campaign.- 

In February Rragg had been reinforced by Van Dorn with the 
bulk of the cavalry of Pemberton's army. Rosecrans vainly urged 
his Government to send him additional cavalry, and when they 
turned a deaf ear to his appeals, proceeded to organise a brigade 
of mounted infantry. The Army of the Cumberland had little to 
hope for from the Washington Administration, because Rosecrans 
had lost Halleck's goodwill by his stern rebuke of what he 

' See Map VI. '' Cist, ij;. 

274 



i863l STRUGGLE FOR EAST TENNESSEE 275 

regarded as an insult. On March ist Halleck had written letters 
to Grant and Rosecrans promising that the vacant place on the 
major-generals' list in the regular army should be given to which- 
ever general first achieved a decisive success. Grant received 
the communication with characteristic silence. But Rosecrans 
denounced the proposition as unfair, because it made no allowance 
for the difference of opportunities, and as degrading, because a 
patriot and man of honour should require no additional incentive 
to make him do his duty.^ 

After his defeat at Murfreesborough, Bragg had withdrawn his 
army to the railway, which branches off from the main line at 
Wartrace and runs to Shelbyville. His right wing, under Hardee, 
was encamped near Wartrace, and the left wing, under Polk, held 
Shelbyville. Both flanks were protected by his very powerful 
cavalry force. On the right Wheeler had his headquarters at 
McMinnville, the terminus of another branch line, and on the left 
Van Dorn was in command with his headquarters at Columbia, 
on the Nashville-Decatur road. Bragg had also constructed a 
second entrenched line at Tullahoma, where he held a strongly 
fortified position to which he could retire if his front line should 
be broken. The two armies were about twenty-five miles apart, 
and Bragg's second line of entrenchments about twenty miles in 
rear of his first.- 

The operations on both sides during the first half of 1863 were 
of but minor importance, consisting mainly of cavalry expeditions 
against each others' lines of communication. Towards the end 
of January Bragg despatched Wheeler on an expedition against 
Fort Donelson, but the Confederate cavalry were repulsed with 
considerable loss. In March a Federal force, some 3,000 strong, 
marched from Franklin, where Rosecrans' right rested on the 
Nashville-Decatur Railway, to reconnoitre Van Dorn's front 
towards Columbia. This force suddenly found itself in the 
presence of 10,000 Confederate troops under Van Dorn himself 
The artillery and cavalry made good their escape, but nearly all 
the infantry were captured. In April Rosecrans organised a 
brigade of mounted troops for a raid against the Confederate 
depots in Georgia. Though a considerable amount of damage 
was done, and the Round Mountain Ironworks (about thirty miles 
south-east of Guntersville), one of the most important manufac- 
tories of war material in the South, were destroyed, the whole 
brigade was eventually captured by Forrest's cavalry.^ 

Both Grant and Halleck were anxious that Rosecrans should 
advance against Bragg to prevent him sending reinforcements to 
Vicksburg. Rosecrans, however, took a different view of the 

' Cist, 150. ■■^ Cist, 154. 

" For these cavalry raids, see Cist 140-7. 



276 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

situation. He considered that as long as he continued to occupy 
his lines at Murfreesborough, Bragg would keep all his army- 
united in his front, because the possession of Middle Tennessee 
seemed to the Confederates of sufficient importance to justify 
Bragg's whole army remaining inactive, until the Army of the 
Cumberland should resume its advance. If, on the other hand, 
he succeeded in driving Bragg from his works at Shelbyville and 
Tullahoma, then the Confederate general would be very likely to 
move westwards, at any rate with part of his forces, and reinforce 
Johnston, who was operating against Grant's rear, and thus the 
very object of the advance urged on him would be defeated. 
Moreover, if Grant's operations against Vicksburg proved unsuc- 
cessful, the Confederates in the west would concentrate against the 
Army of the Cumberland, and its commander preferred in that 
case to be as near as possible to his base. Bragg, for his part, was 
quite satisfied to remain where he was, so long as his presence 
there prevented Rosecrans from sending reinforcements to Grant's 
aid.i 

It was not till the end of June that Rosecrans resumed his long- 
interrupted advance against Bragg. The movement was to be 
made in co-operation with an advance of the Army of the Ohio 
under Burnside into East Tennessee against Knoxville. If Rose- 
crans was slow to move, he proved himself a strategist of great 
ability when the campaign was actually begun. His army had 
been organised by an order of the War Department into three 
Corps, the 14th under Thomas, the 20th under McCook, and the 
2 1 St under Crittenden. In February reinforcements had reached 
him under General Gordon Granger, which were formed into a 
reserve Corps under that commander. His plan of campaign was 
to make a feint with Granger's Corps and most of his cavalry 
against Polk's force at Shelbyville, whilst the three main Corps 
made a flanking movement round Bragg's right by way of Man- 
chester, a point on the branch line between McMinnville and 
Tullahoma, and within twelve miles of the latter place. 

The movement commenced on June 23rd, and met with complete 
success. In spite of the incessant rain, which rendered marching 
very difficult, the 14th Corps was concentrated at Manchester on 
the night of the 27th. On the same day some brilliant work by 
the Federal cavalry on the right revealed the fact that Bragg had 
abandoned his lines at Shelbyville. It remained to be seen whether 
Bragg would stand and fight at Tullahoma, or continue his retreat 
to the Tennessee.- On July ist it was discovered that Tullahoma 
had been evacuated, and the troops, which had been cautiously 
advancing for another flanking movement, were pushed to the 
front in vigorous pursuit. Bragg, however, safely withdrew his 
' Cist, 151-2, aaJ I Sheiiilan, 259. '^ Cist, 164. 



July, 1863] STRUGGLE FOR EAST TENNESSEE 277 

army, retarding the pursuit by destroying the bridges over the 
swollen streams. He crossed the mountains and took up a fresh 
position at Chattanooga on the eastern bank of the Tennessee. 
Rosecrans' operations so far had been brilliantly successful. In a 
nine days' campaign he had manoeuvred the enemy out of two 
strong positions and forced him to retire behind the Tennessee. 
He had captured eleven guns and 1,600 prisoners, whilst his own 
loss only amounted to 560 in all.^ 

The retreat of the Confederates across the Tennessee marked 
the close of the first stage of the campaign. Chattanooga, the key 
both to Northern Georgia and East Tennessee, was in itself a 
position of great strategical importance, and became the prize for 
which the two armies contended. But it was not merely for the 
possession of Chattanooga that Rosecrans fought : he recognised 
that his true objective was not any one position, however important, 
but the Confederate army itself, which he must, if possible, destroy, 
or at any rate decisively defeat. The problem which now con- 
fronted him was how to move his army across the Tennessee so as 
again to get within reach of Bragg's army. Once across the river, 
he could either invest Chattanooga or, if Bragg continued his 
retreat, could fall upon him and deal him a succession of heavy 
blows, before he could reach a place of safety. As a preliminary 
step to crossing the river Rosecrans commenced to repair both the 
railroads in his rear and also the line in his front to the Tennessee. 
This work took up some three weeks. When it was completed, 
Rosecrans established his new depot at Stevenson and set himself 
as rapidly as possible to accumulate the necessary supplies at that 
point. 

It had been the original intention of the Washington Government, 
that Rosecrans' advance against Bragg should be accompanied by 
an invasion of East Tennessee by Burnside's Army of the Ohio, and 
that the two armies should co-operate. On June 2nd Burnside was 
ready to advance from Lexington, Kentucky, with his two Corps, 
but on the following day was ordered to send large reinforcements 
to Grant's aid, and consequently his advance had to be postponed. 
Rosecrans did not consider that it would be safe to cross the 
Tennessee and outflank Bragg's left by a movement across the 
mountain ranges of Northern Georgia, until he knew that Burnside 
could provide a diversion by capturing Knoxville and securing 
possession of the upper valley of the Tennessee. Consequently 
he was obliged to postpone his forward movement across the 
Tennessee until Burnside was ready to co-operate. The delay was 
not in itself disadvantageous, as it would give time for the corn to 

^ Cist, 169-70. The Federal loss is stated at 570 in 3 B. & L., 637, note. Rosecrans* 
flanking movements were rendered comparatively simple by his superiority in numbers. 
He seems to have had 63,000 against Bragg's 46,000 (3 B. & L., 635-6). 



278 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

ripen, and also enable reinforcements to be brought from Grant's 
army, now set free from the siege of Vicksburg, to the Tennessee, 
and thus prevent Bragg from making any movement against the 
Federal rear on that flank. ^ 

On the other hand, it was plain that Bragg, having a railroad open 
to his rear, might be considerably reinforced both from Johnston's 
army in Mississippi and from the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Hallcck, at Washington, adopted the same faulty policy after the 
fall of Vicksburg as he had in the previous year after the occupa- 
tion of Corinth. Grant's victorious army was split up and dis- 
persed, and no reinforcements were sent to Rosecrans till after his 
defeat at Chickamauga. 

On August 1 6th Rosecrans moved forward from his headquarters 
at Winchester and Burnside advanced from Lexington. Rosecrans' 
plan of campaign was to feint at Bragg's right and lead him to 
suppose that he would cross above Chattanooga, whilst the main 
part of his army was crossing the river some distance below the 
town. In order to mystify Bragg as to the intended point of 
crossing, Rosecrans had spread his cavalry for 150 miles along the 
west bank of the river, and demonstrations were made at various 
points.^ Bragg was completely deceived, and concluding that his 
opponent intended to cross above Chattanooga, concentrated all his 
army at and above the town, leaving the lower crossings quite 
unguarded."^ 

For a proper appreciation of the difficulties with which 
Rosecrans had to contend, a brief mention must be made of the 
topography of the region in which he was about to operate. The 
general course of the Alleghany Mountains is from north-east to 
south-west. The Cumberland Mountains form the most westerly 
range of the great chain, and separate the upper waters of the 
Cumberland and Tennessee. On the eastern bank of the latter 
river a succession of parallel mountain ranges confronted him. The 
first range, which runs parallel and very close to the river, is known 
as Raccoon Mountain. Parallel to this range is Look-out Mountain, 
a hundred miles in length, and reaching the Tennessee about two 
miles south of Chattanooga. The valley between these two ranges 
is drained by Look-out Creek and is traversed by a railway branch- 
ing off from the main line at Wauhatchic and terminating at 
Trenton. East of Look-out Mountain rose Missionary Ridge, 
some forty miles long and running up to the river above the town. 
These two ranges enclosed the Chattanooga Valley, drained by the 

* Cist, 173. 

"^ Cist, 179. The main columns of Rosecrans' army were fifty miles apart 
(3B .& L., 668). 

' Bragg naturally expected that Rosecrans would cross above Chattanooga, in con- 
sequence of Burnsidc's advance upon Kno.wille. 



Sept., 1863] STRUGGLE FOR EAST TENNESSEE 279 

Chattanooga Creek, near whose mouth the town of the same name 
is situated. East of Missionary Ridge come Chickamauga Valley, 
drained by the West Chickamauga Creek, and Pigeon Mountain. 
Still further east rise Chickamauga Hill and Taylor's Ridge, 
drained by the Middle and East Chickamauga Creeks, Last of 
the series comes Chattanooga Mountain, and beyond it runs the 
railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, which formed Bragg's line 
of supplies. 

From Winchester Rosecrans commenced his movement across 
the Cumberland Mountains. The 14th and 20th Corps reached the 
river near Stevenson and Bridgeport, whilst the 21st Corps moved 
through the Sequatchie Valley and part of it appeared opposite and 
above Chattanooga, thus confirming Bragg in his anticipation that 
the crossing would be above the town. 

The movement across the river commenced on August 29th and 
was completed by September 4th.^ The 21st Corps forming the 
left of the Federal army occupied Wauhatchie. Thomas' Corps 
held Trenton, and the 20th Corps crossed to Valley End." Bragg 
finding the enemy on his left, determined to evacuate Chattanooga 
temporarily and concentrate his army in the Chickamauga Valley, 
with a view to falling upon the enemy's columns, as they emerged 
from the defiles of the mountains. He had called to his assistance 
Buckner's Corps from East Tennessee and had also received rein- 
forcements from Mississippi. He evacuated Chattanooga on the 
7th and the 8th September, and moved twenty-five miles south 
to Lafayette, where he covered the railroad and hoped to get a 
chance of defeating Rosecrans' army in detail. 

On September 9th Crittenden's Corps took possession of Chatta- 
nooga. After securing the coveted prize, it would have been wiser 
on the part of Rosecrans to concentrate the whole of his army in 
Chattanooga by marching his right and centre down Look-out 
Valley under cover of the mountain, and then having taken 
possession of the crests of Look-out Mountain and Missionary 
Ridge, to make Chattanooga his base for a fresh and deliberate 
movement against Bragg's army. Unfortunately, however, Rose- 
crans interpreted the evacuation of Chattanooga to mean that 
Bragg was in full retreat. He supposed that the Confederate army 
was thoroughly demoralised by its abandonment of one strong 
position after another. Bragg sent pretended deserters into 
Chattanooga, whose reports Rosecrans readily believed : and 
their false news was actually confirmed from Washington.^ He 
determined to press the pursuit without delay. Crittenden was 
ordered to leave one brigade in Chattanooga, and with the rest of 
his Corps move out along the railroad to Ringgold and Dalton. 
Thomas' Corps was directed through the gaps in Look-out 

1 Cist," 180. 2 jTjsj^e^ 261. 3 Fiske, 262-4. 



S80 THE CIVIT. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Mountain into McLemore's Cove, the valley in which the 
Chattanooga and West Chickamauga Creeks rise. The 20th Corps 
was ordered to advance to Alpine and Summerville. Rosecrans 
had in fact fallen into the trap which his opponent had set for him. 

It was not till September 12th that the Federal commander 
discovered his mistake. The appalling nature of the sudden re- 
velation was enough to unnerve the stoutest heart. From Ring- 
gold to Alpine, over a distance of fifty-seven miles, the Federal 
army was strung out in three main detachments, whilst at Lafayette 
lay Bragg with an army nearly three times the strength of any one 
of the isolated bodies, which seemed absolutely at his mercy.^ Rut 
Bragg signally failed to rise to the height of the occasion. Though 
his enemy had walked straight into the trap, he made no attem{)t 
to close it upon him. He was perplexed by the wide dispersion 
of the Federal forces, and bewildered by the sudden appearance of 
those forces at so many different points in his front.^ There was 
at the Confederate headquarters a singular ignorance of the enemy's 
movements.^ It is possible that during this part of the campaign 
Bragg was not well served by his subordinates. It would seem 
that but little love was lost between the commanding general and 
his chief lieutenants, and that the confidence of the officers and 
men in their commander had been rudely shaken by the uninter- 
rupted succession of reverses which had been experienced since the 
invasion of Kentucky in the previous year. Whatever the causes, 
the opportunity was lost* By the night of the i8th Rosecrans 
had succeeded in reconcentrating his army in the Chickamauga 
Valley, near Lee and Gordon's Mills. The long delay was due to 
the action of McCook, who, instead of marching, as ordered by 
Rosecrans, straight from Alpine through Dougherty's Gap into 
McLemore's Cove, withdrew his Corps over Look-out Mountain to 
Valley End and recrossed the mountain by Johnson's Crook and 
Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps into the Chickamauga Valley.^ 

This delay almost proved fatal to Rosecrans. For in spite of 
Bragg's failure to seize the opportunity, it compelled the Federals 

^ Fiske, 264. I5ragt; had been reinforced by two divisions (Breckinridge's and 
Walker's) of Johnston's army, and two more brigades were on their way, and Buckner's 
division had been called in from Knoxville. 

■^ 3 B. & L., 644. » 3 B. & L., 640. 

* ikagg made two attempts to defeat Rosecrans' army in detail. On the loth and 
nth he endeavoured to crush Negley's and Baird's divisions in McLemore's Cove. The 
failure of this movement he seems to have attiibuted to D. H. Hill, and specially Hind- 
man. Polk was ordereil on the 13th to concentrate against Crittenden, whose forces 
were at Ringgold and Lee and Gordon's Mills. Bragg was much dissatisfied with Polk's 
failure to carry out this manoeuvre. But D. H. Hill (3 B. & L., 641) says of Bragg's 
failure to defeat Rosecrans in detail : " So far as the commanding general was concerned, 
the trouble with him was : first, lack of knowledge of the situation ; second, lack of 
personal supervision of the execution of his orders." For a defence of Polk's f.iilure to 
attack on the 13th, see 3 B. & L., 663. * Fiske, 265. 



%:^ 



?^"^2^1s>^*^-^"'''^-- BATTLE OF -^i^"^'^'* 



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MtUtuut » C>. 



Sept., 1863] .STRUGGLE FOR EAST TENNESSEE 281 

to fight in the Chickamauga Valley instead of at Chattanooga, and 
also gave Bragg time to receive heavy reinforcements from the 
Army of Northern Virginia. Rosecrans was obliged to fight on 
ground which he had not selected, and against heavy odds. 

It was fortunate for the Federals that Longstreet's divisions 
were prevented from arriving sooner. As soon as the news of the 
evacuation of Chattanooga reached Richmond, Jefferson Davis 
resolved to reinforce Bragg from Lee's army. But the Federal 
occupation of Knoxville closed the Virginia and East Tennessee 
line to the Confederates, and Longstreet was obliged to take 
a roundabout route through the Carolinas and Georgia, and joined 
Bragg by way of Atlanta. 

Bragg, having failed to crush his foe in detail, determined to 
await the arrival of Longstreet's divisions, and then attack with 
his entire army. His plan of battle was to turn the Federal left 
flank, roll it back upon the centre, and cut Rosecrans' line of 
retreat to Chattanooga, On the iSth Hood, with three brigades, 
reported for duty, and was placed temporarily in command on the 
right. The movement across the West Chickamauga against the 
Federal left was ordered to commence on that day^ (see Plan). 
D. H. Hill, in command on the left, was to hold the enemy fast 
in his front, whilst the centre, under Polk, was to be in readiness 
to cross the creek at the points which the turning movement of 
the right wing was expected to uncover. The execution of the 
movement proceeded very slowly, and by nightfall only Hood's 
division and Walker's small Corps had crossed the river. 

On the 19th Bragg continued his attempt to turn the Federal 
left and gain possession of the roads to Chattanooga. But during 
the night of the iSth Rosecrans, realising Bragg's intention, moved 
Thomas' Corps to the extreme left and directed him to hold his 
position there, covering the roads to the rear at all costs, and 
promising to reinforce him if necessary with the rest of the army. 
The fighting was very sharp throughout the day. The Confederate 
attacks were made with great determination, but failed to achieve 
permanent success owing to the lack of concert which characterised 
all their efforts, Rosecrans kept bringing up fresh reinforcements 
to support his left, whilst the Confederate left was moved across 
the Chickamauga, and a considerable part of it was engaged in the 
battle against Thomas. The results of the day's fighting were, on 
the whole, favourable to the Federals, They had succeeded in 
repelling all the attacks of the Confederates, and at nightfall were 
holding the roads on their left in greater strength than at the 
beginning of the day. But Bragg was expecting further reinforce- 
ments : not all the troops actually on the field had been engaged 

^ D. H . Hill (3 B. & L. , 649) blames Bragg for not having ordered this movement 
on any one of the four preceding days. 



282 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

on the 19th, and with greater concert of action the Confederates 
could still hope to achieve their object.^ 

Late on the night of the 19th Longstrcet arrived at Bragg's 
headquarters, and two brigades of McLaws' division reached the 
battlefield during the night. Bragg now determined to make a 
fresh organisation of his forces. lie divided his army into two 
wings : the right wing, under Polk, consisting of Hill's and Walker's 
Corps and Cheatham's division, with Forrest's cavalry, and the left 
wing under Longstrcet, consisting of Buckner's and Hood's Corps 
and Hindman's division, with Wheeler's cavalry. Polk was directed 
to commence the attack at daybreak with Breckinridge's division, 
which had not been engaged on the previous day, on the extreme 
right, and the attack was to be taken up successively by the 
divisions from right to left. When the attack of the right wing 
was fully developed the left was to come into action, and a sweep 
to the left was to be made by the whole army pivoting upon the 
division which held the extreme left of the line. 

But Bragg's plan for concerted action again miscarried. Polk 
had not slept within his lines, and this caused much delay in the 
attack next morning.- Not till 9.30 a.m.^ did Ikeckinridge assault 
the extreme left of the P^ederal line, which he overlapped with two 
of his brigades. The P'ederal left was held by Thomas with his 
four divisions and one from either of the other two Corps. McCook 
commanded the right with his other two divisions, and Crittenden 
held two divisions in reserve near the point where Thomas' and 
McCook's lines joined, ready to reinforce either as might be 
required. Granger's reserve Corps was guarding Rossville Gap in 
Missionary Ridge through which the road from Lafayette to 
Chattanooga ran. During the night the P'ederals had thrown up 
breastworks of logs and rails. Sheltered behind these, Thomas 
repulsed the successive assaults of Polk's wing. Gradually the 
tide of battle rolled from the Confederate right to the left wing, 

^ On the Confederate side Hindinaji's, Breckinridge's, and Preston's divisions had not 
been engaged. Rosecrans had put in all but two brigades of Thomas', McCook's, and 
Crittenden s Corps. Granger's Corps was held in reserve throughout the 19th (3 B. & L., 

652). 

^ Bragg told D. H. Hill that he had " found Polk after sunrise sitting down reading 
a newspaper at .Mexander's Bridge, two miles from the line of battle" (3 B. & L. , 653). 
But General Polk's son denies the charge, and states that though his father slept at 
Alexander's Bridge, he was on the line of Itattle at sunrise, where he remained and lirst 
met Bragg. According to General Polk's account, the blame for the delay rests with 
D. H. Hill. Polk at mi<lnight sent Hill an order to attack at sunrise, but Hill could 
not be found. A second order, issued at 5.30 a.m. to Hill's divisicm commanders, 
directing them to attack as soon as possible, was received by Hill himself about 6. 15 
a.m. Hill rejilie.l that his men were gelting their rations, and woul.l not be ready to 
move for an hour or more (3 B. <!\: L., 662). Hill declares that the first order which 
he received from Polk was at 7.25 a.m., and that he had received no intimation of the 
intende'l attack at daylight, and that therefore his troops were not rea'ly. 

* Skirmishing commenced about an hour earlier. 



Sept 20, 1S63] CHICKAMAUGA 283 

where Longstreet had been for several hours waiting the signal 
to attack. 

The Federal right had been much weakened in order to rein- 
force Thomas. Negley's division ^ had been ordered to the left 
and its place filled by Wood's division of Crittenden's Corps. 
Just before Longstreet's attack was made Wood, misinterpreting 
an order, had withdrawn his division and marched it to the left to 
support Thomas' right rear.'^ One brigade was hastily thrown into 
the gap.^ But before the Federal line could be closed up, Long- 
street's attack struck it with crushing force. This assault was made 
with Hood's column of eight brigades.* Two other brigades of 
Sheridan's division, which had started towards the left in answer to 
Thomas' call for reinforcements, were hastily recalled, but were 
only in time to share the general rout of the right wing. Six 
Federal brigades were swept off the field.^ Forty pieces of 
artillery fell into the hands of the Confederates,® and Rosecrans' 
army was cut in two. 

Rosecrans at the moment of Longstreet's assault was on the 
Federal right, giving instructions to McCook to close up his line. 
He now found himself cut off from Thomas' position, and with 
his Chief of the Staffs hurried back to Rossville. After a brief 
consultation, as the news from the left seemed to point to its 
speedy defeat, Rosecrans decided to return to Chattanooga and 
make the necessary preparations for receiving his beaten army and 
posting it to the best advantage, whilst the Chief of the Staff 
made his way to the front and rejoined Thomas. 

Soon after reaching Chattanooga Rosecrans was joined by 
McCook and Crittenden, who had been swept away in the rout of 
the right wing. The brigades of this wing retreated by the Dry 
Valley road, were re-formed on the west side of Missionary Ridge, 
and marched to Rossville. 

Thomas was now the only Corps commander left upon the field 
on the Federal side, and it seemed as if he too must soon be over- 
whelmed. But, as before at Murfreesborough,so now, Thomas showed 
himself possessed of extraordinary staying powers as a fighter, his 
breastworks proved of sterling value, and the attacks of both wings 
of the Confederate army failed to drive him from his position, 

Longstreet, as soon as he had broken the enemy's front, stopped 
the wheel to the left, as that movement was rendered useless by 

' Negley's division of Thomas' Corps formed the extreme riglit of the left wing. 
It was now ordered to the extreme left, but only two brigades reached the designated 
position. The third brigade with Negley himself "drifted away from the field to 
Rossville " (3 B. & L., 670). 

^ For Wood's mistake, see note at end of chapter. 

» Of Sheridan's division. ^ 3 B. & L., 657. 

' The six brigades, says D. H. Hill, consisted of the three of Sheridan's division, 
two of Davis', and one of Van Cleve's. (Cist, 211.) * Cist, 207. 

^ Garfield, afterwards President of the United States. 



284 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the failure of Polk to break Thomas' line, and swung his troops 
round to the right, thus forming a new line almost perpendicular 
to the old. Whilst thus engaged, he was summoned to Bragg's 
side. He urged him to abandon the offensive movement of his 
right wing, and whilst holding it on the defensive, to draw off from 
it as many troops as could be spared to reinforce the left wing. 
But Bragg was in no mood to listen to suggestions from a sub- 
ordinate : without apparently giving Longstreet any instructions, 
he rode off to the right wing and prepared to renew his attack 
against Thomas' left. Longstreet found himself obliged to fight 
a separate battle against Thomas' right. 

On discovering the rout of the right wing, Thomas had posted 
his reserve division under Brannan and Wood's division, which had 
just joined him from the right, along the crest of a commanding 
ridge, known as Horseshoe Ridge, almost at right angles with the 
line of log works, which he still held against Polk's wing. By 
holding this ridge he prevented Longstreet turning his right and 
cutting him off from Rossville Gap. Longstreet attacked the ridge 
with two of his divisions (Johnson's and Hindman's), and brought 
up from the extreme left another division (Preston's), which had 
taken but little part so far in the fighting. General Granger from 
his position near Rossville, judging from the sound of increasing 
firing on the right that Thomas was hard pressed in that quarter, 
without waiting for any orders, moved with two brigades to the 
threatened point and took up his position at the extreme right of 
the ridge. He arrived just in time to repel a furious assault made 
by three of Longstreet's divisions (Johnson's, Hindman's, McLaws') 
against the Federal right flank. Although Longstreet renewed 
the attack with all the available troops of his wing, at nightfall the 
Horseshoe Ridge was still held by the gallant soldiers of Granger's, 
Wood's, and Brannan's divisions. P'or nearly six hours Thomas' 
right had held its ground against the repeated attacks of Long- 
street's wing, and the last assault was hurled back with fixed 
bayonets and rifle-butts, as the ammunition of the defenders was 
almost completely exhausted. On the Confederate right two 
movements were made in the course of the afternoon, but were 
easily repulsed. 

After dark Thomas withdrew his troops to Rossville, where a 
strong position was taken up. So skilfully was the retirement 
conducted, that Bragg was not aware of it until the following morn- 
ing. Throughout the 2ist Thomas held his position at Rossville 
Gap, in order to secure time for Rosecrans to put Chattanooga 
into a state of defence, and the same evening withdrew his forces 
unmolested into the town.^ 

' For a more detailed account of certain phasei of the battle of Chickamauga, see note 
at end of chapter. 



Sept. 20, 1863] CHICKAMAUGA 285 

The battle of Chickamauga was one of the fiercest and bloodiest 
in the war. The Federal force engaged was between 55POO ^.nd 
60,000, and their losses amounted to over 16,000. On the Con- 
federate side between 60,000 and 70,000 men took part in the 
battle, and their losses probably exceeded 20,000.^ The fruits of 
the victory remained with the Confederates in the shape of some 
forty guns and the possession of the battlefield. But the victory 
in itself was a barren one. It is probable that if Rosecrans, instead 
of returning to Chattanooga, had gone forward to Thomas and 
had seen for himself the condition of affairs, the order to retire to 
Rossville would never have been given. 

The Confederate leaders were in doubt as to the best method of 
following up their victory. It ought naturally to lead to the re- 
occupation of Chattanooga. Longstreet proposed that the army 
should cross the river above the town, and by threatening Rose- 
crans' line of retreat force the evacuation of Chattanooga. The 
Confederates would then have the choice of either pursuing Rose- 
crans or falling upon Burnside in East Tennessee. Bragg objected 
to this suggestion, that the country north of the river afforded no 
subsistence for either animals or men, and decided to invest 
Chattanooga. 

The Federals, when they retired into the town, abandoned 
Look-out Mountain, and the Confederates' lines were drawn right 
round the town from Missionary Ridge on the right to Look-out 
Mountain on the left. On both hills entrenchments were thrown 
up, whilst an entrenched line was made through Chattanooga 
Valley, within a short distance of the Federal line of defence (see 
Plan, p. 288). 

Bragg expected that the danger of starvation would compel 
Rosecrans to evacuate Chattanooga. On the ist October he sent 
a cavalry force under Wheeler to make a raid against the Federal 
line of supplies. A depot was broken up and many wagons 
burned and mules killed.^ The nearest road from Bridgeport, 
where Rosecrans had accumulated his supplies, along the north 
bank of the river, was promptly closed by the Confederate guns 
and sharpshooters, who were posted along the southern bank from 
Look-out Creek for some ten miles down the river. The only way 
in which the Federals could now get provisions was by hauling 
them over mountainous roads, a distance of sixty miles, into the 

' In 3 B. & L., 673-6, the Federal loss is estimated at 16,179, out of a total strength 
of 56,965 ; the Confederate loss at 17,804, out of 71,551. Cist, 228, states the Federal 
force at 55,000, the Confederate at aljout 70,000. D. H. Ilill considers that " Rosecrans 
was stronger in infantry and artillery by at least 4,000 men." The Confederates claim 
to have captured fifty-one guns. Cist, 228, estimates the Confederate loss at 20,950. 
Henderson (ii. 616) states in round numbers the Federal strength at 57,000, their loss at 
17,100; the Confederate strength at 71,000, their loss at 18,000. 

* Cist, 231. 



286 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE ITNITED STATES 

Sequatchie Valley. As the rainy season made the roads more 
difficult and the mules began to die from exhaustion and want 
of forage, starvation soon stared the Army of the Cumberland 
in the face. Provided that the Federal Government failed to 
relieve Rosecrans, Bragg might expect shortly to recover Chatta- 
nooga.^ 

The news of Rosecrans' defeat came as a tremendous shock to 
the Washington Administration. Instead of hearing, as they 
expected, that Rosecrans was continuing his triumphant advance 
into Northern Georgia, they now learnt that he had been driven 
back into Chattanooga, and was there besieged. Burnside's 
position in East Tennessee was also gravely compromised by the 
defeat of Chickamauga. Every effort was now made to relieve 
the Army of the Cumberland. Bart of the iith and I2th Corps 
were detached from the Army of the Potomac and sent, by rail, 
under Hooker's command, to Tennessee, and Grant was directed 
to send reinforcements from the Mississippi. Immediately after 
Chickamauga McCook and Crittenden were relieved of their com- 
mands, and ordered to return to Washington to attend a Court of 
Enquiry, which was to examine into their conduct on September 
19th and 20th, and their two Corps were consolidated into one 
under the command of Gordon Granger. 

By a War Department order of 16th October the Military 
Division of the Mississippi was created, composed of the Depart- 
ments of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee, and Grant was 
assigned to the command, being succeeded in the command of the 
Army of the Tennessee by Sherman. 

At the same time Rosecrans was relieved of the command of 
the Army of the Cumberland, and Thomas put in his place.- 

Changes were also taking place in the Confederate army. 
Bragg was bitterly disappointed at his failure to win a complete 
victory at Chickamauga and relieved Polk of his command, putting 
him under charges for not having opened the battle of the 20th at 
daybreak. The higher officers of the army were clamorous for 
Bragg's removal from the supreme command, and on 9th October 
President Davis visited Chattanooga to investigate matters for 
himself His visit failed to allay the ill-feeling. Longstreet, who 
had expected when he left Virginia to be assigned to the com- 
mand of the army, now refused to accejjt it, after Bragg had 
compromised its safety by entangling it in a siege. Consequently 
Bragg remained in command. To Polk's Corps the President at 
first proposed to appoint Pemberton. But the feeling against that 
unsuccessful general was so strong, that Davis gave up the idea 

' Cist, 232. 

* Ci<t, 234. The s uljstitulioii uf Thomas for KuLCcrans was made Ly llic advice of 
Grant. 



Oct., 1863] CHATTANOOGA 287 

and appointed Hardee.^ D. H. Hill, who had been specially 
emphatic in expressing his opinion about Bragg, was also relieved 
of his command. In the beginning of November Longstreet was 
sent to East Tennessee against Burnside : and it seems probable 
that this step, unjustifiable on military grounds, was taken at the 
President's suggestion to put an end to the increasing bad feeling 
between Bragg and his chief subordinate.'- 

Grant reached Chattanooga on October 23rd. Hooker's force, 
about 15,000 strong, was already encamped at Bridgeport.^ 
Rosecrans, judging it useless to bring more troops into Chatta- 
nooga, when he could barely feed those already there, had directed 
Hooker to put his troops along the Nashville Railroad, and defend 
it against the raids of the Confederate cavalry. 

Thomas, on taking command of the Army of the Cumberland, 
had ordered a concentration at Bridgeport with a view to carrying 
out a plan for opening up a shorter and easier line of supplies. The 
plan had been conceived by General " Baldy " Smith, chief engineer 
of the Army of the Cumberland. He proposed that Hooker should 
cross the Tennessee and move up the south bank, sweeping aside the 
Confederate sharpshooters, to Brown's Ferry : at the same time a 
force was to be sent from Chattanooga to the same point, and a 
bridge was to be laid across the river. Supplies could then be 
brought up the river as far as Kelly's Ferry by boat, and conveyed 
by a good wagon road across the tongue of land, which is here 
formed by a sudden turn northwards of the river, to Brown's 
Ferry. They would then be conveyed across the river by a 
pontoon bridge and brought into Chattanooga by the road running 
along the north bank, covered from the fire and view of the enemy 
by the hills. 

Upon Grant giving his approval. Hooker crossed the river at 
Bridgeport on the 26th and moved up the south bank. At 3 a.m. 
on the 27th, 1,300 men were put on board fifty-two boats of the 
pontoon train and floated down the river to Brown's Ferry, where 
a landing was made and the piquet guard surprised.* On the 
opposite bank 2,700 men had already taken up a position under 

' Hardee, who had oiii^inally commanded a Corps in the Army of Tennessee, had 
been transferred in July to the Army of Mississippi. In Novemljer he was trans- 
ferred back to the Army of Tennessee, and Polk was assigned to take his place in the 
Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana under General Johnston. 

'■^36. & L. , 709. LonsTStreet, in his From Afanassas to Appomattox, gives an 
interesting account of the changes which took place after Chickamauga in the Army of 
Tennessee. It is possible that Bragg ordered Longstrect's Corps to move on Knoxville 
on his own initiative. He may perhaps have thought, as Longstreet had only a hundred 
miles to go to reach Knoxville, lie would have ample time to get back again before the 
arrival of Sherman's reinforcements, who had taken a month to get half-way from 
Memphis to Chattanooga, and had still two hundred miles to come (Fiske, 294-6). 

^ Hooker's force consisted of two divisions of the nth Corps, under the Curps- 
Commander Howard, and one division of the uth, under Geary. * Fiske, 290. 



288 THE CIVir, WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

cover of the darkness : they were now ferried over, entrenchments 
thrown up covering the Ferry, and the bridge laid. On the 2Sth 
Hooker arrived, and Howard's Corps was posted at Brown's Ferry, 
whilst Geary's division encamped in Look-out Valley near 
Wauhatchie, some three miles from Howard's position.^ 

A division, under Palmer, of the 14th Corps, had in the mean- 
time moved down the north bank, crossed the river lower down, 
and held the road in Hooker's rear,'- On the night of the 28th a 
fierce attack was made by part of Longstreet's Corps upon Geary's 
camp, but, being badly supported, was repulsed with some loss. 
As soon as the road between Brown's and Kelly's Ferries was put 
in working order, all danger of starvation was removed for the 
army in Chattanooga. 

Sherman had started from Memphis with four divisions on 
October iith, but his progress was slow, because Halleck had 
ordered him to repair the railroad as he advanced, in order to 
bring up supplies. On October 27th, having advanced no further 
than luka, he received orders from Grant to discontinue the work 
of repairing the railroad and advance with all speed to Stevenson.^ 
General Dodge, with 8,000 men, was ordered to be left at Athens 
to repair the railroad between Nashville and Decatur, and thus 
lighten the heavy pressure upon the Nashville-Stevenson line. 

By the beginning of November, Burnside's position at Knox- 
ville had become one of considerable peril. Leaving Lexington 
on August 1 6th, he had turned Cumberland Gap, which was held 
by a small Confederate force, by crossing the Cumberland Moun- 
tains at other points hitherto deemed impracticable for military 
purposes, and on September 3rd had occupied Knoxville. He 
then concentrated his forces against the garrison of Cumberland 
Gap and compelled its surrender on the 9th.'* But after the Army 
of the Cumberland was besieged in Chattanooga, Burnside found 
himself in great difficulties for supplies. He was, in fact, cut off 
from his new base. He was a hundred miles from any other possible 
base,^ and the animals of his transport were utterly exhausted by 
the difficult march across the mountains. When, on November 4th, 
Longstreet was sent with his two divisions. Corps artillery, and 

' Cist, 240. 

" I'alnier crossed the river at Rankin's Ferry. Grant (3 B. & L. , 687) says that 
lluoker crossed the river on the 26th, but it is stated by other authorities that Hooker 
crossed on the 28th (3 H. ^: L., 720). 

* Halleck had ordered Sherman to depend for liis supplies on the Meniphis- 
Chaltanoojra Railway, and therefore to keep that line constantly repaired as he 
advanced. But Clrant ordered su|)plics to he sent up the Tennessee from St. Louis, 
which met Sherman at Lastport (3 B. & L., 691). 

* Cox, 12. 

* On reaching Knoxville, Burnside had tlrawn most of his supplies from Chattanooga 
by boat. After the investment of Chattanooga, his nearest possible base was Big South 
Fork of the Cumberland River (3 B. & L., 691). 



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Nov., 1863] CHATTANOOGA 289 

Wheeler's cavalry, a force of nearly 20,000 men/ against Knoxville, 
Burnside's position seemed desperate. Though his force was 
strong enough to hold its own in the field against Longstreet, yet 
the want of supplies would lead to its being besieged in Knox- 
ville. President Lincoln was in an agony of fear for Burnside's 
safety, and sent repeated messages to Grant to send him aid. 
But Grant was powerless to help him until he had first driven 
Bragg from Missionary Ridge. Until that should be done, and 
the upper waters of the Tennessee again opened to Federal 
boats, it was useless to attempt to send reinforcements which 
could not be fed by Burnside. 

Grant had already arranged his plan of battle before Sherman 
arrived (see Plan). He intended to move Sherman's divisions 
across the river to the south bank above the town from a point 
opposite the mouth of the South Chickamauga River, and with 
this force to assail the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge 
and endeavour to cut Bragg off from Chickamauga Station, 
where he had his depot of supplies. Hooker was to demonstrate 
against the Confederate position on Look-out Mountain and draw 
off Bragg's attention from his right, whilst Thomas' army was 
to come out of Chattanooga, and if necessary attack Bragg's 
position on the Ridge in the centre. 

If Bragg could be driven from Missionary Ridge and from his 
depot, a road would be opened by which relief could be sent to 
Burnside. But news from Knoxville showed that haste was im- 
perative. On the 20th came the tidings that fighting had com- 
menced at Knoxville. On the 22nd Buckner's Corps was detached 
by Bragg to Longstreet's aid.^ 

Sherman himself reached Chattanooga on the 15th, and his 
Corps was on the same date at Bridgeport. After a conference 
with Grant he returned to his command, rowing himself down the 
river. On the 20th he was at Brown's Ferry with the head of his 
column. But many of his troops were far behind, and one division 
had been sent to Trenton to create the impression that an 
attack was intended against the southern end of Look-out Moun- 
tain.^ On that day direct telegraphic communication with Burnside 
ceased. 

Throughout the 20th and 21st the rain fell in torrents. The 
Tennessee rose rapidly and the pontoons at Brown's Ferry were 
with difficulty kept in their places. Grant had hoped to attack 
on the 22nd, but it was impossible for Sherman to be ready in 
time : and Grant had determined not to attack Missionary Ridge 

^ To make up this total of 20,000, two more brigades must be counted in, which, 
under the command of Bushrod Johnson, were sent to Longstreet later in November. 

'^ Only one division, Johnson's, consisting of two brigades, joined Longstreet. The 
other division was recalled by Bragg. •' 3 B. & L. , 697. 



290 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

until Sherman was able to take the leading part in that attack. 
For, rightly or wrongly, he believed that the Army of the 
Cumberland was so demoralised by its defeat at Chickamauga 
and the subsequent weeks of semi-starvation, that it required to 
have a lead given it by troops which had not known the shame of 
defeat.^ 

On the night of the 2ist, ii6 pontoon boats were hidden from 
the enemy's observation in the North Chickamauga River about 
seven miles above Chattanooga.^ Some three miles lower down 
the South Chickamauga enters the main river. By the night of 
the 23rd three of Sherman's divisions were in position close to the 
North Chickamauga River, concealed in the woods.^ The fourth 
division could not be got across the pontoon bridge at Brown's 
Ferry owing to the swollen condition of the river. For the same 
reason Geary's division of Hooker's Corps was left on the southern 
bank in Look-out Valley. Howard's nth Corps had already 
crossed to the north bank and was encamped opposite Chatta- 
nooga, ready to support either Thomas or Sherman as occasion 
required. Hooker's position in Look-out Valley was only necessary 
so long as the siege of Chattanooga continued, because it held 
the line by which the army was supplied. But when once the 
battle had actually commenced on Missionary Ridge, Look-out 
Mountain lost its importance: and Grant's second plan was to 
bring Hooker's remaining division to the north side of the river, 
to cross it back again at Chattanooga and array it for battle on the 
right bank of Chattanooga Creek, thereby turning the Confederate 
position on Look-out Mountain. 

The news that Buckner's Corps had been sent to Longstreet's 
aid caused Grant to attack Bragg's position on the 23rd, in order 
to prevent him detaching more troops to Knoxville. As Sherman 
was not yet ready, the attack had to be made by Thomas' troops. 
At 2 p.m. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions moved out of the 
Federal lines, which were about a mile in front of the town, reaching 
from Chattanooga Creek on the right to Citico Creek on the left, 

' Under pressure from Washington, Grant, on November 7th, onlercd Thomas to 
attack the enemy's right in the hope of forcing Longstreet's recall. According to 
Grant's account (3 B. & L. , 694) the attempt was aliandoned because Thomas could 
not get enough animals to move even a single gun. But General W. F. Smith (3 B. & L., 
715-16) gives a somewhat different version. According to him the order was counter- 
manded, because a more thorough survey of the ground showed that Thomas' force was 
altogether too small to carry out the projected movement. 

" The North Chickamauga rises in "Tennessee, and flows south into the Tennessee. 
The South Chickamauga rises in Georgia, and flows north into the same river. 

* Sherman was enabled to reach his p<isitinn undiscovered, because the enemy, who 
had seen him crossing to the north bank at Urown's Ferry, mistook Howard's Corps, 
which had been concealed bchiml the hills on the north bank, and recrossed on the 
22nd opposite Chattanooga, in full view of the Confederate watchmen, for Sherman's 
force (3 B. & L., 697). 



Nov., 1863] CHATTANOOGA 291 

and carried by a sudden onslaught the first line of the Confederate 
rifle-pits. A mile of ground was secured by this attack, at the cost 
of about 1,100 killed and wounded. 

At 2 a.m. on the 24th the 116 pontoon boats, each with thirty 
soldiers on board, moved out of the North Chickamauga and 
dropped down the river. A small force was landed just above the 
mouth of the South Chickamauga, and the Confederate piquet at 
that point surprised. The mass of the troops landed below the 
mouth of the tributary, and at once the work of ferrying the rest 
of Sherman's forces across the river commenced. By daybreak 
two divisions — 8,000 men^ — were in position on the south bank. 
The work of laying the bridge was then begun, and shortly 
after noon the bridge was complete, as well as another across 
the Chickamauga. Sherman, with his three divisions, moved 
against Missionary Ridge at about i p.m. Atmospheric conditions 
favoured the Federals. A drizzling rain was falling, and the 
clouds lay low upon the hills. The attack upon Missionary Ridge 
took the Confederates by surprise, and Sherman reached the 
northern crest of the Ridge without encountering much opposi- 
tion. Attempts were made by the Confederates to recover the 
lost position, but without success. By nightfall Sherman had 
fortified his position, and Bragg found himself in danger of being 
cut off from his depot at Chickamauga Station. 

On the right of the Federal line. Hooker, with a composite force 
made up of parts of his own Corps, Sherman's, and the Army of 
the Cumberland, fought his way across Look-out Creek and round 
the northern end of Look-out Mountain. A heavy mist concealed 
the mountain-top, and the fight of Hooker's force against the six 
Confederate brigades which held the mountain is known as " the 
battle above the clouds." 

At 2 p.m. Hooker was obliged to suspend operations, owing to 
the thickness of the mist, but he had already secured a firm hold 
on the eastern slope, and his left rested near the mouth of Chatta- 
nooga Creek. During the night the Confederates, who had been 
driven to the very summit of the mountain, abandoned their posi- 
tion and retreated across Chattanooga Creek, burning the bridges 
behind them.^ 

Grant's plan of battle for the 24th had proved admirably 
successful. On either flank of Bragg's position the Federals were 
established, and the way seemed clear for a combined attack on 
the 25th. But it was soon found that obstacles remained to be 
overcome. Both Grant and Sherman had supposed that the crest 
of Missionary Ridge was continuous. It was found during the 

^ For Thomas' attack on the 231x1, see Grant's account (3 B. & L., 698-9) ; for Slier- 
man's movements on the 24th, 3 B. & L. , 701. 

" Cist, 250-1. Hooker's force consisted of three divisions. 



292 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

progress of the fighting on the 24th that between that part of the 
Ridge which Sherman had gained possession of and the next hill, 
the Tunnel Hill, through which the railway passed/ a deep depres- 
sion intervened, and that the latter hill had been strongly fortified 
by the Confederates. At sunrise Sherman moved to the attack 
with one division along the eastern base, three brigades along the 
western, and one brigade between the two.^ But so strongly was 
the Tunnel Hill held, that in spite of all his efforts he could make 
no progress. Bragg, seeing the necessity of driving Sherman from 
a position where he threatened the Confederate line of retreat, 
brought up reinforcements from the left and concentrated the 
greater part of his army against Sherman. 

This was exactly what Grant had expected, and he had 
reckoned upon Hooker making an effective demonstration against 
the southern end of Missionary Ridge through Rossville Gap. 
But the hours passed, and Hooker did not appear. He had been 
detained four hours by the difficulty of crossing Chattanooga 
Creek, and in the meanwhile the pressure upon Sherman was 
growing heavier. 

Realising the critical position of his subordinate, Grant was 
obliged to give up waiting for Hooker any longer, and directed 
Thomas to make a demonstration against Bragg's centre and carry 
the first line of Confederate entrenchments at the foot of the ridge. 
When that was carried, the troops were directed to lie down and 
await further orders. Thomas was slow in carrying out this order,^ 
but about 3.30 p.m. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions, with Johnson's 
on the right and Baird's on the left, some 20,000 men in all,* ad- 
vanced from their entrenchments and in gallant style carried the 
first line of Confederate works. 

For a brief space they halted according to orders, under a heavy 
fire from the crest above. Then, apparently without any orders 
from their officers, the men sprang up and began to ascend the 
slope.^ A second line of works on the slope was carried, and then 
a rush was made at the entrenchments on the crest. The Con- 
federates were driven from their last line of defence down the 
eastern slope in full rout. The officers lost all control over their 
men, who abandoned the artillery and flung away their weapons in 
their flight. Sheridan on the right followed in pursuit of the flying 
foe, and did not halt finally till he had reached the Chickamauga 
River some hours after midnight. Wood on the left met with more 
opposition : a division was sent back by Hardee from Tunnel Hill, 
and it was only by hard fighting that he, su[)[)ortcd by Baird's 
division, held his position on the crest of the Ridge. 

Shortly after the Confederate centre was broken, Hooker came 

' The Chattanooga and Clevelanii line. ^ 3 B. i"v: L., 705. 

» J B. c"vc L., 706. * FisUc, J 10. » 3 )} .^ L., 725. 



Dec, 1863] CHATTANOOGA 293 

into action against the southern end of the Ridge, which he carried, 
and then went into camp near Rossville. Thus by nightfall the 
whole of the Ridge was in the possession of the Federals, except at 
the point where Hardee on Tunnel Hill confronted Sherman, but 
during the night he was withdrawn by Bragg. On that night 
Thomas was ordered to send 20,000 men under General Granger to 
Burnside's relief at Knoxville. The rest of the army on the 26th 
continued to follow up the retreating Confederates, Sherman's 
troops by the road through Chickamauga Station, whilst Thomas 
and Hooker pressed forward by the Greysville and Ringgold road ^ 
(Map VI.). 

On the 28th the pursuit ceased, and Sherman was ordered to 
march with the 15th Corps to the relief of Knoxville, taking com- 
mand as well of Granger's column. Both at Washington and in 
Grant's camp grave apprehensions existed for Burnside's safety. 
He had telegraphed that his provisions would not last out beyond 
the 6th December. On that day Sherman reached Knoxville, to 
find that Longstreet had raised the siege on the 4th, and was in 
full retreat up the Holston Valley. The Confederates had made an 
attempt to storm the works defending Knoxville on November 
29th, but had been repulsed with heavy loss: and the news of 
Bragg's defeat at Chattanooga had rendered Longstreet's position 
one of considerable difficulty. Burnside seems somewhat to have 
exaggerated his own peril, as he was not entirely cut off by the 
investing force from drawing supplies from the country. Leaving 
Granger's Corps to aid in the pursuit of Longstreet, Sherman 
returned with the 15 th Corps to Chattanooga. 

If Chickamauga, on account of the number of forces engaged and 
the heaviness of the losses suffered by either side, is reckoned the 
great battle of the West, Chattanooga, from the point of view of its 
far-reaching consequences, must be considered the most important. 
Desperate as had been the fighting at Shiloh, Murfreesborough, and 
Chickamauga, in not one of these three battles had a decisive success 
been won by either combatant ; but at Chattanooga Bragg's army 
was badly beaten, and his continued presence with it as its com- 
mander rendered impossible. 

The Federal losses were under 6,000 in an army which numbered 
in round figures about 60,000.^ Bragg, after weakening himself by 
sending detachments into East Tennessee, had not more than 33,000 
troops in line on November 24th and 25th. His actual losses in 
killed and wounded were probably considerably less than those 
suffered by the Federals, as his troops were mostly fighting behind 
entrenchments ; but he lost 40 guns and over 6,000 prisoners.^ 

* Cist, 257. ^ 2 B. &.!.., 729. 

^ Henderson (ii. 6l6) gives the Confederate strength at 33,000, and their loss in killed 
and wounded at 3,000. The Statistical Record states the total Confederate loss at 
8,684 (Cist, 258). 



294 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

By his victory at Chattanooga Grant supplemented and com- 
pleted the success which he had gained earlier in the year at Vicks- 
burg. Vicksburg cut the Confederacy in two along the line of the 
Mississippi ; Chattanooga cut the eastern half of it in two along 
the line of the Alleghanies.^ The net result of the two campaigns 
was to recover the Mississippi Valley for the Union. 



NOTE ON BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 

The battle of Chickamauga is not by any means easy to follow in all its 
details. Some of its features recall the battle of Alurfreesborough, fought 
by the same armies under the same generals. In both the Federal right 
was routed, but the staunch resistance of the centre and left robbed the 
Confederates of what had promised to be a signal success. Here, how- 
ever, the parallel ends. Rosecrans at Chickamauga was standing on the 
defensive; Bragg, as at Murfreesborough, assumed the offensive, but his 
attack was directed against the Federal left. His initial movement, how- 
ever, lacked the vigour and success of Hardee's onslaught at Murfrees- 
borough. 

In this campaign Bragg was hampered by his ignorance of the 
enemy's movements, by his failure, owing partly to ill-health, to 
supervise in person the execution of his orders, and by the want of zeal 
on the part of his lieutenants, who, knowing their commander's tendency 
to seek a scapegoat in case of failure, shrank from assuming responsibility. 
The great flanking movement, which was to secure the Chattanooga road 
and cut the Federals off from their base, progressed but slowly. Only a 
small portion of the Confederate army crossed the Chickamauga on the 
1 8th. Next day Bragg was surprised to find that the Federal line, owing 
to Thomas' night march from the right to left of Crittenden's Corps, 
extended considerably further to the left than he had supposed, and that 
his own right was in danger of being turned. This discovery disarranged 
his plan of action, and his attacks on that day, though fierce and accom- 
panied by considerable loss on both sides, were disjointed. No permanent 
success was possible where there was no united effort or concerted action. 

On the 20th Brngg's anticipations were again disappointed. Whatever the 
cause the initial movement on the riglit did not commence till some hours 
after the time ordered. Even when Polk did get into action the attacks of his 
different divisions were not simultaneous, but successive. The battle was 
opened by Breckinridge's division. His two right brigades overlapped 
Thomas' left and penetrated to the left of the Federal entrenchments; hut 
Breckinridge had no reserves to support this movement, and Thomas, 
calling up reinforcements from his right, repulsed the attack. Meanwhile 
Breckinridge's third brigade made a frontal attack against the enemy's 
breastworks, and was so badly cut up that it had to be withdrawn from the 
line of battle. After the repulse of this brigade Cleburne's division took 

» I'iskc, 316. 



CHICKAMAUGA 295 

up the attack, but failed to carry the entrenchments held by superior 
numbers. 

The attack of Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions was over by 
10.30 a.m. At II a.m., under an immediate order from Bragg, Stewart 
on the left advanced, and the attack was renewed on his right by two 
brigades of Walker's Corps. One brigade again outflanked Thomas' left 
and reached the Chattanooga road, but was forced to retreat when menaced 
by an attack on flank and rear. Stewart's attack led indirectly to the fatal 
breach in the Federal line which let in Longstreet. Thoma s was calling 
loudly for reinforcements, and Rosecrans, having sent Negley' s division to 
his aid, ordered Wood's division of the 21st Corps to fill its place. This 
movement brought Wood into line on McCook's left and on the right of 
Brannan's division, which was retired a short distance in the woods, but 
not out of line. On the left of Brannan came Reynolds. One of Thomas' 
Staff officers, not seeing Brannan's division, reported to Thomas that there 
was a gap between Wood and Reynolds. Thomas sent the information 
on to Rosecrans, and the latter sent the following order to Wood : " The 
General Commanding directs that you close upon Reynolds as fast as 
possible and support him." It seems plain that Wood knew that Brannan 
was in position on his left, and probably he guessed that there was some 
mistake in the order. But, possibly because he was irritated at Rosecrans' 
peremptory language earlier in the day in regard to his slowness to relieve 
Negley, he chose to interpret the order literally, and, withdrawing from 
the line of battle, marched to the left behind Brannan, thus creating the 
gap into which Longstreet's column rushed, with fatal consequences to 
the Federal right. 

But Bragg quite failed to utilise the splendid opportunity which chance 
had given him. His whole attention seems to have been absorbed in the 
operations of his right wing, and because its attacks had all been repulsed 
he despaired of success. He declared that he had no troops left with 
which to reinforce Longstreet, and he neglected to order Wheeler's cavalry 
to pursue the flying Federals by the Dry Valley road. Thus in the second 
stage of the battle, in which Thomas was opposed to the whole of Bragg's 
army, the two Confederate wings fought quite separate battles, and the 
commanding generals of both armies were absent from the field of conflict. 

Longstreet and D. H. Hill claim that they forced Thomas to retreat. 
Longstreet says that the Federal withdrawal was due, not to Rosecrans' 
order to Thomas to retire, but to the fire of a battery which he established 
in a commanding position, whilst Hill asserts that the combined attack of 
the Confederate wings forced Thomas' retreat. On the other hand, the 
Federal accounts attach but little importance to the attacks made in the 
afternoon by Polk's wing, and consider that the brunt of the fighting was 
borne by Longstreet's wing, whose repeated assaults were successfully met 
by Wood's and Brannan's divisions. Granger's two brigades, and part of 
Negley's division. They even go so far as to hold that Rosecrans might 
have taken the offensive towards the close of the day with good hope of 
success. 

Longstreet and Hill both maintain that the fruits of the dearly won 
victory were thrown away by Bragg's failure to pursue on the 21st. The 



290 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

narratives of both display marked hostility to Bragg and ignore the 
Federal contention that the Confederate army was in no condition to 
pursue after two days' hard fighting. 

On the Federal side an interesting (lucslion has arisen as to the part 
played by Thomas on the 20th. His admirers hail him as the " Rock of 
Chickamauga," who for six weary hours with 25,000 men "stood at bay 
and hurled back again and again the furious onset of 60,000 rebels mad 
with desire to clutch the prize they had so nearly won" (Fiske, 274), 
On the other hand, some writers, e.g. Colonel Livermore {General Thomas 
in the Record, 3 Massachussetts M. H. S.), hold that the praises bestowed 
upon Thomas were excessive. It is pointed out that Thomas, with five 
divisions under his command and part of a sixth (Negley's), was quite 
strong enough to secure the line of retreat without making constant 
demands for reinforcements : that when Polk's attack commenced Thomas 
had 17,500 men against Polk's 12,800: that Rosecrans had so depleted 
his right and centre, that the force swept away by Longstreet's charge 
numbered less than 7,000 men, and that for the rest of the battle Thomas 
had at his disposal 32,000 men with which to meet the attacks of an army 
which, at the outset, had numbered little over 40,000. According to this 
estimate the strength of the forces engaged on both sides falls considerably 
short of the number generally accepted. 

The truth seems to be that considerable jealousy existed between the 
Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland, and that while the officers 
of the latter were disposed to eulogise, perhaps extravagantly, the doings of 
their great leader, there was a distinct tendency among officers of the 
former organisation to underestimate Thomas' merits. It is unfortunate 
that Thomas' admirers have too often sought to prove their case by de- 
preciating the services of Grant and Sherman. 



CHAPTER XIX 

LEE AND MEADE IN VIRGINIA— WINTER OPERATIONS 

AND PLANS 1 

Meade invades Virginia— Riots caused by the enforcement of the draft — Lee assumes 
the offensive — Hill defeated at Broad Run — Meade forces the passage of the Rappa- 
hannock — The Mine Run campaign — Federal lack of concerted action —Meade 
retreats behind the Rapidan — The Confederate position in the West — Sherman 
marches on Meridian — The Red River expedition — Banks retires before Taylor — 
The Federals abandon Alexandria — Longstreet in East Tennessee — Grant appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the Federal armies— Grant before the war — Further changes 
in the Federal armies — Grant's plan of campaign — Sherman's previous history — Sub- 
sidiary operauDns projected — Divided counsels in the Confederate camp — Longstreet's 
suggested plan of campaign — Bragg's proposed plan of campaign. 

ON July 14th Lee had withdrawn his army from the north 
bank of the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley. It was 
his intention to cross the Shenandoah River and take up a 
position on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, and there to meet 
the advance of Meade's army. But the Shenandoah was so 
full that for some days it was impossible to ford it, and in the 
meanwhile Meade crossed his army over the Potomac and moved 
forward along the eastern front of the Blue Ridge.^ 

There had been great disappointment felt in the North when 
Lee, after his defeat at Gettysburg, was allowed to make good his 
retreat into Virginia. There was a fear lest Meade, after Gettys- 
burg, should prove as inactive as McClellan was held to have 
been after the Antietam. Popular clamour forced Meade to advance 
and endeavour to bring Lee again to battle. But the Federal 
general was too cautious to neglect any precaution, and his advance 
was slow.^ On the 26th July his headquarters were at Warren- 
ton, with his army ranged along the north bank of the Rappahan- 
nock. 

The Confederate army had moved up the Valley and, crossing 
the Ridge, took post for a brief space at Culpeper. But Lee 

^ See Map III. - Lee's Lee, 307. 

' Swinton, 374, however, states that Meade's movement was made with much vigour, 
that his object was to secure Manassas Gap and strike a blow at the Confederate 
column as it was passing up the Valley, and that it was only the misconduct of 
French, commanding the 3rd Corps, which prevented him from effecting his purpose on 
the 23rd. 

297 



298 THE CI\IL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

quickly resolved to fall back to his old position behind the 
Rapidan, and from that vantage ground defy Meade to reach 
Richmond. The Army of the Potomac followed cautiously across 
the Rappahannock to C'ulpcper. 

Early in September Lee was obliged to reduce his strength by 
despatching Longstreet with Hood's and McLaws' divisions to the 
assistance of Bragg, who had been driven across the Tennessee by 
Rosecrans, whilst Pickett's division of the ist Corps was sent to 
the south bank of the James River. Later in the month Meade, 
in his turn, had to send part of two of his Corps, the i ith and 12th, 
under Hooker, to the assistance of Rosecrans, who, after his defeat 
at Chickamauga was besieged in Chattanooga, and detachments 
were also sent to South Carolina and to enforce the " draft " in the 
North.i 

The exigencies of warfare had exhausted both the supply of 
volunteers and the bounty system, and recourse was had to the 
" draft," by which, however, a commutation of 300 dollars was 
allowed in place of personal service. This was not unreasonably re- 
garded by the poorer classes as an unfair advantage granted to the 
rich ; and in several of the large cities in the North riots followed 
the enforcement of the "draft." These riots assumed their most 
formidable dimensions in New York, where for three days the 
whole city was at the mercy of the mob, who specially directcil 
their vengeance against the unhappy negro. At least 1,000 people 
are estimated to have been killed or wounded in the riots, and the 
city authorities subsequently paid a million and a half dollars in 
compensation for damage done to property. The arrival of regular 
troops promptly put a stop to a movement, whose fury had already 
spent itself, and a month later the " draft " was enforced without 
any disturbance.^ 

Meade found that his army was weakened more than Lee's, 
relatively to the original strength of the two forces, by the calls 
made upon him in September : and the Federal advance did not 
proceed beyond Culpeper. As his opponent would not take the 
initiative, Lee determined to flank him out of his present position 
and force him back behind the Rappahannock. On October 9th 
the Confederates crossed the Rapidan, and by a wide flanking 
movement through Madison Court House turned the Federal 
right and caused Meade to recross the Rappahannock.^ Lee de- 

' Swinton, 375. 

^ Hor.ili(j St-yinour, a member of the Democratic party, had been elected Governor 
of New York Stale in November, 1862. 

•" Lee's Lee, 315. After crossing the Rappahannock Meade on the 12th ordered a halt 
and sent three Corps back across the river in the direction of Culpeper. Lee was not, 
however, to be founri there, as he was engaged in crossing the Rappahannock some 
miles farther up at Sulphur Springs. On receiving this information Meade continued his 
retreat, and the three Corps rejoined the rest of the army on the i jth after a night march. 



Nov., .S63] LEE AND MEADE IN VIRGINIA 299 

termined to continue his turning movement and force the Federals 
still further back. The country between the Rappahannock and 
Bull Run had been the scene of one of his most brilliant successes, 
and any mistake made by Meade might enable Lee to inflict upon 
him the fate of Pope. If Lee could reach some point on the 
Orange and Alexandria Railroad in rear of Meade's army, the 
latter would be forced to fight at a disadvantage in order to recover 
his line of communications. 

Crossing the Rappahannock by the upper fords, the Army of 
Northern Virginia reached Warrenton on the 13th. The lack of 
supplies compelled Lee to remain there that day for the purpose 
of foraging : and Meade made good his retreat along the railway. 
On the following day the pursuit was hotly pressed. A. P. Hill, in 
his eagerness to fall upon the rear of the 5th Corps, which had just 
crossed Broad Run near Bristoe Station, blundered into the 2nd 
Corps under Warren.^ Being taken completely by surprise, and 
assailed by a foe who, though also taken by surprise, had the advan- 
tage of being able to form line of battle under cover of the railway 
embankment. Hill's Corps lost heavily, and was forced to fall back 
behind Broad Run. This untoward event caused Lee to abandon 
the pursuit of Meade's army. He saw that a continuation of the 
flanking movement would only force the Army of the Potomac 
back into the impregnable fortifications of Washington. Accord- 
ingly he fell back to the line of the Rappahannock and encamped 
his army along the south bank, holding a strongly fortified tete de 
pont on the north bank of the river at Rappahannock Station. 

If Lee hoped to make his winter quarters on the Rappahannock, 
he was promptly undeceived. As soon as he fell back from Broad 
Run, Meade's army on October 19th commenced to advance. On 
November 7th the tcte de pont, which was held by two brigades of 
Early's division, was gallantly stormed, with but little loss, by 
Russell's division of the 6th Corps. The greater part of the two 
Confederate brigades, as well as a battery of rifled guns, were 
captured. It had been Lee's intention to hold the bridge at 
Rappahannock Station and strike in detail at the Federal forces as 
they crossed the river above and below it. After its loss he aban- 
doned the line of the Rappahannock and fell back to Culpeper 
Court House ; and as Meade followed in pursuit, on the 9th he 
withdrew across the Rapidan.^ 

Both the Government and the Press of the North demanded 
that Meade should make another effort, in spite of the lateness 
of the season, to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. On 

^ Ewell seems partly to blame. Had he pressed the pursuit more vigorously he might 
have prevented Warren from attacking Hill's flank (Svvinton, 388). 

^ Swinton, 387, thinks that, had this success been promptly followed up, the Con- 
federate army might have been cut in two. 



300 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UiNITED STATES 

November 26th Meade set his army in motion with that end in 
view. His plan was to cross the Rapidan with three columns, 
which were to secure possession of the turnpike and plank roads, 
and then, moving west, seize the line of Mine Run before Lee could 
concentrate his army, which he had been obliged to scatter con- 
siderably for the purpose of getting supplies and forage, in the 
entrenchments which he had constructed behind that stream. The 
column, which formed the right flank of the Federal advance, and 
consisted of the 3rd and 6th Corps, the latter to move in support 
of the former, had the hardest task to perform, as they were nearest 
to the Confederate lines and exposed to an attack on their un- 
guarded right flank. 

On the 27th the 3rd Corps, commanded by General French, was 
fiercely attacked by a large part of General Ewell's Corps. French 
repulsed the attack, but a day had been lost, and Meade blamed 
his lieutenant for causing the failure of his plan of concentration, 
and a good deal of recrimination ensued between the two generals. 

On the 28th the two armies were confronting each other on 
opposite sides of Mine Run. The Confederate lines, now manned 
by the whole of Lee's army, ran from the south of the plank road 
to the north of the turnpike. As the result of reconnaissances 
made on the 29th, Meade resolved to assail both flanks of the Con- 
federate position the following morning. Warren, with his own 
Corps, the 2nd, and two divisions of the 3rd, was to attack the 
right flank at 8 a.m. upon a signal to be given by the batteries in 
the centre, whilst Sedgwick, with the 5th and 6th Corps, was to 
assail the left flank an hour later. Meade's plan was frustrated by 
Warren, who decided on the morning of the 30th that the en- 
trenchments in his front were too strong to be assailed with any 
chance of success, and Sedgwick's attack, which had already com- 
menced, had to be abandoned in consequence of the failure to co- 
operate of the other wing.^ 

As it was now plain that the Federals would not attack Lee in 
his entrenched position, the Confederate leader in his turn prepared 

* For the Mine Run campaign, see Swinlon, 390-7, and 4 B. & L., 8S-91. Swinton 
blames French for not reaching his crossing at the Rapklan till some hours after the other 
columns were ready to advance. This delay, combined with the fact that the engineers 
had not provided pontoon bridges of sufhcient length, caused the 26tli to be wasted. 
On the 27th, according to Swinton, French took the wrong road, which led him too far 
to the right and exposed him to an attack from Ewell's Corps. According to General 
McMahon (4 B. & L., 89) Warren was to blame for the failure to attack on the 30th. 
He had been directed, so it was generally understood, "to make a circuit of perhaps 
several days' march, cutting Lee oti from all communication and coming in not so much 
upon his immediate flank as upon his line of communication and rear." The delay 
on the 26th and 27th gave Lee time to strengthen and extend his lines, which, says 
Swinton, did not originally reach as far snuth as the turnpike. Meade's object, according 
to the same authority, was to turn the Mine Run entrenchments and defeat Ewell's and 
Hill's Corps in detail. According to McMahon, hail Sedgwick l^een allowed to make 
his attack on the 30th, the Confetlerate left might have been broken. 



Dec, 1863] LEE AND MEADE IN VIRGINIA 301 

to assume the offensive. He saw that the enemy were entangled 
in a difficult country at a great distance from their base and at an 
unfavourable season, and he had accordingly great hopes of inflict- 
ing upon them a crushing defeat. He directed two divisions to 
throw themselves upon Meade's left flank on the morning of 
December 2nd. But during the night of the ist Meade withdrew 
his whole army to the north bank of the Rapidan, and the brief 
campaign came to an end. Lee was greatly disappointed at the 
failure to strike a heavy blow at Meade under such favourable 
conditions. 

After this both armies went into winter quarters, the Confederates 
on the south bank of the Rapidan, with their headquarters at 
Orange Court House, whilst Meade's army encamped in the neigh- 
bourhood of Culpeper. 

The chief importance of this brief campaign, mainly marked by 
strategic features and containing but little hard fighting, was that 
it showed that Meade, with increased experience, was improving as 
a commander, and was gaining confidence in himself Previous to 
this campaign he had had but little opportunity to handle large 
bodies of troops. At Chancellorsville the 5th Corps, which he had 
commanded, had taken very little part in the hard fighting of that 
campaign, and he had been called at a moment's notice to the 
supreme command on the critical field of Gettysburg. As he 
acquired experience, he showed that he could plan an elaborate 
campaign and also possessed sufficient caution to avoid the mis- 
takes which had proved so fatal in the same theatre of war to Pope 
and Hooker. During the winter he reorganised the Army of the 
Potomac. The ist and 3rd Corps disappeared and were absorbed 
into the other three. Hancock, Warren, and Sedgwick were ap- 
pointed the commanders of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps respectively. 

In the West the Confederate cause at the end of 1863 seemed 
in a desperate plight. The army, with which Bragg had hoped to 
win a great victory and even compel the surrender of the Army of 
the Cumberland, was divided and disheartened. A considerable 
part of it, under Longstreet, was in East Tennessee (Map VI.), 
having retired from before Knoxville to the Upper Holston Valley, 
and was completely cut off from communication with the rest of 
the army, which, after the crushing defeat at Chattanooga, had 
rallied at Dalton. In the winter quarters at Dalton demoralisation 
grew apace. Discontent was rife among both the officers and men : 
the bonds of discipline were loosened, and there was a danger lest 
the army should degenerate into a mere rabble. If discipline was 
to be restored and the army ever become again an organised 
weapon of warfare, it was essential that Bragg should be relieved 
of the command. This step Jefferson Davis very reluctantly took, 
but he made the grave mistake of calling the general to Richmond 



302 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

to act as " Commander-in-Chief near the President," Bragg was 
thus rewarded for his signal failure at Chattanooga by promotion 
to a post corresponding to that which Lee had held for a short 
period in 1862.^ Hardee for the time being succeeded to the 
command of the army at Dalton, but after a short while, being 
unwilling to assume the responsibility of supreme command, he 
was relieved by Joseph E. Johnston. 

While the Confederate forces in the West were thus broken up 
and disorganised, Grant was endeavouring to improve the oppor- 
tunity. Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland remained at 
Chattanooga keeping an c)'e upon the Confederate army at Dalton. 
Schofield succeeded Foster, who had relieved Rurnside, in command 
of the Army of the Ohio, and was at Knoxville preparing to operate 
against Longstreet and, if possible, drive him out of East Tennessee. 
Sherman, with the Army of the Tennessee, was directed to march 
from Vicksburg against Meridian (Map X.) and destroy the rail- 
roads in its vicinity. At Meridian, which is near the eastern border 
of Mississippi, the railroad runs east and west from Vicksburg 
to Montgomery, and beyond crosses the line running north and 
south from Mobile to the Ohio. A thorough destruction of the 
railway system at that point would close to the Confederates 
Northern Mississippi as a possible theatre of war for some con- 
siderable period. Experience had shown that a large~ force, if 
engaged in protracted operations, could not subsist far from a 
railway or some line of water communication. Sherman's expedi- 
tion, if successful, would free the Federal authorities from any fear 
during the next campaign of a movement in force from Northern 
Mississippi either in the direction of the Mississippi or towards 
Nashville,- and thus allow a larger force to be concentrated for 
the offensive movement into Georgia, which Grant and Sherman 
were planning. 

Sherman proposed to march with about 20,000 men from Vicks- 
burg to Meridian, whilst General Sooy Smith was to movc^'with a 
strong cavalry force simultaneously from Memphis and break up 
the Mobile and Ohio Railroad southward from Corinth, and then 
join Sherman at Meridian. There was a Confederate force in 
Mississippi under the command of Polk, but it was not strong 
enough to cope single-handed with Sherman's army, and the Con- 
federate commander at Dalton was prevented from marching to 
Polk's aid by the consideration that Thomas at Chattanooga 
would then have a clear course to Atlanta.^ Consequently Sher- 
man himself encountered no opposition : he reached Meridian on 
February 14th, and completely destroyed the railroads in the 

' Lee had heen relievcJ at his own request of this post, when he assumed the command 
in llie field of tlie Army of Northern Virginia (2 Henderson, 602). 
"^ Cox, Atlantn 7. ' Johnston, 2S1. 



March, 1864] LEE AND MEADE IN VIRGINIA 303 

neighbourhood. Smith, however, was not so fortunate. Before 
he could carry out his share of the work, he had to reckon with 
Forrest, the ablest cavalry commander in the West. He was 
badly beaten and driven back into Memphis.^ 

In March three of Sherman's divisions were detached for service 
under Banks in the Red River expedition (Map X.). This ex- 
pedition calls for notice as being the last directed by Halleck in 
his capacity as General-in-Chief of the Federal armies. After the 
fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Grant, Banks, and Admiral 
Farragut were all in favour of a combined movement of the land 
and naval forces against Mobile, as an effective diversion which 
might aid Rosecrans in his campaign against Bragg. Halleck, 
however, on political grounds, insisted on an attempt being made 
to raise the P'ederal flag in Texas. Napoleon III. had just 
established an Austrian Archduke as Emperor of Mexico under 
French protection ; and it was feared by both the Federal and 
Confederate Governments that the French might try to establish 
an independent Republic in Texas.^ To prevent such an attempt 
it was desirable that the Federals should gain some foothold in 
Texas. To Banks, as commander of the Department of the Gulf, 
the work was entrusted. Halleck favoured an expedition up the 
Red River into Northern Texas, but the Red River was only 
navigable in spring. Banks accordingly attempted to gain posses- 
sion of the coastline pf Texas by sudden descents from the sea. 
In September, 1863, an expedition was sent to seize the Sabine 
Pass, but it was easily beaten off and two gunboats forced to 
surrender. At the end of October Banks made a second attempt. 
This time he struck the mouth of the Rio Grande (on the frontier, 
not shown on map), and hoped to work his way eastward along 
the coast. But the Confederate fortifications at Galveston and the 
mouth of the Brazos River proved too strong to be taken except by 
a movement into the interior and an attack upon their rear; and to 
carry tjiis out Banks needed reinforcements, which Halleck refused 
to give him.^ He therefore found himself obliged to adopt 
Halleck's plan of a movement up the Red River. He was to be 
supported by 10,000 troops from Sherman's army and by Porter's 
Mississippi fleet. Sherman's contingent was to be convoyed up 

^ Sooy Smith's defeat seems to have been thoroughly discreditable. He had a force 
of at least 7,000 cavalry, and allowed himself to be driven back by Forrest with a force 
of not more than 2,500 men {4 B. & L., 416-17). 

^ On June loth, 1863, Marshal Bazaine entered the city of Mexico, and a packed 
assembly at once offered the throne to Maximihan, " or, in case of his refusal, to such 
other Catholic prince as Napoleon might please to indicate." Maximilian refused to 
accept the crown, unless his choice was ratified by a vote of the Mexican people. On 
April loth, 1864, he was formally crowned (Schouler, vi. 428-9). For the French 
designs upon Texas, see Mahan, 185-6. 

•* An earlier attempt upon Galveston had been made on January ist, 1S63, with 
signal ill-success. s. 



304 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the river by the fleet, and Banks' army was to march by land up 
the Teche to Alexandria, where the two forces were to unite on 
March 17th. From Alexandria an advance was to be made upon 
Shreveport, the most important Confederate depot in the Trans- 
Mississippi Department, in conjunction with Steele's army, which 
was to advance from the Arkansas River. Halleck hoped by this 
combined movement to establish the Federal forces on the Red 
River, and from Shreveport as a base to push forward into Texas. 

The navy and Sherman's contingent, three divisions under 
A. J. Smith, reached Alexandria by the appointed date.^ But 
Banks was delayed by certain duties imposed upon him in connec- 
tion with the inauguration of a Civil Government of Louisiana, 
and did not reach the rendezvous till a week later, and his infantry 
were not all up till the 26th. On April 3rd Natchitoches, within 
four marches of Shreveport, was reached, and in spite of an urgent 
message from Sherman, demanding that Smith's Corps should be 
returned to him by the loth, the advance was continued.^ General 
Richard Taylor, commanding in Western Louisiana, had succeeded 
in concentrating two infantry divisions and one division of cavalry 
for the defence of Shreveport, and advancing from Mansfield 
encountered Banks' column, which was strung out on a single road 
for twenty miles at Sabine Cross-roads on April 8th. The 
Federals were taken at a disadvantage, as the successive divisions 
were defeated in detail, until Emory's division of the 19th Corps 
checked the Confederate advance and saved Banks' army from an 
appalling disaster.^ 

The following day Taylor, having been reinforced by two more 
infantry divisions, attacked the Federal army at Pleasant Hill, but 
was beaten off with considerable loss, though gaining some 
success at the outset.* Banks, however, considered it hopeless to 
resume the advance against Shreveport, and retreated to Alexandria.^ 

Meanwhile that part of the fleet which had ascended the river 
above Alexandria was in great danger. It had been deserted by 
the army, and the river was falling so fast that it was very doubtful 
if it could get back to Alexandria. Had Kirby Smith, who was 
in general command of all the Confederate troops in the Trans- 
Mississippi Department, allowed Taylor to continue the pursuit of 

^ Two rlivision^ of the l6lh Corps :in<l one of the I7lh. Grant, after the fall of 
Vicksburg, had sent the 13th Corps to New Orleans to serve under Banks. 

* Orders had already on March 27th been received from Grant, now Commander-in- 
Chief of all the Federal armies, directing that if Shreveport was not to be captured by 
April 25111, Slierinan's divisions were to Ije returned by the loth. 

' Taylor, 164, claims to have driven back Emory's division (which he magnifies into 
the whole iQtli Corps). 

^ Taylor again claims a victory on the ground that Banks retreated during the night. 

* I'.anks reached Grand Ecorc on the lllh, and waited there till the 22nd. Having 
thus secured the passage of the gunboats to Alexandria, he resumed his retreat. 



May, 1864] LEE AND MEADE IN VIRGINIA 805 

Banks with all the available forces, it is not improbable that the 
whole Federal expedition might have been destroyed. But Kirby 
Smith only left his lieutenant one infantry division with the cavalry, 
and marched off with the bulk of his forces to encounter Steele, 
who had reached Camden, ninety miles distant north-east from 
Shreveport. The Confederate commander hoped to have time to 
defeat Steele and get back to rejoin Taylor before the Federal 
gunboats had passed below Alexandria. In this hope, however, 
he was disappointed. Steele made good his retreat to Little Rock, 
and the last of the Federal gunboats had got down the river below 
Alexandria on May 13th. The army at once evacuated Alexandria, 
and on the 19th crossed the Atchafalaya, at which point the pur- 
suit, which Taylor attempted with his small force, came to an end. 
Porter's fleet owed its safety to the genius of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bailey, of Wisconsin, who raised the water in the river to the 
required height by constructing wing-dams and stone cribs.^ 

The Red River expedition, having proved a failure, was fatal to 
Banks' military reputation, and he was relieved^ by General Canby 
in the command of the Department of the Gulf: while the troops 
which took part in the expedition were prevented from having any 
share in the extensive and glorious campaign planned by Grant 
for the ensuing summer. 

During the winter the one Confederate force which held a posi- 
tion of strategic importance was Longstreet's Corps in East Ten- 
nessee. After Bragg's defeat and retreat to Dalton, Longstreet 
found himself cut off from the main army. Having received from 
President Davis discretionary authority over all the Confederate 
troops in that Department, he attempted to resume the offensive. 
But the difficulty of getting provisions and the severity of the 
winter caused the operations on both sides in this theatre of war 
to be ineffective. Still Longstreet in East Tennessee was incon- 
veniently near to Kentucky and the Ohio, and Halleck at Washing- 
ton was urging Grant to drive him out of the Department. For 
a time Grant shared this view, and seems to have anticipated that 
the final campaign of the war might be fought out in East Ten- 
nessee ; but the arguments of General Foster, who was for a short 
time in command of the Department, convinced him that for the 

^ The difficulty with which the fleet had to contend was how to cross the falls 
above Alexandria. 

' Banks still remained for a time in command of the Department of the Gulf, but he 
was placed under the orders of Canby, the commander of the newly made Trans- 
Mississippi Division (4 B. & L., 360). General Taylor, who severely criticises Kirby 
Smith's military methods, claims that the Confederates lost a chance of striking a blow 
which would have been decisive of the war. He maintains that the capture of Porter's 
fleet ought to have followed upon his twofold victory, and that with that fleet the Con- 
federates could have regained possession of the Mississippi and undone all the work of 
the Federals since the winter of 1861 [Dtslriictt'on and Reconstntction, 189). 

X 



306 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

time being there was nothing to fear from Longstreet, owing to 
the lack of supplies, and in April that commander was recalled to 
Virginia, and East Tennessee ceased to be of strategic importance.^ 

During the winter of 1863-4 the Federal Government determined 
to take the very important step of appointing a single Commander- 
in-Chief of all the armies in the field. Ilallcck had been acting as 
General-in-Chief at Washington ever since the middle of 1862, but 
he had not succeeded in establishing any real co-operation between 
the different armies in the field, and it was gradually brought home 
to the Government that the Commander-in-Chief ought not to be 
a bureau officer, but one who could take the actual command in 
the field. It was, in fact, a return to the policy of the beginning 
of the war, when on November ist, 1861, McCIellan had been 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Federal forces in the 
field. The events of 1863 had shown conclusively that Grant was 
the one man who could be safely entrusted with so great a responsi- 
bility. 

The campaign of Vicksburg had resulted in the most notable 
success achieved as yet in the war. The promptitude with which 
Grant had marched to the relief of Chattanooga, and the crushing 
reverse which he had then inflicted upon Bragg, marked him out 
as the general for whom Lincoln had for so long and with such 
ill-success been looking. It was determined to revive the grade of 
Lieutenant-General in the Federal army. Washington alone had 
held that rank.- Scott had only been a Lieutenant-General by 
brevet. On February 26th an Act was passed by Congress for 
that purpose, and on March ist the President sent the name of 
Grant to the Senate as the officer whom he proposed to pron ota 
to that rank. The Senate confirmed the appointment the follcw- 
ing day, and on the 9th Grant received his commission from the 
hands of the President. 

Hiram Ulysses Grant was born in Ohio in 1822.^ He graduated 
at West Point in 1843, twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine. As 
a cadet he did not display any marked intellectual ability, but was 
chiefly distinguished for his skill and daring as a horseman. He 
was assigned to an infantry regiment, and with it served through 
the Mexican War, displaying conspicuous gallantry and gaining 
two brevets. 

After the Mexican War promotion in the United States Army 
became very slow. A great many officers left the service in despair 

^ For Lonfjstrect's operations in Kast Tennessee and the strategic importance of that 
theatre of war, see his From Manassas to Appomattox. 

" In Washington's case the rank was really honorary; as it was known that, if 
the anticipated war with France broke out, he could not take the field in person 
(6 Schouler, 479). 

' Hy a strange mistake Grant was entered at West Point as Ulysses Simpson, the 
latter having been his mother's maiden name. 



i864] WINTER OrERATIONS AND PLANS 307 

of gaining further advancement and entered various walks of civil 
life. Grant resigned in 1854. He left the army under a cloud. 
He was accused of intemperate habits, and this charge, which had 
but a slender foundation of truth, proved prejudicial to him in later 
days, when he re-entered the army on the outbreak of the Civil 
War. After leaving the army he fell upon evil days. He tried 
various forms of employment, but was successful in none. 

At the beginning of the war he was a clerk in his father's leather- 
store at Galena, Illinois. As an ex-captain of the Regular Army 
he quickly found employment in i86r. He served for a short 
while in the Adjutant-General's office under Governor Yates. An 
application for a post on McClellan's staff met, fortunately for 
Grant as it turned out, with no success. Yates appointed him 
colonel of one of the Illinois volunteer regiments: and his name 
was the first on a list of seven citizens of the State sent in by the 
Illinois members of Congress for appointment as Brigadier-Generals 
of volunteers. He served first under Fremont and next under 
Halleck in Missouri. His successful campaign against Forts Henry 
and Donelson at the beginning of 1862 established his military 
fame. Yet in spite of this brilliant success, Halleck was strongly 
prejudiced against him. After Donelson and again after Shiloh he 
was temporarily under a cloud. But his twofold triumph in 1863 
entirely resuscitated his reputation and left him beyond dispute the 
first soldier in the Federal service. 

His appointment to the supreme command of the Federal armies 
necessitated further changes. Halleck was, of course, relieved from 
duty as General-in-Chief and " assigned to duty in Washington as 
Chief of the Staff of the Army under the direction of the Secretary 
of War and the Lieutenant-General commanding." 

Sherman succeeded Grant in command of the Military Depart- 
ment of the Mississippi, and McPherson succeeded Sherman in 
command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee. It was 
Grant's original intention to remain with the Army of the West, 
with which his whole military career in the war had been associated, 
and he was urged to adopt that course by Sherman. But a visit to 
Washington convinced him that he must place himself at the head 
of the Army of the Potomac to prevent the movements of that 
army being interfered with by the Washington authorities. 

The new Commander-in-Chief quickly evolved a comprehensive 
plan of operations for the ensuing spring. The armies in East and 
West were now to act in concert with each other. A general com- 
bined movement was to be made against the Confederate armies 
still remaining in the field, and a campaign commenced which was 
to end by uniting nearly all the Federal armies against the doomed 
capital of the South. Grant himself, with the Army of the Potomac, 
was to take the field against the Army of Northern Virginia under 



308 THE CIVIT. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Lee. Wherever Lee went, Grant meant to follow : and even if he 
failed to destroy Lee's army in the field, he felt certain of being 
able to force it to take shelter within the lines of Richmond. The 
only other large Confederate army was concentrated at Dalton, 
under the command of Joseph E. Johnston. To deal with this 
army was the special task assigned to Sherman and the Grand 
Army of the West. Just as Grant would stick close to Lee until 
he forced him into tiic fortifications of Richmond, so Sherman 
was to stick close to Johnston until ultimately he drove him into 
Atlanta. 

William Tecumseh Sherman, to whom was allotted a task second 
only in importance to that which Grant had taken for himself, had, 
like his Commander-in-Chief, made his reputation in the West. 
Born in Ohio in 1820, he graduated at West Point in 1840 sixth 
in his class, and received a commission in the artillery. He had 
not the good fortune to see service in the Mexican War, but served 
for some years on the Staff in California. In 1853 he retired from 
the United States Army and took up banking in San Francisco. 
In 1859 he was appointed President of the Louisiana Military 
Academy, and held that post until the outbreak of the war. He 
commanded a brigade in the battle of Bull Run and shortly after 
was promoted brigadier-general of volunteers. He succeeded 
General Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame, in the command of the 
Federal forces in Kentucky, but at his own request was relieved 
of so responsible a post and assigned to a subordinate command 
under Hallcck in Missouri. Because he was one of the few persons 
who openly expressed his opinion of the vastness of the task laid 
upon the Federal Government, and maintained that 200,000 men 
would be required to conquer the Valley of the Mississippi, he was 
attacked by various newspapers and declared insane. Like his 
great chief, with whose fortunes his own were linked from the 
commencement of the campaign of 1862, he laboured for a time 
under a heavy load of prejudice. But throughout 1863 he was 
Grant's right-hand man, and became his natural successor in the 
command of the Army of the West. 

Subsidiary operations were also to take place both in East and 
West. In the West, Banks was to organise an army of 25,000 
men, for that purpose drawing off all the troops in Texas except a 
small force left to hold the line of the Rio Grande, and combine 
with the fleet under Farragut in an attempt upon Mobile.^ After 
the fall of that city Banks' army would become a part of the 
Grand Army, with which Sherman was to move eastwards through 
Georgia. In the East, Sigel, commanding the Department of West 
Virginia, was to move up the Shenandoah Valley to Staunton, and 

' After the failure of Banks' Red River cxi>c<lilion the execution of this niovcinent 
passed into Canby's hands. 



i864l WINTER OPERATIONS AND PLANS 309 

if practicable to Lynchburg, and then join the Army of the 
Potomac via Gordonsville, after destroying the railroads in that 
region, which served as lines of supply to Lee's army.^ Another 
column, under General Crook, was to move through West Virginia 
against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, and after 
breaking that up to join Sigel. General Gillmore was to be trans- 
ferred with 10,000 men from South Carolina to General Butler, 
commanding at Fortress Monroe. The latter general was to 
organise a force of about 23,000 men, under the immediate com- 
mand of "Baldy" Smith, with which and Gillmore's contingent he 
was to seize City Point and operate against Richmond from the 
south side of the James in co-operation with the advance of the 
Army of the Potomac. 

At this critical time, when the Federal Government was making 
strenuous efforts to insure unity of action and co-operation in the 
forthcoming campaign, the Confederate camp was distracted by 
divided counsels and personal jealousies. The appointment of 
General Bragg to the post of Commander-in-Chief near the 
President was not likely to commend itself to the other general 
officers serving either in the East or West. Furthermore, Davis 
was known to be prejudiced against both Joseph Johnston and 
Beauregard, who had both been among the five Confederate 
officers appointed full generals at the beginning of the war. The 
President in all probability acted wisely when he refused to accede 
to General Lee's request, that he might be relieved of the command 
of the Army of Northern Virginia after the termination of the 
Gettysburg campaign ; but his refusal was attributed not so much 
to a just appreciation of Lee's great military abilities as to his 
dislike of the other two generals, one or other of whom would 
have been Lee's natural successor. 

The war policy of the President also was very far from finding 
favour in the eyes of the best Confederate officers. From the first 
he had adhered to the policy of standing on the strict defensive, 
dissipating his forces in a vain effort to cover every threatened 
position. It was in vain that Lee and other officers had urged 
the advisability of concentrating all available forces for a vigorous 
offensive at some carefully selected point. The failure of the 
Gettysburg campaign had been largely due to the fact that Lee's 
means were inadequate to the end proposed. The President 
had refused to allow any considerable body of troops to be drawn 
from the garrisons in the Carolinas and along the Atlantic 
coast, in order to form a second army of invasion under Beau- 
regard, as he had requested. Yet the dearly bought experience 
of the recent campaign was powerless to convince the President 
of the danger of scattering his forces over a great area of country 

^ Humphreys, 6. 



310 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

instead of concentrating them by a judicious use of the interior 
lines. 

Lee and Longstreet were indeed called upon to submit schemes 
for a campaign, which might break up the enemy's plans and 
force him to make fresh combinations. Longstreet, having 
thought out a plan, went from East Tennessee to Lee, who 
approved of the suggested campaign ; and the two together 
visited Richmond to lay the plan on which they had agreed before 
the President and his military advisers. Their plan was that 
20,000 men should be drawn from the forts in South Carolina 
and placed under Beauregard's command : that this force, in con- 
junction with Longstrcet's army in East Tennessee, should invade 
Kentucky, and by striking at the railroad to Louisville, the 
sole line of communications for the Grand Army under Sherman, 
force the Federal general to fall back from his position in front 
of Johnston's army. The latter was then to hasten with all 
speed, with his own army and all other troops which he could 
collect from Alabama and Mississippi, after Beauregard and Long- 
street, and a junction would be made of all the columns at or 
near the Ohio, thus putting the Federal forces in the West on the 
defensive.^ 

This comprehensive plan of campaign, conceived by Longstreet 
and approved by Lee, was rejected by the Council of War in 
favour of a scheme proposed by Bragg, according to which 
Johnston and Longstreet were to unite their forces in East 
Tennessee, enter Middle Tennessee, and strike at the Federal 
line of communications near Nashville. This plan of campaign, 
which was approved by the President, was ultimately abandoned 
in consequence of Johnston's objection that he could not ade- 
quately supply his army in the mountainous country through which 
he would have to march before turning west for the invasion of 
Middle Tennessee.^ 

The net result of the Council of War was that no plan for an 
offensive campaign was definitely adopted, and Lee and Johnston, 
in command of the two principal armies of the Confederacy, 
were left to do the best that either could independently of the 
other against the superior numbers which the Federal Govern- 
ment was threatening to bring against the isolated forces of the 
enemy. 

' For Longstrcet's proposed jilan of campaign, see From Matiassas to Appomattox. 

'■* Johnston was strongly opposed to Bragg's plan because, as the interior positions 
were held by the enemy, his own and Longstreet's armies were liable to be defeated in 
detail before they could unite (Johnston, 295-8). 



CHAPTER XX 

GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 
FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOUR i 

The Army of the Potomac under Grant — Alternative courses open to Grant — The Army 
of the Potomac crosses the Rapidan — Movements of the Army of Northern Virginia — 
Collision with the Confederate forces in the Wilderness — The battle on the turnpike — 
The battle on the Plank road — Results of the day's fighting — The Federals assume 
the offensive — Hill driven back on the Plank road — Arrival of Longstreet — Federal 
attack checked — Hancock renews the attack on the Plank road — Longstreet turns 
Hancock's left — Longstreet wounded by his own troops — Confederate attack on 
Hancock's entrenchments repulsed — Ewell's flank attack against the Federal right — 
Results of the two days' fighting — Grant continues his movement by the left flank — 
Lee's countermove — The Confederates win the race to Spottsylvania Court House 
— Concentration of both armies — Oj^erations on the banks of the Po — Battles round 
Spottsylvania Court House — Warren's attack repulsed — Hancock's attack repulsed — 
Partial success of Wright's attack — Grant's plan for renewing the attack — Hancock's 
attack on the 12th May — The Confederate lines broken — Desperate struggle for the 
salient — Failure of Warren's attack — Failure of Burnside's attack — Losses of both 
sides — Grant endeavours to crush the Confederate right — The Federals renew the 
attack on the salient — Grant decides to make a fresh movement by the left flank — 
Operations of the Federal cavalry — Death of Stuart — Sheridan threatens Richmond — 
— Grant moves round Lee's right — Lee falls back to the North Anna — Grant reaches 
the North Anna — Dangerous position of the Federal army — Grant withdraws his 
army — Federal movement to the Pamunkey — Lee follows and covers Richmond — 
Fighting on the 30th — The Federals occupy Cold Harbour — Grant continues the 
movement to the left — Battle of Cold Harbour — Lee's movements on the 2nd — The 
Federal assault — Federals repulsed with heavy loss — Grant's change of plan. 

BY the end of April the Army of the Potomac encamped on 
the north bank of the Rapidan numbered over 99,000 men 
with 274 guns.2 It had been recently reorganised by 
Meade into three Corps ; but it is very doubtful whether this step 
was a wise one. In the densely wooded country, which was to be 
the scene of the next campaign, the Corps, as enlarged under the 
new arrangement, was too unwieldy an organisation to be easily 
handled, and in consequence a degree of responsibility devolved 
upon the divisional commanders which their actual rank hardly 
qualified them to undertake.^ North of the Rappahannock was a 
fourth Corps under Burnside, over 19,000 strong with 42 guns.* 

1 See Map HL 

^ " Present for duty equipped" (Humphreys, 14). ^ Humphreys, 3, 4. 

* Return of the 9th Corps for April. "The Morning Report for May lOth gave 
for its strength over 22,000 (Humphreys, 14). 

3" 



312 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

This Corps, though taking part in the campaign, was not formally 
placed under Meade's command till a month later.^ The Army of 
the Potomac was also handicapped by the anomalous position of 
General Meade. He was still commander of the army which he 
had led to victory at Gettysburg, and through him all orders 
passed. But the presence of the Commander-in-Chief led to a 
division of authority, which did not invariably work for good. 

When Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the 
P'ederal armies, Meade had at once offered to resign his position, 
thinking that Grant would probably wish Sherman to take his 
place. But Sherman could not be spared from the West, and 
Meade's straightforward conduct gained him Grant's warm approval 
and caused him to be retained in the command. 

It was open to Grant either to advance against Lee's army by 
land, or else to transport the Army of the Potomac by sea to the 
vicinity of Richmond. The latter had been the course adopted 
by McClellan in 1862. But there were weighty reasons which 
rendered it unsuitable in 1864. In the first place, Lee, both in 
1862 and 1863, had invaded the North and threatened Washington. 
If the Army of the Potomac were removed from his front, it was 
probable that he would again march upon the Federal capital. In 
the second place, the events of the last two years had convinced 
Grant that his true objective was not so much Richmond as the 
Army of Northern Virginia. The fall of Richmond would not 
involve the overthrow of the Southern Confederacy. The true 
bulwark of the South was the Army of Northern Virginia and its 
great commander. Therefore Grant, in the orders which he issued 
to Meade, directed him to keep close to Lee's army. " Wherever 
Lee goes, there you will go too." An advance by land was a 
course dictated by sound military principles. It specially com- 
mended itself to President Lincoln, who had never succeeded in 
reconciling himself to the movement by water. 

Grant had still to decide between two plans of campaign. He 
might move so as to turn either Lee's right or left flank. A 
movement against the Confederate left would threaten Gordons- 
ville and the line of communications between Richmond and the 
Shenandoah Valley, still one of the most fruitful sources of sup- 
plies on which the Confederates could count. It had this further 
advantage, that it would be made in more favourable country for 
offensive operations. But there were two reasons which caused 
Grant to reject it. It would be necessary to detach considerable 
bodies of troops, increasing in number as the Federals advanced, 
in order to protect the Orange and Alexandria Railway, which 
would be the main line of supplies for the advancing army. F^ven 
if the railway were abandoned, a strong force would be required to 

' Tliis Corps became part of Meade's command on May 24th. 



May, i864] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 313 

protect the wagon-trains moving to and from the navigable rivers, 
which might serve as an alternative line of supplies. Further, a 
movement by the right would necessitate a march of more than 
forty miles being made in full view of the Confederate signal posts 
on Southwest Mountain, and Lee would have ample time to 
entrench a formidable position on the mountain, covering all the 
lines of approach to Gordonsville. 

On the other hand, if the Federals moved by their left, they 
would have, it is true, to pass through the terribly intricate 
country of the Wilderness, but all their supplies could be brought 
up from the navigable rivers by which connection was maintained 
with Washington, and the wagon-trains would be moving on the 
left, in this case, the protected flank of the Army of the Potomac. 
There was, moreover, the chance, judging from the experience of 
the Mine Run campaign, that the advancing army might get safely 
through the Wilderness before Lee was in a position to strike it.^ 

Accordingly on May 2nd Grant issued orders for an advance by 
the left flank. The movement commenced at midnight of the 3rd. 
Five bridges were laid down across the Rapidan, two at the 
Germanna Ford, two at Ely's Ford, and one at the Culpeper Mine 
Ford. The 5th Corps crossed at Germanna Ford and marched on 
May 4th as far as the Wilderness Tavern, the point of intersection 
between the Germanna Plank road and the turnpike from Orange 
Court House to Fredericksburg. The 6th Corps followed the 5th, 
and bivouacked on the night of the 4th on the south bank of the 
river, waiting for Burnside's Corps to come up and take its place. 
The 2nd Corps crossed at Ely's Ford and moved to Chancellors- 
ville, whilst the trains crossed at Ely's and the Culpeper Mine 
Fords. The troops might have marched several miles further, and 
even have cleared the Wilderness, if their advance had not neces- 
sarily been regulated by the much slower rate of progression of 
the trains. 

The Army of Northern Virginia numbered over 60,000 men 
with 224 guns.2 Two Corps, Ewell's and A. P. Hill's, were near 
the Orange Court House.^ The 1st Corps, under Longstreet, 
recently returned from East Tennessee, was held back at Gordons- 
ville, in case the Federal movement should be by the right. But 
Lee fully expected that Grant would prefer to advance through the 
Wilderness, and his signallers on Clark's Mountain were ready to 
convey to him the earliest news of Grant's advance. The passage 
of the Rapidan was reported on the morning of the 4th, and the 

1 For a criticism of the advantages and disadvantages of the two routes, see 
Humphreys, 9-1 1. * Humphreys, 17. 

^ " Evk-ell's Corps was on and near the Rapidan above Mine Run and Hill's on his 
left higher up the stream" (4 B. & L., 119). Lee's headquarters were two miles north- 
east of Orange Court House. 



314 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

2nd Corps, under Ewcll, moved out along the turnpike road and 
went into camp that night about five miles from the Wilderness 
Tavern, where Warren was encamped. A. P. tlill, with two 
divisions of his Corps, marched on the Tlank road and halted about 
seven miles from Parker's Store, His third division, under R. H. 
Anderson, was left on the Rapidan. Orders were sent to Long- 
street at Gordonsville to advance, and at 4 p.m. the two divisions, 
which made up the ist Corps (Pickett's division had been sent to 
the southern bank of the James), were in motion. Early on the 
5th the Confederate columns were again moving towards the 
enemy. Lee did not want to bring on a general battle until 
Longstreet's Corps had arrived, and both Ewell and Hill were 
warned to that effect. Ewell on the turnpike being some miles 
nearer the P'ederal army than was Hill on the Plank road, halted 
his column, when he was within two miles of the Wilderness 
Tavern.^ 

The Federals had moved at 5 a.m. Warren was directed to 
reach Parker's Store on the Plank road, Sedgwick was to take 
Warren's place at the Wilderness Tavern, whilst Hancock, from 
Chancellorsville, was directed to advance to Shady Grove Church, 
on the Catharpin road, and extend his right towards the 5th Corps 
at Parker's Storc.'-^ The cavalry Corps was under the command of 
Sheridan, who had been brought for the purpose from the West. 
He had organised his force into three divisions under Gregg, 
Wilson, and Torbert. Information was received to the effect that 
the larger part of the Confederate cavalry was still on the lower 
Rappahannock below P'redericksburg, whither they had been sent 
for the sake of forage, and Sheridan, with Gregg's and Torbert's 
divisions, was sent on a reconnaissance in the direction of 
Fredericksburg to find the whereabouts of this body of cavalry, 
whilst Wilson's division was ordered to precede the march of the 
2nd Corps and keep parties out on the principal roads running 
west and siuith-west. 

In the 5th Corps Griffin's division lay across the turnpike about 
a mile in front of its junction with the Germanna road, whilst 
Crawford's division, followed by VVadsworth's and Robinson's, 
moved toward's Parker's Store. It was shortly after 7 a.m. that 
Meade was informed by a despatch from Warren that Confederate 
infantry were in his front on the turnpike. He at once sent orders 
to Warren to halt his column and attack with his whole force, in 
order to develop the strength of the force confronting him, and 
orders were sent to Hancock, directing him to halt at Todd's 
Tavern until Warren's movement had cleared up the situation. 
At the time of receiving this order, 9 a.m., the head of Hancock's 

* For the Confederate movements of the 4th ami 5th, see Humphreys, 22-3. 
"^ Humphreys, 21. 



May 5, 1S64] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 315 

column was already two miles beyond Todd's Tavern. The 
6th Corps was on its way from Germanna Ford. Wright's 
division of that Corps was directed to leave the Germanna road 
and take a cross-road, by which it might gain a position on 
Warren's right, and thus continue the Federal line of battle. 
Crawford's division of the 5th Corps received the order to halt, 
when it was within a mile of Parker's Store. A detachment of 
cavalry left by Wilson to observe the Plank road was skirmishing 
with what was supposed to be a Confederate cavalry force. On 
throwing out a skirmish line to support the cavalry, it was found 
that Confederate infantry were also moving on the Plank road. 
Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. Getty's division of the 6th Corps, 
which had already reached the Wilderness Tavern, was ordered to 
move on the Brock road to its intersection with the Plank road 
and to advance along the latter road and endeavour to drive the 
enemy back beyond Parker's Store. At the same time orders 
were sent to Hancock to move up the Brock road into the Plank 
road and be prepared to advance toward Parker's Store. 

About noon Griffin's division moved forward to the attack on 
the turnpike, and at first gained some success, driving back two of 
Ewell's brigades in confusion. But as the strength of Evvell's 
Corps developed itself and Wright's division failed to get up in 
time on the right, Griffin finding himself in danger of being out- 
flanked, fell back, leaving two guns behind him. It was after 
2 p.m. that Wright's division reached the scene of battle and 
formed on Warren's right, where it was immediately attacked 
by two brigades, which were repulsed with some loss. On the left 
of the turnpike Wadsworth's division and one brigade of Robin- 
son's had been endeavouring to connect with Griffin's left. But so 
thick and tangled was the wood through which they had to march 
that they lost their direction, and exposing their left flank to an 
attack from Ewell's right, were forced to retire in some confusion. 
On the extreme left of the 5th Corps Crawford, after receiving the 
order to halt, had taken up a strong position in open ground at 
Chewning's Farm. Further orders were received, directing him to 
send one brigade to the right to connect with the rest of the Corps. 
But this brigade also lost its line of direction in the forest, and 
being enveloped by Gordon's brigade on Ewell's right, was driven 
back with loss. Crawford's division being thus isolated, was with- 
drawn from its advanced position. 

Ewell and Warren now confronted each other with a distance of 
about 300 yards dividing them at the nearest point, and both sides 
hastened to entrench their positions. 

On the Plank road Getty's division was moving forward soon 
after 1 1 a.m., and found the cavalry outposts engaged with the 
skirmishers of Heth's division, which was leading Hill's advance. 



316 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Neither side, however, was anxious for a stand-up fight. Getty, 
on learning from some prisoners that Hill's Corps was in his front, 
decided to wait for the arrival of Hancock's Corps before assuming 
the offensive, and in the meantime threw up some slight entrench- 
ments. Hill had been directed by Lee not to bring on a battle 
before Longstreet's arrival, and made no attempt whatever to pre- 
cipitate matters, letting Heth halt in front of Getty and sending 
Wilcox's division to the left to assist Ewell, who was plainly en- 
gaged on the turnpike. 

At 2 p.m. Hancock's leading division arrived to support Getty. 
The 2nd Corps was drawn up along the Brock road on Getty's left 
with one division, Barlow's, on the extreme left advanced some- 
what forward beyond the Brock road, occupying some open and 
elevated ground which commanded a good deal of country both to 
right and left, and also covered a possible line of approach from 
the left along the bed of an unfinished railway. Nearly all the 
artillery of the 2nd Corps was posted at this point. As the after- 
noon wore on Grant and Meade learnt that Longstreet's Corps was 
not yet up, and determined to attack all along the line in the hope 
of dealing the Confederate army a crushing blow before the 
1st Corps could arrive to the rescue. At 4.15 p.m. Getty's division 
moved forward to the attack, supported by Hancock with two 
divisions, Birney's and Mott's, and later by two brigades of 
Gibbon's division. Wilcox was brought over from the left to 
reinforce Heth, and two of his brigades having taken post on the 
Confederate right beyond the Plank road, struck Mott's division on 
the left flank and drove it back some distance, but were them- 
selves driven back by a flank attack made by two of Barlow's 
brigades. Fighting continued till about 8 p.m., when the 
approaching darkness put an end to the combat. Hill's two 
divisions had suffered heavy losses, and but for the opportune 
arrival of night would scarcely have resisted the superior strength 
of Hancock's assault much longer. To the right of this fiercely 
contested battle on the Plank road Wadsworth's division had been 
ordered to fall upon Hill's left flank. But the difficulty of making 
a way through the dense forest for a large body of men was so 
great that Wadsworth only succeeded in reaching the skirmish 
line of the enemy, which he was vigorously pushing back, when 
night ended the battle. 

On the extreme right the fighting was confined to an assault by 
two brigades, and part of a third, of the 6th Corps upon Kwell's 
entrenched position, which was found to be too strong to be 
carried by a frontal attack.^ 

* The details of the fighting on May 5tli arc taken from Humphreys, 23-35. Tlie 
fighting on the turnijike was commenced by the Confederates (4 B. & L. , 121, note). 
Early in the day Jones' brigade drove the Federal outposts back, then fell back about 



May6, i864] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA S17 

Night found the two armies confronting each other very much 
in the positions occupied when they had first come into colHsion. 
On the Federal right Warren had been forced to fall back a short 
distance, and Ewell's line in his front was strongly entrenched. 
On the left Hancock's men had raised a triple line of fortifications, 
which played an important part in the battle of the following day, 
whilst, on the other hand. Hill's divisions, facing them, had only 
thrown up very slight entrenchments. Late at night Lee had sent 
orders to Longstreet to come up with all speed to Parker's Store. 
The 1st Corps reached this point at dawn. Anderson's division of 
the 3rd Corps, which had bivouacked at Verdiersville, was also 
called up, and reached the battlefield soon after Longstreet.^ 

Orders were sent from the Federal headquarters to Hancock, 
Sedgwick, and Warren to attack at 5 a.m. Burnside was ordered 
to march at 2 a.m. with three of his divisions. With two of these 
he was to fill the gap between Hancock's and Warren's Corps in 
time to take part in the general assault, when he was expected to 
push forward into the gap, which also existed between Hill's and 
Ewell's Corps, and cut the Confederate line in two.^ At 5 a.m. on 
the 6th the Federals moved to the attack. On the right neither 
Warren nor Sedgwick could make any impression upon Ewell's 
entrenched line, which had been strengthened during the night 
and armed with artillery. Repeated assaults were made during 
the morning, but without success. On the left Hancock attacked 
Hill's two divisions with Birney's, Mott's, and Getty's divisions 
and Gibbon's two brigades, whilst Wadsworth's division on the 
north of the Plank road assailed Hill's left. Hill's troops had 
apparently been told on the previous night that they would be 
relieved the following morning by Longstreet's Corps.^ In con- 
sequence they had made no attempt to strengthen their entrench- 
ments nor any preparations for renewing the battle. Taken more 
or less by surprise, they made a stout resistance for some time, 
but were driven back along the Plank road in ever-increasing 
confusion. 

The Confederate right wing was on the point of giving way 

two miles, in which position it was attacked by Wanen. Grant did not at first suppose 
tliat Lee was attacking him with the bulk of his forces, but imagined that the attack on 
his flank was merely a diversion to cover Lee's withdrawal towards the North Anna 
(Swinton, 421). Consequently he allowed Hancock to remain at Todd's Tavern for two 
hours, at a distance of ten miles from the rest of the army. Professor White claims that 
this delay on Grant's part gave Lee a rare opportunity of cutting the Army of the 
Potomac in two, and blames Longstreet for not Iseing up in time with his two divisions 
to take part in the attack on the 5th (White's Lee, 356-7 ; Lee's Lee, 331). But as 
Longstreet had to come from Gordonsville, it is very doubtful whether he could have 
arrived in time. For Mott's reverse, see Swinton, 426. 

^ Humphreys, 34-5- 

'■* The third division was to be held in reserve at Wilderness Tavern. 

3 White's Lee, 359 ; 4 B. & L., 123. 



318 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

when Longstreet's Corps at last reached the field, and, with Ker- 
shaw's division on the right of the road and Field's on the left, 
rushed into the battle to retrieve the day. Hancock's line was 
considerably disordered by the hard flighting and by pressing a 
pursuit of a mile or more over very difficult ground, and, attacked 
by this new foe, was first brought to a standstill and then forced 
some little way back. Hancock recognised the necessity of re- 
adjusting his line in the presence of Longstreet's reinforcements, 
and the first stage in the fighting on that wing came to an end 
about 6.30 a.m. 

Whilst Hancock was engaged in re-forming his line, Heth's and 
Wilcox's divisions were rallied and again brought up into line on 
Field's left. Anderson's division of Hill's Corps had al.so arrived 
on the battlefield : part had joined Field in the attack on Hancock, 
and part was formed in support. The Federal leaders did not, 
however, know that Anderson's division had come up, and also 
supposed that Longstreet had with him Pickett's division as well 
as Kershaw's and Field's.^ There seemed a danger, therefore, lest 
a strong Confederate force as yet unaccounted for might be march- 
ing against the Federal left flank, and Gibbon, commanding on 
Hancock's left, was ordered to keep a sharp look out along the 
Brock road. At 7 a.m. Hancock directed Gibbon to attack the 
enemy's right with Barlow's division and fight his way to the Plank 
road. But this order was only executed (presumably, owing to 
the fear that Longstreet was approaching on the Brock road) by 
one brigade, which, after some hard fighting, succeeded in con- 
necting with Mott's left. Had Hancock's order been carried out 
by the whole division, Longstreet's subsequent flank attack by the 
unfinished railroad would have been rendered impossible. 

Grant had hoped that he might have the good luck to get 
through the Wilderness without a pitched battle, but from the first 
he had seen that there was a possibility that he might be forced 
to fight, and now that he found himself confronted by the Army of 
Northern Virginia, his true objective, he was prepared to fight to a 
finish. Orders were sent to Hancock formally placing Wadsworth's 
division under his command. Stevenson's division of the 9th 
Corps, which had been held in reserve at the Wilderness Tavern, 
also reported to him for duty : and he was informed that Burnside's 
other two divisions would attack on his right between the Plank 
and turnpike roads. 

This information proved inaccurate, as 13urnsidc, whose move- 
ments were very dilatory on this day, did not come into collision 
with the enemy till 2 p.m. Acting on the information received, 
Hancock shortly before 9 a.m. renewed the attack. Getty's 
division had been withdrawn to the Brock road, but the last of 

' Huniplucys, 41. 



May 6, 1S64] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 319 

Gibbon's brigades had been brought over from the left to take its 
place. With Birney's, Wadsworth's, Mott's, Gibbon's, and part of 
Stevenson's divisions, Hancock made his second attack. Fierce 
fighting ensued, and lasted till nearly 1 1 a.m., but without any 
material advantage being gained by either side. Barlow's division 
on the extreme left was engaged with the enemy's dismounted 
cavalry, and took no part in the main attack along the Plank road. 
About 10.30 a.m. orders were received by Warren and Sedgwick 
to make no further attack upon Ewell's lines, but to entrench 
their own positions more strongly, so that a part of their forces 
might be drawn off to support Hancock. 

But it was now the turn of the Confederates to assume the 
offensive. Longstreet had discovered that the unfinished railroad 
on his right "afforded a safe and covered line of advance against the 
left flank of Hancock's main force on the Plank road. Four 
brigades were moved along this railroad, and then facing north 
fell furiously upon the unprotected Federal flank shortly after 
II a.m. The exposed flank was rolled up "like a wet blanket,"^ 
and the confusion spread to the other divisions. Hancock vainly 
endeavoured to draw the troops which had been struck in flank 
back to the Plank road, and at the same time with his right hold 
his ground against the enemy in his front. The difficulty of form- 
ing troops partially demoralised into a fresh line under heavy fire 
in a thick wood was too great : and he found himself obliged to 
withdraw his whole force into the entrenchments which had been 
thrown up the previous day on the Brock road. 

It was Longstreet's intention to follow up this success by an 
immediate attack, with his Corps and Anderson's division, upon 
Hancock's entrenched position, but as he was riding with his Staff 
along the Plank road at the head of the attacking column, a volley 
was fired across the road by some part of the four brigades which 
had taken part in the flanking movement, and were now arranged 
on the south side of the road, about sixty yards from it. Long- 
street himself was dangerously wounded, and forced to leave the 
field, whilst Jenkins, one of the ablest of his brigadiers, was killed 
on the spot. The fall of Longstreet robbed the Confederates of 
any chance which they had of crushing the Federal left.^ Ander- 
son was appointed to the command of the ist Corps, and was 
succeeded in the command of his division by Mahone. But the 
change of commanders took time, and Lee himself on arriving on 

"' Hancock's own phrase. 

- It has been claimed by some Confederate writers that Longstreet's fall alone pre- 
vented the Confederates from winning a second Bull Run or Chancellorsville. But this 
view ignores the fact that Hancock's left (three brigades of Barlow's Corps) had not 
advanced, but remained on the original line covering the Brock road (Swinton, 434, 
note). 



320 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the scene determined to have the Hne straightened out before the 
attack was made. Not till 4.15 p.m. did the Confederates assail 
Hancock's entrenchments. The attack was gallantly made.^ At 
one point the Federals gave way, and the Confederate colours 
were planted upon the first line of works. ]3ut the success was 
only momentary : an advance from the second line promptly drove 
the Confederates back, and recovered the lost works ; and at 5 p.m. 
the Confederates fell back baffled. 

The repulse of this charge brought to an end the fighting on the 
Federal left. Grant, indeed, intent on " hammering" the enemy, 
had ordered another attack to be made by Hancock and Burnside 
at 6 p.m. But Hancock's troops had almost exhausted their stock 
of ammunition, and there was no time to organise a fresh attack by 
the hour named. On Hancock's right Burnside's two divisions had 
been engaged with Perry's brigade of Anderson's division and 
Law's brigade of Field's division. Fighting commenced in this 
portion of the field about 2 p.m. ; and about 5.30 p.m., in order to 
relieve the pressure upon Hancock, Burnside made a vigorous 
attack with both his divisions and drove back the two brigades in 
his front in confusion. But reinforcements were brought up by 
Heth,^ and Burnside was forced to fall back to the position, which 
he had held earlier in the day. Beyond preventing some of Hill's 
troops from taking part in the attack on Hancock's position, 
Burnside's immediate command played a very insignificant part in 
the day's fighting. 

On the extreme right of the Federal line shortly before sunset 
a vigorous flank attack was delivered by Gordon with two brigades. 
The two Federal brigades on that flank were taken by surprise 
and rolled up in great confusion. Amongst the prisoners both 
the brigadier-generals fell into the hands of the Confederates. So 
complete was the surprise that one of the brigades was assailed 
whilst still engaged in the work of building entrenchments. Gordon 
did not succeed in pushing his success far. His troops were thrown 
into great disorder whilst pursuing the enemy through the dense 
wood. The rest of Wright's division stood firm in their entrench- 
ments against an attack delivered by the rest of Early's division, and 
night put an end to a contest in which both opponents were in con- 
siderable confusion and heartily welcomed a cessation of hostilities.^ 

^ The attacking force seems to have been composed of Field's and Anderson's 
divisions, less one brii^ade of each division, and perhaps part of llelli's (Humphreys, 49). 

'^ Wofilord's brigade of Kershaw's division also took part in Burnside's repulse 
(Iluniphri-ys, 46). 

■* According to Humphreys the attacking brigades were Ciordon's and Pegram's 
brigades of Early's division and Johnston's of Rodes'. Gordon and Johnston attacked 
the Federal right flank and I'egram attacked in front. The two Federal brigades, on 
which the flank attack fell, were Shalcr's and Seymour's. But neither of these brigades 
were completely routed, and part of Shaler's, which suffered the more heavily of the two, 



May, 1864] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 321 

During the night Early formed a fresh line somewhat in advance 
of his old one : on the Federal side the 6th Corps was withdrawn 
and posted in an entirely new position some distance to the rear, 
and the right of the 5th Corps also fell back so as to conform to 
this new disposition. 

The net result of the day's fighting had been that the Confederates 
had gained a little ground on their left, and on their right had 
forced Hancock back into his entrenchments, but their attempt to 
storm those entrenchments had been a costly failure. It was a 
drawn battle, proving the powerlessness of either army to over- 
whelm the other in their present positions. But if the fighting had 
no decisive results, still the losses on both sides were very heavy. 
Grant's loss amounted to ij,666} It is impossible to state the 
Confederate loss with any confidence of accuracy. It was probably 
considerably over 10,000.- It was undoubtedly a good deal less 
than that of the Federals, as the latter were in the main the attack- 
ing force. During the fighting on the 6th the woods caught fire in 
some places, and some of the helpless wounded perished miserably 
in the flames. 

On the 7th May Grant determined to continue the movement by 
his left flank, to get clear of the Wilderness, and by pressing on 
towards Richmond compel Lee to give him battle in more favour- 
able country or else sacrifice the Confederate capital. The trains 
were ordered to start in the middle of the afternoon, so that they 
might not impede the movement of that part of the army which 
followed on the same road. At 8.30 p.m. the 5th Corps started 
along the Brock road for Spottsylvania Court House, fifteen miles 
to the south-east. The 2nd Corps was ordered to follow the 5th to 
Todd's Tavern at the junction of the Brock and Catharpin roads. 
The 6th Corps was ordered to march to Chancellorsville and 
advance to a position on the left of the 5th Corps by the road from 
Piney Branch Church, whilst the 9th Corps followed Sedgwick, but 
was ordered to halt at the junction of the Orange Plank road with 
the Piney Branch Church road to guard the trains. The fighting 
on that day was confined to a cavalry encounter. Sheridan 
assumed the offensive with his whole force and drove Fitzhugh 
Lee's and Wade Hampton's divisions from Todd's Tavern, pursuing 
the former along the Brock road and the latter along the Catharpin 
road. 

Lee quickly learnt that the Army of the Potomac was on the 
move. It was probable that Grant was doing one of two things. 

stood firm, and forced the right of Gordon's brigade to give way. According to another 
account, Gordon's, Pegram's, and Hays' brigades were the three engaged in the 
Confederate attack (4 B. & L., 127, note). 

1 4B. & L., T82. 

^ Swinton, 439, reckons the Confederate loss at about 8,000. Phisterer's Statistical 
Record states it at 11,400. But see Humphreys, 54. 



322 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Either he was retiring to Fredericksburg, or he was seeking to out- 
flank the Army of Northern Virginia by a movement round its 
right. Anderson, now commanding Longstreet's Corps, started at 
1 1 p.m. to march for Spottsylvania Court House by the Shady 
Grove Church road, and at daybreak of the 8th was across the river 
Po.^ After a brief rest the Corps moved to the left on discovering 
that the enemy was advancing on the Brock road, and took posi- 
tion on a ridge about a mile and a half north of the Court House, 
at the intersection of the Brock and Block House roads (the latter 
ran from the Old Court House, intersecting the Shady Grove 
Church road a mile east of the crossing of the Po). 

The advance of Warren's Corps along the Brock road had been 
considerably delayed by the presence in his front of Fitzhugh Lee's 
cavalry division. Trees had been felled across the road, and the 
dismounted cavalry offered so obstinate a resistance, that by the 
time the 5th Corps reached open ground, in the vicinity of Alsop's 
Farm, the men were thoroughly exhausted, and the ist Corps of 
the Confederate army was found roughly entrenched in their front. 
Some sharp fighting ensued, with the result that the Federal Corps 
took up a position from 200 to 400 yards distant from the enemy's 
entrenched line and commenced to throw up entrenchments 
themselves.^ 

On the arrival of the 6th Corps in the course of the afternoon the 
fight was renewed, but without any decided advantage being gained 
on either side, as the 2nd Confederate Corps reached the battlefield 
shortly after Sedgwick's arrival, and the advance of Rodes' division 
prevented the right flank of Anderson's position being turned.^ 
Ewell had had the longest march of any of the Confederate Corps 
to make, having been ordered to go round by Parker's Store, and 
by that route reach the Shady Grove Church road. The 3rd Corps, 
temporarily commanded by Early (whose division in the 2nd 
Corps was for the time commanded by Gordon), took a road 
between those followed by Anderson's and Ewell's Corps, and was 
ordered to move to Spottsylvania Court House by the Brock road. 
Having struck the Catharpin road by a cross-road from the 
Orange Plank road, Early was advancing towards Todd's Tavern 

' The 1st Corps marched by a road running soutli from the Plank road into the 
Catharpin road Ixjtween Todd's Tavern and Corbin's Britlge. After crossing the Po at 
Corbin s Bridge the Corps took tlie Sliady Grove Church road to Spottsylvania Court 
House and crossed the Po a second lime a mile west of the Block House. Two 
brigades of Kershaw's division marched thence to Si>jttsylvania Court House and 
hastened the retreat of Wilson's cavalry division, which had been in possession of the 
Court House for two hours and had just received orders to withdraw from General 
Sheridan (Humphreys, 62-3). ^ Humphreys, 61. 

' This is Ewell's statement, who says that Rodes advanceil nearly half a mile, when 
his left coming uix)n strong works was checked, and he was forced to halt. On the 
other hand, it is stated that Crawford's division came suildenly upon Rodes' division, as 
it was "moving by a flank," and drove it back three-quarters of a mile (Swinton). 



May, .864] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 323 

to get into the Brock road, when he found Wade Hampton's 
cavalry division in his front engaged with the Federal cavalry, 
and on pressing forward discovered that Hancock's Corps held 
Todd's Tavern, and that the route by the Brock road was closed 
to him. Throughout the 8th these two Corps remained confront- 
ing each other, and some skirmishing took place between their 
advance guards. Very early in the morning of the 9th Early 
marched by the Shady Grove Church road to Spottsylvania Court 
House, and took position on the right of the Confederate line facing 
Burnside's Corps, which was advancing along the Fredericksburg 
road. Hancock marched by the Brock road, and took position 
on the extreme right of the Federal line with his right resting on 
the Po. 

The battlefield of Spottsylvania was not one of any particular 

strategic importance.^ The Confederate position rested on a ridge 

which ran across the peninsula formed by the Po and Ny Rivers, 

but, though fairly strong in itself, it might be turned on either flank. 

During the 9th, Hancock was ordered to cross the Po with three 

of his divisions, move down the right bank, and endeavour to 

locate the position of the Confederate left. The other division — 

Mott's — of the 2nd Corps was ordered to the left of the 6th Corps. 

This movement round their left threatened the Louisa Court 

House road, by which the Confederate trains were moving, and 

had it been persisted in, would have turned their left.- Anxious 

for the safety of his trains, Lee directed Early on his right to move 

two divisions to the left. At an early hour on the 10th, Mahone's 

division entrenched a position covering the bridge, by which the 

Shady Grove Church road crossed the Po, a mile west of the 

Block House and two and a half miles west of Spottsylvania 

Court House, whilst Heth's division crossed the river lower down 

and moved out against Hancock's turning column. But the Federal 

Commander-in-Chief, on the morning of the lOth, had determined 

to assault the Confederate lines in front, and Hancock was directed 

to withdraw two of his divisions to the left bank and join in an 

attack by the 5th Corps upon Anderson's position. Grant, having 

got the enemy in position in front of him, was resolved to repeat 

the experiment, which had already proved so costly in the 

Wilderness, of assaulting all along the line. Barlow's division of 

Hancock's command was ordered to remain on the right bank to 

threaten the Confederate left. But Heth's advance against this 

isolated division necessitated its withdrawal across the Po.^ The 

retrograde movement was not effected without some heavy 

fighting, in which the Federals lost a gun. 

At 3.45 p.m. Warren advanced to the attack with Crawford's 

1 Humphreys, 71. "^ Humphreys, 80. 

^ Barlow's division had already received orders to recross the Po. 



324 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

and Cutler's divisions (Cutler had succeeded to the command of 
Wadsworth's division after the latter's death on the 6th) and two 
brigades of Gibbon's division, which had recrossed the river. The 
assault was gallantly made. But the Confederate position was too 
strong to be carried by a frontal attack, and though at certain 
points the entrenchments were reached, the Federals were repulsed 
with heavy loss. When Hancock, after seeing Barlow's division 
safely withdrawn, reached the scene of the recent attack, he was 
directed to renew it at 7 p.m. He attacked with Birney's and 
Gibbon's divisions, and part of the 5th Corps co-operating, but 
met with no better success.^ The really vulnerable point in the 
Confederate lines was further east, where, near the intersection of 
the Brock and Block House roads, the general line of the entrench- 
ments turned sharply to the south ; from the angle thus formed a 
salient, roughly in the shape of an inverted letter U, a mile long 
and half a mile across, projected northwards. The western half of 
the curved portion was, however, so flat as to be almost a straight 
line ; it was held by Doles' brigade of Rodes' division of the 
2nd Corps, and the eastern half occupied by Johnson's division of 
the same Corps." Upton's brigade, with four regiments of another 
brigade, was ordered by General Wright (who had succeeded to 
the command of the 6th Corps upon the death of Sedgwick, killed 
by a sniper on the 9th) to assault the west shoulder, whilst Mott's 
division was to attack on Wright's left. Upton was able to form 
his regiments for the attack under cover of a wood, which reached 
within 200 yards of the Confederate lines. The assault at this 
point, delivered at 6.10 p.m.,^ proved at first entirely successful. 
The first line of the Confederate defences was carried, as also was 
a second line of entrenchments 100 yards to the rear, but the 
failure of Mott to co-operate enabled the Confederates to concen- 
trate a superior force against Upton, who was driven back to the 
first line of entrenchments, from which the Federal troops were 
withdrawn under cover of the darkness. Mott was obliged to 
form his line of attack in full view of the enemy, and was 
repulsed by the heavy fire of artillery and musketry without 
reaching the Confederate entrenchments. The nature of the 
ground prevented his attack from partaking of the nature of a 

* Humphreys, 81-2, and General Webb (4 B. & L., 167-8) speak of two assaults. 
But Swinton, 449, states that Gibbon's two brigades attacked as early as II a.m. (of. 
White's Lee, 372), that Crawford and Cutler made a preliminary assault at 3 p.m., and 
two more attacks were made by Warren and Hancock together. General Law (4 B. & 
L., 129) mentions three assaults, the second at 3 p.m. and the third some hours later. 

'■' In Humphreys, 73-4, it is pointed out that what is usually called the salient was 
an east and west line about 400 yards long, and should properly be termed its apex, 
but the Confederate plan, made by Major Hotchkiss and reproduced in the atlas of the 
Othcial Records of the war (83. 3), shows the salient as described in the text. General 
Humphreys probably means the flattened western shoulder of the inverted U, which runs 
about east by north and west by south. " Humphreys, 86. 



May, i864] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 325 

surprise : and only a surprise attack had any chance of success 
against Lee's lines. 

On this day Burnside on the Federal left pushed a reconnaissance 
close up to the enemy's lines on the Fredericksburg road and took 
up and entrenched a position there. 

In spite of his heavy losses on the loth, which probably amounted 
to over 4,000,^ Grant was determined to make another attempt to 
break Lee's lines. He was encouraged in this determination by 
the partial success which had attended Upton's attack, and he 
attributed the failure to follow up that success to the want of energy 
displayed by Mott and Burnside. Accordingly he issued orders to 
Hancock to march on the night of the nth in rear of the 5th and 
6th Corps, and under cover of the darkness take up a position in 
the open ground of Brown's Farm, from which point Mott had 
made his unsuccessful attack on the loth. Having connected the 
rest of his Corps with Mott's division, Hancock was ordered to 
attack the apex of the salient at 4 a.m. on the 12th, and Burnside 
on Hancock's left was to attack at the same hour. Warren and 
Wright were to keep their troops in readiness either to attack the 
enemy's lines in their respective fronts or to move to some other 
point, according to the orders which they might receive. The 
entrenchments left empty by the withdrawal of the 2nd Corps 
were filled by part of the 5th, whilst Wright kept one division in 
the trenches and held the other two in reserve. Lee was deceived 
by certain movements of the Federal troops on the nth into the 
idea that they intended to turn his left, and ordered the withdrawal 
of the artillery of Johnson's division holding the apex of the 
salient. The order was countermanded in the course of the night 
owing to information received from Johnson that the enemy were 
massing in his front. But Hancock's assault was made before these 
guns had got back into position. Only two of them fired at all, and 
they only two rounds, and the whole of this artillery force fell into 
the hands of the victorious Federals.^ 

During the night of the i ith the 2nd Corps took up the position 
assigned to it. The morning was very foggy, and in consequence 
the assault ordered for 4 a.m. did not take place till half an hour 
later. Birney's division was on the right and Barlow's on the left ; 
the former in two deployed lines, the latter in two lines of masses, 
each regiment formed in close column of attack.^ Mott's division 
was in rear of Birney's in a single line, and Gibbon's was held in 
reserve. In advancing to the attack over the open ground, which 
at this point lay in front of the Confederate lines, the two lines of 
Barlow's division combined into one dense mass, and edging off 
somewhat to the left, struck the east shoulder of the salient and the 
entrenchments running south from it for about 600 yards. Two of 

^ Humphreys, 89. "^ Humphreys, 95. ^ Humphreys, 92. 



326 THE Civil. AVAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Gibbon's brigades rushed forward and entered the Confederate lines 
at the same time as Barlow's division, continuing the storming line 
to the left. The Confederates were swept away by the assault. 
Without artillery musketry was powerless to check an advance 
over so short a distance of open ground. Johnson's division was 
almost annihilated. He himself and one of his brigadiers, G. H. 
Stcuart, were taken prisoners, as were also a great part of his troops, 
variously estimated from 2,000 to 4,000,^ all the artillery of the 
division, twenty guns, were captured, and a very heavy loss of 
killed and wounded inflicted, as the entrenchments were carried at 
the point of the bayonet. Birney's and Mott's divisions struck the 
Confederate lines just west of the east angle extending from that 
point to the west angle and for some 400 yards along the west face 
of the salient.^ 

Great as had been the success achieved, the confusion into which 
the assailants had fallen prevented them following up their victory. 
Gordon with two brigades forced back Barlow's and Gibbon's 
troops to the outer face of the salient, whilst on the other wing two 
brigades of Rodes' division drove back Birney's and Mott's divi- 
sions.^ V^ithin an hour after the entrenchments were carried, the 
Federals had been forced back to the further side of the lines which 
they had assailed. Both sides hurried up reinforcements, Wright's 
two divisions were ordered to attack on Hancock's right soon after 
6 a.m., and throughout the day and far into the night a desperate 
encounter raged in the vicinity of the west shoulder, since known 
as the IMoody Angle.'* Lee did not dare to draw any troops from 
his left : for if that part of the line were broken, then the troops in 
the salient would be exposed to attack in rear and flank. The 
lines, which Anderson's Corps held, formed in fact the hinge upon 
which Lee might swing back from the salient, and it was vitally 
important that they should be held intact.^ 

Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. Warren attacked the entrenchments 
held by Anderson's Corps, but as they were fully manned, the 
attack of the 12th met with the same fate as that of the loth, and 
the assault was promptly ordered to cease. Still Lee did not 
venture to withdraw any troops from Anderson's Corps to help his 
sorely pressed centre till late in the afternoon. In the meantime, 
as soon as Warren's attack was seen to be a failure. Cutler's division 
was withdrawn and sent to support the 6th Corps, and prepara- 
tions were made to follow with the rest of the 5th Corps.^ But by 

* The Confederate accounts say that nearly the whole of Johnson's division was 
captured, and that it numbered only 2,8oo. H.incock claimed to have captured nearly 
4,000 of Ewell's Corps and to have inflicted very heavy loss as well in killed and wounded 
(Humphreys, 93). ' Humphreys, 93. '•' Humphreys, 96-7. 

* The fighting at this point continued till 3 a.m. (Humphreys, 98). 

* Humphreys, 92, note. 

® Except Crawford's division, which occupied the entrenchments of the Corps. 



MAYi2,i864l GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 327 

the time that Warren reached the point from which the attack was 
to be made, the Federal commanders had decided that it was use- 
less to make any fresh assault. 

The chief burden of the day's fighting consequently fell upon the 
6th and 2nd Corps, and it extended all along their line from the 
right of the one Corps to the left of the other. Lee was only able 
to send up to the support of his centre under Ewell three brigades 
from the right wing. But with their support Rodes' and Gordon's 
divisions obstinately held their own throughout the day. Never 
probably in the annals of warfare has a stranger combat taken 
place than that which was carried on hour after hour by two large 
bodies of troops separated only by a line of log works. 

Prisoners were taken on both sides by being simply pulled over 
the top of these works. The Federals advanced artillery quite 
close up to the breastworks, and brought an enfilading fire to bear 
upon the Confederates, but they held fast to their posts, and the 
Federals were unable to regain a footing on the southern side of 
the entrenchments which they had stormed so many hours ago. 
In the early hours of the 13th the Confederate troops were with- 
drawn to a retrenchment which had been constructed across the 
base of the salient.^ The loss at the Bloody Angle at Spottsyl- 
vania Court House far surpassed that at the Bloody Lane at 
the Antietam. So pitiless was the storm of bullets that an oak 
tree within the Confederate lines with a diameter of twenty-two 
inches was actually cut in half. 

On the left of the Federal line Burnside moved to the attack at 
the hour appointed. Potter's division carried the line of works 
held by Lane's brigade on Early's left at 5 a.m., but Lane, re- 
inforced by two other brigades, renewed the battle and recaptured 
his entrenchments. Burnside made repeated attacks with his three 
divisions, but failed to drive the enemy from their lines. 

The losses on both sides for this day's fighting were very heavy. 
The total Federal loss was over 6,800: the Confederate loss in 
killed and wounded must have been between 4,000 and 5,000,"^ and 
the prisoners may have amounted to nearly as many more. In 
spite of his tremendous losses, Lee had nevertheless held his own. 
Both on the right and left the Federal attacks had been decisively 
repulsed, and though the salient had been carried by Hancock, yet 
the retrenchment constructed across its base was of so formidable 
a nature that any fresh attempt to break Lee's lines by a frontal 
attack was likely to lead only to increased slaughter. 

Even Grant at last recognised this fact. Instead of pressing the 
attack at the centre, he determined to transfer a considerable part 
of the army to the left flank, in the hope that they might break the 

1 This line apparently had been begun by Gordon's division, which formed Ewell's 
reserve, two or three days before. ^ Humphreys, 105. 



328 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Confederate lines at that point before Lee could bring up reinforce- 
ments. An advance by the right flank would have probably caused 
Lee to abandon his lines in front of Spottsylvania Court House and 
withdraw towards Richmond, with which his communications would 
be threatened. But an advance by the left flank was not so likely 
to frighten Lee into a hasty retreat, and at the same time would 
secure the Federal communications with their depots at Washing- 
ton and the despatch of their wounded to Fredericksburg for 
Washington.^ 

Warren was directed to move his Corps on the night of the 13th 
towards the left to the Fredericksburg road, to form on the left of 
the 9th Corps and assault the Confederate right at 4 a.m. of the 
14th. The 6th Corps was to follow the 5th and attack on its left 
along the Massaponax Church road. The commanders of the 
2nd and 9th Corps were ordered to hold themselves in readiness 
to attack the lines in their front at 4 a.m., but to wait for actual 
orders to do so.^ Warren's night march was made under circum- 
stances of extreme difficulty. Rain fell throughout the night, 
turning the road into a slough : the darkness was intense. Not 
till two hours after the hour fixed for the assault did the 5th 
Corps reach its destination : and then the troops were so worn out 
with exhaustion and so reduced by straggling, that it was vain to 
think of making an attack on that day. The 6th Corps on the 
14th took position on the left of the 5th, and some high ground 
on the Massaponax Church road, about half a mile south of the 
Ny, which commanded the surrounding country as well as the 
Fredericksburg road, was seized and held by the Federals. 

This summed up the fighting of the 14th. On the same day 
the one brigade of Mahone's division, which had been left to guard 
the bridge near the Block House, was brought over to Early's 
right. But it was not till night that Field's division of Anderson's 
Corps was brought from its entrenchments to the Confederate 
right, and Kershaw's division of the same Corps did not follow 
till midnight of the 15th. Could Warren's Corps have been up 
to time, there would have been a good chance of breaking the 
Confederate lines before any reinforcement arrived from the left.^ 
But the unavoidable delay gave the Confederates time to extend 
their lines further south as far as Snell's Bridge over the Po, and 
to bring over to the threatened point troops from the other flank, 
which was no longer menaced. Early on the morning of the 15th 
Hancock moved two of his divisions to the left to the Fredericks- 
burg road, leaving Birney's division to cover Burnside's right 
flank. The 15th, i6th, and 17th were spent by the 5th and 6th 
Corps in advancing and entrenching their lines, putting batteries 
in position, and examining roads which led southwards.'* 

' lluiiii)lir«;)b, loO. - lIumj)hiL}s, 107. •* llumjtlireys, loS. * llumjilircys, 109. 



May, 1S64] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 329 

As the strength of the Confederate right did not hold out any 
prospect of a successful attack at that point, Grant determined to 
move the 2nd and 6th Corps back on the night of the 17th, in 
order that at daylight of the i8th they might assault the retrench- 
ment, which had been constructed across the base of the salient 
after the successful attack of the 2nd Corps on the 12th. It was 
hoped that the Confederates at that point might be caught off 
their guard, and a permanent lodgment effected in their lines. 
Burnside was to attack in conjunction with Wright and Hancock, 
and Warren was to open fire with all his artillery, and be prepared 
on receiving orders to that effect to assume the offensive.^ 

The attack proved, however, a complete failure. The enemy 
were fully prepared to meet it. The entrenchments attacked 
proved to be of a most formidable character, and as soon as 
Meade realised that failure was inevitable, he ordered the troops 
to be recalled. The 6th Corps at once returned to its position on 
the left of the 5th, and the same night the 2nd Corps was moved 
to the left and took position on the east bank of the Ny below 
the left of the 6th Corps.^ The 9th Corps was also moved to the 
left of the 6th Corps and posted on the west bank of the Ny. 
Both the 6th and 9th Corps pressed up as close as they could to 
the Confederate lines and entrenched.^ 

After the failure of the attack on the i8th Grant at last decided 
that nothing was to be gained by further assaults upon Lee's 
entrenched position. He therefore determined to continue his 
movement by the left flank. He hoped that by throwing the 2nd 
Corps several miles out in advance of the rest of his army, Lee 
might be induced to attack it, and that thus a chance might be 
given of forcing him to fight, before he had time to entrench.* 
The movement was to be commenced by Hancock on the night of 
the 19th, but on that day Ewell's Corps moved out of its entrench- 
ments round the right of the Federal line to see whether the 
enemy were withdrawing from their lines or not. Ewell en- 
countered Tyler's division, which had recently joined Grant from 
Washington, on the Fredericksburg road near the Harris House, 
and a sharp engagement ensued. Hancock and Warren were 
ordered to send reinforcements to Tyler. Ewell was repulsed 
with considerable loss, but Hancock's march was postponed till 
the night of the 20th. 

On May 8th Grant had ordered Sheridan to concentrate all his 
available cavalry and make a raid against the railways in Lee's 
rear, and after threatening Richmond to connect with Butler's 
army on the James, and thence rejoin the Army of the Potomac 
by U'ay of the White House on the Pamunkey. Such a move- 

^ Humphreys, no. ^ Humphreys, in. 

^ Humphreys, II2. * Plumphreys, 1 19. 



330 THE CIVIT. WAR TN THE UNITED STATES 

ment was certain to bring the Confederate cavalry in hot pursuit 
of Sheridan, and a cavalry encounter might be expected to ensue, 
in which the Federal superiority of numbers was likely to give 
them the advantage. On the 9th Sheridan moved round Lee's 
right flank by the Telegraph road, crossed the North Anna on the 
same day with his leading division, and on the loth struck the 
Virginia Central Railway at Beaver Dam Station, where ten miles 
of the track were torn up, and engines, cars, and a quantity of 
army supplies destroyed. At daylight on the nth the Fredericks- 
burg Railway was reached at Ashland Station, and a similar scene 
of destruction inaugurated. Stuart with three cavalry brigades 
promptly started in pursuit, and whilst one brigade hung on 
Sheridan's rear, the other two by a roundabout route got in front 
of him, and on the nth confronted him at Yellow Tavern about 
six miles from Richmond. A fierce engagement took place, in 
which the Confederates were ultimately forced to retire with the 
loss of their commander mortally wounded. 

Stuart died the following day at Richmond. His loss was a 
heavy blow to Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. But to 
suppose that it was as great a blow to the Confederate cause as 
the death of Stonewall Jackson is to overstate the case. Stuart 
was the bean ideal of Southern chivalry, a dashing cavalry com- 
mander, who won a well-deserved fame for his daring raids. 
But there is nothing to show that he was growing as a strategist, 
or that he would ever have displayed the same ability in indepen- 
dent command as did Forrest in the West. He was succeeded 
in the command of the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia 
by General Wade Hampton. 

Having disposed of the Confederate cavalry, Sheridan pushed 
on towards Richmond. He entered the most advanced line of 
the Confederate entrenchments, but the second line of works was 
so strongly held that he was forced to cross to the north bank of 
the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge (Map VH.). He recrossed 
to the south bank on the 13th at Bottom Bridge, and reached 
Haxall's Landing on the James on the 14th, where he remained till 
the 17th. He rejoined the Army of the Potomac a week later.^ 

The Federal losses which took place about Spottsylvania Court 
House from the 8th to the 19th amounted to 18,399.- It is 
difficult to form any approximate estimate of what the Con- 
federate losses were during the same period. Except on the 12th, 
they must have been considerably less than those of their op- 
ponents, as they were fighting on the defensive behind entrench- 
ments with wire entanglements in front, new to warfare even in 
America,'' 

^ For Sheridan's raid, sec Hunipiireys, 134-6. 

" 4 13. & L., 1S2. ^ llumi)lireys, 1 17. 



May, 1864] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 331 

Grant commenced to withdraw his forces from Lee's front on 
the night of the 20th. Hancock's Corps marched during the night 
to Guinea Station on the Fredericksburg Railway, a distance of 
about eight miles. The march was continued through BowHng 
Green, and by noon on the 21st the leading division had crossed 
the Mattapony and entrenched a position after driving off a small 
force of Confederate infantry from the north bank of the river. 
The original plan was that Warren's Corps should march by the 
Telegraph road, to be followed by Burnside's Corps, whilst Wright's 
Corps followed Hancock's line of march.^ But apparently Grant 
grew apprehensive for the safety of Hancock's advanced column, 
and directed Warren to take a route which would bring him 
nearer to Hancock's exposed flank. Under his fresh orders 
Warren was directed to march to Guinea Station and then take 
a road running south-west, which would ultimately bring him into 
the Telegraph road. 

Lee had had timely information of the Federal movements. 
As soon as news reached him that a Federal force had appeared 
upon the Fredericksburg Railway, he brought Ewell's Corps round 
to the extreme right and directed him to extend along the south 
bank of the Po until he covered the crossing of the Telegraph 
road at Stannard's Mills. When he found that Warren's Corps 
was withdrawing on the morning of the 21st, he started Ewell's 
Corps, followed by Anderson's Corps, along the Telegraph road. 
His first impression was that Grant was moving to the left, in 
order to put the Mattapony between himself and his foe and to 
open up communications with Port Royal, and he did not anti- 
cipate meeting Grant again in the field until he should have 
crossed the Pamunkey on his way to Richmond.^ He did not 
attempt, as Grant had hoped that he would, to fall upon Hancock's 
isolated Corps, but determined to withdraw behind the North 
Anna, keeping between Grant and Richmond and covering the 
Virginia Central Railway. This railway intersects the Fredericks- 
burg line at Hanover Junction, about two miles south of the North 
Anna, and from that point runs to Richmond at a distance of about 
six miles to the east of the other railway. The junction is twenty- 
five miles north of Richmond, and by the Telegraph road twenty- 
eight miles south of the right of Lee's position at Snell's Bridge.^ 

Ewell's Corps reached Hanover Junction in the morning of the 
22nd, and Anderson's Corps in the course of the afternoon took 
up a position on the south bank of the North Anna. Hill's Corps 
marched on the night of the 21st, after a brisk skirmish with the 
6th Corps, by a road west of the Telegraph road, and was in 
position near Hanover Junction along the Virginia Central Railway 
on the morning of the 23rd. Hill had resumed command of the 

^ Humphreys, 120. - Humphreys, 121, note. ^ Humphreys, 123. 



332 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

3rd Corps just before it marched from Spottsylvania, and Early 
returned to the command of his own division in the 2nd Corps, 
whilst Gordon was assigned to the command of Johnson's division, 
which had suffered so heavily on the 12th. At Hanover Junction 
Lee received his first reinforcements since the campaign opened. 
He was joined there by Pickett's division of the ist Corps, by two 
infantry brigades brought by Breckinridge from the Shenandoah 
Valley after SigePs defeat on the 15th, and by Hoke's brigade, 
which had originally belonged to Early's division. Altogether 
Lee's reinforcements amounted to about 9,000 men.^ Grant also 
had received considerable reinforcements since the beginning of 
the campaign. On the 17th Tyler had joined him with a division 
of 8,000 men, and other troops had reached him as well. But the 
army was being so much reduced by the continual mustering 
out of time-expired regiments, that it may be doubted whether the 
reinforcements did more than make good the deficiencies thus 
caused.^ 

The 5th Corps of the Army of the Potomac started on its march 
for Guinea Station on the morning of the 21st, and was followed by 
the 9th Corps, as soon as Burnside had convinced himself by a 
reconnaissance that the Telegraph road crossing was too strongly 
held to be easily forced. Wright's Corps withdrew at nightfall. 
These three Corps, after reaching the Fredericksburg Railway, 
moved on the 22nd by parallel roads between the railway and the 
Telegraph road, whilst Hancock stood fast waiting for the other 
Corps to come into line with him. But on that night Lee had two 
Corps, with the third near at hand, on the south bank of the North 
Anna, fifteen miles in front of the nearest Federal Corps.^ 

The whole Army of the Potomac moved forward at 5 a.m. on the 
23rd. Warren having reached Jericho Mills, four miles above the 
Telegraph road bridge, which was about half a mile above the 
Fredericksburg Railway bridge,* crossed the river, which at that 
point was unguarded, and though attacked towards evening by 
Hill's Corps advancing from the Virginia Central Railway, beat it 
off with considerable loss and entrenched a position.^ Hancock 
moved forward with his right across the Telegraph road and his left 
across the railway, and about 6 p.m. captured some entrenchments 

* Humphreys, 125. 

^ Between May 2nd and July 4th thirty-six regiments were discharged from the 
service (Humphreys, no, note). 

^ The distance from Lee's right to Hanover Junction by the Telegraph road \yas 
twenty-eight miles. To reach the same point Hancock had to march thirty-four miles 
and the other Corps thirty. Had Hancock been able to take the direct route by the 
Telegraph road, the distance for his Corps would have been only twenty-five miles 
(Humphreys, 126, note). * Humphreys, 128. 

* Lee was much incensed with Hill for allowing Warren to cross the river (White's 
Lee, 381). 



May, 1864] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 333 

covering the Telegraph road bridge on the north bank of the river, 
and gained possession of that bridge. He did not, however, cross 
the river, as the Confederates held entrenchments on the south bank 
covering both bridges. 

Burnside on Hancock's right endeavoured to cross by the Ox Ford, 
about a mile above the Telegraph road bridge, but found it too 
strongly held by the enemy. 

On the 24th Hancock, finding that the enemy had abandoned 
their entrenchments close to the bridges, crossed the river, whilst 
Burnside moved a mile and a half up the river above Ox Ford and 
crossed one division over at Quarles' Mill. This force joined hands 
with Crawford's division of the 5th Corps and moved down to 
uncover Ox Ford, where Willcox's division of the 9th Corps was 
waiting (Burnside's third division had already taken position on 
Hancock's right on the south bank), but the Confederate lines were 
too strongly held, and an attempt to force them was repulsed. The 
6th Corps had followed Warren's line of march and crossed on the 
morning of the 24th. 

On the 25 th the Federal army found itself in a far from enviable 
position. One division was still north of the river. The rest of the 
army was in two distinct bodies, separated from each other by Lee's 
whole army, holding a central position and strongly entrenched. 
For one wing of the Federal army to reinforce the other it would 
be necessary to cross the river twice. Lee's lines had been drawn 
with great skill. The left rested on the Little River, and ran for 
about a mile and a half to Ox Ford on the North Anna. This flank 
was held by Hill's and Pickett's troops. From Ox Ford the 
Confederate lines extended down the river for three-quarters of 
a mile, and then ran in a south-east direction until the extreme 
right again rested upon the river.^ This part of the line covered a 
distance of three miles, and was held by Ewell's and Anderson's 
Corps. 

Grant saw that there was no prospect of attacking either flank 
of Lee's army with any hope of success, and ordered his army to 
withdraw on the night of the 26th to the north bank and continue 
the movement by the left flank to the Pamunkey. 

It has been sometimes stated that Lee's ill-health alone prevented 
the Army of Northern Virginia from striking a crushing blow at 
one or other wing of the Federal army in its uncomfortable position 
on the south bank of the North Anna. But when it is remembered 
that both wings of the Army of the Potomac were entrenched, it 
must be admitted that Grant had little to fear from any frontal 
attack. His own reluctance to attack his enemy's entrenched lines 
is the best proof that a Confederate assault on the Federal lines 
would have had but little chance of success. 

' Humphreys, 130-2. 



334 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

On the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan, with two divisions of 
cavalry, started for Hanover Town on the Pamunkey, some thirty- 
two miles south-east of the Federal position on the North Anna. 
During the night the Army of the Potomac was withdrawn across 
the North Anna, and on the 28th was in position on the south 
bank of the Pamunkey. The 5th and 9th Corps crossed at 
Hanover Town, the latter not till midnight. The 6th and 2nd 
Corps crossed four miles higher up.^ On the same day Sheridan, 
after a hard fight, drove the Confederate cavalry from Hawes' 
Shop, four miles out from Hanover Town, on the road to 
Richmond, 

On the morning of the 27th Lee discovered that his foe had 
withdrawn across the river, and was informed that some of the 
Federal cavalry and infantry had crossed the Pamunkey at 
Hanover Town. The 2nd Corps, under the command of Early, 
Ewell being ill, was at once started on the march. It crossed the 
South Anna by the Virginia Central Railway bridge, and moved 
through Atlee's Station on that line to Huntley's Corner (Map 
VHI.), where it covered the direct road from Hanover Town to 
Richmond and also a road from White House to Richmond. 
There, on the afternoon of the 28th, Early took up his position 
with his right close to Beaver Dam Creek and his left resting 
on the Totopotomoy, near Pole Green Church. The ist Corps 
crossed the South Anna by the Fredericksburg Railroad bridge, 
and moving by Ashland and Atlee's Stations, took up its position 
on the same afternoon on Early's right from Huntley's Corner to 
Walnut Grove Church, covering another road from White House 
to Richmond. The 3rd Corps and Breckinridge's command 
formed on Early's left along the Totopotomoy, with its left across 
the Virginia Central Railway, a mile north of Atlee's Station. 
Lee's new position covered the approaches to Richmond from the 
Pamunkey.^ 

On the 29th Grant ordered reconnaissances to be made in full 
force by the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps, whilst the 9th Corps was 
held in reserve near Hawes' Shop (Map HI.). The 6th Corps 
marched north-west along the river-road in the direction of 
Hanover Court House, but finding no infantry force in its front, 
was ordered to march at daylight on the 30th, and take position 
on Hancock's right, and try to place itself across the Confederate 
left flank. But the line of march lay across the swampy ground 
at the head of Crump's Creek, and in consequence it arrived too 
late to take any part in the fighting on that day. On the Federal 
left the 5th Corps crossed the Totopotomoy, and on the 30th 
moved out along the Shady Grove Church road (Map VHI.). 

' But Russell's division of llie 6th Corps, wliicli led the advance, crossed at Hanover 
Town. ■^ Humphreys, 165-6. 



May. i864l GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 335 

Burnside's Corps on the 30th was brought up between the 2nd 
and 5th Corps, and crossed the Totopotomoy. On the right the 
2nd Corps found the enemy entrenched on the south bank of the 
stream holding the crossing of the Richmond road. On the after- 
noon of the 30th Early moved his right across Beaver Dam Creek 
on to the Mechanicsville and Old Church turnpike, where it was 
on the left flank of Warren advancing along the Shady Grove 
Church road. Early's position at Huntley's Corner was taken 
by Anderson's Corps. A fierce attack was made by Rodes' 
division of the 2nd Corps against Warren's left by the cross-road 
from Bethesda Church into the Shady Grove Church road, but 
was repulsed with considerable loss. To lighten the pressure 
upon Warren, Hancock was directed to attack in his front, 
which he did with Barlow's division just before dark, and carried 
the enemy's advanced line of rifle-pits.^ 

W. F. Smith's Corps, the i8th, had been sent from Butler's 
army on the south bank of the James by water to White House, 
where it began to arrive on the 30th. On the afternoon of the 
31st Smith was marching with 10,000 men of his command and 
the Corps artillery towards New Castle Ferry, on the Pamunkey, 
according to his original instructions. A mistake in the orders, 
which he received next morning, caused him to continue his march 
up the Pamunkey, when Grant's real intention was to send him to 
Cold Harbour. 

On the 31st Sheridan, moving on the left of the Federal army, 
drove Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division out of Cold Harbour and 
received orders to hold it at all costs. Cold Harbour was an 
important point, because it lay on the direct line of the Federal 
advance to the left, and was the meeting-point of various roads 
from the different bridges over the Chickahominy.^ Grant had by 
this time come to the conclusion that an attack on the Confederate 
position, where it lay behind the Totopotomoy covering the 
approaches to Richmond by the Shady Grove Church road and 
the Mechanicsville turnpike, held out no reasonable prospect of 
success. He determined therefore to continue the movement by 
the left towards the Chickahominy, in the hope that he might have 
a chance of attacking the Confederate right before it had time to 
entrench itself strongly. Anticipating that an attack would be 
made upon Sheridan at Cold Harbour, he ordered the 6th Corps to 
make a night march, and, if possible, reach Cold Harbour by day- 
light of June 1st. Wright, however, had to march his troops over 
difficult country a distance of fifteen miles, and did not reach Cold 
Harbour till 9 a.m. 

The capture of Cold Harbour warned Lee of danger to his right 
flank. On the 31st Anderson's Corps was moved to the right of 

^ Humphreys, 166-9. "^ Humphreys, 171. 



336 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Early's, and the extreme right was held by Hoke's division, which 
had reached Lee from the south side of the James on the 28th. 
The intention was to make a strong movement on the ist towards 
Cold Harbour.^ Sheridan, however, had no difficulty in holding 
his ground against the attack, which was confined to two weak 
attempts by a part of Kershaw's division, until the arrival of the 
6th Corps set him free to continue the movement towards the 
Chickahominy covering the left flank of the army. In the after- 
noon Smith's Corps arrived from New Castle Ferry and was posted 
on Wright's right. Some 1,400 yards separated the hostile lines. 
The intervening space was mainly open ground, but a good part of 
the Confederate skirmish line was in a narrow strip of pine 
wood.2 At 6 p.m. Smith and Wright attacked. Ricketts' division 
of the 6th Corps penetrated an interval between Hoke's and 
Kershaw's divisions and carried the main line of entrenchments at 
that point, capturing 500 prisoners. The 18th Corps drove the 
enemy out of the pine wood and captured their advanced line of 
rifle-pits. The loss suffered by the two Corps amounted to about 
2,200.^ They entrenched themselves along the new line which 
they had gained, whilst the Confederates threw up a fresh line of 
works in rear of that portion of their lines which had been carried 
by Ricketts' division. 

This partial success encouraged Grant to continue his plan for 
breaking the enemy's right, and Hancock's Corps was ordered to 
move that night, and by a forced march reinforce Wright's left, 
extending the Federal line still nearer to the Chickahominy. It 
was hoped that he would be in position early on the 2nd. The 
difficulties of a night march over unknown roads in very sultry 
weather were great : nevertheless Hancock reached his destination 
at 6.30 a.m. But his Corps was so exhausted with its hard march, 
that the attack was postponed till 5 p.m. 

It had been Grant's original plan that the whole Army of the 
Potomac should attack as early as possible on the morning of the 
2nd. But Smith's Corps was nearly out of ammunition, and this, 
in conjunction with the tired state of Hancock's Corps, led to the 
postponement of the attack. Meanwhile the 5th Corps had 
extended its left so as to connect with Smith's right, and the 9th 
Corps had been placed in rear of Warren's right. The assault was 
still further postponed until 4.30 a.m. on the 3rd. This decision 
was come to in consequence of the heat of the day and to give 
longer time for preparation. 

When Lee discovered that Hancock's Corps had been with- 
drawn from its position in front of his left, he ordered Hill, with 
two divisions of his Corps and Breckinridge's division, to move 
to the right and extend the line to the right of Hoke's division. 

' Iluiiiphreys, 172. * Humphreys, 174. * Humphreys, 176. 



June, 1S64I GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 337 

Hill formed on the extreme right, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry- 
crossed the Chickahominy and piqueted the roads leading to the 
James. Three brigades of Field's division were moved from the 
left to the right of the ist Corps and posted in support of 
Kershaw.^ This movement was rendered possible by the fact that 
the ground in Field's front was so swampy that no attack at that 
point need be apprehended. Heth's division of the 3rd Corps 
remained on Early's left. Furthermore, Lee directed Early with 
the left wing to place himself across the right flank of the Federal 
army and drive down along the front of the Confederate lines. 
The attempted movement led to some sharp fighting with Burn- 
side's and Warren's Corps, which lasted till nightfall, but failed to 
produce the desired effect. 

At 4.30 a.m. on the 3rd, the 2nd, 6th, and i8th Corps advanced 
to the attack. But besides the heavy artillery and musketry fire 
which blazed forth in their faces, a murderous cross-fire of artillery 
swept the flanks of each of the attacking Corps. They were, in 
fact, advancing on divergent lines, and consequently Hancock's 
right. Smith's left, and both of Wright's flanks were exposed to 
a deadly enfilading fire.- Against such odds the assault was 
doomed to failure. The advanced rifle-pits were captured, and on 
the extreme left Barlow's division carried an advanced line of 
works along the road from Despatch Station, but was speedily 
driven out again. The fate of the assault was settled in less than 
an hour.^ Unable, under the tremendous fire which they en- 
countered, to carry the main line of entrenchments, the attacking 
force quickly took cover and succeeded in holding the advanced 
positions which they gained, at some points within thirty yards 
of the enemy's works. The loss of the Federals in this short but 
desperate attack was very heavy. 

In the three Corps which took the chief part in the attack over 
4,000 were killed and wounded, and probably this estimate falls 
considerably short of the truth.* Burnside's and Warren's Corps 
on the Federal right were not heavily engaged. Before any 
regular assault by these troops could be delivered, Meade's order 
suspending further offensive operations was received.^ The Con- 
federate losses were in comparison very slight, probably not more 
than 1,700^ in all. After the repulse of the first attack. Grant 

^ Pickett's division was on Kershaw's left. 

^ 4 B. & L., 217-18. Smith's right was also exposed to an enfilade fire, owing to 
a considerable gap existing between his right and Warren's left. 

^ Humphreys, 182. General McMahon (4 B. & L. , 217) says that the time of actual 
advance did not exceed eight minutes. * Humphreys, 182. 

^ The losses of these two Corps in killed and wounded amounted to about 1, 200. 
(Humphreys, 18S). The Federal loss from June 1st to 12th is given at 12,737 in 
4B. & L., 187. 

" Phisterer in his Statistical Record estimates the Confederate losses from June ist to 

Z 



338 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

ordered that the assault should be renewed, but realising the hope- 
lessness of the attempt, neither officers nor men made any effort 
to carry out the order.^ 

At 1.30 p.m. an order was issued directing the suspension of the 
attack, and that further advances should be made by regular 
approaches after due reconnaissance. In his despatch to Meade, 
which contained this order, Grant stated that his object now was 
to hold Lee's army fast until Hunter's army in the Shenandoah 
Valley was well on its way to Lynchburg, and that that purpose 
would be more easily effected by keeping Lee out of the Richmond 
entrenchments than by forcing him back into them.^ The two 
armies remained confronting each other till the night of the 12th. 
Though the Federal lines were being pushed forward by regular 
approaches, there seemed no chance of making a successful assault, 
and on that night the Army of the Potomac withdrew from its 
lines and marched to cross the James. 

The Federal losses suffered from the crossing of the Pamunkey 
to the night of June 12th exceeded 14,000.^ 

With the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from its lines 
at Cold Harbour ended the first stage in the great struggle be- 
tween Grant and Lee for the possession of Richmond. From the 
Rapidan to the Po, from the Po to the North Anna, from the North 
Anna to the Pamunkey and Chickahominy, Grant had made 
a succession of movements by the left flank, the ultimate object of 
which had been either to destroy Lee's army in the field or force it 
to abandon the defence of Richmond. But at the end of every 
movement Lee's army had been found in position barring the 
further progress of the Army of the Potomac, and Grant had 
entirely failed to force it to fight a battle when not protected by 
entrenchments. It was ridiculous in Grant to complain that the 
Army of Northern Virginia would not fight in the open, when 
it was barely half the size of his own. Throughout this campaign 
Lee had proved himself a master of defensive warfare, and at 
every point had baffled Grant. But the limitations imposed upon 
him by his numerical inferiority had prevented him striking any 
crushing blow at his opponent : and though Grant was turning his 
back upon Richmond and preparing to seek an entrance to the 
Southern Ca{)ital by the " backdoor " of Petersburg, yet Lee must 
have felt that the policy pursued by his opponent must, sooner or 
later, if allowed to run unchecked, end in the reduction of 
Richmond. This policy consisted in attacking the Army of 
Northern Virginia at every possible opportunity. If the Con- 
federate losses in these engagements amounted to one half of 

I2th at 1,700; IIunii)hreys, 192, thinks that the actual number was much greater; 
Swiiiton, 4S7, (loulits whcthi^r the Confederate losses on lune 3ril reached 1,300. 
• 4 B. & L., 218. ■■' Humphreys, 1S7-8, ^ lluniphreys, 191, note. 



June, 1864] GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA 839 

those of the Federals, Grant considered the work well done. For 
the Confederate losses could not be made good, whereas the 
Federals had infinite resources on which to fall back, both of men 
and material. Both in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania Court 
House Grant had inflicted upon his foe a proportionately heavier 
loss. On the banks of the North Anna he had shown a wise 
discretion in not attacking Lee's lines, but in the battle of Cold 
Harbour his own losses had been out of all proportion to those of 
the Confederates. It was the one battle which he ever expressed 
regret at having fought. 



CHAPTER XXI 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 

Movements of the Army of the James — Butler's feeble ofiensive — Confederate forces 
in Petersburg and Richmond — Butler's procrastination — Federal advance towanls 
Drewry's Bluff — Beauregard assumes the offensive— Battle of Drewry's Bluff — Early 
sent to the Shenandoah Valley — Butler's unsuccessful attempt on Petersburg— The 
Army of the Potomac crosses the James — Defences of Richmond and Petersburg — 
Partial success of Smith's Corps against Petersburg — The 2nd Corps reinforces Smith — 
Preparations of the Confederates — The fighting on June i6th — The 9th Corps on 
the 17th — Heavy losses of the Federals on the i8th — Grant resolves to attack the 
Confederate railways — Grant fails to secure the Weldon Railway — Wilson's raid 
against the railways —Sheridan's expedition to Charlottesville — The Burnside mine — 
Movement of the 2nd Corps to the north bank of the James — Hancock withdraws to 
the south bank— The mine fiasco — Hancock's second movement to the north bank of 
the James — Warren's movement to the Weldon Railway — Federals secure possession 
of the Weldon Railroad — Hill drives Hancock from Reams' Station — Grant's third 
movement to the north liank of the James— Ord captures Fort Harrison— Warren 
moves towards the Boydton Plank road — Federal success at Peebles Farm— Grant 
makes a final effort to secure the Southside Railway — Failure of the Federal move- 
ment. 

IT was part of Grant's general plan of campaign that a co- 
operative movement should be made by the Army of the 
James under General Butler up the south bank of that river 
against Richmond. This army had been organised into two Corps, 
the loth and the i8th, under the command of Generals Gillmore 
and VV. F. Smith, and numbered about 36,000 men.^ A small part 
of the force was composed of coloured troops.- The army had 
been concentrated on the York River with the view of deluding 
the Confederate Governinent into the idea that the line of advance 
would be that followed by McClellan in 1862. On the night of 
May 4th the troops were conveyed by water from the York to the 
James, and disembarked on the south bank at Bermuda Hundred 
Neck (Map VHL), where the Appomattox falls into the James. 
Butler was directed to march on Richmond, keeping as close as 
possible to the river, and invest the city, establishing his left flank 
on the river above Richmond, where it was hoi)ed that the Army of 
the I'otomac might be able to effect a junction.^ But unfortunately 

' Humphreys, 137. * One infantry division and one cavalry brigade 

■' Swinton, 462-3, argues with consitlerable force that the orders given to Butler were 
vague, if not contradictory. After having entrenched a poslti<;n un the south bank he 

340 



May, 1864] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 341 

for the success of the Federal plans, Butler was perhaps the most 
incapable officer still retained in a high command. His appoint- 
ment as a major-general of volunteers had been made at the very 
beginning of the war on purely political grounds. He had had no 
military training or experience : his only claim was that he had 
commanded the Massachusetts militia, which had marched to the 
relief of Washington in 1861. 

Disembarking on May 6th, the Army of the James moved forward 
from the landing-place about six miles and occupied and entrenched 
a position across the Neck, where it is only three miles wide, with 
the right resting on the James and the left on the Appomattox.^ 
Two and a half miles away were the Richmond and Petersburg 
Railroad and turnpike. One brigade was sent the same afternoon 
to secure these, but withdrew on finding a small Confederate force 
holding the railway at Port Walthall Junction. The following day 
Butler despatched a force of five brigades to secure the railway, 
but after some sharp fighting the Federals were again beaten off.'^ 
On the 9th Butler moved out of his entrenchments with a still 
stronger force and succeeded in breaking up the railway for a 
distance of about six miles from Chester Station to Swift Creek.^ 
At this latter point he was within three miles of Petersburg, but 
the Creek was held by the Confederates in force, and the following 
day Butler withdrew to his lines at Bermuda Hundred. 

At this time the Confederate forces holding Richmond and 
Petersburg, twenty-two miles apart, were very weak indeed. They 
probably did not number on May 1st more than 6,000 infantry in 
addition to the artillery, who worked the heavy naval guns, which 
commanded the James at Chaffin's and Drewry's Bluffs and the 
field guns, with which the entrenchments were armed.* General 
Beauregard was in command, having been transferred from the 
Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida to that of 
North Carolina and South Virginia, where he relieved General 
Pickett. He had been ordered to bring as many troops as possible 
from these two Departments for the protection of Richmond 
against an advance along the line of the James. He had succeeded 
in getting together about 19,000 infantry.^ But at the moment 
when Butler commenced his movement none of these troops had 
even reached Petersburg.*" To reach that city they had to be 

was to move up the river against Richmond, which he miglit either capture or invest, or 
at the worst he might " hold a ddboucke for the Army of the Potomac above the city." 
But throughout the operations his action was to depend upon Grant's movements ; and 
as events turned out very differently to what Grant expected on the north side of Rich- 
mond it is not surprising that Butler failed also on the south side. 

^ Humphreys, 139. ^ Swinton, 464. ^ Humphreys, 145. 

* Humphreys, 141. * Humphreys, 142. 

* The leading troops only began to arrive at Petersburg on the 5th. Part of one 
brigade had already been called in by Pickett from the Blackwater, where it was watch- 
ing the approaches from Norfolk and Suffolk. 



342 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

brought from Weldon (Map VII.) by rail. But on May 5th Butler 
had sent a cavalry division under General Kautz from Suffolk to 
break up the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad at various points : 
and the destruction of two railway bridges proved a considerable 
hindrance to Beauregard in his task of forwarding troops from the 
south to the threatened cities. 

It would have been Butler's wisest course to turn his back for 
the moment upon Richmond, march upon Petersburg, which he 
could have easily captured, garrisoned as it was by little more than 
a brigade,^ and by securing the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad 
cut off Beauregard's troops from their most direct route to Rich- 
mond. The fall of Petersburg would have necessitated the im- 
mediate recall of Lee's army, or else the abandonment of the 
Confederate capital itself. For Butler, even if he failed to capture 
Richmond single-handed, could at least have closely invested it on 
the south side of the James, and materially assisted in forwarding 
Grant's plan of campaign. Possibly, if Butler had been in posi- 
tion in front of Richmond at the time of Sheridan's cavalry raid, 
the city would have fallen. Both his Corps commanders joined 
on the night of May 9th in urging Butler to bridge the Appomat- 
tox at the Point of Rocks (Map VIII.) and operate on the south 
bank of that stream against Petersburg from the east.^ 

With such great possibilities before him Butler adopted a policy 
of procrastination, which gave Beauregard time to get all his rein- 
forcements into Richmond and Petersburg, and actually assume 
the offensive with a force of equal strength to that which Butler 
was able to put into the field. Turning a deaf ear to the sound 
advice of his lieutenants, the Federal commander on the 12th moved 
out along the turnpike towards Richmond, and advanced against 
the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff. P>om the Bluff the Confederate 
entrenchments ran westward for two and a half miles, crossing both 
the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad and turnpike, and then 
turned north. Near the Bluff an outer line of works branched off 
from the main entrenchments and reached across the railway about 
a mile in front of the inner line, with its right resting on a hill to 
the west of the railway.-^ On the 13th Gillmore, whose Corps 
formed the left of Butler's army, turned this outer line and secured 
possession of the aforesaid hill : and on the 14th the whole of the 
outer line of works was in the hands of the Federals. Butler 
ordered an assault against the main line of the enemy's works to 
be made on the morning of the 15th, but the attack had to be 
abandoned owing to the lack of available troops to form the 
assaulting column.'* 

^ The orif^inal garrison of Petersburg consisted of one infantry repiment and part of 
a brigade on the Blackwater, I'art of an<ither lirigadc reached Petersburg on the 5th. 
■^ 4 B. iS: L., 206, note. * lluiuijlircys, 141. * Humphreys, 148. 



May, 1S64] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 343 

By this time Beauregard had concentrated three infantry divi- 
sions, 17,000 strong, with an artillery battalion and a cavalry regi- 
ment to each division, within the fortifications at Drewry's BlufT.^ 
Two infantry and one cavalry brigade held Petersburg. Butler by 
his delay had lost the initiative, and on the i6th Beauregard 
attacked. The weak point of the Federal line was the right, which 
was "in the air" a mile away from the river. Beauregard hoped by 
turning Butler's right to cut the Federal army off from its entrench- 
ments at Bermuda Hundred and destroy it, or force its surrender 
in its present position before his lines. Whiting, who had been left 
in command at Petersburg, was ordered to make a co-operative 
movement and fall upon the enemy's flank or rear.-^ Whiting, how- 
ever, found his line of advance barred at Walthall Junction by a 
division which Butler had posted there to cover his rear, and failed 
to render Beauregard any assistance. 

There was some hard fighting between the two main armies on 
the morning of the i6th. Beauregard succeeded in turning the 
Federal right, but his attacks on the rest of Butler's line were 
firmly met and repulsed. A dense fog, which just before daybreak 
came up from the river, prevented Beauregard from following up 
the turning movement, and his left division, after its first success, 
was withdrawn, in order that its line might be readjusted. Butler, 
finding himself in danger of being cut off from his base, ordered 
his whole line to fall back some distance to the right rear. The 
Confederates recovered their first line of entrenchments, and at 
nightfall Butler withdrew from his second position to Bermuda 
Hundred.^ Beauregard followed in pursuit on the following day 
and entrenched a position in front of Butler. The Army of the 
James was thus confined in a bottle, of which Beauregard held the 
cork. 

When Grant learnt of the failure of Butler's co-operative move- 
ment, he ordered him to send all the forces not required for holding 
his entrenchments to White House on the Pamunkey, in order to 
take part in the movement of the Army of the Potomac against 
Lee between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy. 

Beauregard, knowing that he held Butler fast, had already des- 
patched one division and one brigade to Lee's aid, and a little 
later sent a second division to join the Army of Northern Virginia.* 

^ Humphreys, 148. 

^ President Davis, in a personal conference with Beauregard, approved of his plan 
of battle except that part which related to Whiting's division. He urged that it 
should move during the night so as to join the main force in the Drewry Bluff entrench- 
ments (Humphreys, 151). 

^ The Federal loss on the l6th was about 3,500, the Confederate over 2,000 
(Humphreys, 157). In this engagement Smith utilised telegraph wire for the defence of 
part of his line, stretching it among the stumps in his front. The fog lifted about 9 a.m. 

* Humphreys, 159. 



344 THE CIVIL WAR IN 'IIIR UNITED STATES 

Butler, in obedience to Grant's orders, sent Smitli with a force of 
about 16,000 infantry to White House.^ 

On June 7th Sheridan was despatched with two cavahy divisions 
on an expedition to Charlottesville (Map V.). Tiiere he was ex- 
pected to find Hunter who, after defeating a small Confederate 
force on the 5th at Piedmont, about ten miles north-east of Staunton, 
was moving up the Shenandoah Valley against Lynchburg. The 
two forces were to destroy thoroughly the Virginia Central Railroad 
back from Charlottesville to Hanover Junction and then join the 
Army of the Potomac. 

After the repulse of the Federal attack at Cold Harbour, Lee 
felt himself strong enough to send back Breckinridge's division 
to the Valley, whence it had come,- and being seriously alarmed 
for the safety of Lynchburg, he despatched the 2nd Corps under 
Early on the 13th after Ikeckinridge. I"2arly was directed, after 
defeating Hunter, to march down the Valley and crossing the 
Potomac to threaten Washington. It may be, as has been fre- 
quently stated, that Lee hoped by this move to cause Grant to 
detach a considerable force to the relief of Washington, but it is 
perhaps more probable that he only aimed at the relief of Lynch- 
iDurg and the upper end of the Valley.^ When he learnt on the 8th 
that Sheridan was moving in the direction of Charlottesville, he 
ordered Wade Hampton to follow with two divisions of cavalry. 

On June 9th Ikitler sent across to the south bank of the Appo- 
mattox (Map VHl.) a small force under Gillmore, consisting of 
3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, to attempt the capture of Peters- 
burg. The cavalry carried the entrenchments to the south of the 
town and penetrated some way beyond them, but the commander 
of the expedition judged that the works in his immediate front 
were too strong to be successfully attacked, and withdrew the same 
day.* 

On the night of the 12th Grant commenced to remove his army 
from Cold Harbour. He had decided to cross the James at Wilcox's 
Landing rather than higher up, in order to withdraw his troops as 
far as possible from the observation of Lee. The 5th and 2nd 
Corps crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, fifteen miles 
below Cold Harbour, whilst the 6th and 9th Corps crossed at Jones' 
Ikidge, five miles further down, and the trains crossed still lower. 
W^ilson's two cavalry brigades were stationed on either flank. By 
midnight of the 16th the whole of the Army of the Potomac was 

^ Smith's force is generally spoken of in the subsequent operations ,-xt Colil Harbour 
as the l8th Corps, ))ecause Smith comnianclc<l that Corps in the Army of the James. It was 
really composed of one division of his own Corps and two of the loth Corps (Humphreys, 

159)- , . , . . 

' Breckinridge's division had l)een lirought from the Valley after Sigel s defeat at 
Newmarket, May iSth. Sec Cap. XXIV. 

' Humphreys, 195 -6. * Humphreys, 197 ; 4 B. & L., 534-7- 



June, i864] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 345 

safely established on the south bank of the James.^ The i8th 
Corps had received orders to march with all speed to White House, 
re-embark on the transports, which had brought it from the James, 
and rejoin Butler's command at Bermuda Hundred. 

Lee was led to believe from the movements of the 5th Corps, 
which formed the right wing of the Army of the Potomac and 
covered the movement from the Chickahominy to the James, that 
Grant intended either to march by the north bank of the James 
against Richmond or else to cross the river at Malvern Hill. He 
accordingly posted Anderson's and Hill's Corps so as to cover the 
approaches to Richmond from White Oak Swamp to Malvern Hill. 
He remained uncertain of the movements of his opponent until 
the afternoon of the i/th.^ 

The defences of Richmond comprised, first, a series of field 
redoubts, which encircled the city at a distance of from a mile to 
a mile and a half. Outside these, on the north bank of the James, 
a connected line of artillery redans and infantry parapets enveloped 
the city at a distance of from one to two miles in front of the 
redoubts. This line of entrenchments crossed the James two and 
a half miles below Richmond and continued westwards till within 
a mile and a half of the river above the city. On the north bank 
there was further a disconnected line of entrenchments at a distance 
var)'ing from half a mile to three miles in front of the connected 
line and resting on the James at Chaffin's Bluff. Almost opposite 
that Bluff on the other side of the river was Urewry's Bluff, and at 
both these points heavy batteries of coast defence guns had been 
established to prevent the further advance of the Federal gunboats 
up the river. A number of mines had also been placed in the 
river, and one hostile gunboat had already been blown up. The 
shallowness of the bar at Trent's Reach, which was nine miles by 
water from Drewry's Bluff, prevented the Federal monitors going 
further up the river. The defences on the south bank starting from 
Drewry's Bluff have already been described in connection with 
Butler's advance from Bermuda Hundred. 

The defences of Petersburg consisted of a circle of strong redans 
connected by infantry parapets drawn about two miles outside the 
city.^ 

On the night of the 14th General Smith with his Corps reported 
to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, and was ordered to move 
against Petersburg along the south bank of the Appomattox at 
daylight. 

Smith was not aware how weak was the force garrisoning 
Petersburg. It consisted only of one infantry brigade, numbering 
about 2,400 men, one cavalry brigade, and some local militia. 

^ Huni])hreys, 203. - Humphreys, 202 ; Lee's Lee, 348. 

' For the defences of Richmond and Petersburg, see Humphreys, 140-I. 



346 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Smith had about 14,000 infantry and artillery, and Kautz's 
division of cavalry. But he spent a considerable part of the day 
in pushing forward reconnaissances to test the strength of the 
enerny's lines. About 7 p.m. he advanced to the attack with a 
heavy skirmish line, and captured, without much difficulty, a mile 
and a half of the entrenchments (seven redans with their connect- 
ing infantry parapets) and sixteen guns. He did not, however, 
make any attempt to push his success further, although the weak- 
ness of the resistance encountered should have shown him that 
only a small infantry force was at the moment defending Peters- 
burg.^ 

The 2nd Corps was across the James at an early hour on 
the 15th. It was ordered to march towards Petersburg as soon 
as it had been provided with rations to be sent from City Point. 
The rations did not, however, arrive, and at 10.30 a.m. the Corps 
marched without them. The instructions which Hancock had 
received for his line of march proved extremely inaccurate, and 
further delay was thereby caused. Consequently it was not till late 
in the evening that Hancock joined Smith, and the latter general, 
believing that considerable reinforcements were reaching J^eaure- 
gard, urged the postponement of further operations till daylight- 

The reinforcements, which actually arrived in Petersburg on the 
evening of the 15th, only consisted of Hoke's division. It can 
hardly be doubted that if Smith, after Hancock's arrival with two 
fresh divisions, had renewed the attack, Petersburg must have 
fallen.^ 

During the night Beauregard withdrew the greater part of 
B. R. Johnson's division from its lines at Bermuda Hundred, 
leaving Gracie's brigade to do its best to hold those entrench- 
ments. The Confederate general was in the awkward predicament 
of being obliged to abandon either his Petersburg lines or the 
works which he had constructed in front of Butler. He wisely 
determined to abandon the latter, hoping, as proved the case, 
that General Lee would shortly arrive and retake them. He 
occupied the night in throwing up a fresh line of entrenchments in 
rear of that portion of his lines which had been captured by 
Smith's attack. With the addition of Hoke's and B. R. Johnson's 
divisions, Beauregard had in his lines on the morning of the i6th 
about 14,000 infantry. But his extreme right did not reach the 
Jerusalem Plank road by half a mile, and for four and a half 
miles westwards to the Appomattox the Confederate entrench- 
ments were unoccupied except by a few cavalry piquets.* 

' For Siiiith't; operation on the 15th, sec Humphreys, 206-8. 

' Humphreys, 21 1 -12 ; Swinton, 503-4. The iviilcncc seems to cstablisli the conten- 
tion that Hancock received no intimation from Ciran'. tli.vl he was expected to attack 
i'elcrsburg till after 5 p.m. '•' Humphrey.,, 210. ■• Humphreys, 215. 



June, 1864] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 347 

Early on the i6th the Federals at Bermuda Hundred, finding 
that the forces in their front had been greatly reduced, advanced, 
and after a short struggle carried the Confederate lines. But in 
the evening they were recaptured by Pickett's division, which 
Lee had brought early on that morning to Drewry's Bluff. 
Field's division followed Pickett's, but Kershaw's division and 
Hill's entire Corps still remained on the north bank of the 
James. 

On the morning of the i6th the 9th Corps arrived before 
Petersburg. Meade had ordered Hancock to wait for its arrival 
before renewing the attack upon Beauregard's lines. At 6 p.m. 
the 2nd Corps, supported by two brigades of the i8th on the right 
and by two brigades of the 9th on the left, went forward to the 
assault and carried one redan on the right and two on the left of 
the breach, which Smith had already made in the Confederate 
works, together with their connecting lines. 

During the night the Confederates constructed a new entrenched 
line reaching from Redan No. 3, near the Appomattox, to the 
works on the Norfolk Railway.^ On the 17th the 5th Corps 
reached the scene of action. At the earliest dawn of day Potter's 
division of the 9th Corps carried in gallant style a mile of Con- 
federate entrenchments on the Shand House ridge, but on pushing 
forward found itself confronted by the new line of works. The 
fighting on that day was mainly confined to the 9th Corps, 
though portions of the 2nd and 5th took part in the operations. 
Late in the afternoon Led lie's division of the 9th Corps carried 
part of the Confederate lines, but a spirited charge of Grade's 
brigade, which had just reached Petersburg, recovered the captured 
works. 

During the night of the 17th Beauregard decided to fall back to 
yet a fresh line of entrenchments. These were constructed in rear 
of a ravine from 500 to 1,000 yards behind his last line, intersect- 
ing the original line of entrenchments near the Jerusalem Plank 
road.^ As these works had only been thrown up in the night, 
Meade ordered a general assault to be made by the 2nd, 5th, and 
9th Corps at noon of the i8th,^ The i8th Corps, with the excep- 
tion of one division, had been sent back on the previous day to 
Bermuda Hundred, and this one division with one division of the 
6th Corps held the extreme right of the Federal line. At the 

* It does not seem quite certain whether this entrenched line is the same as that 
which the Confederates threw up on the night of the 15th, or another one made on the 
night of the i6th. The latter seems the more likely, as on the i6th Hancock captured 
Kedan No. 4, and the new line started from Redan No. 3 (Humphreys, 218). 

' Humphreys, 219-20. 

' On the night of the 17th Meade ordered the attack to be made at 4 a.m. next 
morning. When this movement was carried out, it was found that the enemy had fallen 
back to Beauregard's new line, and Meade fixed the attack for noon. 



348 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

appointed hour the 2nd Corps made two assaults, but was repulsed 
with heavy loss. Another attack was made by the same Corps 
late in the afternoon with the same result. The 5th and 9th Corps 
found much greater difficulty in approaching the enemy's lines, as 
they had first to carry the Norfolk Railroad cut, which was strongly 
held. This cut was eventually captured, but a further assault 
upon the main line of entrenchments was repulsed with heavy 
loss. Beauregard on this day was reinforced by Kershaw's and 
Field's divisions (Pickett's having been left to hold the Bermuda 
Hundred entrenchments), and Hill's Corps also arrived later, in 
time to assist in repelling the assaults made in the afternoon. 
The positions, which had been gained by the Federal Corps 
close to the enemy's line, were entrenched, and these two oppos- 
ing lines were held by the respective armies till the close of the 
siege. 

After the failure of the assault of the i8th, Grant, recognising 
that, now that Lee with the greater part of his forces was confront- 
ing him, there was no longer any chance of success for a frontal 
attack, directed that his men should be put under cover and a 
much-needed rest given them. Since crossing the James, from the 
15th to the 18th, his entire loss fell little, if at all, short of 10,000 
men.^ The Confederate loss must have been considerably smaller, 
as they were standing on the defensive. 

Grant's plan of campaign after crossing the James was to reduce 
Richmond by destroying its lines of supply. These were from 
the north the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg Railroads, both 
of which had already been considerably damaged, and it was 
hoped that Sheridan's expedition to Charlottesville would per- 
manently destroy the former. From the south three railways 
entered Petersburg and Richmond. Into Petersburg ran the 
Weldon, and Lynchburg or Southside lines, whilst the railroad 
from Danville entered Richmond.- It was Grant's purpose by a 
gradual extension of his left to gain possession of these different 
railroads in turn, and thus compel the surrender of Richmond. 
Had he succeeded in capturing Petersburg, as he had every right 
to expect to do, his task would have been immensely lightened. 
But when he found that Petersburg was impregnable against direct 
assault, undismayed he entered upon his more arduous under- 
taking. The occupation of the Weldon and Lynchburg Railways 
would compel the evacuation of Petersburg; the next step would 
then be to turn the Confederate entrenchments at Bermuda 
Hundred, and then to operate against the last remaining line, the 

' Humphreys, 224. 

- Beside the WcMon and Lynchl)iirg Railways a third line entered Petersburp fmm 
the south-cast — the Norfolk Railway. But Grant's advance from the James at once 
chjsed this line to the Confederates. 



June, 1S64] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 849 

Richmond and Danville Railway. When that fell into his hands, 
starvation would oblige the Southern capital to surrender. 

Accordingly he set himself to construct a line of entrench- 
ments, steadily stretching westwards, of even greater strength 
than those which the Confederates held, in order that he might 
be able to leave a small force to hold them, and employ the 
greater part of his army in extensive movements to turn Lee's 
right flank. The costly plan of attacking all along the line was 
thus abandoned, but not until it had produced a more or less 
demoralising effect upon the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. 
It was noticeable that in the operations which ensued after the 
crossing of the James, for some considerable period the Federal 
troops fought with much less determination and fire than they 
had displayed in the earlier part of the campaign.^ This was 
due in part to the discouragement produced among the troops 
by the useless sacrifice of life in assaults which the soldiers them- 
selves knew to be doomed to failure : partly to the deterioration 
in the quality of the recruits, who were steadily pouring in. 
These being either substitutes, or obtained through the "draft," 
were very inferior to the volunteers of the earlier years of the 
war, and tended to impair the efficiency of the organisations to 
which they were assigned. The Government continued the mis- 
taken policy of forming entire regiments of the new recruits, 
instead of distributing them to fill up the vacancies created in 
the veteran regiments. 

On June 21st Grant commenced a turning movement, which 
was confidently expected to secure the Weldon Railroad, whilst 
it was hoped that it might also get possession of the Southside 
line." The movement was not, however, made in sufficient force 
to ensure success. The 2nd and 6th Corps were ordered to move 
to the left of the 5th, across the Jerusalem Plank road, and 
advance against the Weldon Railway, which was only three miles 
beyond the road. At the same time Wilson, with 5,500 cavalry, 
was ordered to make a raid against the Southside and Danville 
Railroads, and, if possible, break them up so completely as to 
render them useless for the rest of the campaign. 

On the 22nd the two infantry Corps moved forward from the 
Jerusalem Plank road. The 2nd Corps on the right was ordered 
to swing its left forward and entrench a position, whilst the 
6th Corps was directed to push straight for the railway. It had 
originally been intended that the movements of these two Corps 
should be made in close connection with each other, but the diffi- 
culty of moving through the dense thickets proved so great that 
Meade ordered the Corps commanders to operate independently, 

^ Walker's statement, quoted in White's Lee, 392. 
^ Humphreys, 227. 



350 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

whilst impressing upon them the necessity of guarding carefully 
their exposed flanks.^ 

As soon as the movement began to develop, Lee sent Hill with 
Wilcox's and Mahone's divisions, supported by B. R. Johnson's, 
out of the Confederate lines down the railway. As the Federals 
advanced, the gap between the two Corps increased : and Hill, 
seizing the opportunity, detached Wilcox to hold the railway 
against the 6th Corps, and moved forward with Mahone's division 
to fall upon the exposed left flank of the 2nd Corps. That Corps 
was temporarily commanded by Birney, and he had neglected 
to carry out Meade's instructions to protect his left flank against 
just such a movement as the Confederates were now making. 

Hill's attack was entirely successful. The 2nd Corps, struck 
on the flank and rolled up from left to right, was driven from the 
entrenchments, which it had thrown up, to the position which it 
had quitted in the morning, with a loss of four guns and 1,700 
prisoners.- The loss in killed and wounded was comparatively 
slight and points conclusively to the impaired vioral of a Corps 
which had been both the best and strongest in the Army of the 
Potomac. Hill, after driving the enemy, returned at dusk to his 
own lines, and the next morning the 2nd Corps advanced and 
reoccupied the line of works lost on the previous day. Wright, 
on the left, had been unable to gain ground in the face of 
Wilcox's opposition, and entrenched a position which was a 
mile and a half short of the Weldon Railway. The Federal 
infantry had completely failed to secure even the nearer of the 
two railways. 

Very early on the morning of the 22nd Wilson started on his 
expedition. Crossing the Weldon Railway at Reams' Station, he 
struck straight for the Southside Railway. Reaching it at a 
point about fourteen miles from Petersburg, he destroyed it for a 
distance of thirty miles as far as Ikirkesville (Map VII.), where it 
intersects the Richmond and Danville line. Having completely 
destroyed the station and all railway appliances at the Junction, 
the work of destruction was continued for thirty miles south along 
the Danville Railway.^ But on reaching the bridge over the 
Staunton River, further progress was barred by a strong force of 
infantry entrenched with artillery. W. H. F. Lee's cavalry 
division had followed closely after Wilson throughout these 
operations, but had not been able to interfere seriously with the 
work of breaking up the railways, though sharp skirmishing con- 
tinued all the time. Finding himself unable to advance further 
south and being already nearly a hundred miles from Petersburg, 
Wilson determined to retire. 

But his return journey proved to be one of extreme difficulty, 

' Ilumplireys, 228. "^ Huinijhrcys, 229. * lluinphicys, 237. 



June, 1864] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 351 

and was only effected with heavy loss. Lee had made arrange- 
ments for intercepting his retreat. On approaching the Weldon 
Railroad on the 28th Wilson found himself confronted by Wade 
Hampton's cavalry division at Stony Creek Depot, whilst Fitz- 
hugh Lee's division and two infantry brigades had been posted at 
Reams' Station, ten miles to the north. Unable to fight his way 
through Hampton's division, he moved westwards, hoping to cross 
the railway nearer Petersburg, but on the 29th encountered Fitz- 
hugh Lee's cavalry at Reams' Station. As the Federals tried to 
retreat, Fitzhugh Lee and Mahone, who commanded the infantry, 
attacked, and under their united pressure Wilson's force was 
broken. Kautz's division managed to get round the Confederate 
left, and crossing the railway a short distance south of Reams' 
Station, reached the Army of the Potomac in the course of the 
same night. But the larger part was forced to make a wide 
detour, and did not rejoin the rest of the army till July 2nd. 
Wilson lost twelve guns, his wagon -train, and 1,500 killed, 
wounded, or missing.^ He had done considerable damage to the 
railways, but the Confederates found no difficulty in repairing 
them. 

The rest of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had started 
with Sheridan on June 7th on the expedition to Charlottesville 
(Map HI.). On the evening of the loth the North Anna was 
crossed, and the Federals bivouacked about ten miles north-east 
of Trevylian Station. On the same night Wade Hampton's cavalry 
division encamped about three miles north-west of the station, and 
Fitzhugh Lee's division near Louisa Court House, six miles east. 
At daylight on the iith the two Confederate divisions moved from 
their respective camps, hoping to encounter Sheridan before he 
could reach the railway. It was, however, very difficult to carry 
out a combined movement between two bodies of troops separated 
by several miles of wooded country.^ Wade Hampton, before he 
could effect a junction with Fitzhugh Lee, encountered Sheridan, 
who had also broken up his camp early in the morning, about 
three miles north of the station. According to Sheridan's account 
Torbert's division carried the entrenchments, which Wade Hamp- 
ton's men had hastily thrown up, and drove the Confederates pell- 
mell into Custer, who had moved between the two Confederate 
divisions and reached Trevylian Station. Gregg meantime had 
attacked Fitzhugh Lee on the Louisa Court House road, and driven 
him back some distance, pursuing till nightfall.^ During the night 
the two Confederate leaders reunited their commands in the direc- 
tion of Gordonsville, whilst Sheridan with his whole force occupied 

* For Wilson's raid, see Humphreys, 236-41. ^ Humphreys, 231. 

^ Ciregg commanded one of Sheridan's two divisions, and Custer a brigade in Torbert's 
division. 



352 THE CIVir. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the station. On the strength of his subsequent movements the 
Confederates claimed tlie victory, but it seems quite clear that they 
were driven beyond the Virginia Central Railway. During the 
night Sheridan learnt from his prisoners that General Hunter was 
not moving on Charlottesville, as he supposed, but was threatening 
Lynchburg. It was useless in the presence of Wade Hampton's 
united force to attempt the systematic destruction of the railroad, 
and accordingly he retired on the night of the 12th and reached 
White House on the 21st. Grant had determined to break up 
his depot there, and on the 22nd Sheridan started to escort a train 
of 900 wagons to the James. The train safely crossed on the 
25th, but Gregg's division, which was covering the movement, had 
a hard fight on the 24th with Wade Hampton's and Fitzhugh 
Lee's divisions, and was driven back some distance. On the 27th 
Sheridan was ordered to move by the left to Reams' Station 
(Map VH.) to aid Wilson's return. But he did not arrive in time 
to take part in the fighting ; for the enemy's infantry had already 
withdrawn within their own lines, and the cavalry, after pursuing 
Wilson's main body as far as the Blackwater, returned by circuitous 
routes to their camp on July ist.^ 

Since the beginning of June the heat had been intense, and no 
rain fell for forty-seven days.^ All the surface water disappeared, 
and the Federals had to rely upon wells for their supply. The 
dust lay thick upon the ground, and marching caused great suffer- 
ing to the troops. Under the circumstances Grant decided to 
postpone, till a more convenient season, his flank movement to 
turn Lee's right and gain possession of the Petersburg Railroads : 
and orders were issued that the operations against the Confederate 
lines were to be conducted by regular approaches on the front 
opposed to the 5th and 9th Corps.^ In July the 6th Corps had 
been sent north to defend Washington against Early's raid, and 
after its departure the left flank of the Federal army was drawn in 
to the Jerusalem Plank road, on which two strong redoubts were 
constructed about half a mile apart."* The Federal left was thus 
refused. A formidable siege-train, including forty rifled siege-guns 

* For Sheridan's operations, see Iluniphreys, 230-5, 241. The Confederates claimed 
that on the nth Custer's brigade was routed by Rosser's brigade, which not only 
recovered all that Custer had captured, but also "got possession of Custer's headquarters 
ambulances" (4 B. & L., 23S). I'.ut the same writer, General Butler, C.S.A., admits 
that the day "ended disastr<Hisly." There was also some hard fighting on the 12th. 
Torbert's division was trying to secure a ford over the North Anna, but being opposed 
by both Hampton and Fit/.hugh Lee, was repulsed. The Federals were therefore obliged 
to return by the road by which they had come (Sheridan, i. 424-5). 

■■* Humphreys, 243. 

* Humphreys, 247. The right of the 9th Corps reached to the Prince George Court 
House road, where it joined a division of the iSth Corps. On the left of the 9th Corps 
came the 5th Corps, whose left rested on the Jerusalem Plank road. 

* Forts Davis and Sedgwick. 



July, 1864] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 353 

and forty heavy, as well as lighter, mortars had by this time 
reached Grant. ^ 

Towards the end of June Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, of the 
48th Pennsylvania regiment, which was largely composed of coal 
miners, whilst he himself had been a mining engineer, suggested 
to his divisional commander, Potter, the practicability of running 
a mine under one of the Confederate redans. The scheme was 
reported to Burnside, the Corps commander, and Meade gave his 
consent, though with some hesitation. For though the ground on 
the Federal side was favourable for carrying on the work un- 
observed, yet the space, which would have to be crossed by the 
columns advancing to the attack after the explosion of the mine, 
was exposed to a cross-fire on both flanks. The mine was com- 
menced on June 25th, and was ready to receive the powder-charge 
by July 23rd. The main gallery was 511 feet long, with two 
lateral galleries 37 and 38 feet long, and 8,000 pounds of powder 
were placed in them.^ The mining operations of the Federals 
failed to escape Beauregard's notice. He threw up entrench- 
ments across the gorge of the salient threatened, and established 
batteries of heavy mortars to give a front and cross-fire on it. 

On July 25th Grant ordered the 2nd Corps, again under the 
command of Hancock, with three cavalry divisions under Sheridan 
(including Kautz's cavalry division of the Army of the James),^ 
to cross to the north bank of the James with as much secrecy as 
possible. The principal object of this expedition was to destroy 
the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg Railways from the neigh- 
bourhood of Richmond back to the North and South Anna Rivers. 
If a favourable opportunity presented itself, the cavalry might 
make a dash at Richmond. The infantry was to support the 
cavalry if it got into Richmond, and also to prevent troops being 
sent to interfere with the cavalry's operations against the railways. 
At the same time Grant hoped that this movement across the 
James would cause Lee to withdraw some of his forces from the 
Petersburg lines and thus weaken the opposition to be en- 
countered, when a general assault followed the explosion of 
Burnside's mine.* 

Two pontoon bridges had been laid across the James at Deep 
Bottom (Map VIII.), one just above and the other below the 
mouth of Bailey's Creek, They were guarded by General Foster, 
of the loth Corps. Opposite the upper bridge the Confederates 

^ Humphreys, 246. This siege-train had also a reserve of six loo-pounder Parrotts. 

^ 4 B. & L., 545-6. Colonel Pleasants had to work under great disadvantages, as 
Meade and his chief engineer did not believe the undertaking was possible. "With 
proper tools and instruments it could have been done in one-third or one-quarter of the 
time." 

•'' Kautz's division was to join Sheridan at Deep Bottom. 

* For the objects of this expedition, see Humphreys, 247-S. 

2 A 



354 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

held an entrenched Hne, which did not, however, apparently extend 
far from the river. Before dayhght on the 27th Hancock crossed 
by the lower bridge. The defences of Richmond on the north 
side of the river were under the charge of Ewell, who had under 
his command two militia brigades and a force of Government 
employes. Hancock's plan was that Foster, moving forward from 
the upper bridge, should threaten the enemy's entrenched line in 
front, whilst he himself turned its left. 

But Lee had already, in anticipation of the attack, brought two 
infantry divisions from the south bank, and on the 27th a third 
division arrived. Two cavalry divisions and another infantry 
division were subsequently withdrawn from the Petersburg lines. 
In the face of so strong a force the Federal movement made no 
progress. Hancock had been ordered not to attack entrench- 
ments, and a turning movement was rendered impossible by the 
superior numbers of the enemy. On the night of the 29th 
Hancock withdrew his forces to the south bank of the river, 
preparatory to taking part in the general assault upon Petersburg. 
The knowledge that Lee, by withdrawing so large a force from 
Petersburg, had left only three infantry divisions and one cavalry 
division for its defence, and the discovery that what had hitherto 
been supposed to be a connected line of entrenchments along a 
ridge 500 yards in rear of the main Confederate line was not a 
connected line at all, but only consisted of detached redans,^ 
caused Grant to have great hopes of the success of the assault, 
which he had determined to make with all his available forces on 
the 30th. 

The mine was to be exploded at 3.30 a.m. Burnside's Corps 
Avas to make the main assault, supported on the right by the 
18th Corps, and on the left by the 5th, whilst the 2nd Corps was 
also expected to co-operate. Burnside had originally proposed 
that his fourth division, consisting of coloured troops under 
General Ferrero, should lead the assault, because his three white 
divisions had suffered considerably from the heavy fire kept up day 
and night from the Confederate lines, only a hundred }'ards away. 
But both Grant and Meade refused to entrust so important a task 
to inexperienced troops. The other three divisional commanders 
drew lots for the post of honour, and the lot fell upon Ledlie. 
Burnside had been specially directed by Meade to prepare his 
parapets and abatis for the passage of the assaulting columns, 
to equip his pioneers for the purpose of opening passages for the 
artillery and destroying the Confederate abatis, and to distribute 
the entrenching tools of the Corps. But these precautions were 
totally neglected by the commander of the 9th Corps. At a 
personal interview on the 29th Meade had endeavoured to impress 

' IIumplircy'5, 251. 



July, 1864] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 855 

upon Burnside and the commanders of his three white divisions 
the importance of pushing forward at once to the ridge in the 
enemy's rear, and the uselessness of trying to hold the crater 
which the explosion would make.^ 

Owing to some defect in the fuse the explosion did not take 
place till 4.40 a.m. The redan, against which the mine was 
directed, was held by Elliott's brigade of B. R. Johnson's division. 
One regiment and part of another and a battery were overwhelmed, 
and the Confederates in terror abandoned their lines for some 200 
or 300 yards on either side of the crater. A few minutes after the 
explosion Ledlie's division filed slowly out of their entrenchments. 
The movement was necessarily slow, as no proper passages for the 
assaulting columns had been prepared. The division, on reaching 
the crater, which was about 150 feet long, 60 wide, and 25 deep,^ 
poured into it. The divisional commander, who had been par- 
ticularly cautioned not to let his troops enter the crater but to 
hold straight on for the ridge beyond, had not considered it part 
of his duty to accompany his troops, but remained behind 
sheltered in a bomb-proof fifty yards within his own lines, whence 
he could see nothing of the movements of the troops under his 
command. The troops, having once entered the crater, could not 
without much difficulty be induced to go forward, and time was 
thus given to the Confederates to recover from their surprise and 
prepare for defence. Elliott rallied the remnant of his brigade in 
a ravine behind the salient, and on his left Ransom's brigade and 
an artillery battery opened fire on such of the Federals as tried to 
advance beyond the crater. 

Eighty-one heavy siege-guns and mortars had been carefully 
placed in position to beat down the fire of the Confederate batteries, 
and, as soon as the mine was exploded, opened fire, and about the 
same number of field-guns came into action. But a four-gun 
battery on the Confederate left and a two-gun battery on the right 
were so skilfully concealed, that the Federal artillery failed to 
silence them, and they brought a cross-fire to bear upon the troops 
advancing from Burnside's entrenchments. Ledlie's division was 
followed by Potter's, which, keeping to the right of the crater, 
captured, after a sharp fight, that part of the entrenchments which 
had been partially abandoned. A corresponding move on the left 
was made by Willcox's division. His first brigade entered the 
crater, but the second, keeping to the left, captured some portion of 
the enemy's entrenchments. Though on both sides of the crater 
part of the Confederate lines had been captured, no further progress 
towards the ridge was made. At 8 a.m. the coloured division 
advanced from the Federal entrenchments, but its commander, 
General Ferrero, remained behind with Ledlie in the bomb-proof. 

' Humphreys, 254. "^ ITuaiphreys, 255, note. 



356 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

A considerable part of it, in spite of the efforts of the brigadiers, 
hurried into the crater : the rest entered the entrenchments to the 
right. 

Ord, commanding the i8th Corps, had been ordered on the 29th 
to withdraw his troops from their entrenchments and post them in 
rear of Burnside's Corps to follow up its attack. When ordered 
by Meade to advance, Ord experienced great difficulty in getting 
his troops through Burnside's entrenchments, owing to the lack 
of proper preparation. At last he got one division into open 
ground, and carried a part of the Confederate lines to the right 
of the point which the coloured troops had occupied, and was 
preparing to sweep along the enemy's line to the right, when he 
saw the troops on his left streaming back to their own entrench- 
ments, and his own troops promptly followed suit.^ 

Lee, on hearing of the attack, had ordered up two brigades of 
Mahone's division, which held the right of the Petersburg defences. 
Mahone arrived shortly before 9 a.m., and seeing how large a force 
had occupied the Confederate entrenchments, sent back for a third 
brigade. One of Ferrero's brigadiers, followed by a very small 
fraction of his men, was attempting to push forward to the ridge, 
when one of Mahone's brigades charged and di'ove them back. 
Thereupon the whole of the coloured troops, who had gained a 
footing in the entrenchments, took to their heels, carrying away 
with them many of Potter's men and Ord's one division. By this 
precipitate flight the Confederates were enabled to recover the 
entrenchments which they had lost on their left of the crater. 
Meade, recognising that all chance of success was gone, ordered 
offensive operations to cease.- Warren was just advancing to 
attack with his right division when the order reached him, and he 
abandoned the movement. A large number of men were in the 
crater suffering great distress under the burning rays of the sun, 
and one brigade was holding a part of the Confederate entrench- 
ments on the left.^ Mahone attacked these troops, but was driven 
back. Having been reinforced by his third brigade, he renewed 
the attack along with part of Johnson's division between i p.m. 
and 2 p.m. Two of the brigadiers in the crater gave the order to 
retire, and the greater part of the troops in the crater and 
entrenchments fell back to their own lines, suffering heavy loss, 
whilst a large number of prisoners were taken in the crater. 

Thus the great assault, by which Grant had hoped to gain posses- 
sion of Petersburg and to cross to the north bank of the Appo- 
mattox, turned out a costly fiasco. The Federal loss nearly 

^ Ord, who liad rclicvcil W. F. Smith in the conimaivl of tlio iSth Corps, had at his 
disposal one division of his own Corps and one of the lolh. It was the latter which took 
part in the attack. 

^ At y.45 a.m. (Humphreys, 262). " One of Wilicox's lirifjades. 



AnG.,i864] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 357 

reached 4,000, whilst that of the Confederates was probably not 
more than 1,200.^ 

Meade requested that a Court of Enquiry should be held to 
examine into the causes of the disaster. The finding- of the Court 
fully exonerated him, and laid the blame, where it justly belonged, 
upon Burnside and his divisional commanders, with the exception 
of Potter. The Court also expressed its opinion that a single 
general on the spot should have been given command of all the 
troops which were to take part in the assault, in order to secure 
greater unity of action. Warren's Corps, through no fault of that 
commander, was kept out of the fighting: only one division of Ord's 
Corps was engaged, and the list of casualties shows that the 
9th Corps had practically all the fighting to itself. Ledlie was 
allowed to resign, and Burnside was succeeded in the command of 
the 9th Corps by General Parke.^ 

In August Sheridan was sent to command the Federal forces in 
the Shenandoah Valley, and two cavalry divisions from the Army 
of the Potomac were sent with him. Lee, in turn, reinforced Early 
in the Valley with Kershaw's infantry division and Fitzhugh Lee's 
cavalry division. Grant's information led him to believe that the 
whole of Anderson's Corps, and not a single division only, had been 
sent to Early.^ He therefore directed Hancock to take his own 
Corps and the loth, now under the command of Birney, along with 
the remaining cavalry division under Gregg, and make another 
movement along the north bank of the James on Richmond. 

The object of the movement was to prevent Lee from sending 
more troops to the Shenandoah Valley, and, if possible, cause him 
to recall some of those which Grant erroneously supposed to have 
been sent. It was expected that Hancock would be able to break 
through the left of the Confederate entrenchments on Bailey's Creek, 
and this success, if vigorously followed up, might lead to the 
capture of Chaffin's Bluff, the strongest work on the north bank 
guarding the river approach to Richmond. The cavalry might get 
a chance of making a dash upon Richmond: failing that, they were 
to fall upon the railways coming into Richmond from the north. 

Every effort was made to keep the movement a secret. The 
2nd Corps was marched to City Point to give the impression that 
it was about to be sent by water to Washington. But in the night 

' 4 B. & L., 560, note, where the Federal loss is stated at 3,798, of which 3,475 
belonged to the 9th Corps. 

^ The Congressional Investigating Committee found that the chief cause of the 
disaster was due to the fact that the attack was led by white and not black troops. 
Ferrero's coloured division had been specially drilled in view of the contemplated move- 
ment. This view was not, however, taken by the military Court of Enquiry. For the 
details of Burnside's unsuccessful attack, see Humphreys, 250-65. 

^ Grant was deceived by the fact that R. H. Anderson, the Corps commander, 
accompanied Kershaw's division. 



358 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

it was conveyed in steamers up the river to the lower pontoon 
bridge at Deep Bott'jin, and disembarked on the morning of 
August 14th. ^ 

The northern defences of Richmond were not so weakly held as 
Grant imagined. The Bailey's Creek line was defended by Field's 
division : Wilcox's division occupied Chafifin's Bluff, and at once 
moved out to join Field. From the south bank Lee sent across 
Mahone's infantry division and two cavalry divisions : only a single 
brigade of cavalry was left with Beauregard in the Petersburg lines. 
Against such a force as Lee had thus concentrated Hancock had 
no chance of achieving success. On the i6th the left of the Con- 
federate entrenchments on Bailey's Creek was carried by Terry's 
division of the loth Corps, but was quickly recaptured. Though 
Grant now saw that the information on which he had acted was 
inaccurate, he still retained Hancock in front of the Bailey's Creek 
entrenchments until the night of the 20th, in order to prevent Lee 
from withdrawing troops to resist a movement which was mean- 
while being carried out against the Confederate defences on the 
south of Petersburg. 

On the 1 8th Warren, with the 5th Corps, marched to the Weldon 
Railroad at the Globe Tavern.^ A single cavalry brigade was 
easily driven off, and Griffin's division commenced the destruction 
of the railway, whilst the other two divisions moved up the line 
towards its intersection with the Vaughan road. On learning of 
the appearance of Federal troops on the railway Beauregard 
despatched Heth with two brigades to the threatened point. A 
surprise attack on the left flank of Ayres' division, which was 
advancing on both sides of the railroad, caused the P'ederals to fall 
back a sliort distance, but their line was quickly restored and Heth 
driven off with considerable loss.^ 

On the 19th Mahone's infantry division and W. H. F. Lee's 
cavalry division arrived from Richmond, and on the Federal side 
the 9th Corps was gradually withdrawn from its entrenchments 
and sent to Warren's assistance. On that day Hill, with five 
brigades, attempted, whilst pressing Ayres' division in front with 
Hcth's two brigades, to turn Crawford's right with Mahone's three. 
Warren had sought to establish connection by means of a skirmish 
line between Crawford's right and the left of the 9th Corps, which 
held the entrenchments just quitted by the 5th Corps. But the 
intervening country was very thickly wooded, and Mahone had no 
difficulty in breaking through the skirmish line and falling upon 
Crawford's right flank. Crawford was forced to fall back, and 
Ayres' right brigade shared in the retrograde movement, but on 

^ Humphreys, 268. 

^ The Globe Tavern was about four miles south of tlie outskirts of 1 etersburg 
(Humphreys, 272). ^ Humphreys, 274-5. 



Aug., 1864] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 359 

two divisions of the 9th Corps coming up Warren assumed the 
offensive and drove Mahone back into his entrenchments with 
heavy loss. 

As it was now plain that the enemy would not abandon the 
possession of the railroad without a serious struggle, Warren 
selected on the 20th a position about a mile in rear of his earlier 
one, mainly in open ground and favourable for the use of artillery .1 
On the 2 1st Hill, who had been reinforced by Wilcox's division of 
his own Corps and part of Hoke's division, attacked Warren's new 
position, but was repulsed. After this failure the Confederates made 
no further attempt to interfere with Warren, and the Federal 
entrenchments were extended from the Jerusalem Plank road to 
Warren's position on the Weldon Railway.^ 

But, though the occupation of that railroad at the Globe Tavern 
prevented the Confederates from running trains any longer right 
through into Petersburg, they could still use the railway as far as a 
point which was within a distance of a day's hauling by wagon 
to Petersburg. Grant therefore determined to destroy the railroad 
as far as Rowanty Creek (Map VH.). If that work were success- 
fully accomplished, the Confederate wagon-trains would have to 
follow a roundabout route from Stony Creek Depot to Dinwiddle 
Court House on the Boydton plank road, a distance of fully thirty 
miles from Petersburg.^ 

On the 22nd Hancock was despatched with two of his divisions 
and Gregg's cavalry division to destroy the railroad to the desired 
point. By the night of the 24th the line had been destroyed to 
within five miles of Rowanty Creek, and the troops bivouacked for 
the night at Reams' Station.* The Confederates, realising the 
importance of preventing the further destruction of the railway, 
concentrated eight infantry brigades^ and Hampton's two cavalry 
divisions, under the command of Hill, against Hancock, and attack- 
ing him on the afternoon of the 25th, after two unsuccessful 
attempts, drove him from the slight entrenchments, which had been 
thrown up earlier in the year at Reams' Station.*^ It was only the 

* Humphreys, 277, 

^ It is not quite clear as to what was the strength of the forces with which Hill 
attacked on the 21st. Of Mahone's three brigades, which fought on the 19th, two 
belonged to Hoke's division, and a third brigade of that division was engaged on the 21st, 
Humphreys speaks of Hill having his own Corps, three divisions under Heth, Mahone, 
and Wilcox, in the attack of the 21st. Potter's division of the 9th Corps joined Warren 
in time to take part in the fight on that day. The Federal losses in the two days' fighting 
were 4,278 (4 B. & L., 571). The Confederate loss was not officially stated, but must 
have been heavy. 

^ Humphreys, 278. Rowanty Creek was about thirteen miles beyond Warren's left. 

* The destruction of the railway had been continued three miles south of Reams' 
Station. 

^ Humphreys, 279, note. 

^ The unsuccessful attacks were made by Wilcox with four brigades at about 2 p.m. 
Hill made his successful attack about three hours later. 



SCO THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

gallant bearing of Hancock himself and of General Miles ^ com- 
manding the first division, who succeeded in rallying a part of his 
division, which prevented a great disaster overtaking the Federals. 
Miles held the road leading to the station from the Jerusalem Plank 
road until dusk, and the whole force was then withdrawn. Hill, 
having driven the 2nd Corps from the railroad, returned with his 
infantry to their entrenchments, leaving Plampton's cavalry at 
Reams' Station. If a Federal force had been sent to Hancock's 
assistance along the railway, it would have had a fair chance of 
taking the Confederates in flank and converting the defeat into a 
victory. Meade, however, was afraid lest the railroad should be 
closed to the relieving force, and preferred the safer and longer 
route by the Jerusalem Plank road. Consequently neither of the 
two divisions, sent by Meade to reinforce Hancock, arrived in time 
to be of any assistance.- 

A month later Grant tried another co-operative movement 
against Lee's lines. On September 28th Ord and Birney were 
ordered to take part of their respective Corps, the i8th and loth, 
and with Kautz's cavalry division cross to the north bank of the 
James.^ Ord was directed to cross by a pontoon bridge, to be laid 
down during the night, two miles below Dutch Gap (Map VHI.). 
He would thus turn the enemy's line of entrenchments at Bailey's 
Creek, and be able to march straight up the river by the Varina 
road. Birney and Kautz were to cross by the upper pontoon bridge 
at Deep Bottom and march by the Newmarket and Darbytown 
roads. 

By 7.30 a.m. on the 29th Ord found himself in front of the main 
line of Confederate entrenchments, and j^romptly attacked and 
carried Fort Harrison, the strongest work in that line. An attack 
upon I'ort Gilmer, which was about three-quarters of a mile north 
of Fort Harrison, was, however, repulsed. The capture of P^ort 
Gilmer would have given the Federals possession of the Chafhn's 
Bluff defences. Accordingly when Birney arrived on the ground, 
he renewed the attack upon P^ort Gilmer, but with like ill-success. 
As soon as the attack developed, Lee summoned reinforcements 
from the Petersburg lines. Six brigades of infantry were brought 
across the river, and also some regiments of Pickett's command at 
Bermuda Plundred. 

On the 30th Anderson, with five brigades, made a determined 

' Late Coniiiiaiider-in-Cliicf of the United Slates Army. 

'■^ Willcox's division and a delacliment, about i,Soo strong, from Mott's. Willcox had 
to march twelve miles (ami Mott's troops about the same distance) instead of live. The 
Federal loss was 2,742 and nine guns; the Confederate was returned by Hill as 720. 
For details of this engagement, see Humphreys, 279 S3. 

* Ord took with him 2,000 men from each of his first and second divisions. Birney 
bad under his command two divisions of his own Corps and one coloured brigade as well 
as Old's third division (coluuied), numbering in all about lO.OOO men (Hnmplireys, 2^5). 



Sept.,iS64] the siege of PETERSBURG 361 

attempt to recapture Fort Harrison, but the Federals had 
strengthened the fort, and the attack, though twice repeated, was 
repulsed with heavy loss. On the previous day Ord had attempted 
unsuccessfully to sweep down the Confederate lines to the river 
and capture their pontoon bridge. But a line of entrenchments 
was constructed by the Federals connecting Fort Harrison with 
the river at Dutch Gap.^ 

On the south side of the river the co-operative movement was 
commenced on the 30th. Warren, with two of his divisions, 
followed by two divisions of the 9th Corps, moved out of the 
Federal lines and advanced towards the Boydton plank road, 
whilst Gregg's cavalry division covered their left flank. About 
two miles west of the Weldon Railroad a redoubt and line of 
entrenchments at the Peebles Farm were captured by Warren,^ 
and Parke, with his two divisions, pushed forward on Warren's left 
towards the Boydton plank road. Hill sent Wilcox's and Heth's 
divisions to drive back Parke, and Potter's division, which was 
leading on the right, was taken in flank and forced to fall back. 
Parke established a new line with Willcox's division and checked 
the Confederate advance. Having been reinforced the next day 
by Mott's division of the 2nd Corps, he again advanced and suc- 
ceeded in establishing a line of entrenchments about a mile from 
the enemy's lines. This new line was quickly connected with the 
Federal entrenchments on the Weldon Railroad. 

Grant was very anxious, before the approach of winter put an 
end to the operations of the year, to make one more attempt to 
seize the Southside Railroad. For this purpose a force of about 
32,000 infantry with Gregg's cavalry division and a proper com- 
plement of artillery was detailed. The infantry were drawn from 
the 2nd, 5th, and 9th Corps. Hancock was to move on the left 
across Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road, advance by Dabney's 
Mill to the Boydton plank road, and then to push for the South- 
side Railway by the White Oak and Claiborne roads.^ At this 
time the Confederate lines almost reached to Hatcher's Run, about 
two miles above the Vaughan road crossing ; but further up the 
stream there was no connected line of entrenchments, but only 
some infantry parapets and emplacements for artillery at the 
Boydton road crossing of the Run. Parke was to endeavour to 
surprise the entrenchments near Hatcher's Run, but in case of 

^ The Federal loss during the two days' fighting was 2,272; the Confederate, perhaps, 
2,000 (Humphreys, 285-9). 

- The importance of the Peebles Farm was that it lay at the junction of two roads 
coming from the south-west (Iluniplireys, 291). The entrenchments captured by 
Warren were not part of tlie Confederate main line, but an advanced work. 

^ The White Oak road intersects the Claiborne road, and by this latter Hancock's 
column would strike the Southside Railway east of Sutherland Station (Humphreys, 
295)- 



36^ THE CIVIL WAR LN THE UNITED STATES 

failure to continue to demonstrate in front of them, whilst the 5th 
Corps was to cross the Run and, keeping on Hancock's right, turn 
the Confederate right by recrossing above the Boydton road 
crossing.^ 

Hancock crossed Hatcher's Run at daylight of the 27th October, 
and reached the Boydton road, but at i p.m. was directed not to 
advance further, as the forward movement of the other two Corps 
had been obstructed. Hill concentrated on the Boydton road 
Heth's and Mahone's divisions and Hampton's whole cavalry 
force. Mahone's division was sent across the Run lower down, 
and tried to turn Hancock's right, whilst Heth's division barred 
further progress up the plank road, and Hampton's cavalry 
endeavoured to fall upon the Federal left. 

Hancock had just advanced one of his two divisions against the 
bridge at Burgess' Mills, when Mahone's brigades rushed from the 
woods, and falling upon the exposed flank of an isolated brigade 
on the east side of the road, drove it across the road and captured 
a couple of guns. As Mahone formed across the road, and facing 
south was opening fire upon the two Federal brigades, who were 
holding the intersection of the Dabney's Mill road with the 
Boydton road, he was himself taken in flank by Egan's division 
counter-marching from the bridge, and was driven in great con- 
fusion into the woods with the loss of the two guns just captured. 

On the Federal left a fierce contest was maintained between 
Hampton and Gregg, whose cavalry division was covering 
Hancock's left flank, till dark, but though hard pressed, Gregg 
held his own. During the night Hancock withdrew his forces, as 
no reinforcements had reached him and his supply of ammunition 
was running short. Had he remained till the following morning 
a battle against superior forces could not have been avoided, as 
Hill, leaving only one division to hold the Hatcher's Run entrench- 
ments, was concentrating all his available troops on the Boydton 
road. 

Early in the afternoon of the 27th it had become plain to Grant 
and Meade that their attempt to seize the Southside Railway was 
doomed to failure. On the Boydton road Hancock was still six 
miles distant from the desired goal, and all chance of taking the 
enemy by surprise had vanished. 

Parke had found the Hatcher's Run entrenchments too strong 
to be carried by assault. After some delay Warren was ordered 
to move one division across the Run lower down, and advancing 
up the right bank, to flank the enemy out of their lines. But 

^ Warren was to cross Hatcher's Run at Annstronj^'s Mill, aljout a mile below the 
point where the Confederate entrenchments resteil on the Run. He would then be in a 
position to support either Parke or Hancock. But he was only to cross the Run if 
I'arke failed to carry the entrenchments in his front. 



Oct., iS6s] THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG SG3 

Crawford's division, which crossed the Run at Armstrong's Mill, 
made very slow progress in the dense wood and intricate country. 
It took four hours to cover a mile and a half, and even when the 
division was in position opposite to the Confederate right it was 
found impracticable to cross the Run.^ Nor was Crawford able, 
owing to the thickness of the intervening thicket forest, to form a 
junction with Hancock on his left. On the 28th the whole Federal 
force returned to its entrenchments. 

At the same time that this unsuccessful movement against the 
Southside Railway was being made, Butler was directed to make 
a co-operative movement on the north bank of the James. Whilst 
part of the loth Corps under Terry moved up the Charles City 
and Darbytown roads and made a demonstration against the Con- 
federate lines in their front, Weitzel,- with part of the i8th Corps, 
was ordered to push through the White Oak Swamp and en- 
deavour to carry the works reaching from the Williamsburg road 
across the York River railroad. It was expected that these works, 
if occupied at all, would only be held by a very weak force. But 
Longstreet, who had returned to duty and on October 19th had 
taken command of the forces on the north bank of the James and 
the Bermuda Hundred front,^ quickly divined the significance of 
Terry's demonstration, and hurried Field's and Hoke's divisions 
and Gary's cavalry brigade to his left along his lines to cover the 
Williamsburg and Nine Mile roads. 

Field was just in time to repulse Weitzel's attack, and though 
the Federals captured part of the entrenchments beyond the rail- 
road, they were promptly driven out again by Gary. An attack 
made by Terry against the entrenchments in his front was also 
repulsed. Butler's demonstration proved rather a costly failure, as 
he lost r,ioo men and inflicted practically no loss on his enemy.'^ 

With this double failure Grant's operations against Richmond 
and Petersburg came to an end for 1864. 

^ Crawford arrived opposite the Confederate lines aliout 4 p.m., at which hour 
Mahone was advancing against Hancock's right. Crawford was accompanied by one 
brigade of Ayres' division. For the whole movement, see Humphreys, 294-303 ; 
Swinton, 540-7. 

- Weitzel had succeeded Ord, wounded on September 29th, in the command of the 
iSth Corps. 

^ Humphreys, 304 * Humphreys, 306. 



CHAPTER XXII 
THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN i 

The Grand Army of the West — The Confederate position— Sherman's general plan of 
campaign — The campaign opens — McPherson's flanking movement — Johnston aban- 
dons Dalton — Johnston's position at Resaca — Johnston abandons Resaca — Johnston 
falls back liehind the Etowah — Davis captures Rome — Johnston's position at 
Allatoona — Sherman moves on Dallas — Johnston advances from the railway to meet 
him — Sherman unsuccessfully attacks Johnston's right — Confederate attack on 
Federal right repulsed — Johnston falls back towards Marietta — Johnston's new 
position — Death of General Polk — Confederate left outflanked — Johnston falls back 
to Kenesaw Mountain — The Federals continue to gain ground on tlie right — Hood's 
attack on the Federal rigiU repulsed — Federals attack Kenesaw Mountain — The 
attack repulsed with loss— Schofield turns the Confederate left — Johnston falls back 
to the Chattahoochee — Johnston retreats behind the Chattahoochee — Sherman 
decides to move by his left flank — Ilood supersedes Johnston — Thomas crosses Peach- 
tree Creek — Hood attacks Thomas' left flank — The Confederates defeated — Hood 
attacks McPherson's left flank — Death of McPherson — Tlie Confederates repulsed 
with hea\7 loss — Changes in the Federal army — The Atlanta railways — Sherman's 
movement by the right flank against the Macon Railway — Hood attacks Howard's 
right flank — The Confederates again defeated — Unsuccessful attempts of the Federal 
cavalry to break up the railways — Sherman' gains ground on the right — Sherman 
moves with nearly all his army against the Macon Railway — Hood outwitted — Hood 
vainly attacks Howard — The Federals secure the Macon Railway — Unsuccessful 
attempt to capture Hardee's Corps at Jonesboro — Hood evacuates Atlanta. 

FOR his campaign against General Joseph E. Johnston, Sher- 
man had under his command, when he took over from Grant, 
the three Armies of the Teimessce, Cumberland, and Ohio. 
The Army of the Cumberland, under the command of Thomas, 
was composed of the 4th Corps, under Howard, who had relieved 
Gordon Granger, the 14th, under Palmer, and the 20th, under 
Hooker. It numbered about 60,000 men with 130 guns. The 
Army of the Ohio, commanded by Schofield, who had relieved 
Foster, only consisted of one Corps, the 23rd, and numbered 
14,000 men with 28 guns. The Army of the Tennessee, under 
McPherson, who had succeeded Sherman upon the latter's appoint- 
ment to the military division of the Mississippi, at the commence- 
ment of the campaign consisted of two Corps: the 15th under 
Logan and the iGth under Dodge, and numbered 25,000 men 
with 96 guns. The 17th Corps j'oincd it later on. Sherman re- 

1 See MapXH. 



May, 1 864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 365 

ported his infantry and artillery present for duty on May ist as 
numbering 98,797 men. The cavalry force, not included in this 
estimate, was more than 10,000 strong, consisting of four divisions 
under Stoneman, Garrard, McCook, and Kilpatrick. The Con- 
federate army at the time when Sherman advanced against Dalton, 
and before the arrival of Polk's Corps, probably numbered about 
60,000 men.^ 

Johnston held a strongly entrenched position at Dalton, thirty- 
eight miles south-east of Chattanooga on the Chattanooga- Atlanta 
Railroad. Before reaching Dalton the railroad passes through 
Rocky Face Ridge, the eastern barrier of the basin drained by the 
Chickamauga River.^ The ridge extends some three miles north of 
Mile Creek Gap, through which pass the railroad runs, and con- 
tinues south for several miles, completely covering Dalton on the 
west. From Dalton a branch line runs to Cleveland, where it 
joins the East Tennessee Railway. Both armies were tied for their 
supplies to the railway. Sherman had the choice of operating 
against Johnston from either Chattanooga or Cleveland as a base. 
But to have adopted Cleveland for that purpose would have been 
to lay open to Johnston a road by which he might invade Middle 
Tennessee and strike at the Federal lines of communication with 
the Ohio. Such a movement would have at once cut Sherman off 
from his line of supplies in the Lower Tennessee valley ; and the 
experience of Burnside at Knoxville showed that East Tennessee 
would be unable to provide sufficient supplies for so large an army 
invading Georgia.^ 

Johnston saw clearly that the Federal advance must proceed 
along the main railroad to Atlanta, and devoted himself to 
strengthening his position across that line. Mill Creek was 
dammed so as to flood part of the country in his front, and 
entrenchments were thrown up in the Gap, and extended along 
both the northern and' southern crests of Rocky Face Ridge. 
About four miles north of Dalton, near the northern extremity 
of the ridge, a line of entrenchments was constructed, running 
eastward to the high ground commanding the Cleveland Railway, 
and thence continued south, covering Dalton against any attack 
from the east. Johnston's position was almost impregnable to 
any attack from the front or either flank. He regarded Sherman 
as impulsive and reckless, and hoped that, in spite of the strength 

1 Cox's Atlanta, 28, 241-4. The Confederate return for April 30th gave the total 
" present for duty" at 52,992. To this must be added Mercer's brigade, which joined 
Johnston May 2nd, and is estimated at 2,800 men : and during the first week in May 
there was an increase in Hood's and Hardee's Corps of about 5,000. Johnston stated 
his " effective total " on April 30th as only 42,856. But this estimate excludes officers, 
and only includes sergeants, corporals, and private soldiers "for duty equipped." To 
form a fair comparison of the strength of the two armies the totals " present for duty" 
must be taken (4 B. & L., 281). '^ Cox's Atlanta, 29. •' Cox's Atl.nta, 30. 



366 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

of the position, his adversary would attempt to storm it, and thus 
give him an opportunity of deliverinf^ a crushing counter-blow.^ 

Sherman, however, had no intention of wasting his troops in 
frontal attacks upon Johnston's entrenchments. His whole plan 
of campaign aimed at flanking him out of successive positions 
and forcing him either to stand and fight on open ground, where 
effective use could be made of the Federal numerical superiority, 
or to continue his retreat, until at length he abandoned Atlanta, 
or submitted to be besieged within its walls. 

To carry into execution this plan the Army of the Cumberland, 
which was about the strength of Johnston's whole force, formed 
the centre of the Federal line of advance, with the two smaller 
armies on the wings ready to operate against either flank, as 
opportunity offered. 

On May 4th the campaign opened. The Federal armies were 
concentrated along a line about sixteen miles long with the 
centre at Ringgold, the Army of the Cumberland being somewhat 
advanced in front of the wings.- On the 7th Thomas and 
Schofield moved forward to hold Johnston fast in his entrenched 
position, whilst the Army of the Tennessee made a sweep to the 
right through Ship Gap to Villanow. From Villanow McPherson 
advanced through Snake Creek Gap early on the 9th, and at 2 p.m. 
was close to Resaca, a station on the railway some twelve or fourteen 
miles south of Dalton. 

Sherman's superiority of numbers made it quite safe to detach 
McPherson's army on this flanking movement. Johnston, con- 
sidering the length of the lines which he had to hold, was not 
strong enough to divide his forces and detach a large enough 
part of his army to hold McPherson in check for any length of 
time, as reinforcements could be easily sent to the flanking 
column. Either he must hold on to Ualton with his whole army, 
or if he wished to attack McPherson he must abandon his present 
position and move against him with all his forces. In case 
Johnston adopted the latter course, Sherman knew that he could 
depend upon McPherson, who was a soldier of great ability and 
sound judgment, to hold his own until he was able to bring up 
the bulk of his army to his support. If Johnston held on to his 
position round Dalton, Sherman hoped that McPherson would be 
able to seize Resaca, and thus compel the Confederate army in its 
retreat to abandon the railway and move to the east : in which case 
its destruction would be a comparatively ea.sy task. 

' Cox's Atlanta, 31. But Jnhnston {A'ar/at/ve, 278) tlisliked the position liccause 
Rocky Face Ridge covered any direct approach from Chattanooj;a to Resaca or Calhmin. 
Had lie l)cen left to himself he would have preferred to withdraw his troops to the 
vicinity of Calhoun, so as to free his left flank from exjiOFVirc. 

* Cox's Atlanta, 25. 



May, KS64] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 867 

Johnston apparently considered that the road through Snake 
Creek Gap was impracticable for the movements of large bodies 
of troops, and had made no attempt to secure it. At Resaca 
he had constructed an entrenched camp and placed two brigades 
as a garrison in it.^ McPherson, greatly to Sherman's disappoint- 
ment, did not deem it prudent to attack this camp, not knowing 
how large a part of Johnston's army he might have to encounter, 
and withdrew his forces to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap.^ In 
the meantime the other two Federal armies had been demon- 
strating against various points of Johnston's lines. The Con- 
federate skirmishers had been driven into Mill Creek Gap, and 
attempts had been made to gain a footing on Rocky Face both 
above and below the Gap. But at both points, where the attempt 
was made, the Confederate lines were found to be too strong to 
admit of any chance of success. Sherman therefore determined 
to leave Howard's Corps and a cavalry division to watch the Gap 
and follow up Johnston, as soon as he commenced his retreat, and 
to swing the rest of his army round to the right and join McPherson 
at Snake Creek Gap, 

On the night of the 9th Johnston sent Hood with three divisions 
from his right towards Resaca, expecting that an attack would be 
made upon the entrenched camp at that place. But on finding 
that McPherson had withdrawn to Snake Creek Gap, he ordered 
one division to return to his right wing in front of Dalton, whilst 
the other two were posted at Tilton, a station between Dalton and 
Resaca. On the nth Polk, with the advance division of his Corps, 
arrived at Resaca and reported for duty to Johnston. On the 
same day the general movement of the Federal army to the right 
commenced, and on the 12th the whole of Sherman's force was 
concentrated at the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, with the excep- 
tion of Howard's Corps and Stoneman's cavalry, which latter force 
took up the position in front of Johnston's lines recently held by 
Schofield's Corps. On that night Johnston, finding that his posi- 
tion at Dalton was no longer tenable with the enemy in force 
threatening his rear, abandoned his lines and withdrew to Resaca. 
His retreat was covered by his cavalry, and Polk's division held 
back the advance of McPherson's column. On the morning of the 
13th Howard entered Dalton. 

Thus Sherman had won the first move in the great game of war 
to be played out between Johnston and himself. The Confederate 

' Johnston seems to have considered that this entrenched position at Resaca would 
delay any force advancing through Snake Creek Gap long enough to enable him to make 
good his retreat from Dalton (4 B. & L., 262 ; Johnston's Narra/ive, 316-17). 

- Cox's Atlanta, 36. Sherman has been criticised for not accepting Thomas' original 
plan and entrusting the flanking movement to the Army of the Cumberland. He seems 
at the outset of the campaign to have wished to " walk warily," and therefore preferred 
to retain the Indk of his forces in Johnston's front. 



S68 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

general was disappointed of his hope of dealing his opponent a 
severe counter-blow at the commencement of the campaign, and 
the Federal soldiers were proportionately elated at the ease with 
which so strong a position had been turned. 

At Resaca Johnston took up a strong position with his left rest- 
ing on the Oostanaula, whilst his right was bent back across the 
railway until it rested on the Connasauga. Strong as the position 
was, it had one fatal defect. There was a river in its rear, and if 
Sherman continued his flanking movement and threatened to 
cross the river below, Johnston would be obliged to continue his 
retreat. The left and centre of the Confederate line were covered 
by Camp Creek, and Polk on the left had put part of his forces 
across the Creek in order to secure some high ground from which, 
if it fell into Federal hands, the railway and wagon bridges over 
the river could be commanded. 

During the 14th there was some sharp fighting, as Hood, com- 
manding the Confederate right, attempted to fall upon the left 
flank of Howard's Corps, which on the extreme left of the Federal 
line, was " in the air." lint Sherman, seeing the weakness of 
Howard's position, promptly moved Hooker's Corps to his support, 
and Hood's attack was repulsed. On the Federal right McPherson 
drove Polk's troops from their advanced position on the west bank 
of Camp Creek, and a footing on the east bank was secured by 
part of Osterhaus' division of the 15th Corps,^ 

On the 15th Sherman moved Schofield's Corps from the centre 
to the extreme left, and one division of McPherson's army crossed 
the Oostanaula and threatened Calhoun some seven miles south of 
Resaca on the railway. It was Sherman's plan to advance by 
the left flank, and having by that movement strengthened and 
contracted his lines on the left to detail a considerable part of 
his army for a flanking movement by the right against Calhoun."' 
For that purpose he had two bridges laid across the river below 
Resaca. 

Johnston had already found his position gravely compromised 
by McPherson's capture of the high ground on the west bank of 
Camp Creek, and had been obliged to lay a pontoon bridge across 
the river about a mile above the railway bridge, out of range of 
the Federal batteries. Seeing that Sherman intended to continue 
his flanking movement, on the night of the 15th he retired across 
the Oostanaula, burning the railway bridge behind him. 

The railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta is crossed by three 

* Con's Atlanta, 45. 

- Ciix's Atlanta, 47. Siicli a llankinj,' niovcmciU vvoul.I ho cfniipletoly protected by 
the Oostanaula (4 H. & L., 267). Johnston (4 B. & L., 265) claims that on the 14th 
Hoo'l drove the Federal left from its position ; but Howard (4 B. & L., 302) maintains 
that though his left was very hard pressed, yet it held its ground by the aid of reinforce- 
ments fnun Hooker. 



May, 1864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 369 

rivers flowing in a general direction from the north-east to the 
south-west. These rivers are the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the 
Chattahoochee. After crossing the railway close to Allatoona, 
the Etowah flows west till it joins the Oostanaula at Rome, where 
the united streams form the Coosa. From Resaca to the point 
where the Etowah crosses the railway is a distance of about thirty 
miles, and in the triangle formed by the two rivers and this section 
of the railway the next stage in the duel between Johnston and 
Sherman was about to be fought out. In this district the country 
is more open and less broken than on the northern bank of the 
Oostanaula, and altogether more favourable for military operations 
on an extensive scale.^ 

Sherman was in great hopes that he could force Johnston to 
fight a battle before crossing the Etowah, and he had every con- 
fidence that the battle, if fought, would be decisive of the cam- 
paign. Johnston also felt that his retreat had gone quite far enough. 
To continue it further would only tend to discourage and demoralise 
his troops. He had now under his command three full Corps, and 
the numerical disproportion between the two armies was at this 
moment less than at any other part of the campaign.^ Immediately 
after crossing the Oostanaula he began to look about for some 
favourable position, where he might offer battle to Sherman's army. 
On the 16th he was hoping to stand and fight a mile or two south 
of Calhoun. But on examination the position was found to be 
unsuitable : and he accordingly fell back to a position about a mile 
north of Adairsville, where his engineer officers had reported that 
the ground was favourable for the defensive.^ This position also 
was finally judged unsuitable, as the breadth of the valley to 
be held was too great, and the retreat was continued, Hardee 
retiring in the direction of Kingston, and Hood and Polk towards 
Cassville. 

Sherman, who had pressed on in pursuit as fast as he could get 
his various Corps across the rivers,* judged that Johnston intended 
to give battle at Adairsville, and directed a concentration of his 
troops with a view to a general engagement on the i8th. So 
anxious was he to finish the campaign by one decisive blow, that 
he directed his lieutenants to bring on a battle without waiting for 
supports, reckoning that such veteran troops as his, and under such 
able commanders, would be able to hold their own until he had 
time to concentrate the bulk of his army against the Confederate 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 49. 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 63. Whilst at Resaca, Johnston had been joined by two divisions 
of Polk's Corps, and the third division and a cavalry division joined him at Adairsville. 
These reinforcements amounted to nearly 20,000 men (4 B. & L., 281), making up the 
Confederate strength to over 80,000. ^ Cox's Atlanta, 50. 

■• Hooker and Schofield crossed the Connasauga and Coosa waltce, two tributaries of 
the Oostanaula. 



370 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

position.^ Greatly disappointed to find on the i8th that Johnston 
had abandoned his position at Adairsville, he continued to make 
vigorous pursuit. Under the impression that Johnston's main hne 
of retreat was on Kingston, he ordered Thomas with the 4th and 
14th Corps to follow that road, having the Army of the Tennessee 
on his right, whilst the 20th and 23rd Corps were sent along the 
road to Cassville. 

As the railway at Kingston makes a sharp bend to the east, and 
the wagon road does the same, the roads on which Sherman's 
columns were marching rapidly diverge. The two roads are at 
the widest interval about seven miles apart, and between them is a 
gravelly plateau, somewhat broken towards the south." On the 
right McPherson, in order not to crowd Thomas, was marching 
towards Kingston by parallel roads. Thus on the i8th Sherman's 
army was strung out upon a broader front than at any time since 
the campaign commenced,^ and Johnston had such a chance as was 
never again presented to him of striking his foe in detail. His best 
chance of dealing a heavy blow would have been to order Hardee 
to march with all possible speed from Kingston to Cassville, and 
thus to concentrate the whole of his army against the exposed left 
of the Federal forces. Could he have massed his whole strength 
against Schoficld's solitary Corps, or even against Schofield and 
liooker combined, he might have inflicted considerable damage 
upon them before Sherman could have got Thomas' two Corps 
across the difficult ground between the two roads to their assistance. 
]}ut Johnston did not give any such orders to Hardee, who conse- 
quently fell back slowly, skirmishing with Thomas' advance 
guard, and did not reach Cassville until the aftcrn(~)on of the 19th. 
Johnston claims, indeed, to have given orders to Hood and Polk to 
make a combined attack upon Schofield on the i8th, but Hood 
denies that any such movement was ordered for that day. 

On the 19th Thomas occupied Kingston in the morning, and 
pressed close on Hardee's rearguard, until in the evening it was 
driven into Cassville, and the Armies of the Cumberland and the 
Ohio held a connected line close up to the Confederate entrench- 
ments. The Army of the Tennessee on that day halted at 
Kingston. 

Johnston, who was equally anxious to fight a battle, if he could 
find a strong defensive position, was intending to stand and fight 
at Cassville on the following day. But Polk and Hardee protested 
that their position was untenable, as part of both their lines was 
enfiladed by the batteries on the Federal left, and Johnston, very 
reluctantly throwing the responsibility upon his two Corps com- 
manders, ordered the lines to be evacuated on the night of the 19th, 
and on the 20th retreated across the Pltowah, burning the railway 

' Cox's Atlafitn, 56. " Cox's Athriila, 56. ' C<>\'s Allatita, 53. 



May, 1S64] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 371 

bridge behind him. Hood, however, has a very different version, 
saying that he vainly pressed Johnston to assume the offensive- 
defensive on the 1 8th, and that what he complained of was John- 
ston's purely defensive policy. Whatever the actual fact, it is 
quite clear that the difference of opinion between the Confederate 
generals by preventing an engagement on the north bank of the 
Etowah, prolonged the campaign.^ Sherman was justly confident 
of gaining a decisive victory if he could force his adversary to 
give battle. 

Davis' division of the 14th Corps had been detached down 
the west bank of the Oostanaula to support Garrard's cavalry 
division, which was moving towards Rome, with a view to crossing 
the river and operating on Johnston's flank. The cavalry did not 
go far down the river for fear of separating itself too much from 
the main column. But Davis continued to march down the river, 
and on the i8th, after some sharp fighting, captured Rome. This 
town, which was connected with Kingston by a branch line, was 
a depot for military stores of some size, and its occupation by 
Davis' division gave Sherman's advance a broad front, which 
tended to impose upon the enemy.^ 

Sherman had secured two bridges near to Kingston, and, as 
he could therefore count with certainty on being able to move his 
army across the river, he gave his troops a few days' rest, while 
the railway behind him was being repaired and a store of supplies 
accumulated for the next move.^ 

Johnston, after crossing the Etowah, had taken up a strong 
position along the railroad. His temporary base was at Marietta, 
about half-way between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee. After 
crossing the river the railway runs through the Allatoona Pass, 
a deep gorge which traverses a spur of high, rugged hills. This 
pass was held by Johnston. It was not likely that Sherman, 
having the means of crossing the Etowah at Kingston, would 
attempt to force a crossing in front of Allatoona. Accordingly 
Johnston kept the main part of his army along the railroad, 
waiting until he should have definite information of Sherman's 
next movement. If, as he expected, Sherman continued his 
flanking movement by the right, Johnston intended to move 
his troops to meet him and to hold the roads leading from that 
direction to the railway. 

Sherman's plan was, after providing his army with twenty days' 
rations, to cut loose from the railway and make straight for Dallas, 
a village twenty-five miles south of Kingston and nearly twenty 
miles west of Marietta.* From Dallas he would then march east 

' Cox's Atlanta, 56. For Johnston's plans and his view of the point in controversy, 
see Nai-rative, 319-24. 

2 Cox's Atlanta, 57. ^ Cox's Atlanta, 58. •• Cox's Atlanta, 64. 



372 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

and endeavour to strike the railroad near Marietta : if that line of 
advance proved very strongly held by the enemy, he would swing 
his left wing on to a road leading to Ackworth and regain tiie 
railway above Marietta. On May 22nd he gave orders for the 
movement to commence on the following day. He had no fear 
of Johnston attempting to meet him near the river in front of 
Kingston, as the Confederate commander could not afford to 
divide his army, and if he massed his troops to resist an advance 
at that point, Sherman could throw his left wing across the river at 
Allatoona and retain his hold on the railway.^ 

On the 24th Wheeler's Confederate cavalry, which had crossed 
the river on the 22nd, made a reconnaissance to Cassville to find 
out whether the whole of Sherman's army was crossing at 
Kingston. Jackson's cavalry, on the left of the Confederate army, 
had already come into contact with the Federal advance at 
Stilesboro', and it was soon plain that Sherman, with his whole 
force, was pushing for Dallas. Johnston accordingly ordered his 
troops to move forward from the railroad, and on the 25th his line 
of defence was formed. Hardee, on the left, lay across the road 
from Dallas to Atlanta, and Hood, on the right, with his centre 
at New Hope Church, covered the road from Dallas to Ackworth. 
Polk's Corps formed the centre closed up on Hood, with a thinner 
line connecting with Hardee.^ The Confederate position was 
a strong one, occupjdng a succession of ridges with wooded 
summits, and approached by open valleys, which an attacking 
force would have to cross without shelter.^ It covered all the 
roads from Dallas to Ackworth, Marietta, and Atlanta as well 
as those running in the same direction by New Hope Church. 

In the Federal army McPherson was on the right, Thomas in 
the centre, and Schofield on the left. In the centre the 20th Corps 
leading the advance attacked Hood's centre at New Hope Church 
on the 25th, but the position was too strong to be carried by 
frontal attack, and the assault was repulsed with considerable loss. 
The 4th Corps was sent from Thomas' right to the support of the 
20th, and took position on its left, extending the Federal line in 
that direction. 

On the 26th Schofield, with two divisions of the Army of the 
Ohio, came into position on Howard's left, and with his left reached 
across the Dallas-Allatoona road. On the next day Sherman made 
an unsuccessful attempt to turn the Confederate right. Howard 
was directed to take two divisions. Wood's of his own Corps and 
R. W. Johnson's of the 14th, which as yet had been held in reserve, 
to move up the Allatoona road, face eastward, and when he over- 
lapped the Confederate lines to fall upon their exposed flank. But 
what the Federal leaders took to be the extremity of the Con- 

1 Cox's Atlanla, (^i^. "^ Cox's Athiula, 6S. » Cox's Atlanta, 69. 



May, 1864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 373 

federate lines was only an angle of the works, which at this point 
made a sharply refused flank : ^ and Hood had been reinforced by 
Cleburne's division from Hardee's Corps. The consequence was 
that Wood and Johnson found themselves taken in flank, and were 
repulsed with a loss of about 1,500 men.^ 

Sherman now determined to extend his whole army towards the 
left, hoping that by crowding troops in that direction he might be 
able to gain the road to Ackworth,^ Howard's movement on the 
27th, though failing to achieve the desired object, had nevertheless 
gained valuable ground, which helped to cover Sherman's move- 
ment to the left. But on the 28th Hardee, anticipating the 
movement, sent Bate's division forward to feel McPherson's lines 
and find out whether the whole Army of the Tennessee was still 
confronting him. Bate made a fierce attack on Logan's Corps, 
which formed McPherson's right, and after about half an hour's 
hard fighting was repulsed with very heavy loss. In order to 
withdraw Bate's troops Hardee made a demonstration against the 
i6th Corps on the left of Logan : and a sharp engagement took 
place all along McPherson's line. Logan reported a loss of 379 
in all, and no special return was made of the casualties in the 
1 6th Corps, which must consequently have been few. The Con- 
federate loss probably reached 2,000.* 

On the same night Hood moved with his Corps to the extreme 
right of the Confederate position, intending to fall upon Sherman's 
extreme left, but, finding that the Federals had not advanced as 
far as he expected, withdrew his troops to his own lines.^ On the 
evening of the 29th an artillery demonstration was made by 
Johnston all along the line, the probable object of which was to 
find out whether McPherson still held the lines in Hardee's front 
in full force. 

On June ist Stoneman's cavalry occupied Allatoona, and on 
the 2nd Sherman's whole army was steadily gaining ground to 
the left, moving three miles in that direction.'* It was now plain 
to Johnston that the continued extension of the Federals towards 
the railway rendered his position untenable, and on the night of 
June 4th he evacuated his lines about New Hope Church and 
withdrew to a fresh line of entrenchments already laid out by 
his engineers nearer Marietta. 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 79. ^ This engageuient is known as the battle of Pickett's Mill. 

* Cox's Atlanta, 84. ■* Cox's Atlanta, 86. 

® Cox's Atlanta, 87. But, according to Johnston's Narrative, 333-4, Hood refrained 
from attack, because he found a Federal division thrown back almost at right angles to 
the general line and entrenching. Polk's Corps had been moved to the right of Hood, 
apparently after the engagement of the 27th, though Johnston says that this movement 
took place on the 26th, and that it was Polk's Corps and not Hood's which, with Cle- 
burne's assistance, repulsed Howard's attack (Cox's Atlanta, 79, note). 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 92. 



374 THE CIVIL AVAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

As soon as he discovered Johnston's withdrawal Sherman com- 
menced to move his army to the railway, where fresh depots could 
be established, and the work of rebuilding the bridge over the 
Etowah was pushed on with all possible speed. The Army of 
the Ohio was ordered to hold its ground, whilst the other two 
armies moved to the left, and thus became the right of the new 
Federal line. Thomas' army held the centre, and McPhcrson's 
formed the left wing. The work of transferring the army to its 
new line continued from the 5th to the 9th. The change of base 
was most opportune : for rain had been falling steadily, and the 
roads from Kingston had been rendered by the constant passage 
of the wagon-trains mere seas of mud, in which all traces of the 
original track were lost. 

The first month of the campaign was over. In that period the 
Federal army had advanced nearly eighty miles, had forced 
Johnston across the Oostanaula and Etowah, and after cutting 
loose from the railway at Kingston had regained it at Ackworth, 
thus turning the Allatoona Pass. The total loss during the month 
of May is returned by Sherman as 9,299. Johnston stated his 
own loss for the same period as 5,393, but in his estimate he did 
not include prisoners or cavalry losses. During the Atlanta cam- 
paign 12,983 prisoners were taken by the Federals: and on the 
assumption that the proportion of prisoners was about the same 
for each month, Sherman estimated the Confederate loss for May 
as quite 8,600. The Federal leader had manoeuvred his opponent 
out of a succession of strong positions, and inflicted upon him 
a loss relatively, and perhaps even actually, greater than that 
which he himself had suffered.^ 

Johnston's new line of entrenchments rested on the mountains 
to the north and west of Marietta. His right held Brush Moun- 
tain, and the line then extended over Pine Hill to Lost Mountain 
on the extreme left. Pine Hill in the centre stands out somewhat 
in isolation from the other mountains, forming a salient, and in 
order to protect it on the west an advanced line to the south-west 
was held, crossing the road from Burnt Hickory to Marietta, about 
a mile north of the Gilgal Church.- The left wing was held by 
Hardee's Corps, its left at Gilgal Church and its right on Pine 
Hill. In the centre, Polk's Corps reached from Pine Hill across 
the railway to the Ackworth and Marietta road : and on the right 
Hood's Corps lay along the foot of Brush Mountain behind 
Noonday Creek. This creek also partially covered Polk's front. 
The entrenchments from Gilgal Church to Lost Mountain were 
held by Jackson's cavalry. Formidable as the line appeared, it 
was really too long, covering as it did ten miles, to be held by an 

» Cox's Atlanta, 8S. 
"^ Cox's Atlanta, 92-3. 



June, 1864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 375 

Army of 60,000 men/ and the isolated position of Pine Hill in the 
centre was a source of weakness, as the Confederate general 
quickly realised. 

It was open to Sherman to operate against Johnston's new line 
either on the east or on the west of the railway. Probably the 
ground east of Marietta was more favourable for offensive move- 
ments. But to have adopted that line of advance would have 
exposed to Johnston's attack the railroad back to Kingston. 
Accordingly Sherman resolved to ensure the safety of his lines 
of communication by advancing by the right flank, though the 
ground in that direction was less favourable for his operations. 
Rain had been falling continually since the 4th, and the discomfort 
of the troops was increased by a cold east wind. But advantage 
was taken of a partial cessation of the rain on the 14th to press 
close up to the Confederate entrenched lines. In the centre 
Thomas pushed forward into the re-entrant angle between Pine 
Hill and the works to the east, and advanced so far as to threaten 
to cut off the troops posted on that mountain from communication 
with the rest of the Confederate lines. A consultation was being 
held on the top of the mountain by Johnston, Hardee, and Polk 
as to the advisability of withdrawing the troops — Bate's division 
— holding it. A chance cannon shot killed Polk. 

The fallen general had been Bishop of Louisiana, and a cousin 
of J. K. Polk, who was President of the United States during the 
Mexican War. Having had a military education at West Point, 
on the outbreak of the Civil War he offered his services to the 
Confederacy. Exercising very considerable influence from his 
position both in Church and State, he had been advanced to 
a higher command in the Confederate army — at the time of his 
death he was a lieutenant-general — than perhaps his purely 
military qualifications justified.^ He was succeeded for the time 
being in the command of his Corps by Loring, the senior 
divisional commander. During the night the troops on Pine Hill 
were withdrawn. 

Johnston's weak spot now was on the extreme left, where he had 
not enough troops to hold in force the lines between Gilgal Church 
and Lost Mountain : these lines and Lost Mountain had been 
committed to the charge of Jackson's cavalry, for lack of infantry 
to hold them. Schofield, on the Federal right, pressed Hardee 
vigorously, and forced him on the night of the i6th to abandon 
Gilgal Church and fall back about three miles to a new line 
of entrenchments behind Mud Creek.^ With Hooker's Corps on 
his left, Schofield continued to press Hardee; and on the 17th, 

^ 4 B. & L., 252. Sherman estimated Johnston's force at this juncture at 62,000. 
Probably this estimate is sHghtly below the mark. The Confederate strength was nearer 
70,000 (4 B. & L., 2S2). ' Cox's Atlanta, 98. » Cox's Atlanta, 100. 



376 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

whilst Hooker "contained" Hardee's left, Schofield moved his 
Corps across Mud Creek and secured a position overlapping the 
Confederate left flank. In the centre Thomas was pushing close 
up to the enemy's lines, and his batteries were getting into position 
to enfilade the salient angle, which Hardee's new line formed with 
the original line of Confederate entrenchments. On the Federal 
left the Army of the Tennessee, reinforced by the arrival, on 
June 8th, of the 17th Corps, under Blair, about 9,000 strong,^ was 
overlapping the Confederate right. On the night of the i8th 
Johnston withdrew the whole of his army to a fresh line. 

The key to the new position of the Confederates was Kenesaw 
Mountain. It was held by Loring's Corps. Hood, on the right, 
held the high ground beyond the railway, which, bending back 
north-east, runs between Kenesaw and Brush Mountains, and 
faced the latter mountain. On the left Hardee's Corps was drawn 
up behind Noses Creek. These lines formed a semicircle round 
Marietta facing west, but were considerably nearer the town on the 
north side. Hardee's Corps had fallen back some six or eight 
miles, whilst Hood had not retired more than two miles.- 

The change of position did not bring Hardee much relief. 
Hooker and Schofield were promptly pressing in pursuit, and whilst 
Hooker crossed Noses Creek in Hardee's front, Schofield was 
moving round his left towards the valley of Olley's Creek and 
threatening to gain possession of the road from Powder Springs 
village to Marietta.^ At the same time a general extension of the 
Federal troops was being made towards their right. 

Johnston, in order to prevent his left being turned, on the night 
of the 2 1st moved Hood's Corps from the right to the left. Having 
reached his new position, Hood made an impetuous assault upon 
Hooker's right and Hascall's division of the 23rd Corps. But the 
Federal lines were too strongly held to be carried by direct assault, 
and Hood's attack was repulsed with a loss of about 1,000 in killed 
and wounded. 

It would seem that Hood, after his night's march from McPherson's 
front, had expected to be able to outflank the Federal right.'* But 
on the morning of the 22nd, before the Confederate attack was 
made, that wing of Sherman's army had been extending eastwards 
and thus upset Hood's calculations. For Schofield had pushed 
Cox's division down the Sandtown road towards the point, where 
it crossed the road from Powder Springs village to Marietta. 
Hascall's division was on the road from Powder Springs Church, 

' Cox's Atlanta, 94. ^ Cox's Atlanta, 104. 

^ Schoficld's turning movtiiicnt was protected l)y the swollen w.iters of Noses Creek, 
which was eventually crossed hy aid of a disniantled bridge, whilst Iluukcr crossed by a 
bridge, which was still standing, higher uj) the creek at a i>uint where the Confederate 
lines were drawn a considerable distance back from the stream (C'lx's Atlanta, 105-7). 

* Cox's Atlanta, 1 12. 



June. 1864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 377 

which is about four miles north of the village of the same name, 
to Marietta, covering the road which Cox was following. At the 
same time Hooker had swung his Corps to the right so as to con- 
nect with Hascall, and Hood found stretching all along his front 
a continuous line of entrenchments. The attack on Hascall's 
division was so persistent that Schofield ordered Cox to send back 
three of his brigades to his support, though these did not reach the 
battlefield until the fighting was over. Cox's fourth brigade had 
already passed the junction of the two roads and held some high 
ground overlooking Olley's Creek. The loss of the Federals in 
this engagement, known as the battle of Culp's Farm, was but 
slight, being mainly confined to two brigades, and probably did not 
exceed 300.^ Hood's attack had, however, necessitated the recall 
of Cox's division from a movement down the Sandtown road, which 
had seemed likely to produce great results.^ 

It was plain, that if further progress was to be made in that 
direction, it would be necessary to extend the whole Federal army 
to the right. But such an extension would carry the troops further 
away from their depots, and in the shocking condition of the roads, 
owing to the continuous rain, it was impracticable to lengthen the 
lines of supply, especially as the Confederate cavalry were threaten- 
ing the long line of railway in the Federal rear. Sherman was 
therefore obliged either to wait until the weather improved and the 
roads grew harder, and then accumulate supplies preparatory to a 
movement of a considerable part of his army by the right flank to 
some point on the railway well to the south of Marietta, or else 
to make an attempt to break Johnston's lines at some point or other. 
He was loath to remain inactive until such time as the weather 
might improve, because his adversary might seize the opportunity 
to detach some of his troops to Lee's aid in Virginia, and Grant in 
mapping out the campaign had specially impressed upon his chief 
lieutenant the necessity of keeping so tight a grip upon Johnston, 
that he could not afford to weaken himself by sending reinforce- 
ments to the Army of Northern Virginia. Besides, Hood's move- 
ment from right to left must have left that part of the Confederate 
lines, from which he had come, very weakly defended at some 
point : and Sherman hoped by a direct assault to find out that 
weak point, and if he could break Johnston's lines there, he expected 
to make the battle decisive of the campaign. 

It seemed probable to him that Kenesaw Mountain, as the 
naturally strongest part of the Confederate lines, would be the 
most weakly guarded. Accordingly he ordered McPherson to 
attack the south-western face of the mountain, whilst Thomas was 
directed to assail the lines in his front at whatever point he judged 
most suitable. The attack was fixed for June 27th. Schofield 

' Co-i's Atlanta, 113. * Coyi's Atlanta, 117. 



378 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

also, partly by way of creating a diversion, partly in the hope that 
he might gain some solid advantage, was instructed to push for- 
ward along the Sandtown road. 

McPherson made the assault with one division of Logan's Corps, 
whilst Thomas, further to the right, launched two columns against 
the Confederate lines, consisting of Newton's division of the 4th 
Corps and Davis' division of the 14th. The rest of the Armies of 
the Cumberland and the Tennessee held themselves in readiness 
to follow up any advantage which the attacking columns might 
gain, whilst all along the front of the two armies the skirmish- 
line kept up a brisk demonstration. But the superiority of a 
strongly entrenched position over a frontal attack was again 
demonstrated, and the Federal columns were beaten off with a 
loss of about 2,500.^ 

Seeing that the sole chance of success lay in a surprise, the 
Federal Corps and divisional commanders did not repeat the 
attack after the first repulse, and the troops which had formed 
the columns of attack quickly entrenched themselves close to the 
lines which they had failed to storm. This they were enabled to 
do without severe loss, owing to the thickness of the forest, which 
reached close up to the abatis in front of the Confederate trenches.'^ 

On the extreme right, however, Schofield made good progress. 
He had already, on the 26th, pushed one brigade across Olley's 
Creek, whilst a mile below a second brigade was threatening to 
cross. On the 27th the movement was continued. Cox's division 
reached a position beyond Olley's Creek on a ridge, which separated 
that valley from the valley of Nickajack Creek. The Confederate 
left was completely turned, and a road was now opened, by which 
an advance might be made to Smyrna, a station some five miles 
south of Marietta.^ 

Sherman, after his failure at Kenesaw Mountain, determined to 
wait until he had accumulated the necessary supplies, and then 
move McPherson's army over to the extreme right, and carry out 
in force the flank movement so successfully initiated by Schofield. 
He had heard from Grant on the 28th that the possibility of 
Johnston trying to reinforce Lee might now be dismissed from 
consideration, and consequently the chief motive for assaulting 
the Confederate entrenchments was removed.'* The weather was 
improving : the heat of the summer sun was drying up the roads, 
and in a few days he expected to be able to make a big flank 
movement, which would force Johnston to abandon his lines and 
fall back behind the Chattahoochee. 

' Cox's Ailanta, 127. J(jhnslon {Narrative, 343) stated his loss at 808. General 
Ilnwanl (4 H. & L. , 310) says tliat the whole Confederate line was "stronger in 
artificial contrivances rmd natural features than the cemetery at Gettysliurg. " 

- Cox's Atlanta, 128. ' Cox's Atlanta, 124. ■• Cox's Atlanta, ijo. 



July, 1864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 379 

Johnston, however, fully realised that Schofield's advance along 
the Sandtown road had rendered his position at Marietta unten- 
able. The lie of the country beyond Olley's Creek was such that 
it was impossible to extend a really continuous line of entrench- 
ments into the Nickajack valley, and on the 28th his engineers 
were busily occupied in laying out two fresh lines of works. The 
work was speedily done with the assistance of negroes and the 
Georgia militia.^ The first line crossed the railway at Smyrna 
(Map XIII.), continued in a south-west direction for some three 
miles to the left of the railway, and then ran south behind Nicka- 
jack Creek. The second line was nearer the river, and only 
covered about two miles of the railway, and its left flank also 
reached Nickajack Creek, which, before entering the Chattahoo- 
chee, runs for some miles parallel to it at a distance of about a 
mile.^ 

Sherman having accumulated the supplies necessary for his fresh 
movement, on July 2nd began to move the Army of the Tennessee 
from the left to the extreme right. On that night Johnston fell 
back from the Kenesaw entrenchments and occupied the new 
lines in front of Smyrna. But the continued advance of the 
Federal right along the Sandtown road towards the Chattahoochee 
showed Johnston that his position at Smyrna was too far in 
advance of the river, and that if he wished to make any stand on 
its northern bank he must fall back to a position where he would 
be able to guard the crossings over it. Accordingly, on the night 
of the 4th, he retreated to his second line of entrenchments. 

Sherman followed in pursuit, and from Vining's Station, where 
he established his headquarters, could see his goal, the city of 
Atlanta, nine miles south of the Chattahoochee. 

Writing to Halleck, Sherman had said that, if Johnston decided 
to hold the line of the Chattahoochee, he should have to study the 
situation a little. It is likely that Johnston would have been able 
to make a more obstinate defence, if instead of entrenching a camp 
on the north side of the river he had only fortified a tcte de pont 
on that bank and had withdrawn the bulk of his army to the other 
bank.^ As it turned out, the situation did not require any pro- 
longed study. Johnston's lines were about five or six miles long, 
and covered the railway bridge and principal wagon roads from 
Marietta to Atlanta. His cavalry were stationed along the 
southern bank, and all the crossings for a dozen miles were de- 
fended by separate fortifications on that bank,* Some twenty 
miles above the railway bridge there was a bridge at Rosswell, 

^ Two brigades of the Georgia militia had been brought across the Chattahoochee 
under the command of General G. W. Smith, who had been second in command at the 
battle of Seven Pines in 1862. 

* Coyi's Atlanta, 131. » Cox's Atlanta, 137. * Coxs, Atlanta, 134. 



380 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

which the Confederate cavalry burnt. Sherman invested John- 
ston's position with the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ten- 
nessee. McPherson held the extreme right at Turner's Ferry, 
whilst Howard's Corps formed the left at Pace's Ferry. Schofield's 
Corps was held in reserve near Smyrna, ready for a movement 
in any direction which seemed to promise success. Stoneman's 
cavalry was sent down the river to see if any crossing could be 
found, and on the other flank Garrard's cavalry moved up the river 
to Rosswell, only, however, to find the bridge already burnt. 

On the 8th Schofield crossed the river without the loss of a 
man at the mouth of Soap Creek, some six or seven miles above 
Pace's Ferry.^ The Confederates were completely taken by sur- 
prise, as the opposite bank was only held by a handful of cavalry 
with a single gun. A hasty reconnaissance convinced Johnston of 
the futility of trying to drive back the Federal troops across the 
river, and on the night of the 9th he withdrew to the south bank, 
destroying the bridges behind him, and marched towards Atlanta. 

The second month of the campaign was ended, and Sherman's 
victorious progress still continued. The railroad from the Etowah 
to the Chattahoochee had passed into the hands of the P'ederals. 
Their total losses for June are given by Sherman as amounting to 
7.530. whilst the Confederate losses are probably not over- 
estimated at 7,000.- Relatively to the respective strength of the 
two armies the Confederate loss for June, as for May, was de- 
cidedly the heavier. Of the P^ederal losses just one-third were 
accounted for by the figiiting of the 27th. The remaining 5,000 
show how fierce had been the fighting on the skirmish-lines. The 
average daily loss was about 200, and the skirmish-lines were 
so strongly entrenched as to be little less formidable than the 
main line of works, and any attack upon them rapidly assumed 
the dimensions and the dignity of a regular battle. A month of 
such fighting was worth years of ordinary experience : and Sher- 
man's veterans might well feel confident that with the coveted 
prize in sight nothing could prevent them from shortly crowning 
their hopes with its capture. 

When he had driven Johnston across the Chattahoochee, Sherman 
had next to decide whether he would operate against Atlanta by 
his right or left flank. If he chose the former course, the ground 
on the south side of the railway was the more favourable for 
offensive movements. The streams, which run into the Chatta- 
hoochee below the railway bridge, enter it at right angles, and the 
ravines, which their courses form, would prevent Johnston taking 
up a position very far from Atlanta, as they would make it difficult 
to move supports from one point to another with any speed. 
Furthermore, as soon as the Federal army was across the river on 

' Cox's Alanta, 13.S 40. '■' Cux's Atlanta, 135-6. 



July, i864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 381 

the south side of the raihvay, it would be already in rear of Atlanta, 
and the railways running south from that city to Macon and Mont- 
gomery would lie at its mercy. 

If, on the other hand, Sherman advanced by his left flank, the 
ground would favour the defensive. On that side, the streams 
instead of running perpendicular to the river, follow a course more 
or less parallel to it, and empty into Peach-tree Creek, which itself, 
after running parallel for some distance to the Chattahoochee, falls 
into it close to the railway bridge. The succession of parallel 
ridges would ensure Johnston a choice of strong positions. The 
road on the north side of the railway was both longer and more 
difficult ; but it had this advantage, that it would enable Sherman 
to strike the Atlanta-Decatur Railway. There was a danger, so 
Grant warned his lieutenant, that the troops from the Army of 
Northern Virginia, which had recently been withdrawn from the 
Shenandoah Valley, were about to be sent to Georgia, and in such 
a contingency it was all important to seize this line of railroad in 
time to prevent their arrival. A movement by the left flank was 
also calculated to give more protection to the Federal lines of 
supply. For to have adopted the southern route would have 
allowed Johnston to cross his cavalry over the river at points which 
would be at once in the Federal rear, and to break up the railway 
right back to the Allatoona Pass, whereas a movement by the left 
flank practically covered the railway communication. It was Sher- 
man's intention as soon as he got near to Atlanta to swing his 
right wing across the railway, and, when that was secured, to order 
the reconstruction of the bridge over the Chattahoochee with all 
speed. ^ 

Having decided for the above reasons to advance by the left, 
Sherman gave orders for the general movement to commence on 
the i6th. Thomas' army was to form the right, and crossing the 
river at Pace's and Phillips' Ferries to march direct on Atlanta. 
Schofield, in the centre, was to move towards Decatur, whilst 
McPherson, on the left, was to strike in upon the railroad between 
Decatur and Stone Mountain, and after destroying the track move 
on Decatur. Johnston, for his part, was prepared to give battle 
behind the line of Peach-tree Creek. He might easily have selected 
a strong position nearer the river, but he was afraid lest in that 
case his untiring foe might strike in between him and the railway. 

But another was destined to command on the field which John- 
ston had selected. On the night of the 17th he received a telegram 
from Richmond, relieving him of the command of the army and 
ordering him to turn it over to Hood. The Confederate President 
and the Southern Press had grown tired of Johnston's continued 

^ For the motives which decided Sherman to move by the left flank, see Cox's 
Atlanta, '44-7 



382 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

retreats, and the appointment of Hood signified that a new poh'cy 
was about to be adopted. As such, it was hailed with delight by 
the whole of the Federal army. Hood had gained a well-deserved 
reputation in the East as a hard fighter, especially when a divisional 
commander under Longstreet, but it was a dangerous experiment 
at this critical stage of the Confederate fortunes to put in supreme 
command a man whose methods savoured so much of recklessness, 
and it promptly proved a fatal mistake.^ 

The new commander adopted the general outlines of the policy 
which his predecessor had fixed upon. He determined, first, to 
attack the Federal right, as soon as it had crossed Peach-tree 
Creek, hoping to take it in flank, whilst it was in motion and 
separated from the rest of Sherman's army; and, secondly, to move 
troops to the south and east and fall upon the exposed flank and 
rear of the left wing. The Confederate lines started on the railway 
two miles south of the river, ran six miles eastwards to the junction 
of Pea Vine Creek with Peach-tree Creek, and then turned south- 
wards along the former creek, till they reached the railway between 
Atlanta and Decatur.- 

In carrying out Sherman's plan of advance by the left flank 
McPherson's army had nearly four times as far to go as Thomas', 
and it was plain that the latter would have to stand fast whilst the 
rest of the Federal forces were coming into line. Sherman fully 
realised that he was giving Hood an opportunity of striking at his 
exposed right wing, but he had every confidence in the ability of 
Thomas and his army of veterans to hold their own, and was most 
desirous that Hood should strike a blow, which, considering the 
well-known rashness of that commander, was likely to inflict a 
heavier loss upon the Confederates than their opponents. The 
result fully justified his expectations. 

On the 19th Thomas crossed Peach-tree Creek with the heads 
of his three columns, and the following day the whole of the Army 
of the Cumberland was on the south side of the creek. Sherman 
had directed his lieutenant, whilst holding fast with his right, to 
try and connect on his left with Schofield. But the maps in the 
hands of the Federal commander proved faulty, and Thomas 
found it impossible to connect with Schofield by anything like a 
continuous line. Eventually he ordered Howard with two divisions 
of his Cur[)s to make a detour to the left rear and press forward, 
until he arrived within supporting distance of Schofield. In con- 
sequence the right wing of the Federal army, consisting of the 
14th and 20th Corps and one division of the 4lh, was, on the 
morning of the 20th, on the south side of Peach-tree Creek, showing 

> Ilond h.-id graduated at West Point in 1853. McPhersnn, Schofield, and Sheridan 
had l-elonged to the same class, Mcl'herson praduatinR 1st, Schofield 7th, Sheridan 34th, 
and Hood 44th. " C'^x's Atlanta, 147. 



.TuLY2o,i864l THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 383 

a front of only a mile, whilst the left wing of four Corps and the 
other two divisions of the 4th was strung out as far as Decatur 
along a front of quite eight miles, and between the two wings there 
was a gap of two miles.^ It seemed as though Hood was to have 
a perfect opportunity of striking Thomas a heavy blow on his 
exposed flank. 

The Confederate commander ordered Hardee's and A. P. Stewart's 
Corps (Hood, after taking over the command of the army, had 
assigned Stewart to the command of what had been Polk's Corps 
and after the latter's death had been temporarily commanded by 
Loring, whilst Cheatham had succeeded to the command of Hood's 
own Corps) to fall upon Thomas' left flank, assaulting it by divisions 
in echelon, whilst the lines fronting the Federal left wing were to 
be held by G. W. Smith's Georgia militia and Cheatham's Corps. 
The attack was ordered to commence at i p.m. But the Federal 
left was pressing forward with a speed not anticipated by Hood, 
and threatening to turn the Confederate right. Accordingly Hood 
ordered Cheatham's Corps to take ground to the right, and the 
attack was thereby delayed until 3 p.m. 

The assault fell first upon Newton's division of the 4th Corps, 
and then, as the successive divisions came into battle, spread along 
Hooker's front, but the 14th Corps on the extreme right was barely 
engaged. The attack was repulsed at every point, but, in obedience 
to Hood's instructions for a decisive engagement, it was renewed 
again and again, though, as in the Federal attack on Kenesaw 
Mountain, its only chance of success lay in its taking the enemy 
by surprise. The combat was brought to an end by an urgent 
summons from Hood to Hardee, who was just about to renew the 
attack on Newton's exposed flank, to send a division to the assist- 
ance of Cheatham. The Federal loss for the four divisions actively 
engaged was 1,707. The loss in the two Confederate Corps can 
have been but little short of 6,000. Whilst this combat was raging 
on his left Hood was being very hard pressed on his right. 
Wheeler's cavalry, which had been skirmishing in advance of the 
Confederate lines on the extreme right, was pushed back with 
great rapidity by McPherson's advance, Cheatham's line was 
already stretched as far as it could possibly reach, and it was only 
the opportune arrival of Cleburne's division, sent by Hardee in 
answer to Hood's summons, which prevented Wheeler being driven 
into the city and the Federals following him in.^ 

' Cox's Atlauia, 152-4. 

2 For the battle of Peach-tree Creek, see Cox's Atlanta, 155-62. Hood (4 B. & L., 
337) puts the blame for his failure on to Hardee, whom he charges first witli being the 
cause of the delay in commencing the attack, secondly with contenting himself with 
skirmishing instead of pressing the attack home. Sherman {4 B. & L. , 253) estimates 
the Confederate loss at 4,796, but Cox gives the higher figure adopted in the text. 



384 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

As a result of the fighting of the 20th Hood found that both his 
flanks were in danger of being turned. He therefore determined 
to abandon the Peach-tree Creek Hne and withdraw his troops to 
fresh entrenchments nearer Atlanta, and at the same time to carry 
out the second part of his programme of offensive action by assail- 
ing the left flank and rear of Mcl'herson's army. This very im- 
portant task he entrusted to his most capable and experienced 
Corps commander, Hardee.^ On the night of the 21st Hardee's 
Corps was withdrawn from its position north of Atlanta, marched 
through the city, and struck south and then north-east in order to 
fall upon McPherson's flank somewhere near the railway between 
Atlanta and Decatur. The advance of the Federal left on the 
2 1st obliged the turning column to make a considerable detour. 
A march of fifteen miles brought it shortly after daybreak within 
two or three miles of Decatur.- There the road was left, and the 
troops plunged into the thick wood beyond, in order to find a 
position on the flank of the Federals. The greater part of the 
Federal cavalry was away engaged in raiding expeditions against 
the various railways. No information reached McPherson vf 
Hardee's approach, and the Army of the Tennessee was taken by 
surprise. It was Hood's intention, as soon as Hardee's Corps 
gained any success, to move the rest of his troops in succession 
out of their entrenchments, and, falling upon the Federal line as it 
was being rolled up from left to right, to drive it down and, if 
possible, into Peach-tree Creek. 

Hardee, with wonderful accuracy considering the difficulties with 
which he had to contend, arranged his troops on the Federal flank 
so that his left slightly overlapped the Federal left, consisting of the 
17th Corps under Blair. The Confederates moved to the attack 
about noon.^ But to their surprise the two right divisions ran up 
against the i6th Corps under General Dodge, which was halted in 
rear of Blair preparatory to advancing to take a position on his 
left.* On that part of the field the Confederate attack was repulsed. 
But the two divisions on the left, taking Blair's Corps in the rear, 
gained considerable ground. 

Early in the fight McPherson, riding from the i6th to the 
17th Corps, encountered the skirmish-line of Cleburne's division 
and fell mortally wounded. Sherman, when informed of McPher- 
son's death, sent orders to Logan, commanding the 15th Corps, to 



* Hood says tliat he selected Il.ardce's Corps because it was the largest, and was 
comparatively fresh, as it ha<I taken hut little part in the battle of the 20th. Apparently 
he (li<l not select Cheatham's Corps, l)ecause that commander had been so short a time 
in command of the Corps (4 B. & L. , 33S). 

'^ Cox's Atlanta, 166. * Cox's Atlanta, 168. 

* .\ V>. & L., 326. The i6th Corps had been in reserve behind the 15th Corps, north 
of the railway, until the 21st. 



JULY22, i864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 385 

take the temporary command of the Army of the Tennessee. 
Gaining ground steadily on his left, Hardee drove the Federals 
back upon a high bald hill south of the railway, which had formed 
the southern extremity of Cleburne's position on the 20th, and had 
been captured by Blair on the 21st. Here a desperate struggle 
ensued, as the Federals, being attacked from the rear, were forced 
to leap over their entrenchments and fight from the opposite side. 
A brigade was sent by Logan^ to fill the gap between Blair and 
Dodge, and with its aid the Confederate attack on the hill was 
repulsed. 

Hood, who was watching Hardee's battle from a salient of the 
Atlanta fortifications, now directed Cheatham to assail the hill and 
the lines of the 15th Corps running to the north of it, whilst Smith's 
Georgia militia attacked Schofield's line, which was now only held 
by one division and one brigade.^ Smith's attack was repulsed 
without much difficulty. But Cheatham made a vigorous onslaught, 
and that part of the 17th Corps which was holding the hill leapt 
back over their entrenchments and again faced towards their proper 
front. Cheatham failed to carry the hill, but north of it he met 
with more success, and a great gap was made in the line of the 
15th Corps.^ Schofield's artillery was, however, now brought into 
play, and massed so as to bear upon the flank of the Confederates 
as they pushed towards the east. As Cheatham and Hardee were 
attacking the sides of a right angle, and were personally several 
miles apart, their attacks lacked combination, and were defeated 
in detail.* Night put an end to the conflict. The Confederate 
leaders, following the mistaken policy of the 20th, again and again 
renewed the attack after all chance of success had vanished, 
only swelling their own list of killed and wounded. The Federal 
loss was 3,521, and ten pieces of artillery fell into the hands of 
the Confederates : but the total loss of the assailants numbered 
not less than 10,000.^ Wheeler's cavalry had accompanied Hardee's 
Corps on its flank march, and had swooped down on Decatur, 
where a part of the Federal trains was under the protection of a 
single brigade. A brigade sent from Schofield's Corps assisted the 
garrison of Decatur to drive off the Confederate cavalry. 

Thus far the policy conceived by Johnston and executed by Hood 
had proved a disastrous failure. Both wings of Sherman's army 
had been attacked in turn, and both attacks had been repulsed with 
a loss which the Confederacy at that crisis of the struggle could ill 
afford. It would seem that Hood, when he relieved Johnston of 

^ Commanding the 15th Corps on McPherson's right. 

^ Three brigades had been detached from Schofield's Corps, one to Decatur and two 
to cover Dodge's left flank on the railway. 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 173. * Cox's Atlanta, 173. 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 175-6. General Cox highly commends Hardee's conduct of the 
flank movement, and shows how unjust were Hood's charges against his lieutenant. 
2 C 



38fi THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the command, felt some misgivings, realising that the condition of 
assuming the offensive was virtually imposed on him ;^ but in 
spite of the two reverses which he had suffered in such quick 
succession he was still resolved to carry out at any cost what he 
believed to be the wishes of the Richmond Government, and was 
ready to seize the earliest opportunity of striking another blow at 
Sherman's flanks. 

The death of McPherson led to various changes in the higher 
commands of the Federal army. Logan, who had temporarily 
succeeded to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, had not 
been a member of the regular army before the outbreak of the 
Civil War. Like Blair, the commander of the 17th Corps, he had 
been a politician before he became a soldier. It was doubtful 
whether the other Corps commanders of that army would give him 
an ungrudging obedience : and for these reasons Sherman, after 
consultation, recommended Howard for the vacant command, and 
the President approved his selection. Hooker, however, ex-com- 
mander of the Army of the Potomac, and senior major-general in 
Sherman's army, had regarded the appointment as his own by right. 
Sherman had deliberately passed him over, feeling sure that he 
would not find in him the sympathetic co-operation which he had 
a right to look for in his chief subordinates. Hooker throughout 
the campaign had displayed a distinct tendency to fight for his 
own hand : he had more than once disregarded orders in order to 
secure a better position for himself and his Corps. His own 
glorification, rather than the ultimate success of the Commander- 
in-Chief's plans, had been his consistent aim. The appointment 
of Howard, whom he had sought to make the scapegoat for his 
defeat at Chancellorsville, seemed to Hooker a double insult, and 
he promptly applied to be relieved of his command. His request 
was acceded to, and Slocum was summoned from Vicksburg to 
take command of the 20th Corps. Stanley succeeded Howard 
in command of the 4th Corps. 

Four railways run into Atlanta. The Chattanooga line was 
in the hands of the Federals. The Georgia line had been 
destroyed by the Federal cavalry for some distance beyond 
Decatur, and the left wing of Sherman's army already lay astride 
of it. On the other side of Atlanta two railways ran south and 
south-west to Macon and Montgomery. For the first five miles 
these railways ran over the same line, but at East Point they 
diverged. The Montgomery Railway had already been raided by 
a cavalry force under Rousseau, and in its course west passed 
within easy striking distance of a force advancing from the 
Chattahoochee. It was obviously out of the question for any 
force operating from Atlanta to attempt to defend that line. The 

^ 4KS, L., 336. 



July, 1864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 387 

safety of Atlanta consequently depended upon Hood's ability 
to keep open and preserve intact the Macon Railway : and this 
railway naturally became the objective of Sherman's next move- 
ment. It was open to him to advance against it from either flank: 
he decided to move by the right because it would be easier in that 
case to keep his army supplied. 

By July 25th the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee had 
been rebuilt, and the railroad completed up to the camps of 
Thomas' army.^ On the 27th the movement to the right com- 
menced. The Army of the Tennessee was to be transferred from 
the extreme left to the extreme right and commence an advance 
on that flank, whilst Schofield was to hold the Federal lines on the 
left. Dodge's Corps led the advance of the Army of the Tennessee, 
followed closely by Blair's Corps. 

On the morning of the 28th the two Corps held a position 
facing due east along a road running south to Mount Ezra 
Church, where a road from Atlanta to Lickskillet, a village near 
the Chattahoochee, was crossed.^ Blair's right was within a mile 
and a half of the railway from Atlanta to East Point. 

Hood's engineers were already constructing a line of entrench- 
ments running south-west, which should guard the junction of 
the two railway lines at East Point ; and in the meantime S. D. 
Lee, who had been summoned from Alabama and placed in 
command of the Corps recently assigned to Cheatham, was 
ordered to fall upon the right flank of Howard's army, and 
Stewart, with two divisions of his Corps, was directed to support 
the assault. Hardee and Smith, with their respective commands, 
were to occupy the lines facing the Armies of the Cumberland and 
Ohio. Sherman, expecting this attack, had directed Davis' division 
of the 14th Corps to move round the rear of the Army of the 
Tennessee and get into position to fall upon the flank of any force 
coming out of Atlanta to attack Howard.^ But Davis was not 
in time to take any part in the fight of the 28th, else the repulse 
of the Confederates might perhaps have been converted into a 
rout. In this engagement the brunt of the fighting was borne 
by Logan's Corps, which was placed on the right of Blair's Corps, 
bent back so as to form almost a right angle with it. But on this 
day the Confederates showed by no means the same determina- 
tion and desperate courage as had marked their assaults on the 
20th or 22nd, and were beaten off with comparative ease.* 

^ Cox's Af/an/a, i8r. 2 Qo^'s Atlanta, 182. 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 184. But Howard says (4 E. & L., 319) that on the morning of 
the 28th Sherman, with whom he was riding, expressed the belief that Hood would not 
venture to renew the attack. 

* Cox's Atlanta, 185. Sherman (4 B. & L., 254) estimated the Confederate loss at 
4,632 to the Federal 700. Sherman's estimate of the Confederate losses during this 
campaign is generally less than Cox's, e.g. he states Hood's loss on the 22nd as only 8,499. 



388 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Howard's loss was under 600, whilst that of the Confederates 
probably exceeded 5,000. After this third repulse the Confederate 
Government took alarm, and Hood, on August 5th, was directed 
by President Davis to avoid, if practicable, attacking Sherman in 
his entrenchments.^ 

At the same time as the Army of the Tennessee was moved to 
the extreme right, the Federal cavalry had been sent in two 
divisions from the right and left flanks respectively to break up 
the Macon Railroad. Neither expedition proved very successful. 
McCook, who moved by the right, reached the railway at Lovejoy 
Station, about thirty miles south of Atlanta, and did some 
temporary damage to the track. But returning by the road by 
which he had come, he was surrounded by the enemy's cavalry, 
and only succeeded in cutting his way through with considerable 
loss. Stoneman, on the left, was even more unsuccessful. Work- 
ing eastwards, he raided the railway between Macon and Augusta 
and then shelled the former town, but in his turn was surrounded 
by the Confederate cavalry and forced to surrender in person with 
about a quarter of his whole force.^ 

After this failure on the part of his cavalry, Sherman determined 
to strike at the railway with a strong force of infantry. The 
23rd Corps moved on August 2nd round to the right of Howard's 
position, and the 14th Corps was also posted on the right along 
the Lickskillet road. Schofield was directed with his own Corps 
and the 14th to push ahead and reach the railway if possible above 
East Point. But the commander of the 14th Corps, Palmer, 
refused to recognise Schofield's authority, and the misunderstand- 
ing between the two generals caused the movement to hang fire, 
until after a couple of wasted days Palmer was relieved of his 
command and Davis appointed in his place.^ Schofield failed to 
reach the railway, as the Confederates when driven from their first 
line of entrenchments took position behind a second strongly 
fortified line, which reached the Montgomery Railway about a 
mile below East Point.* 

Sherman now considered that he had stretched his lines as far 
as was safe, and determined to try the effect of a bombardment 
with his heavy guns. This was maintained for several days with- 
out apparently producing much effect on the enemy's lines. As 
the cannonade produced but little result, Sherman determined to 
make a last attempt with his cavalry to break up the Macon Rail- 
road. Kilpatrick made a dashing raid, starting from the right 

1 Cox's A//an(a, 187. ' Co\s Atlanta, 188-9. 

' Davis was assigned to the comiiiand of the 14th Corps by order of President 
Lincoln. Till his appointment the Corps was temporarily commanded by K. W. 
Johnson. 

* Tor these operations, see Cox's Atlanta, 189 94. 



Aug., 1864] THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 389 

flank and riding right round Atlanta. But as had been the case 
with the previous cavalry raids, the damage done to the railway 
was speedily repaired. Sherman now found himself obliged to 
cut loose from his line of supplies and strike the railroad with 
almost his whole force. The 20th Corps was ordered back to the 
railway bridge over the Chattahoochee, where it entrenched itself, 
whilst the rest of the Federal army were directed to take rations 
for ten days, to be made to last fifteen, preparatory to a march to 
the Macon Railroad.^ 

The movement commenced on August 25th. The Army of the 
Tennessee led the way on the right, followed by the two remaining 
Corps of the Army of the Cumberland. Schofield remained in his 
lines in front of East Point with the 23rd Corps, and kept up a 
series of demonstrations. This final move of Sherman, which was 
destined to bring about the fall of Atlanta, completely baffled 
Hood. At that critical moment the Confederate general had 
stripped himself of the greater part of his cavalry. 

Wheeler, early in the month, had started on a raid against the 
Federal lines of communication, and after being beaten off at 
Dalton had made his way into East Tennessee. His subsequent 
operations in that region had no effect upon the fortunes of the 
two armies battling round Atlanta. Hood, deprived of the eyes of 
his army, found himself in the dark as to the real object of 
Sherman's movements. On the evening of the 27th he jumped 
hastily to the conclusion that Wheeler's raid had iDeen successful 
and that Sherman's army was retiring from lack of supplies to the 
other side of the Chattahoochee. For forty-eight hours he adhered 
to this strange delusion, and by that time the Federals had gained 
a position, from which it was impossible to dislodge them, com- 
manding the Macon Railway.^ 

From the commencement of the last stage of the campaign on 
the south bank of the Chattahoochee, when the Federal army was 
beginning to close in upon Atlanta, Sherman's policy had been not 
to assault the city or invest it by regular approaches, but by 
destroying its lines of supply to compel its evacuation. It was for 
that purpose that he had employed his cavalry on their somewhat 
futile raids against the railways, in order that he might keep the 
bulk of his army in hand to fall upon Hood, as soon as he evacuated 
the city. For Sherman never forgot that his objective was not 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 196. 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 197-8. In spite of Wheeler's absence with more than half the 
cavalry. Hood still had a sufficient force of that arm to enable him to get fairly accurate 
information of Sherman's movements. The information which his cavalry recon- 
naissances gave him, viz. that the bulk of the Federal forces were echelonned along the 
Atlanta-Sandtown Road, was correct enough in itself, but Hood entirely misinterpreted 
its significance. Had he retained Wheeler's force, he might perhaps have discovered his 
error sooner. 



390 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

merely Atlanta, but also the Confederate army in his front. It 
was with reluctance that he acknowledged the failure of cavalry 
raids to permanently destroy the railroad, and moved with almost 
his whole army to complete that task, knowing that, though the 
success of his movement would render the surrender of Atlanta 
inevitable, yet Hood's army would escape destruction and be left 
free to fight another campaign. 

Thanks to Hood's illusion, the Federal movement encountered 
no opposition at first. On the 2Sth the Army of the Cumbe«'land 
reached the Montgomery Railway at Red Oak, seven miles below 
ICast Point, and the Army of the Tennessee at Fairburn, five miles 
further down the line.^ On the 29th Schofield's Corps came into 
line with the rest of the army, which devoted that day to a 
systematic destruction of the railway. On the 30th the march 
was resumed. Schofield moved up the railroad a mile and a half 
towards East Point, in order to cover the trains whilst the rest of 
the army was moving between the two railroads.- 

Hood at last awoke from his dream of fancied security, but he 
still failed to grasp the full meaning of his opponent's movement. 
He directed Hardee to take his own and Lee's Corps to Jonesboro 
and fall upon the flank of the Federal advance the following 
morning. 

On the 30th Howard had reached the Flint River to the west of 
the Macon Railway, and put Logan's Corps across the river with 
the other two Corps in close support but still on the west bank of 
the river.^ On the 31st Hardee attacked Logan's lines, but the 
Confederate movement lacked combination. The fighting was 
almost entirely confined to Lee's Corps, and the assault was repulsed 
with ease.* 

On the same day Schofield reached the Macon Railway close to 
Rough-and-Ready Station, and the 4th Corps struck it a little 
further south. Both Corps set to work to destroy the line from 
Rough-and-Rcady Station southwards. When Hood learnt from 
those on board a railway train, which had returned to Atlanta on 
finding its way south blocked by Schofield's Corps, that the P'ederals 
were astride his line of communications, he inferred that a general 
assault upon Atlanta was about to take place, and that it was not 
the whole of the P'cderal army, but only an extension of the right 
flank, which was across the railway. He therefore sent peremptory 
orders to Hardee to send back Lee's Corps that night for the 
defence of Atlanta.^ Hardee with his single Corps was directed 

1 Cox's Atlanta, 198. * Cox's Atlanta, 199. 

' On the morning of the 31st bridges were built across the river so that the three 
Corps were in mutual support. 

♦ Hardee's own Corps, under Cleburne's command, crossed the river on Howard's 
right in pursuit of Kilpatrick's cavalry. ' Cox's Atlanta, 203. 



Sept.,i864] the ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 391 

to cover the railroad and guard the ammunition and provision 
trains which had accompanied the two Corps as best he could. 

At 2 a.m. on September ist Lee marched away towards Atlanta. 
Hardee stretched his troops along the lines, which had been occu- 
pied the previous day, hoping by a bold front to impose upon his 
opponents. In this he succeeded to a certain extent. It was im- 
possible that the Federal commanders could foresee that Hood 
would take such an extraordinary step as withdrawing Lee's Corps 
out of supporting distance of Hardee. 

Sherman, who knew that by the possession of the railway line at 
Rough-and-Ready the fate of Atlanta was sealed, at first directed 
Schofield and Thomas to move their respective forces down the 
railroad, destroying the track as they advanced, and to connect 
with Howard's left. But upon finding in the course of the after- 
noon that Lee's Corps had been withdrawn and only Hardee's 
remained in his front, he determined to try and capture this force. 
The knowledge that he could not hope to destroy Hood's entire 
army made him all the more eager to capture this, its strongest 
Corps. The 14th Corps was ordered to swing its left forward and 
endeavour to envelop Hardee's right, and the 4th Corps was 
directed to march with all speed towards Jonesboro. Davis with 
the 14th Corps assailed Hardee's right on September ist with 
much determination, and after one repulse succeeded in carrying 
the salient angle, where the Confederate line of entrenchments was 
bent back across the railway, and captured nearly a whole brigade 
and two batteries of artillery. But the 4th Corps did not get up 
in time to co-operate in the assault, and Hardee's right wing took 
up a new position, where they showed a bold front, whilst the centre 
and left held their original lines confronting Howard.^ 

By this time Hood had learnt his fatal mistake. Lee's Corps, 
which was about half-way to Atlanta, received orders counter- 
manding its advance, and directing it to cover the withdrawal of 
Stewart's and Smith's troops. It was too late to attempt to save 
anything which had not already been removed from Atlanta,^ and 
during the night the explosions in the city, where the military stores 
and railway stock were being destroyed by a cavalry rearguard, 
made known both to Sherman and to Slocum the welcome fact 
that Atlanta was being evacuated. Slocum had been directed on 
the 1st to make a reconnaissance towards Atlanta to see if Hood 
had abandoned it, and on the 2nd entered the city without en- 
countering any resistance. Under cover of the darkness Hood, 
marching south, rejoined Hardee, who also evacuated his lines 
during the night, at Lovejoy Station. But Atlanta, " the gate city 
of the South," was in Sherman's hands. 

This campaign, which commencing on May 4th terminated on 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 204-7. ^ Cox's Atlanta, 207. 



392 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

September 2nd with the capture of Atlanta, may be fairly regarded 
as the most brilliant feat accomplished by any Federal general 
throughout the war. One hundred and thirty miles of mountainous 
and difficult country had been covered.^ Three rivers had been 
crossed.- No offensive battle had been fought except the assault 
on Kenesaw Mountain, which was stopped immediately after the 
first repulse. In all other instances the Confederates had been 
forced to assume the offensive and had been repulsed with heavy 
loss. The conditions of the country were favourable to the defensive, 
and it was a triumph of skilful mancjeuvring to have forced an army 
strategically acting on the defensive to assume so often the tem- 
porarily offensive and with such disastrous results. Johnston's 
force after it had been reinforced by Polk's Corps was probably 
in the proportion of seven to ten, when compared with Sherman's 
army of invasion.^ The advantages of the defensive are commonly 
reckoned at five to two. It cannot therefore be said that the two 
armies were unequally matched. 

It must, however, be admitted that the substitution of Hood for 
Johnston greatly facilitated Sherman's task. Probably this was 
one of the greatest mistakes made by Jefferson Davis throughout 
the four troubled years of his Presidency. He had been prejudiced 
against Johnston from the very beginning of the war, because he 
considered that that commander had endeavoured to put off on to 
his shoulders the responsibility for not following up the victory of 
Bull Run.* In Johnston Sherman had found a foeman worthy 
to be matched against him. The Confederate general had a real 
genius for defensive warfare. In spite of Sherman's brilliant 
manoeuvres Johnston again and again withdrew his troops in 
safety from one position to another as strong. In the series of 
retrograde movements, which carried him from Dalton across the 
Chattahoochee, he was never caught at a disadvantage, never gave 
Sherman a chance of striking a decisive blow, and succeeded in 
keeping his troops in good spirits and good health.^ His removal 

^ Johnston, however, considers that the ilifficulties of the country between Dalton and 
Atlanta were greatly exaggerated. " That country is intersected by numerous practicalile 
roads and is not more rugged than that near Baltimore and Washington" (4 B. & L., 
267). 

2 The Oostanaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee. 

* Cox's Atlanta, 212. But Major Dawes, who has made a special study of the 
numbers engaged in this c.impaign, estimates the odds from the end of May as less than 
five to four (4 B. & L., 282). 

* This prejudice was greatly increased by Johnston's failure to relieve Vicksburg. 

« Hood, however, states (4 B. & L., 336) that "the troops of the Army of Tennessee 
had for such length of time l>ecn subjected to the ruinous j^oiicy pursued from Dalton to 
Atlanta that they were unfitted for united action in jiitched liattle." The evidence is, 
however, all in favour of Johnston's contention that under his command the »iotal oi the 
army had greatly improved ; see Hardee's and Stewart's testimony quoted in Johnston's 
Narrative, 365-9, and Maury's KecoUeclions of a Virginian, 148-9. 



1 



Sept.,i864] the ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 393 

from command was a great mistake ; the appointment of Hood in 
his place was a still greater error. 

Since Lee's defeat at Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, it was 
plain that the only chance which the Southern Confederacy still 
had of maintaining its independence was by playing a waiting 
game, by striving to tire out their opponents, and to gain time in 
the hope that the mass of the people of the North would weary of 
the expense and bloodshed of war and insist upon a compromise. 
This last chance was flung away when Hood, a fighting general 
of no proved strategical ability,^ was appointed to supersede 
Johnston, who throughout this campaign had shown himself a 
master of Fabian tactics. It would not be safe to assert that, had 
Johnston been continued in the command, the fall of Atlanta 
might have been averted, but at any rate it would have been post- 
poned. And time was just what the Confederacy needed. With 
Johnston in command the Confederate losses on July 20th and 
22nd would very probably have been much smaller, and it is most 
unlikely that Johnston would have committed Hood's extra- 
ordinary blunder of supposing that Sherman, at the moment when 
he was cutting loose from his base for the purpose of seizing and 
holding the Macon Railway, was in retreat across the Chatta- 
hoochee. A strong line of entrenchments would have confronted 
Sherman on his approach to the Montgomery Railway at Red Oak 
and Fairburn, and another long flanking movement, probably by 
the left round Atlanta, would have been imposed upon the 
Federals.2 

The Federal losses during the month of August, including the 
fighting at Jonesboro on September ist, were given by Sherman 
as amounting to 5,139, whilst the Confederate losses for the same 
period were estimated at 7,443. The aggregate loss for the whole 
campaign on the Federal side was 31,687, whilst that of the 
Southern army was stated as 34,979, and this estimate given by 
Sherman has been generally accepted as tolerably correct.^ 

The conquest of Atlanta, besides being a brilliant feat of arms, 
was of great political significance. It exercised a great influence 
over the inhabitants of the North, who were on the eve of a 
Presidential election. Grant's operations before Petersburg, slow 
and costly as they were, might easily be misunderstood by the 
"man in the street." Lincoln might express his conviction that 
"Grant was in a position whence he would never be dislodged until 

^ Another argument against Hood's appointment is the fact that his physical activity 
had been impaired by wounds. At Gettysburg he was crippled in one arm : at Chicka- 
mauga he lost a leg. General G. W. Smith thinks that to some extent his failure as 
an army commander may have been due to this cause (4 B. & L., 335). 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 198. 

* Major Dawes estimates the losses of the two armies as about equal — 40,000 each. 



394 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Richmond was taken,"^ but it is doubtful whether the President's 
conviction was shared by the majority of his supporters. But the 
capture of Atlanta, like that of Vicksburg in the previous year, 
was a definite solid fact, which no reasoning, however ingenious, 
could get rid of It gave the lie to the Democratic Party, who 
were running General McClellan as a candidate for the Presidency 
on a programme which denounced the war as a failure. To 
Sherman's victory at Atlanta Abraham Lincoln was greatly in- 
debted for the overwhelming majority by which he defeated 
McClellan at the polls. 

* Speech of June i6th, 1864, at Philadelpliia. 



CHAPTER XXIII 
THE MARCH TO THE SEA^ 

The military position after the fall of Atlanta — Farragut enters Mobile Bay — Import- 
ance of Georgia as the Confederate granary — The Confederate cavalry raids against 
Sherman's lines of communication — Hood crosses the Chattahoochee — Confederate 
attack on Allatoona repulsed — Hood's game of "hide and seek" — Sherman follows 
Hood to Alabama — Beauregard assigned to the chief command in the West — Hood 
moves west to Tuscumbia — Sherman prepares for his march through Georgia — ■ 
Hood crosses the Tennessee — Sherman's army — Sherman destroys the railway in his 
rear — And dismantles Atlanta — Sherman's plans — The march begins — Slocum 
occupies Milledgeville — Movements of the Federal right wing — Howard occupies 
Millen — Savannah in sight — Destruction of the Georgia railways — Sherman subsists 
his army off the country — Hardee's plans — Hatch's failure to cut Hardee's line of 
retreat — Capture of Fort McAllister — Hardee abandons Savannah. 

A FTER the fall of Atlanta the Federal army enjoyed a well- 
AA earned rest. But whilst the soldiers rested, the general was 
considering how the success already gained might be yet 
further improved. It was plain enough that the campaign was not 
ended by the capture of Atlanta. The Confederate army in the 
West still had to be dealt with. If Sherman's army was to play 
the part assigned to it in the general plan of campaign as devised 
by Grant, it could not rest upon its laurels, but must push on to 
deal fresh blows, which might lighten Grant's arduous task before 
Richmond. Sherman saw that, if he could ultimately establish his 
army at Columbia in South Carolina, Lee would be caught between 
two fires, and would be obliged to evacuate Richmond. 

But in the meantime the question as to what should be the next 
movement called for much consideration. Sherman had partially 
fulfilled his allotted task in capturing Atlanta, even though he had 
failed to destroy the Confederate army ; but Canby's movement 
against Mobile (Map X.) had miscarried. The divisions of the 
1 6th Corps, under A. J. Smith, recently returned from the Red 
River Expedition, which were to have reinforced Canby, had been 
suddenly called away to aid Rosecrans in Missouri. The Con- 
federate general, Price, had succeeded in organising a considerable 
force in that State, and was showing so bold a front that Rosecrans 
was obliged to call for reinforcements.^ Without Smith's divisions 

1 See Map XH. a Cox's Ailania, 219. 

395 



396 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Canby had not considered himself strong enough to attack 
Mobile. The navy had, indeed, done its work. On August 5th 
Admiral Farragut forced his way past the forts guarding the 
entrance to the Bay, and though he lost one of his largest iron- 
clads, which at the very beginning of the fight was sunk by 
a mine, made himself master of the harbour, and destroyed 
the greater part of the Confederate squadron in it.'^ The city 
itself lay at the top of the Bay, thirty miles from the sea, and was 
too strongly fortified for a naval attack unsupported by a land 
force to have any chance of success. But the forts controlling the 
Bay were reduced, and almost their last harbour on the Gulf was 
thus lost to the Confederates. Had Mobile itself fallen, Sherman 
from Atlanta would have been able to establish communications 
with Canby's army, either through Montgomery or by the lower 
Chattahoochee through Columbus. The two generals joining 
hands would have cut off another great section from the Con- 
federacy, and the Southern troops in Mississippi and Alabama 
would have been prevented from taking any part in the operations 
going on further east. 

Grant had hoped to capture either Wilmington (Map XII.) or 
Savannah, in which case Sherman could have safely ventured to 
nmrch through the heart of Georgia, knowing that at the end of 
his march he would find a depot of supplies waiting to receive 
him. But the fact that in September Mobile on the Gulf and 
Savannah and Wilmington on the Atlantic coast were still in 
the hands of the Confederates, decidedly complicated the position. 

Georgia had become the granary of the Confederacy. As cotton 
could no longer find a market, the inhabitants grew bread-stuffs 
instead, and since the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson had 
deprived the East of the products of the Trans-Mississippi region, 
the Confederates had come largely to depend upon Georgia for 
their supplies. The horrors of war had as yet barely made them- 
selves felt in that fertile State. If a Federal force were to march 
through it, laying waste the crops and destroying the railway 
system, a staggering blow would be inflicted on the Confederacy. 
Sherman, anxious as he was to strike this blow, decided that his 
immediate task should be to keep Hood fully occupied, until Grant 
had reduced the Atlantic seaports. Then he could march eastward, 
leaving Hood to follow him or not as he chose. But till then it 
would be dangerous to push into a hostile country, where it would 
be impossible to keep open his lengthening lines of communication, 
and Hood's Army would still constitute a serious obstacle. Sher- 
man, therefore, was not unwilling to let his army rest at Atlanta 
until Hood gave some indication of his intentions. He had not 
long to wait. 

» See Cap. XXVI. 



Sept.,i864] the march to the sea S97 

On September 22nd President Davis delivered a speech at 
Macon, which clearly foreshadowed an attempt to transfer the war 
back again to the Valley of the Tennessee.^ Hood had concen- 
trated the bulk of his forces at Lovejoy Station. But his cavalry 
under Wheeler had been raiding in Northern Georgia, trying with 
but slight success to break up the railway from Chattanooga, and 
was now in East Tennessee ; and on September 20th Forrest with 
his cavalry started on a raid into Middle Tennessee and sought to 
destroy the railway from Nashville to Decatur.^ This attempt also 
was attended with but little success, and on October 6th Forrest 
recrossed to the south bank of the Tennessee. 

Though neither of these cavalry raids had done any serious 
damage to the Federal lines of communication, yet when coupled 
with the Confederate President's speech at Macon, they caused 
Sherman to apprehend an attack by Hood in force against the 
railway in his rear. He ordered Thomas to return to Chattanooga, 
whither he also sent two divisions : and another division was sent 
to Rome, where it might protect the railroad north of the Etowah.^ 

The wisdom of these precautions was quickly proved. On 
September 29th Hood crossed the Chattahoochee twenty-four 
miles south-west of Atlanta. It was not at first certain whether he 
was marching westwards into Alabama with a view to invading 
Tennessee, or would turn northward against the Chattanooga- 
Atlanta Railroad. Sherman waited a day or two for the Con- 
federate movement to declare itself definitely. By October 2nd it 
was plain that Hood was marching to strike the railroad in the 
neighbourhood of Marietta.^ Sherman left one Corps to hold 
Atlanta and the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee, and with 
the rest of his army started in pursuit. 

On the 3rd Hood's main army was in the neighbourhood of 
Lost Mountain. Stewart's Corps was sent to strike the railway 
north of Marietta and to capture, if possible, Allatoona and the 
railway bridge over the Etowah. Stewart on the morning of the 
5th rejoined Hood, having destroyed two small posts on the rail- 
road and having left French's division to capture Allatoona and 
destroy the Etowah bridge. The Army of the Cumberland led 
the pursuit, and on the evening of the 4th was bivouacking at the 
foot of Kenesaw Mountain.^ The Army of the Tennessee was at 
Smyrna on the railroad, whilst the Army of the Ohio, which had 
to come from its encampment at Decatur and had been detained 
by swollen streams, rested for the night at Pace's Ferry on the 
north bank of the Chattahoochee, 

On the morning of the 5th Sherman, from the top of Kenesaw 

^ Cox's Atlanta, 221. ^ Cox's Atlanta, 222. 

* Cox's Atlanta, 223. ■* Cox's Atlanta, 224. 

^ The Army of the Cumberland was commanded in Thomas' absence by Stanley. 



398 THE Civn. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Mountain, could see that Hood's main army was encamped near 
Dallas. IBut he also saw the fierce fight which was raging round 
Allatoona, eighteen miles away. The original garrison of Alla- 
toona consisted of three regiments. General Corse, with three 
more regiments, arrived from Rome just in time to take the com- 
mand before the attack began. French was beaten off after a 
desperate struggle lasting for several hours, in which both sides 
lost heavily. He also failed to capture the blockhouse, which pro- 
tected the railway bridge over the Etowah. 

Sherman, when he commenced the retrograde movement from 
Atlanta, had hoped that he might find Hood's army on the rail- 
road, and so have a chance of hemming his opponent in between 
the river and the Federal army.^ But when he found that Hood 
had been too wary to make such a mistake, and that there was but 
little chance of forcing him to a decisive battle, his thoughts 
turned back to the movement on Savannah: and he wrote to Grant 
proposing to break up the line from Chattanooga southwards and 
turning his back on Hood to march through Georgia for the 
Atlantic coast.^ 

But on the loth came the news that Hood was crossing the 
Coosa several miles below Rome, and seemed to be threatening 
Corse, who with one division held that town. Accordingly he 
ordered a concentration of his army at Rome, whilst at the same 
time orders were sent to Thomas to concentrate all available 
troops at Stevenson, forty miles west of Chattanooga, in case 
Hood, turning north-west, attempted to cross the Tennessee. On 
the next day he learnt that Hood had not approached Rome, but 
had marched in some direction at present unknown. Again he 
wrote to Grant asking for permission to march on Savannah. 
But in a day or two definite information was once more to hand 
of Hood's movements. After crossing the Coosa below Rome he 
had sent his trains and reserve artillery fifty miles west to Gadsden 
(on Map X.), and was now moving north with his army in light 
marching order to strike the railroad at Resaca. As his right flank 
would be covered by the Oostanaula, he hoped to carry that post 
by a coup de main and destroy the railway bridge over the Oosta- 
naula. 

Hood reached Resaca on the 12th, but when the garrison refused 
to surrender, did not venture upon an assault. Leaving one Corps 
before Resaca, he moved along the line of railway and captured 
both Tilton and Dalton. He failed, however, to do any permanent 
damage to the railroad, and on the 14th Sherman, with Howard's 
and Stanley's troops, reached Resaca, and Hood at once retreated 
west in the direction of Villanow. 

Finding that Sherman was in full pursuit. Hood retreated still 

' Cox's Atlanta, 226. ' Cox's Atlanta, 234. 



Oct., 1864] THE MARCH TO THE SEA 399 

further west to Gadsden, in Alabama, which he reached on the 
20th. Sherman followed him, and on the same day that the Con- 
federates arrived at Gadsden (Map X.) had his army concentrated 
at Gaylesville, on the Alabama border. For seven days the two 
armies remained in their respective positions watching each other,^ 

The result of the operations in October had been to bring Sher- 
man back from Atlanta over a hundred miles to his rear. But 
Hood's dash against the Federal line of communications had failed 
to do any permanent damage to the railroad : and it was still open 
to Sherman to march eastwards towards the Atlantic coast when- 
ever he chose. The experience of October had convinced him 
that this move was the right one. The rapidity with which Hood's 
army had moved showed how difficult it would be to overtake it 
and bring it to bay. If Hood now crossed the Tennessee at any 
point east of Guntersville, Sherman was prepared to follow in pur- 
suit ;^ but if, on the other hand, Hood continued to move west, 
and tried to cross the river at Decatur or Florence, he was resolved 
not to throw away all that had been gained during the recent cam- 
paign, but to turn eastwards. He believed that Hood would feel 
himself obliged to follow him in that case ; and he was the more 
strongly inclined to hold that view when he learnt that Beauregard 
had been assigned to the command of all the Confederate troops 
between the Mississippi and Middle Georgia.' 

After the termination of the Atlanta campaign Hood had been 
writing first to General Bragg and then to President Davis, begging 
that all the troops in Georgia might be placed under his command, 
and that Hardee, to whom he attributed all his misfortunes, might 
be relieved of duty, and Lieutenant-General R. H. Taylor, command- 
ing the forces in Alabama and Mississippi, might be substituted for 
him. The Southern President visited Hood at his headquarters on 
September 25th and made the following arrangements. Hardee 
was promoted to the command of a Department embracing East 
Georgia and the adjoining portions of Florida and South Carolina, 
whilst Beauregard was assigned to the command of Hood's and 
Taylor's Departments, which were now consolidated into one 
military division. But it seems to have been distinctly understood 
between Hood and Davis, and impressed by the latter upon 
Beauregard, that he was not to interfere with Hood's plan of cam- 
paign, but must leave him the personal control of his own troops.* 

^ For the October operations, see Cox's Atlanta^ 224-39. Hood (4 B. & L., 426) 
states that it was his intention after leaving Villanow and finding that Sherman was 
following in pursuit, to stand and deliver battle, but he was bitterly disappointed to learn 
from the unanimous opinion of his principal officers that the moral of his troops had 
not sufficiently improved to justify a battle against Sherman's superior numbers. 

'^ Such a move on Hood's part would have left his lines of communication at Sher- 
man's mercy (see Ropes, 3 Massachusetts M. H. S., 140). 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 2. '' Cox's March to the Sea, 9- 10. 



400 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

R. H. Taylor was the President's brother-in-law, and he feared that 
to put him in Hardee's place would cause the charge of favouritism 
to be brought against him, and he was painfully conscious how 
much already his influence was waning. For Governor Brown of 
Georgia was asserting for his State those very rights which had 
formed the basis of secession, and had granted to the State militia 
a furlough for the purpose of gathering in the harvest, whilst he 
also claimed the right to confine their operations to their native 
State and to appoint their officers himself. 

On October 20th and 21st Beauregard and Hood discussed at 
Gadsden the next move, and it was agreed to invade Tennessee by 
way of Guntersville. But when Hood had only made a single 
day's march in that direction, he suddenly turned off westwards, 
showing how lightly he regarded Beauregard's supposed authority 
over him, and attempted to cross the river at Decatur.^ R. S. Granger, 
who commanded the Federal force in that neighbourhood, repulsed 
an attack upon Decatur, whereupon Hood moved still further west 
to Tuscumbia near to the Mississippi border line.^ Sherman was 
anxious to see whether Hood would, as he expected, turn and 
follow him, if he moved east, and with that end in view marched 
his army back in the first days of November into Georgia, and 
concentrated it about Rome and Kingston. On November 2nd he 
received from Grant the long desired permission to march eastwards 
through the heart of Georgia.^ 

The credit of conceiving this plan of marching to the coast at 
this particular Jioicture hQ\ov\gs solely to Sherman.* Thomas and 
Grant were both opposed to it.^ The latter believed, and rightly, 
as events proved, that Hood having once parted company with 
Sherman would, instead of following him, invade Tennessee, and 
he did not share Sherman's confidence in Thomas' ability to beat 

* Cox's March to the Sea, I2. Hood's own explanation of his sudden chanj^e of plan 
is that it was due to the news that Forrest with his cavalry was near Jackson, Tennessee, 
and owing to the high water in the river could not join Ilood in Middle Tennessee. 
Therefore he turneil west in order to effect a junction with Forrest before crossing to the 
north l)ank of the Tennessee (4 B. & L. , 427). This explanation Cox pronounces "more 
specious than sound" on the ground that the same orders "which apparently stopped 
Forrest at Jackson could have brought him back to Tuscumbia or to any other place 
where the Tennessee could be more easily crossed and a junction with Hood more easily 
made." 

'^ Hood, however, only admits that he made a slight demonstration against Decatur in 
order to cover the movement to Tuscumbia {4 B. & L., 427). 
•* Cox's March to the Sra, 2. 

* A letter from Sherman to Grant written before the commencement of the Atlanta 
campaign shows that from the very first Sherman had been contemplating a march to 
the Atlantic coast (Cox's Atlanta, 19). The peculiar circumstances under which he 
carried out the details of a plan, the broad outlines of which had undoubtedly presented 
themselves to many other minds, were these : first, he left behind him as yet undefeated 
the Confederate army of the West ; secondly, he started for the Atlantic coast before the 
Federal forces in the Fast had secured for him any place which might serve as a new base. 

•'' Cox's Match to the Sea, 5. 



Nov.,i864] THE MARCH TO THE SEA 401 

Hood back. Thomas himself had been reluctant to accept a charge 
of such great responsibility,^ yet there was certainly no one better 
qualified than himself to undertake it. His natural qualities pre- 
eminently fitted him for carrying out a Fabian policy, and at the 
same time no one was better able, as he proved afterwards at 
Nashville, to strike a crushing blow, when in his opinion the proper 
time for such a blow had arrived. Lincoln also viewed Sherman's 
proposed march with much uneasiness, though, true to his settled 
policy, since the appointment of Grant to the supreme command, 
of not interfering with the operations of the armies in the field, he 
raised no objection.^ 

Whilst he still believed that Hood would follow him to the east, 
Sherman had proposed only to send back the 4th Corps for service 
under Thomas, but when he found that Hood, so far from following 
him, was moving still further west, he determined to detach the 
23rd Corps as well. Schofield, its commander, was ready enough 
to agree. He was still in command of the Department of East 
Tennessee, and if he were placed under Thomas' orders, there 
would be no need to make any fresh alterations in that Depart- 
ment, and at the same time he anticipated that Tennessee would 
be the scene of an interesting and important campaign, in which 
he could find full scope for the display of his military abilities.^ 
Both Corps were sent back to report for duty to Thomas, and 
Schofield was assigned by that general to take command of them, 
with his headquarters at Pulaski, on the Nashville-Decatur Railroad 
(Map VI.). 

Hood, from Tuscumbia, crossed the river to Florence. He had 
at that time under his command an army of 44,700 men, whilst 
Forrest's cavalry, which were placed under his orders, amounted 
to 9,200. The latter at the end of October had started for a raid 
into Tennessee, hoping to draw Thomas' attention away from 
Hood's passage across the river by threatening his lines of com- 
munication in rear of Nashville. On the 29th he struck the 
Tennessee a few miles above Fort Henry, and moving up the left 
bank of the river, joined Hood at Florence on November i6th. 
Hood had been obliged to remain for three weeks at Florence in 
order to accumulate a store of supplies for his next movement. 
These supplies were collected at various points along the Mobile 
and Ohio Railroad, brought to Corinth, and then conveyed east- 
ward to Cherokee Station along a section of the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad, which Forrest had been able to keep open. 
From there they had to be transported in wagons to Tuscumbia, 
a distance of about fifteen miles, over a wretched country road, 

' Cox's March to the Sea, 7. 

^ See his letter to Sherman, quoted in 4 B. & L., 256. 

' Cox's March to the Sea. 8. 

2 D 



402 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

quickly converted by the rain into a morass.^ But probably Hood 
was in no hurry to advance until he had satisfied himself as to 
what Sherman's next move would be. If that general marched 
into Alabama and struck the Confederate lines of supply, Hood 
might find himself caught between Sherman in the rear and 
Thomas in front among the " barrens " of Tennessee, where little 
subsistence for man or beast could be found.^ He hoped against 
hope that Sherman would yet abandon his hold upon Georgia and 
fall back to protect Nashville, and the fact that Sherman did not 
follow that course, but continued to march east, probably rendered 
him desperate, and partially explained the recklessness which 
marked his disastrous campaign against Thomas. Before he moved 
from Gadsden he had agreed with Beauregard to send back 
Wheeler's cavalry, which had rejoined from East Tennessee, to 
hold Sherman in check, and Beauregard reckoned on being able 
to collect a force of about 30,000 men in all,^ counting in the 
Georgia militia and some troops which might be brought from 
the Carolinas, to meet Sherman's eastward march, if that possi- 
bility became an actual fact. 

The army with which Sherman started for Savannah numbered 
62,000 men.* It consisted of two Corps of the Army of the 
Cumberland and two of the Army of the Tennessee. The former 
were placed under the command of Slocum and constituted the 
left wing. The Corps commanders were Davis and Williams. 
Howard, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, was at the head 
of the right wing. Blair still commanded the 17th Corps, but 
Logan, the commander of the 15th, had not returned from the 
North, whither he had gone to take part in the Presidential 
election, and his place was filled by Osterhaus. The cavalry 
force was under the command of Kilpatrick and only consisted of 
a single division. 

Sherman, having received permission from Grant for his march 
through Georgia, had as a necessary preliminary to break up the 
railway back from Atlanta. He wished to leave with Thomas a 
force sufficient to hold Hood in check, until the fresh levies 
arriving from the North should give him a decided superiority of 
numbers. 

Thomas, when reinforced by the 4th and 23rd Corps, had an 
army about equal to Hood's, although the Confederates had a very 
distinct superiority in cavalry.^ A. J. Smith's three divisions were 
on their way from Missouri, and the detachments in Northern 
Georgia and also some in East Tennessee were to be called in to 
reinforce Thomas' army, 

1 Cox's Afanh to (he Sea, 15. ' Cox's March to the Sea, 16. 

' Cox's March to the Sea, II. * Cox's March to the Sea, 2\. 

" Cox's March to the Sea, iS. 



Nov., 1 864] THE MARCH TO THE SEA 40S 

It was Sherman's intention to hold no post beyond Nashville 
except Chattanooga. The supplies accumulated in Chattanooga 
would suffice for the garrisons retained in East Tennessee. ^ 
Accordingly, as soon as the 23rd Corps had been sent back to 
Tennessee and a supply of provisions had been collected at 
Atlanta for the march eastwards, Sherman set to work to destroy 
the railway back from Atlanta to the Etowah (Map XII.). The 
foundries, factories, and machine shops at Rome were also destroyed, 
and the same fate befell Atlanta. Immediately after its capture 
in September, before he had yet fixed his future plans, Sherman 
had determined to convert that city into a " place of arms," and 
for that purpose had directed that the lines of fortifications should 
be contracted, so that the place could be held by a smaller garri- 
son, and had ordered that the whole of the population should 
be removed either north or south, as individuals preferred. This 
measure, harsh indeed, yet amply justified on military grounds, 
had led to an angry correspondence between Sherman and Hood, 
in which the former had had the better of the argument. Now 
that he had definitely decided to advance through Georgia, he 
determined to make it not worth the while of the Confederates to 
regain possession of Atlanta, as it was no part of his plan to 
leave a garrison to hold it, when he required every available man 
to take part in the advance. 

Entering a more or less unknown country, and not knowing 
exactly what opposition he might encounter, he did not definitely 
declare what route he would follow. He told Grant that he 
would either come out on the Atlantic coast near Charleston 
or Savannah, or else reach the Gulf near Mobile and Pensacola. 
He could reach the vicinity of Charleston by way of Augusta and 
the left bank of the Savannah River. The route through 
Milledgeville, Millen, and the Ogeechee Valley would bring him 
out close to Savannah ; and if his progress east were effectually 
barred, he could still move west of Macon and reach the ports 
upon the Gulf. 

On November 12th all communication with the rear was broken, 
and on the 14th the whole army was concentrated at Atlanta. 
On the following morning the great march commenced. At 
first the movement was made in two columns. The right wing 
feinted at Macon, the left wing at Augusta. Sherman himself 
accompanied the left wing, in order that he might be on the spot 
to decide whether Charleston or Savannah should be the point 
aimed at.^ 

The two columns were to come into communication with each 
other in the neighbourhood of Milledgeville, the State capital. 
On the evening of the 22nd the advance guard of the left wing 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 19. ^ Cox's Ma7-ch to the Sea, 25. 



404 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

entered that city, and the next day the whole of Slocum's column 
was concentrated there. During the march of this column seventy 
miles of railroad to the east of Atlanta had been torn up, and the 
bridge over the Oconee River, some miles further on, destroyed.^ 
Sherman did not, however, cross the river at that point, but moved 
down the right bank until he was within reach of Howard's 
column. During the march towards Augusta he had made up 
his mind that the easier route to follow would be that which 
led through Milledgeville and Millen to Savannah, instead of 
attempting to reach Charleston, in which case he would have 
to cross numerous deep rivers and swamps, at any one of which 
a determined opposition might make it almost impossible to 
cross. 

The right wing, which was accompanied by Kilpatrick's cavalry 
division, advanced some distance along the railroad towards 
Macon. Then the infantry crossed the Ocmulgee and marched 
eastwards, and on the 22nd was closed up near Gordon on the 
Central Railroad, some twenty miles east of the Macon line, and 
within easy reach of the other column at Milledgeville.^ 

The cavalry, after capturing the works at Lovejoy Station, 
which were held by two brigades of Wheeler's cavalry, pressed on 
after the retreating enemy close up to Macon, so as to give the 
impression that that city was threatened by the Federal advance, 
and subsequently rejoined the infantry. 

The Confederate authorities were at their wit's end. Beauregard, 
from his headquarters at Corinth, Mississippi, addressed grandi- 
loquent appeals to the people of Georgia to rise en masse against 
the invader. On the 21st Hardee visited Macon, coming from 
Savannah. He correctly decided that Macon was in no danger, 
and that Sherman's objective was either Augusta or Savannah. 
He himself returned to Savannah, having directed Smith's 
Georgia militia to move eastward with all speed and try to get 
between Sherman and Augusta, whilst Wheeler's cavalry were 
ordered to continue to harass the Federal right flank and rear.^ 
The Georgia militia marched in obedience to these orders to reach 
the Central Railroad at Gordon, and on the 22nd, when distant 
eight miles from that place, came up with the rearguard of 
Sherman's right column.* The militia promptly attacked, but 
after several assaults were repulsed with considerable loss. 

The day after Hardee's visit to Macon a Council of War, con- 
sisting of R. H. Taylor, Governor Brown, Toombs, his adjutant, 

1 Cox's March to the Sea, 27. 

2 Milledgeville was not on the main line of the Central Railway from Macon to 
Savannah, hut cfinnected with it by a branch line from Gordon. The distance from 
Macon to Milledgeville is about thirty miles, 

' Cox's March to the Sea, 28. * Cox's March to the Sea, 30. 



Dec.,i864] the march to the sea 405 

and Howell Cobb, commanding the Georgia " reserves," assembled 
there. On learning the news of Smith's engagement they directed 
the militia to take a roundabout route, using two lines of railroad 
and reach Savannah, where it reported for duty to Hardee on the 
30th.^ Wheeler also received orders from Hardee to abandon his 
position on the right flank of Howard's column, and getting in 
front of Sherman to endeavour to cover all the roads by which 
he might advance. This change of policy on Wheeler's part 
led to a corresponding change in the movements of the Federal 
cavalry, and Kilpatrick was directed to leave Howard's right 
flank and move in front and to the left of the infantry advance. 

On the 24th the left wing was again in motion from Milledge- 
ville, and after striking the Central Railway and following it for 
a short distance, crossed the Ogeechee and encamped on the 29th 
at Louisville.2 The right wing continued to advance along the 
Central Railroad, tearing up the rails as they advanced, to Millen, 
which was reached on December 3rd. The direct line of railway 
between Augusta and Savannah was severed by the Federal 
occupation of Millen.^ 

From Louisville and Millen the army moved towards Savannah 
as its next objective. Three Corps marched down the valley 
between the Ogeechee and the Savannah, and the 15th Corps 
kept along the right bank of the Ogeechee. On December 9th 
and loth the whole Federal army was closing in upon Savannah. 
Cavalry and experienced infantry scouts were sent out to make 
communication with the fleet, which was off the coast, and also to 
cut the railroad from the Gulf to Savannah.* 

During the march through Georgia Sherman had set himself 
to break up thoroughly the railway system of the State. If that 
were effectually performed, then the resources of Georgia, probably 
the richest State left to the Confederacy, would be completely 
lost to the Richmond Government. The work of destroying 
the railroads was pursued in a most business-like manner. A 
special corps of pioneers had been formed for the purpose, but 
it was soon found that the infantry could do the work sufficiently 
well. A single Corps could in one day's march thoroughly destroy 
some ten or fifteen miles of track.^ In every direction the work of 
destruction went on unsparingly. From the Etowah through 
Atlanta, as far south as Lovejoy Station, one hundred miles of 
track were torn up : another hundred miles were destroyed from 
Fairburn, on the Montgomery Railway, through Atlanta as far 

^ They were first withdrawn to Macon, then took the rail to Albany, marched thence 
across country to Thomasville, and from that point reached Savannah by the Savannah 
and Gulf Railway (4 B. & L. , 667). 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 31. ^ Cox's March to the Sea, 34. 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 35. ^ Cox's March to the Sea, 36. 



406 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

as the Oconee River. The Central Railroad was completely 
wrecked from Gordon for one hundred and sixty miles, almost to 
the suburbs of Savannah ; and the branch lines from Gordon to 
Millcdgeville and from Millen to Augusta were also destroyed 
beyond any possibility of speedy repair. 

The country itself through which Sherman marched fared very 
little better: over a belt of land, some fifty or sixty miles broad, 
a clean sweep was made of all supplies.^ Along the line of 
march every article which could be regarded as possessing a 
possible military value was seized. Sherman was determined to 
bring home to the inhabitants of the smiling fields of Georgia 
the horrors of war. " War is cruelty," he said, " and you cannot 
refine it." The same policy, ruthless as it seemed at the time, 
yet perhaps most merciful in the end, which had desolated 
Atlanta, now laid bare the granary of the South. Sherman be- 
yond doubt strove to hold tight the reins of discipline and to 
prevent the legitimate requisitioning of supplies from degenerat- 
ing into mere lawless robbery and violence. Every day each 
regiment detailed about one-twentieth of its strength, under an 
officer, to collect off the country the necessary supplies.^ Though 
the trains carried twenty days' rations, and herds of beef cattle 
accompanied the army, it was Sherman's policy to live as far 
as possible off the country and to tax the supplies of the trains 
only when absolutely necessary. The Vicksburg campaign had 
convinced him that it was quite possible for an army moving 
rapidly to some given destination to dispense practically with 
supply trains, and live off the country in the more fertile regions 
of the South : and if it had been possible in the Mississippi 
Valley, it was a still simpler process in the rich lands of 
Georgia. 

In spite, however, of Sherman's endeavours to regulate and keep 
within the limits of military discipline his extensive scheme of 
subsisting his army off the soil, it is impossible to deny that 
very grave hardships were entailed upon the inhabitants by this 
system. Discipline was not equally strict throughout the army : 
and Kilpatrick in particular earned an invidious reputation for 
rapacity and lawlessness.^ Much of the blame must be shared, 
however, by the Confederate soldiers themselves: for, as they 
began to realise the hopelessness of the struggle, they flung aside 
the ties of discipline and plundered the unhappy inhabitants with 
scant mercy.* 

As the Federal arm\' closed in on Savannah, Hardee found him- 
self with a force of about i8,ooo men with which to defend the 

» Cox's March to the Sea, 36. « Cox's Afarch to the Sea, 38. 

' Cox's March to the Sen, jo. * Cox's March to the Sea, AiijKTiilix C. 



Dec, 1864] THE MARCH TO THE SEA 407 

place.^ It was quite impossible to provision Savannah against a 
long siege,^ and the Confederate general had no intention of letting 
the same fate befall him as had overtaken Pemberton in Vicks- 
burg. He intended to evacuate Savannah before there was any 
chance of his line of retreat being cut off, and he then proposed 
to rally all the troops available for the purpose of resisting Sher- 
man's march northwards. Throughout this campaign Hardee dis- 
played a sound military judgment and no ordinary ability in 
reading the designs of his opponent. He fully recognised that 
the garrisons must be withdrawn from the Atlantic coast, and a 
great effort made to prevent Sherman from marching through the 
Carolinas and closing in on Lee's rear, whilst Grant held the Army 
of Northern Virginia fast in front. It was not Hardee's fault that 
Sherman was enabled to march ultimately with comparative ease 
through the Carolinas northwards. 

As Hardee did not propose to stay in Savannah till the place 
was completely invested, it was naturally his object to keep open 
the line of retreat to Charleston. For this purpose he drew his 
first line of defence round the city some distance out with his right 
covering the Charleston railway bridge over the Savannah and his 
left the Gulf railway bridge over the Ogeechee. 

But the advance of a Federal Corps down the right bank of the 
latter river turned his flank and compelled him to fall back upon 
an inner line of defence. After thus contracting his lines his only 
road of retreat lay by the Union Causeway, which ran to Hardee- 
ville, a station on the Charleston Railway in South Carolina about 
six miles distant from the Savannah River.^ 

General J. G. Foster, who was in command of a Federal force 
at Beaufort, had on November 29th sent Hatch's division to strike 
the railway at Grahamville some twenty miles from the Savannah.* 
If the Federals could have effected a lodgment in force on the 
line, it is hard to see how Hardee's army could have escaped from 
Savannah. But Hatch's movements on the 29th were dilatory, and 
gave time for Smith's Georgia militia to arrive by the Gulf Railway 
and take up a position covering the threatened point. There was 
some sharp fighting, in which the Federals lost heavily, on the 
30th, but Hatch failed to reach the railroad and fell back at the 
close of the day. 

As the Federal army approached the coast the supply of bread- 
stuffs grew scarcer. Rice swamps took the place of cornfields, and 
Sherman was anxious as quickly as possible to establish a line of 

' Cox's March to the Sea, 51. But Colonel Chisolm of Beauregard's staff estimated 
Hardee's entire force as only about 10,000 (4 B. & L. , 679). General G. W. Smith's 
estimate (4 B. & L., 669) approximately agrees with Cox's. 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 47. " Cox's March to the Sea, 47. 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 48. 



408 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

communication with the fleet, by which supplies could be brought 
up the Ogeechee River. But before that was possible it was neces- 
sary to reduce Fort McAllister, which lay on the right bank of the 
Ogeechee commanding the approach from Ossabaw Sound. This 
fort was armed with seven heavy and eight field guns, was pro- 
visioned for fifty days, and occupied by a garrison of 200 men.^ 
On the afternoon of the 13th it was captured at the first assault 
by Hazen's division of the 15th Corps: and the question of a 
base was thereby solved. A large store of provisions had been 
accumulated by Foster, and these could now be brought by water 
to Sherman's rear. 

On arriving in the vicinity of Savannah, Sherman had received 
two despatches from Grant, directing him to establish an entrenched 
camp in a suitable position, and be prepared to come by sea with 
the bulk of his forces to join the Army of the Potomac before 
Richmond. Sherman, whilst declaring his readiness to carry out 
his instructions, expressed his opinion both in writing to Grant and 
more emphatically by word of mouth to the staff officers, who had 
brought the despatches, in favour of laying siege to Savannah, and 
then moving by land through the Carolinas to join Grant. The 
Commander-in-Chief, upon further reflection, had already decided 
to leave his subordinate free to act according to his own judgment, 
but before Sherman was informed of the change of plan. Savannah 
had already fallen. The effect of the earlier despatches, however, 
was to cause him to hesitate before embarking upon a siege which, 
if once commenced, it would be difficult to abandon, and to leave 
to Foster the task of cutting off Hardee's retreat by the Charleston 
railroad. He abstained, therefore, from sending any considerable 
force across to the Carolina bank of the Savannah.- Foster, indeed, 
succeeded in establishing himself in a position where his guns 
commanded the railway. But this did not prevent the Confeder- 
ates using the line, as they only had to run the trains over the 
space commanded by the Federal artillery during the night.^ On 
the 19th one brigade of Sherman's army crossed the Savannah. 
The rice fields were under water, and but little progress was made. 
However, a hint was enough for Hardee, who had determined 
on no account to be besieged in the city. On the 20th he com- 
menced to withdraw his troops, and the evacuation was completed 
that night. On the following morning the Federals entered 
Savannah. 

Thus on December 21st Sherman's great "march to the sea" 
was brought to a successful termination. Three hundred miles 
had been covered in twenty-four days. The railway system of 
Georgia was completely broken up, and its resources from that 

» Cox's Manh to the Sea, 51. " Cox's March to the Sea, 58-9. 

' Cox's March to the Sea, 56. 



Dec. 1864] THE MARCH TO THE SEA 409 

time forth lost to the Confederate Government. The losses 
incurred during the campaign had been very slight, amounting in 
all to only 531 killed and wounded, and 1,616 missing. Famous as 
this march has become, and enormous as were its consequences, 
it must yet be admitted that it was little more than a military 
promenade through Georgia. The weather had been, except for 
one or two days towards the end of November, most favourable, 
and in December the Indian summer set in. Hood's reckless 
invasion of Tennessee had practically freed Sherman from all oppo- 
sition. Except for the rearguard action on November 22nd with 
the Georgia militia, the only organised force encountered consisted 
of Wheeler's cavalry. There was some fierce fighting towards the 
end of November between that force and Kilpatrick's cavalry in 
the neighbourhood of Waynesboro and Briar Creek to the left 
of the main line of advance. But from Millen onwards little 
opposition was met with, as Wheeler soon withdrew his troops to the 
left bank of the Savannah.^ In point of hard fighting this cam- 
paign cannot compare with the Atlanta campaign, which preceded 
it, nor in hard marching with the Carolina campaign, which 
followed it. 

Among the spoils of Savannah were over 150 heavy guns and 
31,000 bales of cotton.^ President Lincoln could not complain of 
the Christmas present which Sherman sent him. 



NOTE ON SHERMAN'S MARCH 

For an adverse criticism of the strategy which prompted the March to 
the Sea, see Ropes' masterly paper inio Massachusetts M. H. S., 136-52. 
He considers that, when Sherman gained possession of Atlanta, "he knew 
that he had done practically nothing towards carrying out his intention " 
of destroying the Army of Tennessee: that "in most respects he was far 
less favourably situated for destroying that army than he had been on 
May ist": that "he left to Thomas the accomplishment of the task 
which had been originally assigned to himself" : that "no margin was left 
for accidents," and that Grant and Sherman "counted unwarrantably 
upon the favours of fortune " : and that, great as was the success which 
attended Sherman's plan of campaign, yet if he " had followed up Hood 
before marching to the sea, the destruction of the Confederate army could 
hardly have failed to be more thorough than it was." 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 34. 

^ Sherman, in his letter to the President, speaks of 150 heavy guns. Cox says, " The 
heavy guns, mounted and in store, which were captured, were found to number over two 
hundred and fifty" [March to the Sea, 61). 



CHAPTER XXIV 
THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY IN 18()4i 

The Federal operations in West Virginia — Sigel's advance up the Valley — Sigel defeated 
by Breckinridge at Newmarket — Hunter advances on Staunton — Federal victory at 
Piedmont — Federals occupy Staunton — And advance on Lynchburg from the West — 
Early arrives in time to save Lynchburg — Hunter retreats to the Kanawha Valley — 
Early invades the North — Early crosses the Potomac — And occupies Frederick City- 
Early defeats Wallace on the Monocacy — Early appears before Washington — Early re- 
treats — Early makes good his retreat into the Valley — Early retires to Strasburg — Tiie 
6th Corps recalled by Grant — Early resumes the offensive — The Confederate cavalry 
cross the Potomac — Destruction of Chambersburg — McCausland defeated by Averell 
— Grant sends reinforcements — Grant urges the apjxjintment of a single commander 
against Early — Sheridan appointed to the command — Sheridan's earlier career — Com- 
position of the Army of the Shenandoah — Sheridan threatens Winchester — Early 
falls back beyond Strasburg — Reinforcements sent by Lee to the Valley — Sheridan 
retreats down the Valley — Early advances to the Potomac — Early falls back to 
Bunker Hill — Sheridan again menaces Winchester — Anderson leaves the Valley — 
Grant holds a conference with Sheridan — Early's defective strategy — Sheridan pre- 
pares to attack — Battle of the 0))ecjuon (or Winchester) — The Confederates attempt 
a counterstroke — The Confederate left driven in — The Confederate army routed — 
Early takes up a position at Fisher's Hill — Battle of Fisher's Hill — Rout of the 
Confederate army — Kershaw rejoins Early — Sheridan occupies Harrisonburg — 
Difference of opinion between Grant and Sheridan — Devastation of the Valley — 
Sheridan falls liack to Strasburg — Early follows in pursuit — Confederate cavalry 
routed at Tom's Brook — Difference of opinion between Ilalleck and Sheridan — Early 
resumes the offensive — Sheridan starts for Washington — Early's plan of attack — 
Battle of Cedar Creek — Federal left surprised and routed — Federal centre retreats — 
The 6th Corps forms a new line — Arrival of Sheridan — Attack on the Federal right 
repulsed — Sheridan attacks — The Confederate army routed — The 2nd Corps returns 
to Richmond — Depletion of both armies — Further cavalry operations — Sheridan 
again moves up the Valley — Early routed at Waynesboro — Sheridan rejoins Grant. 

THOUGH the two chief theatres of war during 1864 were 
Eastern Virginia and Georgia, there was yet a third, where 
events of no sh'ght importance and with a distinct bearing 
upon the final issue, which was being fought out between Lee and 
Grant, were taking place. 

The Shenandoah Valley was again the scene of a campaign, 
which was decisive in its results and full of strategical interest. 
In 1862 Stonewall Jackson had conducted that Valley cam- 
paign, which exercised so profound an influence upon the fate 
of McClellan's Peninsular campaign. In 1863 it was down the 

* See Map V, 
410 



May, 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 41 1 

Shenandoah Valley that Lee, after Chancellorsville, had marched 
the Army of Northern Virginia for the invasion of Pennsylvania, 
and it was at Winchester that the greater part of Milroy's command 
had capitulated. In 1864 the Valley was once more the scene of 
a campaign, which lasted longer and was more decisive in its 
results than either of its predecessors. But the tide of fortune 
had turned, and the Federals, to whom hitherto the Valley had so 
frequently been the scene of disaster, found themselves at the 
close of the campaign in undisputed possession of the whole of it. 

In the spring of 1864 Major-General Sigel was in command of 
the Department of West Virginia, of which the Shenandoah 
Valley formed a part. The chief function of the commander of 
that Department was to stand on the defensive and cover the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the great line of communication 
between Washington and the West. But at the same time it was 
possible to assume the offensive against two Confederate railwa}'s, 
the Virginia Central, which passed through Staunton, and the 
Virginia and Tennessee, running through Lynchburg. Grant's 
plan of campaign for 1864 designed an offensive movement to be 
made from the valley of the Kanawha River (Map II.) against the 
latter railway by the forces of Crook and Averell,^ whilst Sigel 
was to advance up the Shenandoah Valley and create a diversion 
by threatening Staunton and the Virginia Central Railway. 

Averell, with two brigades of cavalry, started on May ist to 
destroy the salt works at Saltville, whilst Crook, with about 6,000 
men in all,^ advanced, on May 3rd, to destroy the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railway bridge over the New River at New Bern. On 
approaching Saltville, Averell decided, from the information which 
reached him, that it was too strongly held to be successfully 
attacked. Accordingly he turned towards Wythesville, on the 
Virginia and Tennessee Railway, in the hope of destroying the 
lead works there. But the Confederate general, John Morgan, 
promptly transferred a part of his force from Saltville to the 
threatened point, and drove him off with some loss. 

Crook, in the meanwhile, had been more successful. On the 9th 
he attacked and inflicted a severe defeat upon a Confederate force 
strongly posted on Cloyd's Mountain, and the following day 
reached New Bern, gained possession of the railway bridge, and 
burned it. Having accomplished his object, he withdrew to Union, 
where he was rejoined by Averell, and the united command went 
into camp at Meadow Bluff.^ 

On April 30th Sigel commenced his advance up the Shenandoah 

^ Crook was commanding, under General Sigel, in the Kanawha Valley, and Averell 
was Crook's cavalry commander. ^ Pond, 12. 

•* In this brief campaign, which terminated on May 19th, the total Federal loss was 
745 (Pond, 15). 



412 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Valley (Map V.). He, however, regarded his force, numbering 
about 6,500 men, as too small for offensive purposes, and had but 
a vague idea of the part which he was expected to play. He 
would have much preferred that Crook's force should have co- 
operated with his own in a movement upon Staunton. He ex- 
pressed the opinion that with so small a force it would not be safe 
to advance beyond Strasburg unless his left flank was protected 
against a Confederate movement by way of Front Royal. Though 
Grant, in reply, assured him that he did not want him to move 
beyond Cedar Creek, yet Sigel pushed southward, on May nth, 
through Woodstock, and on the 14th came in contact with Breck- 
inridge's force advancing down the Valley from Newmarket, a 
village of some strategical importance, as the turnpike from Front 
Royal, by way of Luray over the Massannuttons, connected with 
the main Valley turnpike at that point. 

The numerical strength of the two armies actually engaged on 
the following day was fairly equal, about 5,000 troops on either 
side. But Sigel's lack of any definite plan of campaign had 
caused him to string out his troops along the turnpike, and in the 
battle of the 15th he was at a distinct disadvantage. Imboden's 
cavalry brigade turned his left flank, and he was forced to retr-at 
with the loss of five guns. Breckinridge did not press the pursuit 
far, and Sigel withdrew his defeated force to Cedar Creek. He 
was preparing to advance again up the Valley when he was relieved 
of the command of the Department by General Hunter.^ 

On May 26th the new commander advanced up the turnpike 
from Cedar Creek. His force numbered 8,500 men of all arms, with 
twenty-one guns.^ Sigel had been left to hold the line of the Balti- 
more and Ohio Railroad with the reserves. Hunter's directions 
were to march on Staunton, and there join hands with Crook's and 
Averell's forces for an advance upon Charlottesville and Lynchburg. 
In order to march with all speed he was instructed to levy supplies 
from the inhabitants of the Valley, and depend as little as possible 
upon trains. 

Since Sigel's defeat at Newmarket, Lee had called Breckinridge's 
command to the line of the North Anna, and the Confederate 
forces left in the Valley were no match for Hunter's army. The 

* According to Sigel's account (4 B. & L., 487), Grant had originally assigned 
General Ord to command the Field Force operating against Staunton ; but that general 
•'l>ecame so difTident in regard to the whole matter that he asked to be relieved." 
Sigel's reason for moving beyond Cedar Creek was l^ecause he heard that there were 
only alx)ut 3,000 troops in the Shenandoah Valley opposed to him, and he hoped by 
threatening Staunton to force Breckinridge to detach troops, and thereby weaken the 
opp<')sition to Crook. Sigel attributed his defeat to the fact that two of his regiments 
were not up in time to take part in the battle. The Feileral loss was 831, the Con- 
federate 577 (4 B. & L., 491). Sigel admittctl the loss of five guns : other accounts 
say six (i'ond, 20, note). ^ roud, 24. 



June, 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 413 

Federal general, on June 2nd, left the Valley turnpike and took a 
road running south-east to Port Republic, in order to outflank 
Imboden's cavalry, which was holding the line of the North River 
across the turnpike at Mount Crawford.^ 

On the 5th the Confederate main body, which had marched 
from Lynchburg, under General W. E. Jones, was encountered at 
Piedmont, a small village on the road between Port Republic and 
Staunton.^ 

Hunter's superiority of numbers enabled him to turn Jones' 
right, whilst pressing heavily on his left, and the Confederates were 
driven from their position in rout, leaving their commander dead 
upon the field, and three guns and 1,500 prisoners in the hands of 
the victors.^ The remnant of the beaten army, under Vaughan, 
abandoning all hope of saving Staunton, fled eastwards to Waynes- 
boro, where they covered the road to Charlottesville. 

Hunter entered Staunton without further opposition on the 6th, 
where he was joined on the 8th by Crook with his own and 
Averell's forces, a reinforcement about 10,000 strong, with two 
batteries.* 

On the loth Hunter, having now under his command an army 
of 18,000 men, with thirty guns, moved out of Staunton after 
destroying the Virginia Central Railroad for several miles, and 
advanced against Lynchburg. Instead, however, of advancing by 
way of Charlottesville, as Grant had intended, he chose to follow 
the route which led through Lexington, and approached Lynchburg 
from the west. 

He was probably guided in this decision by the consideration 
that a Confederate force was holding Rockfish Gap. But it was a 
mistake which cost him dear later on.^ 

Lexington, thirty-six miles distant from Staunton, was reached 
on the nth. When starting from Staunton, Hunter had sent a 
cavalry division to break up the Charlottesville and Lynchburg 
Railway. This was done at Arrington Station. But Hunter 
remained at Lexington till the 13th, waiting for his cavalry to 
rejoin him and also for a convoy of supplies to arrive.'' This delay 
proved fatal to his chance of capturing Lynchburg, by affording 
time to Breckinridge and Early to reach that city. As soon as 
Lee heard of Jones' defeat at Piedmont, he ordered Breckinridge 

^ Pond, 25. 

2 Piedmont is four miles east of the Valley pike, and seven south-west of Port 
Republic (Pond, 26). 

* Pond, 27. The Federal loss was only 420. Imboden (4 B. & L. , 485) gives the 
Confederate strength at 4,500 ; Vaughan, however, estimated it at 5,600. 

« Pond, 28. 

^ Grant expected Hunter to march on Charlottesville, and sent Sheridan to meet him 
there. 

« Hunter did not move the bulk of his army from Lexington till the 14th (Pond, 32^ 



414 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

to return to the Valley, and shortly after sent the 2nd Corps, now 
under Early's command, to cross the Blue Ridge at either Brown's 
or Swift Run Gap and fall upon the rear of Hunter, who was 
supposed to be still at Staunton.^ 

Breckinridge passed through the Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, 
joined Vaughan's command at Waynesboro, and hastened to 
Lynchburg. Early left Richmond on the 13th, and on the 17th 
half his Corps reinforced Breckinridge at Lynchburg. On the 
same day the Federal army appeared before the city. Hunter 
had decided that to try and drive Breckinridge from Rockfish 
Gap might cause fatal delay, and determined to push straight 
for Lynchburg through the Peaks of Otter.'^ On the 15th his 
cavalry advance occupied Liberty twenty-four miles west of Lynch- 
burg, and was there joined by two hundred of Averell's troopers, 
who had been sent to ride round Lynchburg and break up the 
Charlottesville and Southside Railways. 

On the night of the 16th Hunter encamped seven miles east of 
Liberty, and on the following day an advanced line of Confederate 
entrenchments five miles out of Lynchburg was carried.^ Although 
Hunter knew that Confederate troops were entering Lynchburg, 
he did not despair of success, provided that a whole Army Corps 
had not been sent from Richmond to reinforce the garrison.* 

On the 1 8th he advanced against the city, and after driving in 
the Confederate skirmish line attacked in force. Early's infantry 
sallied out to meet him, but were driven back.^ Although the 
operations on that day were, on the whole, favourable to the 
Federals, yet it became plain that Early's Corps was now con- 
fronting them, and on the same night Hunter ordered his army to 
retreat. The choice of the Lexington route to Lynchburg was 
now found to add to the difficulties of the situation. For the 
natural route up the Shenandoah Valley was now practically closed 
to the Federals, as Early could send troops by the railroad, which 
had been sufficiently repaired to admit of his troops being brought 
from Charlottesville to Lynchburg by train, and operate through 
Rockfish Gap against Hunter's line of retreat. Similarly, a road 
running west of and parallel to the Shenandoah Valley through the 
valley of the South Branch of the Potomac, which would have 
brought the Federals to the Baltimore and Ohio Railway at Cumber- 
land, was considered impracticable owing to the difficulty of getting 
supplies, and the possibility that the enemy might move by Staun- 
ton and Harrisonburg and cut that line of retreat. Accordingly no 
alternative was left to Hunter but to retreat westwards into the 

' Pond, 35. - Pond, 32. ' Pond, 33. * Pond, 37. 

* Pond, 37. But Early (4 B. & L., 493) says that on the 17th he repulsed the 
enemy about two miles from Lynchburg, and that on the 18th a Federal att.ick was 
"handsomely repulsed." 



June, 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 415 

Kanawha Valley, leaving the Shenandoah Valley at the mercy of 
Early.^ He was already two hundred miles away from his base, his 
supplies were almost exhausted, and his stock of ammunition was 
running short. 

The Federal retreat was conducted by forced marches, owing to 
the necessity of reaching with all possible speed a depot of supplies. 
Early abandoned the pursuit on the 22nd, having no intention of 
entangling his troops in the mountainous region of the Kanawha 
Valley (Map H.), and on the 27th Hunter's army arrived within a 
day's march of Gauley Bridge, and finding supplies awaiting them 
went into camp.^ Though the expedition had failed to get pos- 
session of either Charlottesville or Lynchburg, and the damage 
done to the railways was quickly repaired, yet it had been 
by no means barren of result. In the first place it had called away 
from Richmond a considerable portion of Lee's army, and it had 
also destroyed at Staunton a large amount of valuable property.^ 
Unfortunately the necessity of retreating to the Kanawha gave 
Hunter's retrograde movement the appearance of a hurried flight, 
although even during the retreat the Federal soldiers lost no 
opportunity of damaging the railway as long as opportunity 
offered.* However, the troops were so exhausted by their forced 
marches and insufficient supply of food, that it was found impossible 
to utilise them for the defence of Washington when menaced by 
Early. 

When Early started from Cold Harbour for Lynchburg, Lee had 
suggested to him the possibility of marching down the Shenandoah 
Valley and threatening Washington. Such a move would perhaps 
cause Grant to detach a considerable force to the relief of the 
Capital, and would in any case force the Federal troops in West 
Virginia to abandon their plan of operations against Lynchburg, 
and evacuate the upper Valley. As Lynchburg was the third 
largest city in Virginia,^ an important railway centre, and also the 
chief depot of a fertile district, upon which Richmond largely 
depended for supplies, it was of great importance to the Con- 
federates that a Federal force should not be allowed to remain in 
the neighbourhood. But Hunter's retreat to the Kanawha some- 
what changed the situation : and it was left to Early's discretion 
whether under the altered circumstances he would carry out the 
suggested invasion of the North.^ Being of an adventurous tempera- 
ment, he determined to take immediate advantage of Hunter's 

^ For Hunter's reasons for selecting this line of retreat, see Pond, 38. 

''' Hunter expected to meet his supplies at Meadow Bluff, but the officer in charge of 
the depot, frightened by guerilla demonstrations, had fallen back to Gauley Bridge 
(Pond, 40), 3 Pond, 29. ''Pond, 38-9. 

* Richmond and Petersburg were the two largest cities in Virginia. 

« 4 15- & I^- 49.1- 



41 fi THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

evacuation of the Valley and push straight for the Potomac, The 
force, which was about to invade the North for the third time, con- 
sisted of four divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, and 
about forty guns, exclusive of a few pieces of horse artillery 
attached to the cavalry. Breckinridge was second in command, 
and two infantry divisions were placed under his orders : the other 
two divisions and the cavalry reported direct to Early. The whole 
Confederate force numbered about 17,000 mcn.^ 

Early's army reached Staunton (Map V.) on June 27th and 
Winchester on July 2nd. Sigel, who was posted at Martinsburg to 
protect the railway, made good his retreat across the Potomac in 
spite of Early's attempts to cut him off, and on the 4th took up a 
position on the impregnable Maryland Heights. The occupation 
of these heights prevented Early from carrying out his original 
plan of crossing the river at Harper's Ferry.^ On the 6th he 
crossed with two divisions at Shepherdstown, Breckinridge's 
command having passed the river in pursuit of Sigel on the previous 
day. After a fruitless demonstration against Maryland Heights, 
Early moved eastwards towards Frederick City (Map IV,), which 
he occupied on the 9th. Three miles beyond General Lew Wallace 
was holding the line of the Monocacy. His position was well 
chosen : for by holding Monocacy Junction he covered both the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railway and also the two turnpikes from 
Frederick City to Baltimore and Washington.^ But the force at 
his disposal was miserably inadequate to contend with the Con- 
federate army. When first he took up his position, he had only 
about 2,500 men, mainly provisional troops and hundred-days 
militia, under General Tyler, but on the 8th he began to be rein- 
forced by Ricketts' division of the 6th Corps, 3,350 strong, which 
Grant had sent from City Point to I^altimore. Grant for some 
time was under the impression that Early's Corps had returned to 
Richmond, and that the Washington authorities had nothing worse 
to fear than a plundering raid. But on July 5th he discovered that 
Early had not left the Valley, and directed that one division, to be 
followed if necessary by the rest of the 6th Army Corps, together 
with all the dismounted cavalry that Meade could lay his hands 
upon, should be sent north. The dismounted cavalry proved, 
however, of very little use, being mere disorganised details largely 
unfit for active service.* 

Having occupied TVederick City at dawn of the 9th, Early 
pushed forward at once to drive Wallace out of his path. The 
Federal general had placed Ricketts' division on the left, covering 
the Washington turnpike, and Tyler's division on the right, holding 

' Pond, 47. But Early only estimated his strength at I0,cxx) infantry and 2,000 
cavalry (4 B. & L., 493). 

2 I'ond, 49. * Pond, 55. * Pond, 54. 



July, i864l THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 417 

the railway bridge and the Baltimore turnpike. The Federals 
made a stout resistance, but with Early's superiority in numbers, 
and still more overwhelming superiority in artillery,^ there could 
be but one issue to the battle, and when Ricketts was in danger 
of being outflanked on the left by Gordon's division, which had 
crossed the river lower down, Wallace ordered a retreat along the 
Baltimore road. The Federal losses were nearly 2,000, falling 
chiefly upon Ricketts' division, which lost nearly half the force 
with which it went into battle. Early reported his own loss in 
killed and wounded as about 700.^ But judging from the number 
of wounded, over 400, whom he left behind in the hospitals at 
Frederick City to fall into the enemy's hands, it is possible that 
his loss was somewhat heavier. 

With the Washington road lying open before him, Early pushed 
forward at full speed through Rockville, and shortly after noon 
of the nth his leading division, under General Rodes, was deploy- 
ing a skirmish line within range of the artillery in the Washington 
forts. The rest of his army was all up about 6 p.m. But the men 
were exhausted with the long marches made on very dusty roads 
and by the great heat, and to attack that day was impossible.' 
About the same time that Early's troops began to appear before 
Washington, reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac also 
began to arrive. On the evening of the 9th the other two divisions 
of the 6th Corps left the lines before Petersburg for City Point. 
Reaching Washington on the afternoon of the nth, they found 
that some 800 men of Emory's division of the 19th Corps from 
New Orleans had just arrived, and that same night part of the 
6th Corps relieved the raw troops on the piquet line.* Early had 
concentrated most of his forces on the Seventh Street road facing 
Fort Stevens. The defences of Washington on that side con- 
sisted of detached forts connected by rifle pits, and so arranged 
that, if one fell into the hands of the enemy, it would be exposed 
to a cross-fire from its neighbours. Before the arrival of reinforce- 
ments the forces available for the defence of Washington amounted 
to 20,000. But only 9,600 of these formed the actual garrison, 
and nearly all the troops were either raw recruits or reservists.^ 

Early, from the prisoners whom he had captured on the 9th, 
knew that part of the 6th Corps had been fighting him on the 
Monocacy, and naturally imagined that the rest of the Corps had 
already reached Washington. In any case his troops were too 
exhausted to attack on the nth, and on the following day there 
was no chance of a successful assault after the arrival of veteran 

^ Wallace had only eight guns (Pond, 57). ^ Pond, 58-9. 

^ Early's own statement, quoted by Pond, 67. * Pond, 66-8. 

^ 4 B. & L., 498, note. How General Barnard makes up the total of over 20,000 is 
not easy to see. The figures given l)y him amount to only 17,000 at the most. 

2 E 



418 THE CIVIL WAR IS THE UNITED STATES 

reinforcements. Had Early immediately after crossing the Potomac 
pushed straight for Washington, instead of wasting precious time 
in demonstrating against Maryland Heights, he might have had 
just a chance of capturing Washington, But not arriving before 
the Capital till the nth, he wisely judged that any such attempt 
could not lead to permanent success, and might involve his whole 
army in utter destruction. There was some sharp skirmishing on 
the 1 2th in front of Fort Stevens, and one brigade of the 6th 
Corps moved out and drove back the Confederate piquet line. 
That evening Early withdrew through Rockville, and marching 
all night halted near Darnestown.^ It is hardly likely that Lee 
expected with so small a force to capture Washington.- 

The invasion of the North had had the effect of withdrawing 
a whole Corps from Grant's army, and had given both Washington 
and Baltimore a sudden fright. But it had failed to disorganise 
Grant's plans, though it made him all the more determined to 
regain and hold possession of the Shenandoah Valley, in order to 
prevent a repetition of the invasion. 

It had proved impossible to bring up Hunter's army in time to 
aid in the relief of Washington. Both in order to gain time and 
to give the exhausted soldiers some opportunity for rest, Hunter 
decided to transport his troops by water down the Kanawha 
(Map H.) and up the Ohio to Parkersburg, and thence by the Ohio 
and Baltimore Railway to Cumberland. But the rivers were very 
low and progress was slow. The troops were frequently obliged 
to leave the transports in order to get them over the shoals, and 
when the railway was reached, further delay was caused by the 
necessity of repairing the damage to the line, which Imboden's 
cavalry had done. It was not till July nth that Hunter's leading 
division reached Martinsburg.^ 

On the 13th Wright, with his two divisions of the 6th Corps, 
followed by Emory's division of the 19th Corps,* marched out from 
Washington in pursuit of Early (Map IV.). The Confederates 
had, however, got a good start, and on the morning of the 14th 

' Pond, 70. 

' According to Early (4 B. & L. , 492, note) Lee never expected him to do more than 
threaten Washington. Vet Early seems to have hoped to take by surprise the works 
defending Washington on the nth, and had determined to order an assault on the I2th, 
when during the night he heard that reinforcements from Grant had arrived. These 
consisted of the other two divisions of the 6th Corps and 800 men forming the advance 
guard of the 19th Corps. Grant thought that had Early arrived one day earlier he 
might have entered the city before the arrival of these reinforcements. But it seems 
certain that he could not have held the city against the fresh troops of the Army of the 
Potomac. Early ex])lained his delay on the Potomac by the necessity of either driving 
Sigel from, or "safely housing" him, in the fortifications on Maryland Heights. 

» Pond, 52. 

•• The 19th Corps had come from New Orleans to join the Army of the Potomac, but 
on reaching Hampton Roarls was hurried on without disembarking to Washington. 



July, 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 419 

crossed the Potomac at White's Ford and went into camp at Lees- 
burg. The evening of the same day Wright reached Poolesville, 
and the two armies remained watching each other on opposite 
banks of the Potomac till the morning of the i6th. Wright did 
not consider that he was strong enough to cross the river in the 
face of the enemy, until he had received definite information of 
Hunter's movements. 

The general tendency of the Washington Government at this 
time was to leave everything to Grant, who at City Point could 
not possibly have exact knowledge of the actual state of affairs on 
the Potomac, as it changed from day to day. Consequently no 
combined movement was made against Early, who on the i6th 
left Leesburg and marched to Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps in the 
Blue Ridge (Map V.). Grant, though at first eager that an 
attempt should be made to cut off Early from retreating south, 
quickly realised that in all probability Early would make good his 
escape. Accordingly he wrote to Halleck to the effect that 
Wright, to whom by his orders had been given the command of 
all the troops engaged in the pursuit of Early, should be sent 
back to City Point with the 6th and 19th Corps, as soon as it was 
plain that the Confederates were really retreating. He also 
suggested that Hunter should move up the Valley with the view 
of either preventing Early from returning to Richmond, or in case 
Lee judged it expedient to withdraw Early in consequence of the 
return of Wright's force to the Army of the Potomac, of advanc- 
ing against Charlottesville and Gordonsville and getting possession 
of the railroad between these two places. The knowledge that 
Grant wanted him back as quickly as possible may have caused 
Wright to press the pursuit with less vigour than he would other- 
wise have shown. 

Hunter left Martinsburg on the 13th, and the following day 
moved part of his troops across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, 
but on the same night received directions from Wright, that he 
should join him at Leesburg. The next morning he despatched 
a force of about 9,000 infantry and cavalry back across the Potomac. 
It seems plain that with properly concerted action Wright, who had 
under his immediate command some 15,000 men, whilst Ricketts 
with 5,000 more troops was hurrying from Baltimore to join him, 
as well as Hunter's force of 9,000 men, ought to have succeeded in 
seriously embarrassing Early's retreat. I3ut Wright and Hunter 
did not join hands till the i6th, by which time Early was already 
across the Blue Ridge. Crook had now arrived to take command 
of Hunter's field force, and by Wright's orders advanced part of 
his troops to Snicker's Gap. 

On the 1 8th Early was at Berryville, holding the fords of the 
Shenandoah, On that day one of Crook's divisions crossed that 



420 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

river, but was driven back again by the overwhelming force which 
Early brought against it. On the 19th Early abandoned the line 
of the Shenandoah in consequence of a movement of Averell's 
cavalry, supported by one infantry brigade from Harper's Ferry, 
which cut his line of retreat to Winchester and threatened his 
trains. The Confederate army moved to the east of Winchester, 
and then marched towards Strasburg. 

Wright crossed the Shenandoah on the 20th, and seemed at first 
inclined to press on in pursuit, but being hampered by Grant's 
expressed desire to have him back again as soon as possible at City 
Point, and considering that he had sufficiently verified the fact of 
Karl)''s retreat, recrossed the river on the same day and returned 
to Leesburg. In the meantime, Early had sent Ramseur's division 
to Winchester to hold Averell in check ; but the Confederate 
division was suddenly attacked by Averell and driven back with the 
loss of four guns. Early, therefore, sent back Rodes' division to 
cover Ramseur's retreat ; and on the 22nd the Confederate army 
was concentrated at Strasburg, and on the same day Averell, 
marching through Winchester to Kernstown, was joined by Crook 
from Berryville.^ 

On the 23rd orders were received by Halleck from Grant, 
directing that the 6th Corps should be immediately returned to 
him, but that the 19th Corps might be retained at Washington. 
Grant in giving these orders acted upon the supposition that Lee 
would follow the precedent of 1S62, when he summoned Jackson 
from the Valle}', and would recall Early. But Lee, not considering 
that Early's presence was imperatively called for at Richmond, 
preferred to leave him in the Valley, where he constituted a stand- 
ing menace to Maryland and PennsN-lvania, and would also be useful 
in protecting the gathering in o( the harvest. 

As soon as Early learnt that Wright's Corps was returning 
towards Washington, he determined to resume the offensive, and 
on the 23rd moved out to attack Crook and Averell at Kernstown. 
On the following day he drove Crook's army back through 
Winchester to Bunker Hill, and on the 26th Crook retreated across 
the Potomac, and by Hunter's orders took up his position at 
Sharpsburg to hold the Gaps in the South Mountain. Early again 
found himself undisputed master of the Valley.- 

With his infantry he proceeded to break up the railroad at 
Martinsburg, whilst he sent his cavalry on a plundering raid 
across the Potomac. McCausland, who commanded two brigades, 
was instructed first to move on Chambersburg, and, unless 
it consented to pay the ransom demanded, to burn it to the 
ground : then to move against Cumlierland and repeat the same 

• For the oi->crations in connection with Early's retreat to Str.isburg, see Tond, 
Cap. V. ' Ponil, 96-100. 



July, 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 421 

process, and at the same time destroy the machinery of the coal- 
pits there. 

McCausland crossed the Potomac on the 29th, occupied 
Chambersburg on the 30th, and, as the ransom demanded^ was 
not forthcoming, set it on fire. Averell's cavalry had started in 
pursuit of the raiders, and McCausland withdrew to the Potomac, 
which he reached on the 31st at Hancock. Being attacked there 
by Averell, he rode westward, and on August ist appeared before 
Cumberland, where, however, he encountered a Federal force 
under Kelley. Finding himself in danger of being caught between 
two fires, he drew off to the east and crossed the Potomac at 
Old Town, near the junction of the South Branch. Failing in 
an attempt on August 4th to capture the railway post at New 
Creek, he withdrew to Moorefield. But on the 7th Averell, who 
had steadily followed in pursuit, suddenly dashed in upon him 
and routed his command, capturing all his guns and over 400 
prisoners. 2 

The news of Crook's defeat at Kernstown caused the 6th Corps 
to be sent back to Harper's Ferry, and Grant despatched 4,600 
more men of the 19th Corps to Washington,^ at the same time in- 
sisting that someone in Washington must undertake the control of 
the troops on the line of the Potomac, in order to deal with sudden 
emergencies. On July 29th the 6th Corps was at Halltown cover- 
ing Harper's Ferry, and on the same day was joined by Crook's 
command. The news of McCausland's raid across the Potomac 
caused the united force to be withdrawn across the river to hold 
the line of the Monocacy at Frederick City, whither Emory's 
division of the 19th Corps was also sent. 

Grant was quite determined that Early's force must either be 
crushed or driven southward, and in the latter case, in order to 
prevent the Shenandoah Valley from serving again as an avenue, 
by which a Confederate force might invade the North, that the 
Valley must be systematically devastated, so that an army could 
no longer live off the country.^ To ensure his object the first step 
was to put an end to the system, by which a multiplicity of Depart- 
mental commanders were operating more or less independently 
against a single united command, and concentrate all the Federal 
forces available for field operations in the hands of some one 
reliable officer. He had already written to Halleck on July i8th, 

^ The ransom demanded was 500,000 dollars in currency, or 100,000 in gold 
(Pond, 102). ''' Pond, 106. ^ Pond, 99. 

* As the Shenandoah Valley has a general direction from south-west to north-east, it 
was of great importance to the Confederates as affording a line of advance for an in- 
vasion of the North. But it was of comparatively little value to the Federals, as any 
movement up it would lead away from Richmond. Therefore it would be a clear gain 
to the Federals to devastate it so thoroughly that no army could find subsistence there 
(4 B. & L., 500). 



i22 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

suggesting the advisability of merging the Departments of West 
Virginia, of the Susquehanna, of Washington, and the Middle 
Department^ into one, and of calling to the chief command of the 
forces in these different Departments General Franklin.^ 

This suggestion, however, by no means found favour in the eyes 
of the Washington authorities. Franklin was still regarded by 
them as responsible for Burnside's disaster at Fredericksburg, in 
December, 1862 ; nor did the degradation of the Departments into 
mere districts, which must necessarily follow upon their being 
merged into one Department, commend itself to them. 

Grant's next proposal was that the dignity of the Departmental 
commanders might be preserved by creating a single Military 
Division to include the four Departments in question, just as the 
Military Division of the Mississippi had been created for him in 
1863, and that General Meade should be assigned to the com- 
mand.-^ But as this suggestion met with no response, he directed 
Sheridan to report for temporary duty to Hallcck, asking the Chief 
of the Staff, unless Hunter should himself take the field in person, 
to place Sheridan in command of the field forces. Grant had 
already ordered Torbert's division of cavalry to Washington ; and, 
on Sheridan's request that more cavalry might be sent, as the 
country in the Valley and on the Potomac line was much more 
favourable for cavalry operations than the neighbourhood of Rich- 
mond, he promptly despatched Wilson's division. 

On August 4th the Commander-in-Chief himself left City Point 
and hastened to Frederick City to hold a conference with Hunter. 
As a result orders were issued on the 5th that the 6th, 19th, and 
8th* Corps should concentrate at Halltown : that Early's force 
was to be followed wherever it went, and that if only a small 
portion of it had gone north, then Hunter should move up the 
Valley and destroy all the provisions and forage which his army 
did not require for its own consumption.^ 

On the 7th a further order was issued, constituting the Middle 
Military Division to consist of the four Departments already 
named and appointing Sheridan to the temporary command of 
the new Division. During the conference at P^rederick City Grant 
had expressed his wish that Sheridan should have command of 
the forces operating in the field, and Hunter readily falling in with 

^ This Department included Delaware and a part of Maryland. 

'^ Grant had a hi^h opinion of Franklin, and would have been glad to have him 
in command of the right wing of the army, besieging Peterslnirg (4 B. & L., 106, note). 
Franklin had commanded the 19th Corps in the Red River expedition, until he was 
wounded. 

' Grant proposed that Hancock should succeed Meade in command of the Army of 
the Potomac, and that Gibbon should be appfiinted to command the 2nd Corps. 

* The 8th Corps, also called the Army of West Virginia, was commanded by Crook. 

' Pund, 117-18. 



Aug. 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 423 

his wishes, had declared his wilh'ngness to be reh'eved entirely of 
command.^ 

Philip H. Sheridan, who has now assigned to conduct the 
operations in the Shenandoah Valley, was born in 1831. He 
graduated at West Point in the class of 1853,^ standing thirty- 
fourth in a total of fifty-two, and received a commission in the 
infantry. He served in Texas and California and Oregon, and 
had a considerable experience of Indian warfare. The outbreak 
of the Civil War accelerated the rate of promotion, and when 
ordered east in September, 1861, he had just been made a captain. 
In the war itself, in which his earlier service was with the Western 
armies, he had won his laurels as commander of an infantry 
division in the Army of the Cumberland. His division played an 
important part in the battles of Murfreesborough and Chattanooga, 
and he had since increased his fame as chief of the cavalry in the 
Army of the Potomac. But his military genius and qualifications 
to be regarded as a great leader of men had not yet been revealed 
in their fulness. 

The Army of the Shenandoah, as it was officially designated by 
Sheridan, consisted of three infantry Corps, the 6th under Wright, 
the 19th under Emory, and the 8th under Crook, and the three 
cavalry divisions of Torbert, Wilson, and Averell. At the 
moment when Sheridan assumed the command the larger part 
of the second division of the 19th Corps had not yet arrived, and 
both Wilson's and Averell's cavalry divisions were still absent.^ 
One of his first actions as an army commander was to form the 
cavalry divisions into a Corps, to the command of which Torbert 
was assigned, being succeeded by Merritt in the command of his 
division. 

On the loth Sheridan moved from Halltown towards Winchester. 
The first day's march placed him in a strong defensive position 
reaching from Clifton to Berryville and covering Snicker's Gap. 
The next day he pushed forward towards the Opequon. Early 
had moved from Bunker Hill on the 4th, and crossed the Potomac 
the following day. His object was to gather in the corn on the 
farms near Sharpsburg, to cover McCausland's retreat from Mary- 
land, and to mystify the Federal commander. But on the 6th he 
hastily withdrew to Martinsburg, probably in consequence of the 
concentration of the Federal army at Halltown.* When Sheridan 
commenced his movement against Winchester, Early fell back to 

* Pond, 120. Sheridan was only appointed to the temporary command, because 
Secretary Stanton opposed his permanent appointment on the ground that he was too 
young for such an important post (4 B. & L., 501). 

- Sheridan entered West Point in 1848, and would have graduated in the natural 
course of events in 1852, but he was condemned to lose a year's seniority for a serious 
breach of military discipline (i Sheridan, 11-13). 

^ Pond, 121 (note). * Pond, 119. 



4?>1. TIIK ClMl, WAU IN THE UNITED STATES 

cover the threatened town. lUit he had m^ intention of fif^hting 
for its protection. He knew that his adversary had been rein- 
forced, whilst his own reinforcements, which Lee had despatched 
from Richmond, were still on their way. His obvious policy was 
to fall back beyond Strasburg, where the reinforcements could 
join him by way of Chester Gap and I'^-ont Royal. 

Accordingly on the nth he continued his retreat through 
Winchester, and on the evening of the I2th took up a very 
strong position at Fisher's Hill, two miles south of Strasburg, 
with his right flank resting on the North Fork of the Shenandoah 
and his left stretching towards Little North Mountain. ^ 

Sheridan on the same night halted on the left bank of Cedar 
Creek just north of Strasburg. Conflicting reports were at this 
time reaching him as to the strength of his opponent. On the one 
hand, Grant from before Petersburg was assuring him that no 
troops at all had been detached from Lee's Army to the Valley : 
on the other hand, he was informed on good authority that a 
strong force was on its way from Richmond. 

The uncertainty ended on the 14th, when a staff officer arrived 
in hot haste, bearing a despatch from Washington, in which it was 
stated, on Grant's authority, that two infantry divisions, some 
cavalry, and twenty guns had been sent to join Early." As a 
matter of fact the reinforcements consisted of one infantry divi- 
sion, Kershaw's of the ist Corps, one c.ivalry division under 
Fit/hugh Lee, and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery. This force was 
commruuled by R. H. Anderson, the commander of the 1st Corps, 
and his presence with it caused its strength to be exaggerated, a 
fact on which Lee had probably counted. 

It was now Sheridan's turn to retreat. It was now his rein- 
forcements which were on their way, whereas those of his 
adversary were close at hand. Accordingly he determined to fall 
back to the Clifton-Berryville line, where he would cover Snicker's 
Gap, through which his reinforcements were expected. He gained 
this position on the night of the 17th, but the activity of the 
enemy in assaulting his rearguard in Winchester caused him to 
fall back to a more compact line of defence at Charlestown.^ 

In his retreat down the Valley Sheridan had laid waste the 
country between Strasburg and Winchester. North of Win- 
chester, however, the country had not been devastated, and Early's 
great object was to hold a position where he could supply him- 
self with food and forage, and also prevent any repairs being 
made on the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.' He moved his own 
troops to Bunker Hill, whilst Anderson with his forces guarded 
Winchester. An attempt to make a combined movement on the 
2 1st against the Federal position, though it nailed from want of 
' Vow\, 125. '^ ron.l, 127. ' l\>iul, 131. ■* ruiul, 133. 



Aug., 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 425 

concerted action, decided Sheridan to fall still further back, and he 
retired to Halltown, where with his flanks guarded by the Potomac 
and Shenandoah, and within range of the guns of Harper's Ferry, 
he held a position practically impregnable.^ 

On the 25th Early, finding that Sheridan's position was too 
strong to attack, left Anderson with Kershaw's division, Cutshaw's 
artillery battalion, and a cavalry force to watch the Federal lines 
at Halltown, and himself moved with his four divisions towards 
Shepherdstown, whilst Fitzhugh Lee, with the bulk of his cavalry, 
started to cross the Potomac at Williamsport." The object of this 
movement was to keep before the eyes of the Washington 
Government the possibility of another invasion of Pennsylvania 
and Maryland. 

Sheridan despatched Wilson's cavalry division across the Poto- 
mac to hold the South Mountain Gaps ; and Fitzhugh Lee, on 
finding that the fords in the neighbourhood of Williamsport were 
held by Averell's cavalry, drew off towards Shepherdstown.^ 
Early, recognising that it was impossible to attack Sheridan in 
his present position with any hope of success, and that it was 
too dangerous a step to invade the North, when there were 
three cavalry divisions ready to operate against his trains, de- 
termined to withdraw to his old position at Bunker Hill west of 
the Opequon. 

As soon as Early fell back, Sheridan in his turn moved forward 
to reoccupy his old position on the Clifton-Berryville line, where 
he was able to menace Early's line of retreat through Winchester. 

On September 3rd he was in position, and on that day Anderson's 
command, which was returning to Richmond, blundered in upon 
the Federal left. A short encounter, terminated by the speedy 
approach of night, ensued between the Confederates and the 
8th Corps. Anderson was obliged to return to Richmond by 
a different route, crossing the Blue Ridge higher up at Chester 
Gap. 

As Grant had foreseen, the steady pressure which the Armies 
of the Potomac and James were keeping up against Lee in 
Richmond was bound sooner or later to necessitate the recall 
of some portion of the troops in the Valley. During August 
the Federals had both gained ground on the north bank of the 
James and established themselves on the Weldon railroad. Lee 
judged it necessary to recall Anderson, before Grant should stretch 
his lines further west and menace the Southside railway. Anderson 
took back with him Kershaw's infantry and Cutshaw's artillery, 
leaving Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry with Early. 

Anderson's departure, which took place finally on September 14th, 
restored to Sheridan the numerical superiority. As soon as he 

^ Pond, 135. - Pond, 137. ^ Pond, 139. 



426 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

found that Lee was reinforcing Early in August, he had resolved 
to stand strictly on the defensive until Grant's pressure upon 
Richmond should compel the recall of the Confederate reinforce- 
ments. Therefore he had fallen back from Cedar Creek to Berry- 
ville, to Charlestovvn, and finally to Halltovvn. He had refused 
to be drawn from his strong position by Early's threat of crossing 
the Potomac. 

Grant thoroughly agreed with his lieutenant's policy. Halleck 
was not, however, so well satisfied. Early, at Bunker Hill, effectu- 
ally closed the railway and the Ohio and Chesapeake Canal. For 
as often as the Federal cavalry approached the railway at Martins- 
burg Early marched out with a powerful infantry force and drove 
them off. Upon the canal both Washington and Baltimore largely 
depended for their coal-supply. The gas companies and the 
railway company were demanding of Halleck that Early should be 
driven south.^ So strong had become the feeling in the Capital 
that Grant left City Point and hurried to Sheridan to see what 
could be done to satisfy public opinion. He arrived just after 
Anderson's departure, and found Sheridan preparing to strike. 
He had brought with him a plan of campaign, but was so satisfied 
with Sheridan's that he did not even mention his own to him. 
As a result of the conference he gave his instructions in two words, 
" Go in."2 

Sheridan " went in " with the rapidity and vigour which are the 
characteristics of a plan thoroughly digested and complete in every 
detail. Early's mistaken policy made his task comparatively easy. 
Instead of retiring south of Strasburg to the strong defensive 
position of Fisher's Hill, a movement which prudence imperatively 
demanded as the corollary of Anderson's departure from the 
Valley, the Confederate general remained with the rest of his forces 
at Stephenson's Depot, about six miles north of Winchester. 

Sheridan's original plan was to move south of Winchester to 
Newtown and force his adversary to battle by striking at his line 
of retreat. But on the 17th Early moved out from his camp with 
two infantry divisions and advanced towards IMartinsburg to drive 
off Averell's cavalry, who had again appeared on the railway.^ He 
was so impressed with the importance of preventing the railroad 
being put into working order that he lost sight of all other 
considerations, and deliberately divided his forces, when a hostile 
army considerably stronger than his own was close at hand. He 

» Pon.l, 150 (iK.tc). ■■' I'l'nJ, 151. 

* Early uiarchei-l on the 17th, with Rodes' an<l Cionlon's divisions, to Bunker Ilill, 
and on the 1 8th cuntinuetl on to Martinshuri; witli Gordon's division. Having driven 
off Averell, he returned the same night to Bunker Hill, where he left Gordon, with orders 
to march to Stephenson's Dep6t next morning. Rodes started to return on the night of 
the 18th. 



Sept. 19, 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 427 

underestimated his younger opponent, and misconstrued his retreat 
down the Valley and subsequent inactivity as the signs of feeble 
generalship and a halting policy.^ He was destined to be terribly 
undeceived. 

Sheridan, finding that his opponent was playing into his hands, 
determined to march straight on Winchester, in the hope of 
annihilating the two divisions under Ramseur and Breckinridge, 
which were posted near the town and at Stephenson's Depot. At 
3 a.m. on the 19th the Federal army advanced. Wilson's cavalry 
division led the way along the Berryville Pike. His orders were 
to cross the Opequon, which was about six miles distant, and 
make a dash to secure the defile, through which the turnpike runs 
for two miles after crossing the Creek, so as to clear the way 
for the 6th and 19th Corps, which were to follow. The 8th Corps 
was to remain at the crossing of the river in reserve. Torbert, 
with Merritt's cavalry division, was to cross the Opequon by a ford 
further down and push forward so as to connect with Averell's 
division, which was expected to move down the Martinsburg 
Pike. 

Wilson carried out his task admirably, dashing through the 
defile and capturing a breastwork at the southern end of it about 
5 a.m. The two infantry Corps were, however, greatly delayed in 
getting through the defile,^ and it was almost noon before Wright 
got them deployed in line of battle, the 6th Corps on either side of 
the Berryville Pike, the 19th Corps to the right, and Wilson's 
cavalry on the left. 

This unavoidable delay frustrated Sheridan's plan of crushing 
his opponent in detail ; for before the Federal line of battle was 
formed, Rodes' and Gordon's divisions, which Early had taken 
with him on the 17th, reached the field. Consequently Sheridan 
found himself called upon to fight the whole of Early's army, but 
he was fully equal to the task. When Wright attacked shortly 
before noon, the three Confederate divisions, though making an 
obstinate resistance, were forced back. The Berryville Pike, along 
which the 6th Corps was advancing, bears somewhat to the left, 
and as the Federals pressed forward, the gap between the right of 
the 6th and the left of the 19th Corps widened. Into this gap one 
of Rodes' brigades, which had just reached the field, was thrown, 
and being supported by Rodes on the right with the rest of his 
division, and by Gordon on the left, threw the 19th Corps^ and 

^ "The events of the last month had satisfied me tliat the commander opposed to me 
was without enterprise and possessed an excessive caution which amounted to timidity " 
(4B. &L., 522). 

^ The 19th Corps was delayed by the guns and trains of the 6th Corps, which were 
preceding it (4 B. & L., 507). 

^ Only one division — Grover's— of the 19th Corps was thrown into confusion, the 
other — Dwight's — being in reserve (2 Sheridan, 23). 



428 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Ricketts' division of the 6th into considerable confusion, and com- 
pelled the whole Federal line to fall back towards the line on 
which they had deployed before attacking. For a moment tlie 
issue of the battle hung in the balance. But Russell's division of 
the 6th Corps, which had been hitherto held in reserve, was put in, 
and the lost ground recovered, the Confederates being forced back 
to the woods from which they had charged. In this encounter 
both Rodes and Russell were killed. 

A brief lull now followed on this part of the field. But else- 
where the Federal cavalry and Crook's Corps were operating with 
deadly effect. Sheridan had at first intended to move Crook to 
the left, so as to cut off the Confederate retreat south of Win- 
chester, but he now ordered him to the right to support Emory. 
Torbert, after crossing the Opequon, found himself confronted by 
Wharton's division, which, under the personal direction of Breckin- 
ridge, had advanced from Stephenson's Depot to meet him. 
Averell in the meanwhile had moved along the Martinsburg Pike, 
driving before him two brigades of Lomax's cavalry all the way 
from Darksville, whither they had fallen back the previous day 
from Martinsburg. Against the combined cavalry attack Breckin- 
ridge was forced to fall back, and with difficulty extricated his 
division, which he succeeded in bringing into Winchester about 
2 p.m.^ 

Early's position had now become one of great peril ; in front a 
superior infantry force was steadily pushing his troops back, whilst 
on both flanks the Federal cavalry were advancing. In order to 
prevent Wilson from gaining possession of the Valley turnpike, 
and so cutting his line of retreat, Early was forced to detach from 
the cavalry on his left, which were already overmatched by 
Torbert's two divisions. The Confederates made their final stand 
about 5 p.m. behind a line of breastworks a mile to the north of 
Winchester. At the same moment that Wright's and Crook's 
infantry advanced to the charge, Torbert's two divisions with 
drawn sabres bore down upon the left Hank of Early's doomed 
army. The Confederates broke and fled, were "sent whirling" 
through Winchester, leaving five guns on the battlefield. 

The Federal infantry, who had been marching and fighting since 
the early hours of the morning, were too exhausted to press the 
pursuit, but Wilson's cavalry followed the flying foe along the pike 
to Kernstown.- Ramseur's division had, however, preserved its 
organisation and effectually covered the retreat, and at lo p.m. the 
pursuit was abandoned. The Federal loss amounted to about 
5,ooo, and Early's losses nearly reached 4,000. The Confederate 

' Pond, 165. Averell's cavalry, moving iluwn llie Martinsburg road, came into the 
rear of the infantry who were facing Torbert, and forced them to abandon their position. 
^ Pond, 167. 



Sept., 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 429 

loss was considerably the greater in proportion to the actual 
strength of the two armies. For Sheridan put into the field about 
25,000 men to Early's 17,000.^ Though the number of troops en- 
gaged was not large, yet the victory was a decisive one. The 
lower Valley was definitely secured to the Federals. All danger 
of another invasion of the North vanished. Early's army had 
been badly beaten, and was thoroughly demoralised, as was shown 
at Fisher's Hill three days later. In recognition of his victory 
Sheridan was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General in the 
regular army, and assigned to the permanent command of the 
Middle Division. 

On the following day Early withdrew to Fisher's Hill, two 
miles south of Strasburg. The position which he took up was as 
strong as any that could be found in the Valley. The sudden up- 
rising of the Massanutton chain there narrows the Valley to a 
width of four miles. The right flank of the Confederates rested on 
the North Fork of the Shenandoah, which washes the western face 
of the Massanuttons. Along the front of Early's line ran Tumb- 
ling Run, a tributary of the North Fork, whilst the left was 
extended across the Valley to the foot of Little North Mountain. 
Fisher's Hill itself was a precipitous bluff overhanging Tumbling 
Run, and, strengthened by artificial works, was impregnable to 
a frontal attack.^ Earthworks had been thrown up across the 
Valley westwards, and artillery placed in position behind them. 
The only way in which the Confederate lines could be broken was 
by a flank movement against their left. 

On the night of the 20th Sheridan's army arrived in front of 
Strasburg. Next day the infantry was being put in position, and 
the Confederates were driven from a ridge of high ground running 
along the north bank of Tumbling Run. Sheridan's intention was 
to repeat the movement which had been so successful on the 19th, 
and turn the Confederate left. For this purpose the 8th Corps 
was held back out of sight, and on the 22nd marched under cover 
of the thick wood to and along the foot of Little North Mountain 
until it had reached a position from which an attack could be 
made on the Confederate left rear, and their line of earthworks 
taken in reverse. In the meanwhile the 6th Corps and Averell's 
cavalry were demonstrating against the enemy's front. Torbert 
had already been sent through the Luray Valley to try and cross 
the Massanuttons in Early's rear and thus intercept his retreat. 

^ For the losses of the two sides, see Pond, 168-70. The estimate given in the text 
of the Federal strength is taken from 2 Keifer, 109 ; of the Confederate, from Pond, 
266. Early estimated his own strength at about 8,500 infantry and 3,000 cavalry 
(Swinton, 558). The "field returns" of Sheridan's army, however, give the Federal 
strength at considerably over 40,000. 

^ So secure did Early feel himself that the ammunition chests were taken from the 
caissons and placed behind the breastworks (2 Sheridan, 34). 



430 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Early was completely deceived as to Sheridan's plan of attack. 
He imagined that the main assault was about to be made by the 
6th Corps against his left centre, and so completely had he lost 
confidence in his troops after their severe defeat on the 19th, that 
in spite of the strength of his position he gave orders for a retreat 
to be commenced after dark.^ Suddenly, but a short time before 
sunset, Crook's Corps rushed from its place of concealment against 
the left flank. The troops in that part of the Confederate line 
were dismounted cavalry. Taken in reverse, they broke and fled. 
As the Confederate infantry divisions tried to change front to the 
left to meet Crook's advance, the other two Federal Corps rushed 
to the attack.2 The Confederates fled in great confusion. In the 
flight all organisation was lost. Sixteen guns became the spoil of 
the victors, though Early managed to save his trains. 

The Federals pursued throughout the night as far as Woodstock. 
Sheridan's attempt to cut off Early's retreat with Torbert's cavalry 
was frustrated by the resistance of a Confederate cavalry force, 
which held a very strong position at Milford, and caused the 
Federals to fall back towards Front Royal.^ On the right 
Averell's cavalry, instead of taking part in the pursuit, went into 
camp at dark, and did not reach Woodstock till after the infantry. 
On this account, and for similar conduct on the 23rd, Sheridan 
relieved Averell and assigned Powell to the command of his 
division. Sheridan's loss in this battle was only about 400 ; 
Early's can hardly have fallen short of 1,400, the larger part 
of whom were prisoners,* 

This second defeat, following so close upon the first, for the time 
being destroyed Early's army as a fighting force. The upper 
Valley lay at Sheridan's mercy. For Early, after hurrying through 
Newmarket with Sheridan close upon his heels, left the Valley 
turnpike and turned off to the east by a cross-road leading to 
Port Republic. He thus left the road open to Harrisonburg and 
Staunton. Ikit he hoped by taking this route to form a junction 
with Kershaw's division, which Lee had ordered to return to the 
Valley on hearing of Early's defeat at Winchester. 

On the 25th Early passed through Port Republic and took up 
a position covering Brown's Gap, where he was joined by Wickham's 
two cavalry brigades, which had fallen back from the Luray Valley 
after the defeat at Fisher's Hill, and by Lomax's cavalry, which 

' 4 B. & L., 524. 

' As soon as Crook broke the Confederate left the other two Corps made a wheel half- 
left. This movement was commenced by Rickett's division and taken up from right to 
left throughout the Federal line (Sheridan, ii. 3S-8). 

^ This Confederate force consisted of two brigades under the command of Wickliam, 
who had succeeded Fitzhugh Lee in the command of his division after the latter had 
been wounded in the battle of the 19th. 

* Pond, iSo. In 4 B. & L., 524 (note), Sheridan's loss is stated at 528. 



Sept.,i864] the SHENANDOAH VALLEY 431 

had been driven along the Valley turnpike to Harrisonburg. On 
the 26th he was joined by Kershaw's infantry division. 

On the 25th Sheridan pushed the 6th and 19th Corps on to 
Harrisonburg, whilst the 8th remained in reserve at the junction 
of the Valley turnpike and the Port Republic road. Merritt was 
sent to Port Republic to keep an eye on Early, and draw attention 
away from Torbert, who with a larger force was directed against 
Staunton and Waynesboro to destroy the Virginia Central railway 
bridge over the South river at the latter place.^ 

When news reached Early of Torbert's movement, he left Port 
Republic, whither he had advanced on the 27th after receiving 
Kershaw's reinforcement, on the 28th and hurried his army towards 
Rockfish Gap to prevent Torbert destroying the railway tunnel 
through the Blue Ridge. Torbert was engaged in destroying the 
railway bridge at Waynesboro, when Early's whole army moved 
against him. He withdrew his forces and returned on the 29th to 
Bridgewater on the North river. 

Sheridan's plan of campaign had been brilliantly successful. 
He had administered to his opponent two crushing defeats, and 
driven him almost entirely out of the Valley. But his remarkable 
success did not blind him to the limitations of his plan. His swift 
advance up the Valley was after all only a raid. His idea now was 
to devastate the upper Valley so thoroughly that no Confederate 
army could henceforth draw any supplies from it, and, after 
leaving a sufficient force in the Valley to hold in check guerilla 
leaders of the type of Mosby, to detach the bulk of his army to 
assist in Grant's operations against Petersburg. He had sent his 
cavalry to destroy all crops, forage, and supplies of all sorts 
between Harrisonburg on the north, and Staunton and Piedmont 
on the south and east. 

Grant, however, was still anxious that an advance should be 
made against the Virginia Central Railway between Charlottesville 
and Gordonsville. He considered that such a movement against 
the railroad and the James Canal would be a fitting termination 
to the Valley campaign. Orders were sent to Halleck that a 
railway should be repaired to serve as a line of supplies to 
Sheridan in the contemplated movement, and it was left to 
Sheridan to decide whether he would rather have the Manassas 
Gap or the Alexandria and Orange Railroad repaired. 

Sheridan, however, held that his campaign should end with the 
devastation of the Valley. He declared that it would be im- 
possible, either to move through the Blue Ridge against Gordons- 
ville and Charlottesville, or to advance still further up the Valley 
against Lynchburg, owing to the lack of supplies and want of 
transport for his army. He regarded the plan of repairing a rail- 

* Pond, 190. 



432 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

way as premature, and considered that a large force would have to 
be drawn off to protect the line under repair, which might be much 
more advantageously used elsewhere. He proposed to hold the 
lower Valley with Crook's Corps and send the 6th, the 19th, and a 
cavalry division to Grant. The Commander-in-Chief wisely left 
the final decision to the " man on the spot," and on October 3rd 
wrote to Sheridan, authorising him to carry out his plan. 

On the morning of October 6th Sheridan began to withdraw his 
troops from Harrisonburg and marched back down the Valley, 
devastating it as he went from one mountain barrier to the other. 
Two thousand barns and seventy mills were destroyed, and a great 
number of cattle and sheep driven away or killed for the use of the 
troops.^ 

On the 8th the Federal army reached Strasburg. Early had on 
October ist marched across from Waynesboro to Mount Sidney 
on the Valley turnpike, and taken up a position about half-way 
between Staunton and Harrisonburg.- The cavalry piquets of the 
two armies were confronting each other on opposite banks of the 
North river. Defeat had only served to fire Early's aggressive 
temper, and, having under his command with Kershaw's reinforce- 
ments a stronger force than he had had since his defeat on the 
Opequon, he was determined to try conclusions once more with 
Sheridan. He was only waiting for the arrival of Rosser's cavalry 
brigade, which, as he was informed by General Lee, was on its 
way from Petersburg to join him. 

The expected reinforcement arrived on October 5th, and Early 
was preparing to move on Harrisonburg, when he learnt that 
Sheridan was falling back down the Valley. He immediately 
started in pursuit, and on the 7th entered Newmarket. His cavalry 
pressed on after the retiring Federals. Rosser, who had relieved 
Wickham of the command of Fitzhugh Lee's division, followed in 
pursuit along the roads to the west of the Valley turnpike, whilst 
Lomax pushed forward on the turnpike. 

.Sheridan, annoyed at the pressure of the Confederate cavalry 
and wishing to read Rosser a much-needed lesson, ordered Torbert 
to move out on the 9th and fight the pursuing force. The superi- 
ority of the Federal cavalry quickly made itself felt. Custer, who 
had succeeded to the command of Wilson's division, drove Rosser 
before him, whilst Merritt chased Lomax up the Valley turnpike. 
The Federals pursued the flying foe for twenty-six miles, captured 
eleven guns and over 300 prisoners. This cavalry affair is known 
as the battle of Tom's Brook, or the Woodstock Races, owing to 
the precipitancy of the Confederate flight.^ 

The sudden reverse put an end to Rosser's claims to be con- 
sidered " the Saviour of the Valley," the title which the Southern 

' Toncl, 199. " l\.ini\, 194. ' 2 Sheridan, 56-9. 



Oct., i864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 433 

Press was already conferring upon him, and convinced Early of 
the vvorthlessness of his cavalry in comparison with the Federal 
squadrons. Throughout the campaign the Confederate cavalry 
had suffered a succession of reverses, commencing with the rout of 
McCausIand's command at Moorefield. The defeats both at Win- 
chester and Fisher's Hill had been mainly due to the weakness of 
the cavalry, who were holding the left wing in either battle ; and 
now the new commander, from whom so much was expected, had 
proved no more successful than his predecessors. 

On the loth Sheridan withdrew across Cedar Creek, and the 6th 
Corps was sent to Front Royal en route to Washington. Halleck, 
with Grant's approval, had ordered the Manassas Gap railroad to 
be repaired when Sheridan had made it plain that he was opposed 
to any advance through the Blue Ridge against the Charlottesville 
and Gordonsville line. It had been put into working order as far 
as Piedmont, within fifteen miles of P'ront Royal. Halleck wished 
the 6th Corps to march to Piedmont and take the train there to 
Washington. But Sheridan decided instead to march the 6th 
Corps to Washington as a real saving of time. At the same time 
he directed General Augur, who was in charge of the troops guard- 
ing the railway, to fall back from that line — an order which, if 
carried out, involved the suspension of the work on the railroad. 

But both Halleck and Stanton were very anxious that the rail- 
road should be repaired, because they thought that its completion 
would be a proof of the permanent occupation of the Lower Valley, 
and urged Sheridan to come to Washington to confer upon the 
points at issue. Grant was still hankering after an advance against 
the Virginia Central Railway between Gordonsville and Charlottes- 
ville, and though on October 3rd he had accepted Sheridan's argu- 
ments against any such movement, yet eight days later he was 
urging that Sheridan should take up as advanced a position as 
possible toward the Virginia Central Railway, and hold himself in 
readiness to move against it as soon as the enemy showed any 
signs of a diminution of force in that direction.^ 

A complete change in the military situation was produced by 
Early, who on the 13th, hearing that Sheridan was preparing to 
detach troops to Grant's assistance, broke up his camp at New- 
market and moved forward to Fisher's Hill, whilst his advance 
guard pushed through Strasburg to Hupp's Hill, where it had 
quite a sharp engagement with one of Crook's divisions. This 
advance of Early's army took Sheridan by surprise, for till then he 
had supposed that the bulk of that army was either at Charlottes- 
ville or Waynesboro. Orders were at once sent to the 6th Corps 

' Pond, 207. Grant's letter of the nth was to Halleck, who communicated the sub- 
stance of it to Sheridan. The latter himself heard from Grant to the same effect on 
October 15th. 

2 F 



434 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

to return from Front Royal ; and it reached the camp on Cedar 
Creek on the afternoon of the 14th. 

On the 15th Sheridan left his army and started with Merritt's 
division of cavalry for Front Royal, In accordance with instruc- 
tions just received from Grant, he intended to send that division, 
reinforced by Powell's from Luray Valley, through Chester Gap 
against the Virginia Central Railway, and himself to go on to 
Washington to confer with the War Secretary.^ But no sooner 
had he reached Front Royal than he received a startling com- 
munication from Wright, who had been left in command of the 
troops on Cedar Creek. A message had been read from the Con- 
federate signal station on Three Top Mountain to the effect that 
Longstreet was marching to Early's assistance to crush Sheridan. 
The latter at once ordered the cavalry to return to Wright, but 
suspecting, in the light of other information, that Longstreet's sup- 
posed message might after all be only a ruse, and deeming his 
business at Washington of great importance, continued his journey 
to the Federal capital. 

Early, at Fisher's Hill, found that his supplies, which had to be 
brought by wagon from Staunton, were running short, and that 
he must either forthwith advance against Sheridan or else retire up 
the Valley. He decided to adopt the former alternative ^ (see 
Plan). A reconnaissance to Hupp's Hill reported that the Federal 
position was entrenched. Accordingly he determined to make 
an attempt to turn its left flank. He was guided in his selection 
of this flank by the fact that the dreaded Federal cavalry were 
posted on the right.^ From the summit of Three Top Mountain a 
view of all the Federal camps could be had, and Early made his 
plans accordingly. Gordon, with his own, Ramseur's, and Pegram's 
divisions, was to cross the Shenandoah, march under cover of the 
thick timber along the foot of Three Top Mountain, and recross 
the river just below the point where Cedar Creek falls into it, 
Kershaw was to turn off the Valley pike to the right and strike 
Cedar Creek just above its junction with the Shenandoah, whilst 
Wharton's division with all the artillery was to advance over 
Hupp's Hill against the bridge over the Creek as soon as the 
attack on the Federal left commenced, Rosser was to demon- 
strate against Torbert's cavalry on the extreme right, whilst 
Lomax's cavalry in the Luray Valley was ordered to elude Powell's 
force and strike into the Valley turnpike in rear of the Federal 
lines. The troops took up their allotted positions under cover of 
the darkness on the night of the i8th. 

The l-'cderal army was quite unconscious of the blow which 

' PoikI, 212. 2 4 j3_ ^(t L.^ 526 (E.-irly's account of the battle), 

' A further reason for not attacking the Tederal rij^ht was that on that flank the 
banks of Cedar Creek were high antl precipitous {4 15. & L., 526). 




I^orps 






/■"y ) 



B Corps 



I MERRITTS 



QSfl 

,, maMIDDLETOWtf 





T/i* Country is undulatjng 
with many Hnolls 



Mtihuin II Co 



Oct. 19, 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 435 

was being prepared against it. Reconnaissances on the i8th 
had shown that there were no hostile troops in their immediate 
front, and it was even reported that Early was retiring up the 
Valley.^ The Federal line following the course of Cedar Creek 
faced south. The different Corps were posted in echelon, so that 
the line from left to right had a trend northwards.^ The extreme 
left was held by the 8th Corps, the first division on a round 
hill commanding the fords over Cedar Creek, and the second 
on another hill ^ close to the pike. The 19th Corps extended 
the line from the pike to Meadow Brook, and on its right was 
formed the 6th Corps. Beyond that the two cavalry divisions 
of Custer and Merritt were posted, Custer on the extreme right 
watching the fords, where the Back and Mine Bank roads cross 
the Creek.* On the extreme left was one brigade of Powell's 
cavalry division, two miles beyond Crook's left, watching Buckton's 
Ford, where the Front Royal road crosses the Shenandoah on its 
way to Middleton.^ 

Long before sunrise on the 19th, in a dense fog,^ Kershaw's 
division, having forded the Creek unperceived, charged into the 
entrenchments of the ist division of the 8th Corps, which was 
completely taken by surprise, and fled, leaving behind seven guns, 
which had not fired a shot. An attempt to form a line of battle 
on the position of the 2nd division was frustrated by the appear- 
ance of Gordon's column advancing against the Federal left flank, 
and the whole Corps was driven in full retreat down the pike.'^ 
Their flight uncovered the flank of the 19th Corps, which, attacked 
in front by Wharton's division and the Confederate artillery, and 
taken in reverse by Gordon's and Kershaw's troops, was forced 
to abandon its lines and follow Crook's troops in a hurried 
retreat. 

By sunrise two of the three Federal Corps were streaming to 
the rear, and the victorious Confederates were pushing across the 
pike to deal with the 6th Corps.^ The three divisions of this 
Corps had been hastily faced about and formed along Meadow 

^ Pond, 220. 

^ This formation was owing to the bends of the Creek (Pond, 222). 

* " Or another part of this same hill " (Pond, 222). * Pond, 224. 

' Only the 19th Corps and the ist division of the 8th were sheltered by entrench- 
ments. 

® Pond, 224. Kershaw was ordered forward at 4.30 a.m., and "precisely at 5 a.m. 
his leading brigade swept over the enemy's left work" (4 B. & L., 526). At 3.30 a.m. 
the moon was shining, but a thick fog came up just in time to screen Kershaw's move- 
ment. 

^ Early states (4 B. & L., 527) that there had been a delay of an hour at the river 
on the part of Gordon's Corps, and that consequently it encountered a more obstinate 
resistance than it would otherwise have met with. 

* General Emory claims for his Corps that it repulsed the first attack, but fell back in 
perfectly good order when its left was turned (4 B. & L., 518, note). 



436 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Brook. But there was no time to form a properly connected line, 
and each division was left to fight an independent battle, having 
continually to change front to repel flanking movements. This 
disjointed line faced east and extended from Cedar Creek to a 
point west of Middletown, covering the trains. From 6 a.m. till 
9 a.m. a fierce contest raged all along this front ; but in spite of 
all their efforts the Confederates could gain no ground, and the 
Federal left was gradually extending towards the turnpike so as to 
secure a line of retreat if necessary. 

About 10 a.m., when the Confederate assaults had died away, 
Getty's division established itself with its left on the pike about 
three-quarters of a mile north of Middletown. The other two 
divisions came into line on its right. The 6th Corps, for the first 
time since the battle began, was united, and held a line fronting 
south.^ Torbert's cavalry divisions had been brought over from 
the right to the left and were posted east of the pike, three regiments 
having been left to keep Rosser occupied.^ 

The tide of Confederate success was checked. They had captured 
twenty-four guns, over 1,300 prisoners,^ and driven the Federal 
army back about four miles, capturing its camps. But the Federals 
had now formed a strong line of battle with the 6th Corps 
and Torbert's cavalry, which had not shared in the stampede of 
the other two Corps. Their line of retreat along the turnpike was 
secured, and Wright, calmly confident, was preparing himself to 
assume the offensive as soon as the ammunition boxes of his troops 
were replenished. Instructions had been given to his division 
commanders to be in readiness to attack at noon. 

The presence of the Federal cavalry on the east side of the pike 
warned Early that the turning movement against that flank must 
cease. Anxious to complete the victory, which he believed to be 
well within his grasp, he sent orders to Gordon to take his own and 
Kershaw's divisions and turn the Federal right. But to his intense 
disappointment he learnt that so many of the soldiers had left the 
ranks to plunder the captured camps that it was impossible to get 
together enough troops for an immediate advance.* The movement 
had to be postponed till Early had himself visited that part of the 

' But Sheridan says that on reaching the fiehl he found the cavalry and Getty's division 
of the 6th Corps the only troops in the presence of, and resisting, the enemy. "They 
were apparently acting as a rearguard " {Memoirs, ii. 82). 

' Pond, 232. 

' Pond, 228. Early claims that he captured and brought off 1,500 prisoners 
(4 B. & L., 529). 

•* Pond, 234. General J. B. Gordon, in his recently published Reminiscences, 
chapter xxv., denies the "had conduct" on the part of the men. He states that 
Early stopped him from carrying out an attack on the 6th Corps, saying, " No use in 
that ; they will all go directly." He supports his statement by extracts from the diary of 
Major Hotchkiss. But for this the 6th Corps might have been overwhelmed hke the 
8th and iglh. 



Oct. 19. 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 437 

field and succeeded to some extent in restoring the organisation of 
those two divisions. 

In the meantime Sheridan had reached the field. He had arrived 
at Washington on the morning of the 17th, and after a consultation 
with Halleck and Stanton left the same afternoon and spent the 
night at Martinsburg. On the i8th he was at Winchester, and, 
hearing reports of heavy firing in the direction of Middletown, 
started about 8.30 a.m. on the 19th to rejoin his army. As he rode 
along the turnpike he met terror-stricken fugitives with exaggerated 
reports of the disaster which had overtaken the army, and found 
the road crowded with a huge mass of camp followers and flying 
trains. He quickly rallied the fugitives, and the stream began to 
flow back towards Middletown, whilst he himself, with his cavalry 
escort, pressed forward at full speed. He reached the battlefield 
about 10.30 a.m., when Wright had already succeeded in forming 
a strong line of battle, and had ordered an attack to be made at 
noon. 

Sheridan on resuming the command decided to postpone the 
attack till 3 p.m., in order to give time for the broken Corps to 
reform, and sent Custer's division back to cover the right flank.^ 
About I p.m. Early made his deferred attack against the Federal 
right. But by that time the 19th Corps had been re-formed and 
placed on the right of the 6th Corps, and a temporary breast- 
work had been thrown up. The Confederate assault was easily 
repulsed.^ 

Early now saw that there was no likelihood of gaining further 
success. Both Rosser's and Lomax's cavalry had failed to come 
in on the Federal rear. But the Confederate leader resolved to 
hold his ground and keep possession of the field, which he had 
won in the morning. The hours which elapsed between the 
repulse of his i p.m. attack and the advance of Sheridan's whole 
army were spent in strengthening his position, which was naturally 
a strong one on an amphitheatre of hills. Rosser's cavalry held 
his left flank and Wharton's division was posted east of the turn- 
pike to cover the right. 

It was not till 4 p.m. that Sheridan advanced to the attack. 
Early had made ample preparation to meet it, and so deadly was 
the fire of his infantry, posted chiefly behind stone walls, that it 

^ Sheridan states that only one division of the 6th Corps was in line of battle, and 
that his first task was to bring up into line the other two divisions of that Corps and the 
19th. After the repulse of Early's attack on the 19th Corps, Sheridan decided to wait 
for the arrival of Crook's rallied troops. A further delay was caused by a false report 
that Longstreet was marching on Winchester by the Front Royal road {Memoirs, ii. 84-7). 

2 This attack was made by Gordon's, Kershaw's, and Ramseur's divisions on the 19th 
Corps. Early goes so far as to say that no attack was made at all, but that Gordon, 
finding that he had before him a line of battle liehind breastworks, after some skirmishing, 
abandoned the idea of an attack (4 B. & L. , 528). 



438 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

seemed as though the Federal assault must fail and Early would be 
left in possession of the battlefield.^ The sun was already sinking 
behind the mountains, when a small party of soldiers belonging to 
Keifer's division of the 6th Corps ^ succeeded in entering a gap in 
the Confederate lines under cover of a stone wall which ran from 
the Federal front to the Confederate position. At the same time 
the rest of the division charged. Gordon's line, in which the 
breach had been made, turned and fled.^ The panic spread to 
Kershaw's and Ramseur's divisions, and Custer's cavalry, swooping 
down from the right upon the broken ranks, drove them in wild 
confusion across Cedar Creek. The day was won : Pegram's and 
Wharton's divisions on the Confederate right were involved in the 
general rout, and, as the sun set, the Federal infantry re-entered 
the entrenchments of the 19th Corps which had been lost in the 
morning.* 

The infantry did not pursue beyond the Creek, but the cavalry 
continued to press the flying army. A bridge over a small brook 
between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill broke down, the road was 
blocked, and a great haul of spoil was made by the pursuing 
cavalry. The Federal loss was about 5,700; the Confederate loss 
may have slightly exceeded 3,000.^ Twenty-four Federal guns 
captured in the morning were retaken, and twenty-four of Early's 
guns also fell into the hands of the victors. 

With the exception of Thomas' rout of Hood at Nashville on 
December i6th, no such decisive victory as Sheridan's at Cedar 
Creek was gained throughout the war. The dramatic arrival of 
Sheridan, which seemed to pluck victory out of defeat, enhanced 
the victor's fame. On September 19th he had "gone in," and 
within thirty days had won three great victories, the last of which 
might fairly be counted a "crowning mercy."" A few weeks later 

^ " I hoped that the day was finally ours " (4 E. & L., 52S). 

2 Keifer was in temporary command of Ricketts' division. 

3 Tliis successful attack is attributed by Pond, 238, to a portion of Dwight's division 
of the 19th Corps. 

* General Emory (4 B. & L., 519, note) says that his troops reoccupied their camp 
an hour before sunset. " Pond, 239. 

^ The account in the text of the battle of Cedar Creek is largely based upon General 
Keifer's narrative (vol. ii. cap. x.). His version may be regarded as representing the 
reaction against the Sheridan legend. The founders of that legend, in order to magnify 
the exploits of their hero, belittled the good work done by Wright and the 6th Corps, 
exaggerated the extent of the disaster which had overtaken the Federals, and minimised 
the obstinacy of the resistance offered by Early to Sheridan's own attack. The fact that 
Sheridan was on the field for five hours before making an attack must not be ignored. 
Keifer's contention is, that before Sheridan's arrival Wright had definitely checked the 
enemy, formed a fresh line of battle, and given orders for an attack, which Sheridan 
l-)osti)oned for several hours, during wliich time Early was fortifying his position. It is 
I)erhaps a fair argument to say that though Wriglit ordered an advance, it was only 
Sheridan's arrival which gave the men spirit enough to go forward. But this argument, 
though it may apply fairly to the 8th Corps and possibly in a slight degree to the 19th, 
cannot be extended to the 6th Corps and the cavalry. Early's comparative inaction after 



Dec, 1864] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 439 

Sheridan was promoted to the rank of Major-General in the regular 
army. 

Early's army, though routed at Cedar Creek, was not, however, 
done with (Map V.). On falling back to Newmarket he was re- 
inforced by a large number of conscripts and convalescents and 
by Crosby's brigade from the Department of South-West Virginia.^ 
Grant was still pressing Sheridan to advance against the Virginia 
Central Railway, but the latter stuck tenaciously to his original 
opinion, that a movement against Charlottesville through the Blue 
Ridge Gaps was practically out of the question. On November 9th 
the Federal army fell back to Kernstown in order to shorten its 
line of supplies. Early, apprehending that this retrograde move- 
ment was preliminary to detaching troops to Grant's aid, promptly 
followed in pursuit and advanced as far as Middletown. On the 
1 2th there was a sharp engagement between the cavalry of the 
two armies, in which the Confederates were worsted, and under 
cover of the night Early withdrew to Newmarket. 

Lee now ordered Kershaw's division to be returned to Richmond 
and Crosby's brigade to be sent to Breckinridge in south-west 
Virginia. In December still further reductions of Early's army 
were made. The whole of the 2nd Corps was recalled to Richmond, 
and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division followed in January, Infantry 
operations were in fact terminated by the approach of winter in 
the Valley, and the 6th Corps left Sheridan's army for City Point. 
Shortly after Crook's Corps was also detached, one division 
to Grant, and one to West Virginia ; and early in January one 
division of the 19th Corps was sent to join the Army of the 
Potomac.2 

Cavalry operations, however, were continued for some little time 
longer in the Valley. Towards the end of November Sheridan 
sent Merritt's division across the Blue Ridge into Loudoun County 
to devastate it, and by so doing to prevent it any longer affording 
shelter to the guerilla leader Mosby. At the same time Early sent 
Rosser with two brigades to attack once more the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railway, and a garrisoned post at New Creek, south-west of 
Cumberland, was captured by the Confederates. 

On December 19th Sheridan, at Grant's urgent request, sent 
Torbert with 8,000 cavalry to strike the Virginia Central Railway. 
With two divisions Torbert passed through Chester Gap on his 
way to Gordonsville, whilst Custer's division advanced up the 
Valley against Staunton. Early, after the 2nd Corps was summoned 
away, had fallen back to Staunton with Wharton's division. He 

reaching Middletown seems to show that his troops were pretty well "fought out" and 
must have encountered a more strenuous resistance than is compatible with the theory of 
the Sheridan legend. 

1 Pond, 244. "^ Pond, 249, 



440 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

now despatched Wharton with his infantry and Rosser's cavalry 
towards Harrisonburg, which was threatened by Custer's advance. 
On the night of the 20th Rosser dashed into the Federal camp, 
taking it by surprise, and Custer withdrew down the Valley. 
Torbert arrived before Gordonsville, but, finding that place held 
by infantry sent from Richmond, also retired. The cavalry suffered 
greatly during this expedition from the cold, and it was plain that 
operations in the Valley were over for the winter. 

As soon as a resumption of hostilities was possible, Sheridan 
on February 27th started up the Valley with 10,000 cavalry, l^y 
this time Early had only two infantry brigades under his command 
and six guns, whilst Rosser's brigade, which constituted his sole 
cavalry force, had been temporarily disbanded, most of the men 
having returned to their homes owing to the difficulty of getting 
forage for their horses.^ Rosser hastily collected a handful of his 
troopers, and attempted to check Sheridan's advance at Mount 
Crawford, but was swept out of the path.'-^ The next day Sheridan 
occupied Staunton and found that Early had retired to Waynesboro. 
On March 2nd Custer's division attacked Early's position. There 
was little or no fighting, and the greater part of Early's command 
with the artillery was captured. There was no longer any force in 
the Valley to dispute Sheridan's advance. He occupied Charlottes- 
ville and thoroughly broke up the railway both towards Gordons- 
ville and Lynchburg. His instructions had directed him to capture 
Lynchburg if possible. But delay in bringing up the trains of 
supplies, due to the incessant rains, caused him to abandon that 
part of his programme, as there had been time for reinforcements 
to reach Lynchburg.^ For a similar reason he did not attempt, as 
Grant had originally suggested, to form a junction with Sherman 
in the Carolinas, but determined to march direct to Grant, destroy- 
ing the James Canal as he advanced.* He reached White House 
on March 19th in time to take a decisive part in the final operations 
round Richmond. 

Sheridan's Shenandoah campaign was as brilliant as any con- 
ducted during the war. Though the forces engaged were not large, 
yet the results were decisive. The Confederates were completely 
driven out of the Valley, which, till Sheridan took command, had 

^ Luniax's cavalry had been sent to West Vir^jinia. Rosser's brigade had been very 
hard worked, as it had crossed the mountains in the snow and surprised Beverley on 
January nth. 

'■* I'ond, 252. ^ I'ond, 253. 

* A further reason which prevented Sheridan fruni marching to join Sherman was the 
fact that the James was in floud and he would liave been obliged to wait for its waters to 
sink. Grant's orders were to destroy the Virginia Central Railway and the James River 
Canal, capture Lynchburg if practical)le, and then join Sherman in North Carolina or 
return to Winchester. Finding it impracticable to reach Sherman, and knowing that his 
presence at Winchester was no longer required, Sheridan assumed the responsibility of 
going direct to Grant {Memoirs, ii. 112, 113, 119). 



March, 1865] THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 441 

nearly always been associated with disaster to the Federal arms. 
The desolation of the Valley, though a harsh measure, was justified 
on grounds of military expediency. Not only did the Valley cease 
to be a source of supplies to Richmond, it was no longer even 
capable of maintaining an army within its own confines ; and its 
devastatation produced a further very important result by causing 
wide-spread desertion in Lee's ranks, which were largely recruited 
from the Valley. The duty which a man owed to his starving 
family proved in many cases stronger even than his patriotism. 



CHAPTER XXV 

HOOD^S INVASION OF TENNESSEE— SHERMAN'S 
CAMPAIGN IN THE CAROLINAS^ 

Hood advances into Tennessee — Thomas decides to concentrate at Nashville— Schofield 
makes a stand at Columbia — Hood crosses Duck River — Hood misses his opportunity 
at Spring Hill— Schofield retreats to Franklin— Battle of Franklin— Schofield falls 
back to Nashville— Hood follows in pursuit— Excitement at Washington — Impatience 
of the Federal Government with Thomas— Battle of Nashville— Thomas' plan of 
battle— The first day's fighting— Thomas "puts in" his reserve Corps— Hood s fresh 
position— Position of the Federal army— Thomas' plan of battle— The battle of 
the second day— The Confederate left broken— Rout of Hood's army— Results of tlie 
battle — Pursuit of the flying army— Grant's plan of campaign — Unsuccessful attempt 
on Fort Fisher— Second and successful attempt on Fort Fisher— Federal movements 
against Wilmington— Fall of Wilmington— ImiKtrtance of Newbcrne as a Federal 
base— Bragg's unsuccessful attack on Cox — Sherman's advance through the Carolinas 
— Destruction of Columbia— Fall of Charleston— Sherman occupies Cheraw— 
And Fayetteville— Engagement at Averasboro— Battle of Bentonville— Johnston 
retires to Smithfield— Sherman occupies Goldsboro. 

ON November 15th Sherman started from Atlanta on his 
march to the sea. By that date Forrest had joined Hood 
with his cavalry at Florence on the north bank of the 
Tennessee. Hood now had under his command a force of nearly 
54,ocx) Confederates, including 12,000 cavalry .^ At Pulaski, eighty 
miles from Nashville and forty-four from the Tennessee at Decatur,^ 
Schofield was stationed with the 4th Corps and one division of the 
23rd Corps with the cavalry covering the front and right towards 
Plorence and Waynesboro.* Hood had been detained for some time 
by the necessity of accumulating supplies, but Sherman's advance 
from Atlanta necessitated a prompt movement of the Confederate 
army, if the P^ederal invasion of Georgia was to be stopped by 
a counter-invasion of Tennessee ; and on the 20th Beauregard 
telegraphed to Hood to move forward immediately.^ On that day 
S. D. Lee's corps advanced from P^lorence, and on the next day the 

1 See Map VI. . , ^ . r 

" Cox's Mare/i to the Sea, I2. Hood states his strength at 30,600 (4 B. & L., 435, 
note). But his estimate is certainly too low and does not apparently include Forrest's 
cavalry. * Cox's March to the Sea, 17. 

* Cox's Afanh to the Sea, 18. The strength of Schofield's force at Pulaski did not 
exceed 23,000 (4 B. & L., 441). * Cox's Manh to the Sea, 64. 

442 



Nov., 1864] HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 443 

whole army was in motion along the Lawrenceburg and parallel 
roads. 

It had been assumed by Sherman, and his belief was shared by 
Grant and the Washington authorities, that Thomas would at once 
concentrate all his available forces and meet Hood at some point 
south of the Duck River ; and there is no doubt that, had Thomas 
chosen to call in his outlying garrisons, he could have put into the 
field against Hood a force numerically as strong as that which 
ultimately routed him at Nashville. Thomas, however, always 
deliberate in his movements and loath to leave anything to chance, 
decided that it was impracticable to assume the offensive against 
Hood's veteran army, until the arrival of Smith's Corps from 
Missouri. That reinforcement was not expected at Nashville till 
the 25th at the earliest ; ^ and Thomas' orders to Schofield were to 
retreat as little and as slowly as possible, in order to secure time 
for a concentration at Nashville. These instructions placed 
Schofield in a very awkward position, and his attempt to carry out 
his orders nearly brought about the destruction of his force, and 
rendered its extrication from a position of the greatest peril an 
extremely difficult task. 

As soon as news arrived of Hood's advance, Schofield com- 
menced to withdraw. The Federal position at Pulaski was plainly 
untenable, when Hood was turning the right flank by his advance 
on the Lawrenceburg road, and Schofield fell back slowly to 
Columbia, where he hoped to cover the railway bridge over the 
Duck River. The two armies were moving on parallel roads, and 
Schofield moderated his pace to that of his opponent, lest Hood 
should suddenly move to the right and strike the railway at some 
point south of Columbia. But on the night of the 23rd news 
came that Forrest was pressing the Federal cavalry back into 
Columbia, and caused Schofield to quicken his march and push 
forward with all speed towards that town. Early on the 24th 
Cox's division of the 23rd Corps arrived just in time to prevent 
Forrest forcing his way into Columbia from the west, and on the 
same day the whole of Schofield's little army took up a strong 
position on the south bank of the river, covering the railway and 
pontoon bridges. 

Hood was unable to get his troops to march more than about 

1 Cox's March to the Sea, 65. General Cox states that Thomas, after placing 
garrisons in Nashville and Chattanooga, could still have concentrated an army of 47,000 
infantry and 6,000 cavalry in time to prevent Hood from crossing Duck River, He 
censures Thomas for sending Granger's division from Decatur to Stevenson, " a hundred 
miles east," instead of bringing it to Pulaski. On the other hand. Ropes in his article on 
Sherman (10 Massachusetts M. H. S.) thinks that Sherman could have spared Thomas 
12,000 more troops, and considers that "not till November 30th could Thomas be said 
to have at Nashville a force large enough to be called an army." 



444 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

ten miles a day, and his army was not concentrated in Schofield's 
front till the 26th} 

At Columbia some reinforcements joined Schofield : one 
brigade of the 23rd Corps was garrisoning the town, another 
brigade of the same Corps came up from Johnsonville.'^ During 
the march from Pulaski he had been joined by Wilson, sent from 
the Army of the Shenandoah to act as his chief of cavalry, and 
reinforcements of that arm were being slowly sent up from Nash- 
ville, The weakness of Schofield's position at Columbia was that 
he had the river behind him. This was rendered necessary in 
order to safeguard the bridges : for on the northern bank the 
ground falls away, and would be commanded by batteries placed 
on the higher ground of the southern bank,^ The fords below 
the town were held by infantry detachments, whilst above the 
town Wilson's cavalry piqueted the river bank. The preparations 
which Hood made for crossing above the town compelled Scho- 
field to abandon the south bank, and on the night of the 27th the 
whole Federal army was brought across the river and the bridges 
were destroyed. 

On the 2Sth Forrest succeeded in passing his cavalry over the 
river above the town and drove Wilson's cavalry, most of which 
was posted further east, along the Lewisburg turnpike.* Wilson 
by adopting this line of retreat left the rest of Schofield's army in 
a very precarious position, with its left flank exposed and its line 
of retreat along the Franklin turnpike at the mercy of the Con- 
federate cavalry. 

On the 29th Cheatham's and Stewart's Corps with one division 
of Lee's Corps crossed the river about five miles above Columbia, 
and were directed upon Spring Hill eleven miles in rear of 
Columbia on the Franklin road. Lee's other two divisions with 
the artillery of the whole army were retained on the south bank 
confronting Cox's division, which, withdrawn a short distance from 
the river, held the north bank opposite Columbia. 

Owing to the absence of Wilson's cavalry, Schofield's informa- 
tion as to Hood's movements on his left was very slight, and only 
one division of the 4th Corps was sent to hold Spring Hill, whither 
the trains of the army had already been sent.^ This division just 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 66. Hood's march was delayed by the rain, snow, 
hail, and frost, which rendered the roads almost impassable. 

'■^ A third hrigaiie had also been sent by Thomas from Johnsonville to cover a cross- 
ing of Duck River thirty miles west of Columbia. 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 66. 

* Wilscm's cavalry were strung out eastwards along the line of Duck River as far as 
Shelbyville (Cox's March to the Sea, 69). 

'^ Schofield first ordered two divisions of the 4th Corps to Spring Hill, but subse- 
quently onlcrcd Kimball's divisidn to halt at the Rutherford Creek crossing of the 
Franklin road. 



Nov. 29, 1864] HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 445 

arrived in time to prevent the trains becoming Forrest's prey ; but 
presently found itself confronted by the whole of Cheatham's 
Corps. 

On this day Hood had an unique chance of crushing Schofield's 
army. Only one Federal division was holding Spring Hill, 
a point absolutely vital to the safety of the army. The nearest 
reinforcement, Kimball's division of the 4th Corps, was seven 
miles distant at Rutherford Creek.^ Cox's division was facing 
Columbia. Ruger's division of the same Corps was engaged in 
obstructing the fords below the town, whilst Wood's division of 
the 4th Corps was posted about a mile in rear of Cox's position. 
But a sudden fit of indecision seized Hood, and instead of at all 
costs securing Spring Hill, and thus getting possession of the 
Federal line of retreat, he at first withheld Stewart's Corps and 
Johnson's division from the attack on Spring Hill, and formed 
them in line of battle facing west, under the impression that 
Schofield might be meditating a movement to get between his 
two widely separated wings.^ The solitary division at Spring Hill 
made so brave a show, aided by the fortunate presence of six 
batteries, which originally retreating towards Franklin, were 
detained and put in position on the west side of the turnpike,^ that 
Hood, who was with Cheatham's Corps, imagined that he had a 
much larger force than one division to deal with, and instead of 
pressing the attack ordered Stewart's Corps to reinforce Cheatham.* 
But Stewart did not reach the scene of fighting till night had put 
an end to the combat. Thus, at the close of the day, the Federal 
line of retreat still remained open, and during the night, as no 
attempt was made by the Confederates to seize the turnpike north 
of Spring Hill, Schofield withdrew all his forces from their perilous 
position and marched to Franklin, twelve miles from Spring Hill, 
which was reached by the leading division before daybreak.^ 

M B. & L., 446. 

' Or he may have intended to attack the three P'ederal divisions, which were within 
supporting distance of each other in extension of Cox's left, but changed his mind when 
he found that Cheatham was encountering an obstinate resistance (Cox's March to the 
Sea, 74). 3 Cox's March to the Sea, 75. 

* The fighting on Cheatham's part was mainly done by Cleburne's division, supported 
on its right by Brown's. The Federal force consisted of three brigades under Stanley, 
the Corps commander. 

^ It is impossible to reconcile the conflicting statements of Hood and Cheatham. 
The former says that he gave explicit orders to his lieutenant to secure Spring Hill, but 
that Cheatham failed to carry out his orders because he thought that the line confronting 
him was **a little too long for him," and waited for Stewart's Corps. He also blames 
Cheatham for not delaying the Federal retreat during the night. Cheatham says that 
Hood was with him, or near by, most of the afternoon, and that he was about to attack, 
though it was already dark, with his own and Stewart's Corps, when Hood ordered the 
movement to be postponed till the following morning. He also denies that he received 
any explicit orders from Hood during the night (4 B. & L., 429-32, 438-9). Cox 
considers that Hood was seeking a scapegoat for a failure, for which he was himself 
solely to blame. 



446 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UxMTED STATES 

Franklin is a village lying on the south bank in a bend of the 
Harpeth River. It was no more than Columbia, a tenable position 
against a foe greatly superior in numbers. But Schofield's request, 
that a pontoon bridge might be sent there, as both the railway and 
wagon bridges had been damaged or partially destroyed, had 
been ignored, and he was consequently obliged to form line of 
battle and await attack, until the bridges could be repaired and 
his trains and artillery got across. By noon two bridges had been 
sufficiently repaired to permit of the passage of the trains, and a 
ford had also been made available by scarping the banks, although 
the crossing there was a bad one. On the north bank was a fort 
commanding the bridges and also the railroad cut, which runs 
close to the rivcr.^ Here several batteries of the artillery of the 
23rd Corps, which had been sent across the river first of all, were 
posted. South of the river one division of the 23rd Corps held 
the line from the Columbia pike to the railway and river on the 
left. The other division of that Corps extended the line to the 
right to the Carter Creek pike : beyond that pike one division of 
the 4th Corps was placed with its right resting on the river west 
of the village. Another division of that Corps was brought across 
to the north bank, whilst two brigades of Wagner's division,^ which 
had formed the rearguard during the withdrawal from Columbia, 
held an advanced position across the Columbia pike about half a 
mile in front of the main line. But they had been ordered to fall 
back as soon as the enemy advanced in force, and joining the third 
brigade of that division, which had passed within the works, to act 
as a general reserve.^ Wilson's cavalry were on the north bank to 
prevent any Confederate force crossing east of the village. The 
whole line was entrenched, but the Columbia turnpike was left 
open to admit of the passage of the trains and artillery. The 
trains were nearly all over by 3 p.m., and Schofield gave orders 
that the infantry should be prepared to cross at 6 p.m., if the 
enemy did not attack before sunset. But Hood had no intention 
of letting his foe escape a second time without a battle. For the 
failure of the 29th he held Cheatham responsible, and had bitterly 
reproached Cleburne, one of Cheatham's divisional commanders. 
Cleburne's fiery spirit was roused by the undeserved censure : for 
Hood had no one but himself to blame for not pressing the assault 
against the small Federal force on Spring Hill. The whole Con- 
federate army seemed animated by a determination to prove to 
their commander tliat they knew how to fight to a finish, and were 
prepared to annihilate the T'cdcral army, whatever the cost. The 

' Tlic Nashville-Decatur Railway enters Franklin from the south, running 500 yards 
cast of and parallel to the turnpike. For a thousand yards before crossing the river it 
runs close to the bank, and on the eastern edge of the village (Cox's Afarch to the 



Nov. 30. 1864] HOOD^S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 447 

fighting on the 30th was as desperate as any in the war. The 
slaughter of the Confederates was enormous. 

About 4 p.m. the Confederates advanced to the attack. Cheat- 
ham's Corps moved along the pike with a division on either side 
of the road, and the third division in echelon on the left flank of the 
left division. Stewart's Corps continued the line to the right, and 
Johnson's, the only one of Lee's divisions as yet up, was held in 
reserve. The Federal position was, however, so strong, that 
probably a frontal attack would have had but little chance of 
success, and Hood, recognising the fact, might have suspended the 
attack after the first failure. But the misconduct of General 
Wagner gave Hood a better chance of carrying his enemy's lines 
than he could have reasonably hoped for, and caused him to 
persevere in the endeavour long after all chance of success had 
vanished. Two of Wagner's brigades were holding, as already 
described, a post of observation in front of the main line, and the 
third brigade was within the lines in reserve. Though he had 
been ordered to withdraw the two advanced brigades as soon as 
the enemy threatened to attack, yet in the moment of excitement 
he forgot the orders which he had received, and directed them to 
hold their ground. Enveloped on either flank by the overwhelm- 
ing force of two divisions,^ they were driven in wild confusion back 
into their own lines. As they rushed along the turnpike and flung 
themselves over the parapets on either side of the road, the troops 
constituting the first line of defence were thrown into considerable 
confusion. On both sides of the pike a considerable breach was 
made in the Federal line, and it seemed as if the hotly pursuing 
Confederates might fight their way in. The gap was filled by the 
charge of the one brigade in reserve and of the second line of one 
of the brigades^ of the 23rd Corps, which occupied that part of the 
line, and after a desperate struggle the Confederates were driven 
out. How great the peril had been was shown by the fact that 
Confederate corpses were found fifty yards inside the entrench- 
ments.3 Cleburne, smarting under Hood's reproaches, was one of 
the first to fall at the ditch in front of the Federal entrenchments, 
as he led his division forward on the east of the turnpike.* 

That day the air was still and hazy, and the smoke hung thick 
and low over the battlefield. It was impossible to see any 
distance, and Hood, probably believing that the success of his first 
onslaught had been greater than it really was, renewed the attack 
again and again with fearful loss to his gallant troops.^ On the 
Confederate right Stewart's troops, though advancing with the 

^ Cleburne's and Brown's of Cheatham's Corps. 

2 Reilly's. 3 Cox's March to the Sea, 89. 

* But according to another account (4 B. & L., 439), Cleburne's body was found 
fifty yards from the Federal works. ''> Cox's March to the Sea, 95. 



448 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

greatest bravery, could make but little impression on the Federal 
line, and their attempt to force an entrance by the railway cutting 
was defeated by the heavy fire of the artillery posted in the fort on 
the north bank of the river. On the Confederate left the attack 
was not pressed so fiercely as on other parts of the line, and was 
easily repulsed. The fiercest fighting was in the centre across the 
turnpike, where the temporary breach had been made.^ Here 
Cleburne's and Brown's divisions made repeated attacks. The 
larger gap was on the west side of the road, and Brown's men had 
succeeded in establishing themselves on the outer line of the 
Federal parapets, and held on to them desperately. The Federals 
threw up an extemporised retrenchment twenty-five yards to the 
rear, and across this narrow space a sanguinary conflict raged till 
far into the night.^ Johnson's division, hitherto held in reserve, was 
put in at that point, when Brown's division had been fought out, 
but they could make no headway and only swelled the slaughter. 

It was not till 9 p.m. that the Confederates were at length with- 
drawn from an attempt which had long been hopeless. Their 
losses amounted to 6,300, including twelve general ofificers, whilst 
those of their opponents amounted to 2,326, nearly half of which 
were in the two brigades, which had so nearly been the cause of a 
great disaster.^ During the afternoon Wilson's cavalry were 
engaged in sharp skirmishing with Forrest's troopers, who vainly 
endeavoured to force a passage across the river to the left of 
Schofield's lines. 

At midnight the Federals were withdrawn to the north bank and 
continued their retreat, reaching Nashville, twenty miles distant, 
the following morning. 

On the same day the last of Smith's detachments reached Nash- 
ville, the whole Corps amounting to nearly 12,000 men. At the 
same time Steedman arrived from Chattanooga with over 5,000 men. 
General Donaldson, the chief Quartermaster, had also organised a 
division of the employes out of his own and the Commissariat 
Departments, which could be used for garrisoning the city, and 
would set free a corresponding force of regular troops for offensive 
o[)crations. Another division was organised under General Cruft 
of convalescents and men returning from furlough, who belonged 
to Sherman's army, and this, in addition to the men of the same 
description, who had accompanied Steedman from Chattanooga, 
made up a total of over 5,000 men.* At Murfreesborough a force 
of 8,000 men under General Rousseau was concentrated. 

' This gap was due to the flight of r\ raw infantry regiment (4 B. & L. , 432). 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 90. 

' Cox's March to the Sea, 96-7. But Hood's official report stated his loss at 4,500. 

* Cox's March to the Sea, loi. Steedman brought with him two coloured brigades 
as well as a provisional division of Sherman's men. 



Dec, 1864] HOOD^S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 449 

Hood, in spite of the severity of his losses at Franklin, was bent 
on tempting Providence. It is probable that the discovery that 
Sherman had not allowed himself to be called back from his march 
through Georgia, and that consequently the Confederate invasion 
of Tennessee had been a fatal mistake, had made him well-nigh 
desperate, and impaired his powers of cool judgment. He may 
have really believed that Schofield's army had retreated before 
him in confusion, and that he need not any longer take serious 
account of his forces in reckoning up the odds against him. But 
if that was his belief, he was very much mistaken. Schofield's 
army had improved in moral as the result of the battle of Franklin, 
and was quite prepared to hold its ground there, if reinforcements 
could have been sent up from Nashville in time to prevent its flanks 
from being turned. 

Hood, with an army reduced to about 44,000 men,^ followed 
Schofield, and appeared before Nashville on December 2nd. Al- 
though confronted by a force stronger than his own, he seemed 
bent on retaining the offensive, and sent two cavalry divisions 
under Forrest's command with Bate's infantry division to break 
up the railway between Nashville and Murfreesborough.^ On the 
7th Forrest, having been reinforced by two more infantry brigades, 
advanced against Murfreesborough, but was driven back. After 
this Bate's division was recalled to Hood's lines before Nashville, 
but a third infantry brigade was sent to support Forrest, whose 
field of operations lay along the south bank of the Cumberland 
above Nashville. His third division under Chalmers was operating 
along the river below the city, and Hood even sent a cavalry de- 
tachment and one infantry brigade to hold the mouth of the Duck 
River, where it empties into the Tennessee, and thus close the 
latter river to the Federals.^ The presence of Forrest's cavalry 
along the Cumberland put a stop to the usual steamboat traffic, 
but gunboats patrolling the river both above and below Nashville 
effectually prevented the Confederates from crossing to the opposite 
bank. 

Hood's advance on Nashville caused the Washington authorities 
to demand that Thomas should forthwith give him battle. It had 
been the universal expectation that the invading army would have 
been met and crushed south of the Duck River. Already that river 
had been passed, and there seemed a possibility that a Confederate 
army might again be seen on the banks of the Ohio. Something 

^ Cox's Ma7-ch te the Sea, loi. In 4 B. & L. , 474, the Confederate strength is 
estimated at about 38,000. But Hood himself (4 B. & L., 435) says that he had only 
23,000. The Confederate general consistently underestimates his effective strength and 
his losses. 

"^ From General Wilson's account (4 B. & L., 466) it would appear that these two 
cavalry divisions had been detached before the battle of Franklin, and only Chalmer's 
division took part in that battle. ^ Cox's March to the Sea, 106. 

2 G 



450 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

of the same apprehension, which had been excited by Bragg's 
invasion of Kentucky in 1862, was now felt again, as Hood was 
pushing northward, and Thomas appeared to be making no effort 
to check him. 

On December 2nd Grant telegraphed to Thomas, advising him 
to leave the fortifications of Nashville in charge of Donaldson's 
division of armed employes, and with all available forces march 
out and attack Hood. Though the language of Grant's telegram 
was so urgent as to be almost tantamount to a direct order,^ 
Thomas took upon himself the responsibility of waiting a few days 
longer in order to provide remounts for his cavalry. 

Then just as he was preparing to assume the offensive, on 
December 8th a storm of snow and sleet came on, which covered 
the hill slopes, over which the advance against Hood's position 
would have to be made, with sheets of slippery ice, rendering 
military operations impracticable, until a thaw came. When this 
fact was urged as a reason for delay. Grant and the Federal Govern- 
ment regarded the plea as only a part of Thomas' general dilatory 
policy, and peremptory orders were sent him either to attack at 
once or else turn over the command to Schofield.- 

But neither remonstrances nor threats could hurry Thomas into 
taking a course, which, after personal observation, he had decided 
to be premature. He called his Corps commanders to a council 
of war, explained to them that he was required to fight or resign 
his command, and asked their advice. They unanimously declared 
that, until there came a change in the weather, active operations 
were impossible. Thomas replied to Halleck to this effect, ex- 
pressing at the same time his perfect readiness to be relieved of 
the command. The patience of the Government was exhausted. 
On the 13th Logan, commander of the 15th Army Corps, who was 
on leave of absence at Washington, was ordered to proceed to 
Nashville and relieve Thomas of the command of the Department 
and the Army of the Cumberland ; and Grant himself, who was 
daily growing more anxious lest Hood's invasion should break up 
his own carefully matured plans for the reduction of Richmond, 
started from City Point to assume the command in person against 
Hood. But on reaching Washington he received the welcome in- 
telligence that Thomas had at last moved out of his fortifications, 
antl that the first day of fighting had been altogether in favour of 
the Federal army. Logan had only reached Louisville when he 
heard the news of the victory at Nashville. 

On the 14th a warm rain set in, and it was plain that operations 

' Cox's March to the Sea, 105. 

'^ According to another account an order was actually issued relieving Thomas and 
placing Schofield in command, hut did not get beyond the Adjutant-tjeneral's office in 
Washington (4 B. iV L., 454). In the text Cox's account is followed. • 



Dec, 1864] HOOD^S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 451 

would be possible the following day. Hood had already decided 
on the loth that it was undesirable to remain longer threatening 
Nashville, but the same change of weather, which prevented 
Thomas from attacking, prevented the Confederates from retreat- 
ing.^ It is not easy to fathom the reasons which caused Hood to 
remain so long in a position of considerable peril. He himself 
claimed that he was expecting reinforcements from Texas. As 
no considerable force from Texas had succeeded in crossing the 
Mississippi since the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in the 
summer of 1863, Hood's expectation of any aid from that quarter 
was unreasonable. But it is more probable that the true reason 
which detained him before Thomas' lines was the desire to raise 
recruits and gather supplies in Tennessee. That was the special 
work which Forrest with his cavalry was directed to carry out; and 
Hood was accompanied by the Confederate Governor (so-called) 
of Tennessee, whose presence in the camp might have, so it was 
hoped, a stimulating effect upon the recruiting.- 

Strategically Hood's threat of investing Nashville was unsound, 
and his tactical dispositions were equally faulty. 

Some four miles south of Nashville rise the Brentwood Hills.^ 
From these hills flow two streams, Brown's Creek and Richland 
Creek, which after running parallel for some little distance turn to 
the right and left and fall into the Cumberland on either side of 
Nashville. Along a low and broken line of hills crossing the space 
between these two creeks the Confederate line was arrayed. 
Cheatham's Corps held the right, reaching beyond Brown's Creek 
across the Nolensville pike to the Chattanooga Railway and be- 
yond. Lee's Corps, which had suffered the least in the battle of 
Franklin, formed the centre, stretching across the Franklin turn- 
pike, and Stewart's Corps continued the line across the Granny White 
pike to the Hillsboro' road. Stewart's left wing, on reaching the 
Hillsboro' road was sharply refused and found cover behind a 
stone wall running for a thousand yards along the roadside. To 
still further strengthen his position a strong skirmish line was 
thrown forward terminating in an entrenched position on Mont- 
gomery Hill close to the Hillsboro' pike. To the south-west and 
beyond Richland Creek redoubts had been thrown up on detached 
hills, and Chalmer's cavalry division was charged with the almost 
impossible task of covering the ground between the Hillsboro' road 
and the river. 

Hood's weak point was his left flank, which was practically " in 
the air," and Thomas determined to hurl the greater part of his 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 107. 

■^ Cox's March to the Sea, loi. Hood says that he hoped if Thomas attacked him in 
his entrenched position to defeat him and "enter the city on the heels of the enemy" 
(4 B. & L., 436). 3 See Plan, p. 452. 



452 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

army obliquely against it. According to his original dispositions 
the interior defences of Nashville were held by Donaldson's ex- 
temporised division. Steedman's division was posted on the 
extreme left between the Chattanooga Railway and the Lebanon 
turnpike close to the river. In the centre the 4th Corps, com- 
manded in the absence of Stanley by Wood, reached from the 
Granny White turnpike across the Hillsboro' pike to the Hardin 
pike. This line where it crossed the Hillsboro' road formed a 
salient angle at Laurens Hill opposite to and within six hundred 
yards of Stewart's advanced line on Montgomery Hill.^ 

The Federal right was formed by the i6th Corps under A. J. 
Smith, reaching across the Charlotte pike, and between that road 
and the river the whole of Wilson's Cavalry Corps was posted. 
The 23rd Corps was held in reserve within the interior line of 
defences, filling the gap between Steedman's and Wood's positions, 
and Thomas intended to make a telling use of this Corps at the 
fitting moment. The Federal leader's plan of battle was to make 
a grand left wheel with the whole of his right wing pivoting upon 
Wood's position on Laurens Hill,- and to aim at overlapping and 
crushing the Confederate left, whilst Steedman by a brisk demons- 
tration was to hold Hood's right fast. Wood in the centre was to 
threaten and, if opportunity offered, attack Montgomery Hill, and 
Schofield's Corps was held in reserve till the decisive moment. 

Early on the morning of the 15th a thick fog obscured the field 
of battle, but about 8 a.m. Steedman advancing along the Mur- 
freesborough road attacked the Confederate right.^ So vigorously 
was the Federal demonstration pushed, that Cheatham's Corps 
was for the whole of that eventful day held fast in its position 
across the Nolensville pike and Chattanooga Railroad. Not only 
was the Confederate right neutralised for that day, but the centre, 
consisting of Lee's Corps,* was prevented from detaching any con- 
siderable force to the support of either flank by the fear lest the 
Federal force occupying the interior line of defences might sally 
out along the Franklin turnpike and cut the Confederate line in 
twain. 

The movement of the Federal right wing was considerably 
delayed by Smith's infantry crossing the front of Wilson's cavalry,^ 
and it was noon before that part of Thomas' army came into close 
contact with the enemy.^ On the Confederate left Chalmer's 
cavalry division, supported by a single infantry brigade, vainly 
endeavoured to hold its ground against a vastly superior force. 

' 4 B. & L., 457. * Cox's March to the Sea, no. ^ Fiske, 353. 

■• " Lee's corps after sending two brigades to the assistance of Stewart on his left, was 
held in place by the threatening position of the garrison troops and did not fire a shot 
during the day " (4 B. & L., 457). 

" 4 B. & L., 468. • 4 B. ."^ L., 458. • 



BATTLE OF 







Methuin & Co- 



Dec. is, 1864] HOOD^S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 453 

Half a mile south-east of the Hardin turnpike the first of Hood's 
detached works was stormed by a combined attack of dismounted 
cavalry and infantry.^ At this juncture the solitary infantry 
brigade was recalled to extend Stewart's line southward upon 
some hilly ground covering the Granny White pike. The with- 
drawal of the infantry force left the other detached works at the 
mercy of the two Federal Corps, which, after capturing them, 
pressed on against Stewart's main line. 

In the centre about i p.m.- Post's brigade of the 4th Corps 
gallantly captured the Confederate advanced position on Mont- 
gomery Hill ; and Thomas, now satisfied that the offensive lay 
wholly with him, ordered Schofield's Corps to move round behind 
Wood's and Smith's Corps and take position on the right of the 
latter. At the same time Wilson was directed to push straight up 
the valley of Richland Creek, and, if possible, plant himself across 
the Granny White turnpike. Under this combined assault 
Stewart's line crumbled away. Smith carried the southern end of 
the stone wall. Wood, with the 4th Corps, attacked the salient 
angle in Stewart's lines on the Hillsboro' road and broke through 
at that point. The Confederate left at once outflanked, and, 
broken by a frontal attack, fell back in great confusion to the 
Granny White turnpike. 

The delay which had occurred in the earlier part of the day 
prevented the Federal right from reaping the full fruits of its 
victory, but when the short December day came to an end, sixteen 
guns and 1,200 prisoners had been captured and the Confederate 
left forced back two miles, and this great success, promising still 
greater results for the morrow, had been achieved with but slight 
loss.^ 

Hood had now good cause to regret that in his ill-judged desire 
to hold as much country as possible he had detached two cavalry 
divisions and three infantry brigades from his main force. He 
sent orders to Forrest to return with all speed. But as the cavalry 
commander could not rejoin, until twenty-four hours at least had 
elapsed, he resolved to form a second line and hold on for another 
day.* 

The line which Hood took up during the night was two miles 
south of and much more contracted than that which he had 
already tried unsuccessfully to hold. The right rested on Overton 
Hill aross the Franklin pike. The line then stretched to the left 
across the Granny White turnpike to Shy's Hill, which had been 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, iii. - Cox's March to the Sea, 112. 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 114. The 23rd Corps advancing on Smith's right across 
the Hillsboro' road * ' carried the left of a series of hills parallel to the Granny White 
turnpike," but was unable to drive Coleman's brigade from Shy's Hill. 

■* Cox's March to the Sea, 115. 



454 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

held with the utmost difficulty against Schofield's advance. From 
Shy's Hill the Confederate line turned sharply to the south and 
extended to the Brentwood Hills along a line of lesser heights. 
Cheatham's Corps was brought from the right to the left, and 
Lee's Corps now held the right of Hood's position. 

Parallel to the Confederate line the Federal army was arrayed. 
The 4th Corps and Steedman's division faced Overton Hill and 
reached across the Franklin pike, till it connected with the left of 
the i6th Corps, whose right was in front of Shy's Hill. Schofield's 
Corps occupied the line of hills which ran parallel to the sharply 
refused left flank of the Confederates, and extended across Rich- 
land Creek : Wilson's cavalry were on the extreme right, threaten- 
ing Hood's line of retreat by the Franklin pike.^ 

The Confederate left flank was nearly as much exposed as on 
the previous day to a turning movement by the greatly superior 
cavalry force of their opponents, and the salient angle at Shy's 
Hill was a very weak point. The entrenchments on that hill, 
which had been thrown up during the night, were too far back 
from the brow of the hill to command the slope, and they could 
be enfiladed and taken in reverse by the Federal artillery, and 
during the day a considerable part of the parapet was destroyed 
by the fire of Schofield's and Smith's artillery from the opposite 
ridges.- 

Thomas' plan of battle for the i6th aimed at pushing his cavalry 
round and beyond the Confederate left and securing possession of 
the Franklin turnpike, the sole line of retreat for the Confederate 
army. Schofield and Smith were to attack the Confederate left, 
when a favourable opportunity offered, and by breaking it force 
the whole of Hood's army to retreat by the Franklin turnpike. 
Thomas did not direct an assault to be made at any particular 
point, but left it to his Corps commanders to attack when and 
where they liked at their own discretion.^ 

The Federal battle opened with a heavy cannonade all along 
the line, which made itself specially felt on the Confederate left, 
where the rifled guns of the Federal artillery, firing across the 
narrow valley between the two parallel ranges of hills, quickly 
gained the mastery over the smooth-bore weapons of their oppo- 
nents. At 3 p.m.* (the earlier part of the day having been spent 
in marching the troops to their respective positions over the muddy 
and broken ground), an attempt was made by Wood, command- 
ing the 4th Corps and Steedman's division, to storm Overton Hill. 
But the position proved too strong to be taken by a frontal 

' On the morning of llic i6th Wilson made a wide delour beyond the Confederate 
left and secured a footing on the Granny White pike (4 B. & L. , 462). 

- Cox's March to the Sea, 120. "* Cox's March to the Sen, 1 18. 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 121. • 



Dec. i6, i864] HOOD^S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 455 

attack, and the attempt was repulsed with considerable loss to the 
attacking force. 

In the meanwhile Wilson's cavalry had been steadily gaining 
ground on the right, occupying hill after hill, and Hood became 
seriously alarmed for his h"ne of retreat. In his endeavour to 
extend his line further south to hold Wilson in check, Hood was 
obliged to still further weaken his left wing. One division had 
been already sent to the right to reinforce Lee on Overton Hill, 
and one brigade was detached to the left to support Chalmers 
cavalry against Wilson's advance. The Federal commanders on 
the right saw that their opportunity had come. The Confederate 
line had been stretched too far to offer any effective resistance. 
Smith assaulted and captured Shy's Hill about 4 p.m. At the 
same time Schofield attacked and carried an embrasured work on 
the extreme left of the hostile line, and the whole Confederate 
army, seeing its left broken, took to flight. Wilson was already 
across the Granny White turnpike, but the fugitives streamed east- 
wards to the Franklin pike, by which they made their escape. The 
obstinate resistance of two brigades, which still retained their 
organisation, secured the passes through the Brentwood Hills long 
enough to save the larger part of Hood's army from capture.^ 

In the two days' fighting on December 15th and i6th the 
Federals captured fifty-three guns and about 4,500 prisoners.^ It 
is difficult to determine what Hood's losses in killed and wounded 
were. The Federal loss just exceeded 3,000,^ and as the Con- 
federates were throughout acting on the defensive, it is probable 
that their losses in killed and wounded were less than those of 
their opponents. 

The victory of Nashville was the most decisive gained by either 
side during the war. In the North an intense sense of relief was 
felt ; and in the reaction which followed the previous irritation 
against Thomas, the idea arose that the victory was won in conse- 
quence rather than in spite of the dilatory measures which had 
characterised the earlier stages of the campaign. That Thomas 
was to blame for allowing the invading army to advance so far 
north seems probable. It is true that by letting Hood hurl his 
army in repeated and futile assaults against Schofield's lines at 
Franklin the efficiency of that army as a fighting force was greatly 
impaired. But that advantage cannot be regarded as adequately 
counterbalancing the serious derangement which was threatened by 
this delay to Grant's plans ; and it is a fair supposition that, had 

^ These two brigades covered the passes through the Brentwood Hills from the 
Granny White road, along which the Federal cavalry were advancing to its intersection 
with the Franklin turnpike. ^ Cox's March to the Sea, 126. 

^ The available strength of the Federal army at Nashville seems to have been at least 
55,000 (4 B. c% L., 473). 



456 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Hood been fought and defeated in November, a more effective 
pursuit could have been made than was possible in December after 
the change of weather had broken up the roads.^ 

No attempt at organised resistance was made by the flying 
army until Columbia (Map VI.) was reached. There Forrest's 
cavalry rejoined, and with the assistance of eight infantry brigades 
formed an efficient rearguard - which covered the line of retreat 
until on the evening of the 27th Hood's army reached the south 
bank of the Tennessee. Hood rallied the remnants of his army at 
Tupelo in Mississippi, and applied to be relieved of his command. 
His request was granted. The three Corps of the defeated army 
subsequently took part in the campaign against Sherman in the 
Carolinas ; but though their organisation continued the same their 
numerical strength was enormously reduced. During the cam- 
paign over 13,000 prisoners were taken, and seventy-two pieces of 
artillery, and the Confederate strength was still further diminished 
by desertion.^ 

Thomas, after Hood's escape across the Tennessee, issued orders 
assigning winter quarters to his various Corps. But Grant was 
determined to give the enemy no breathing space ; and Thomas, 
revoking his order, made preparations for a fresh campaign.* 

The 23rd Corps was ordered to go by water by the Tennessee 
and the Ohio to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and then proceed 
by rail to Washington, with a view to being transported by water 
to North Carolina, of which department Schofield was now placed 
in command. 

Grant had decided to unite Sherman's army with those of the 
Potomac and the James in a final effort against the Army of 
Northern Virginia ; and in order to make Sherman's task the 
easier and provide him with a base, in case the resistance, which 
he might encounter on his march through the Carolinas, should 
prove too strong to be easily overcome. Grant intended to capture 
Wilmington (Map XH.) and thus enable Sherman, if he deemed it 
necessary to turn aside from the direct road to Richmond, to open 
up communication with the Federal fleet. It was for this purpose 
that Schofield's corps was summoned from the west. 

Wilmington lies on the left bank of the Cape Fear River about 
thirty miles from its mouth. The entrance to the river was com- 

' For a criticism of Thomas' policy, see Cox's March to the Sea, 130-5. Thomas 
rightly or wrongly did not consider that to meet Hood's veteran army he could rely upon 
any but the veterans of the 4th and 23rd Corps, and therefore decided to wail for the 
arrival of the i6th Corps. He distrusted the quality of a considerable part of the troops 
which he might have concentrated earlier against Hood. 

•^ 4B. &L.,437. 

" Hood stated in his report that his losses, including prisoners, for the whole campaign 
did not exceed 10,000. But Thomas claimed 13,000 prisoners and 2,000 deserters 
(4 B. & L., 474). * Cox's March to the Sea, 126. 



Jan., 1865] HOOD^S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 457 

manded by Fort Fisher, a strong post mounting fifty guns^ on the 
left bank of the river close to the sea, reaching across the narrow 
spit of sand which separates the river from the sea. The capture 
of Fort Fisher would at once close Wilmington to the blockade 
runners, and thus seal up the last port left open on the Atlantic 
coast, and at the same time furnish a suitable base for further 
operations against Wilmington. 

Towards the end of December an attempt had been made to 
capture Fort Fisher, but it had failed owing to the misconduct of 
General Butler. Grant had intended that the land forces engaged 
in the expedition should be under the command of General Weitzel, 
one of Butler's Corps commanders. But Butler, in defiance of 
Grant's orders, himself decided to assume the command of the 
expedition. Great reliance was placed upon a powder ship freighted 
with 235 tons of gunpowder,- which was to be exploded close to 
the fort. But this novel experiment in warfare proved a complete 
failure. There was a general lack of co-operation between the 
land and naval forces, and much recrimination between Admiral 
Porter and General Butler. The latter eventually withdrew his 
troops, which he had landed, without making any attempt to 
entrench and hold a position. Butler, who throughout the war 
had held a high command, but had never shown any signs of 
military ability, was, in consequence of this failure, relieved of the 
command of the Army of the James, and succeeded by General 
Ord. 

Porter's report, however, made it plain that with proper co-opera- 
tion the fall of the fort ought to be certain. So in January a 
second attempt was made. The land force now employed was 
under the command of General Terry, and consisted of two 
divisions and one brigade. This force landed on the 13th under 
cover of the fire of the fleet about five miles north of the fort.^ 
The fleet, consisting of sixty war vessels and gunboats,* kept up 
a very heavy fire upon the fort on the 13th, 14th, and earlier part 
of the 15th, concentrating its efforts upon dismounting the heavy 
guns on the land face. 

The navy did its work so well that at 3 p.m. on the 15th, when 
the land forces advanced to the attack, only one heavy gun re- 
mained serviceable in their front.^ An entrance was quickly 
effected near the river bank. A naval force of some 2,000 sailors 
and marines, which attacked at the sea angle, was repulsed. Once 
inside the fort the Federal infantry had still a hard task before 

^ The armament consisted of forty -five heavy guns, three mortars, and two field 
pieces in a small outwork. Cox's March to the Sea, 140. 
^ Schouler, 576; but i Wilson, 138, says 150 tons. 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 141. ^ Cox's March to the Sea, 142. 

^ 4 B. & L. , 649, 



4-58 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

them, as the gun-pits and traverses afforded excellent cover for 
the defenders. But the fleet after the repulse of the naval con- 
tingent reopened fire, and the garrison was at length driven to 
seek shelter in Fort Buchanan, a small work at the very end of 
the sandspit, where that same evening the Confederate force capitu- 
lated, numbering about 2,000 officers and men. This signal success 
was won at a cost of less than 1,000 killed and wounded.^ 

On February 9th Cox's division of the 23rd Corps from Nash- 
ville reached Fort Fisher. Hoke's division had been sent from 
Wilmington to prevent any advance against the city by the left 
bank of the river, and held a strongly entrenched position between 
the river and Myrtle Sound, a long shallow bay, which is only 
separated from the sea by a narrow stretch of sand a few hundred 
yards broad.- The fall of Fort Fisher gave the Federals control 
of the mouth of the river, and enabled them to establish them- 
selves on the right bank as well. But on that bank Fort Anderson, 
held by one of Hoke's brigades, which was about in a line with 
his entrenchments on the left bank, constituted a considerable 
obstacle. Two unsuccessful attempts were made on the nights of 
the 1 2th and 14th to turn Hoke's left by laying a pontoon bridge 
across Myrtle Sound in his rear. After the second failure Schofield 
transferred two divisions to the right bank of the river : a naval 
force moved up the river in co-operation. 

On the 1 8th Fort Anderson was abandoned by the Confederates 
in consequence of a flanking movement carried out by Cox, who 
was in command of the forces on the right bank, threatening the 
line of retreat of the garrison. The next stand was made at Town 
Creek, some eight miles further back,^ but Cox turned the Con- 
federate left by crossing three brigades in a single rice boat over 
the stream out of sight of the enemy, and attacking the de- 
fenders in the rear, captured a number of prisoners and both 
their guns.* 

On the 2 1st Cox's force was in front of Wilmington, though on 
the opposite bank. A battery of rifled guns was, however, able to 
pitch its shells into the city,'* and during the night the Confederates 
evacuated it. Hoke's troops, which had firmly held their en- 
trenchments on the left bank against Terry's forces, were with- 
drawn the same night. With but slight loss the Federals had 
secured the last Confederate harbour on the Atlantic coast, and 
in case of need a fresh base was secured for Sherman's advancing 
army. 

' According to Bragg's official report the garrison numbered about 2,500, of whom 
about 500 were killed and wounded. Terry reported the capture of 2,083 prisoners 
(4 B. & L. , 661). The Federal loss is given at 955. Cox makes the total casualties 
only amount to about 650. 

■^ Cox's Mardi to the Sen, 141. ' Cox's March to the Sea, 1 50. 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 151-2. ' Cox's March to the Sea, rsj. 



March, i865] SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS 459 

It was not, however, Sherman's intention to turn aside to 
Wilmington unless compelled to do so. His chief fear was lest 
Lee should succeed in giving Grant the slip, and coming south 
with the Army of Northern Virginia should concentrate a superior 
force against his army marching through the Carolinas. But 
unless Lee succeeded in accomplishing this extremely difficult task, 
Sherman intended to push straight for Goldsboro. 

With a view to facilitating this movement, it now became 
Schofield's duty to open up the line from Newberne to Goldsboro. 
Newberne, lying forty miles up the Neuse River, had been in the 
hands of the Federals ever since its capture by Burnside in March, 
1862. As a base it had several advantages over Wilmington. 
The harbour at the mouth of the Neuse River was a better one 
than that which had been secured at the mouth of the Cape Fear 
River. A railway was in working order between Newberne and its 
port with cars and locomotives, whilst no rolling stock at all was 
to be found at Wilmington ; and the railroad from Newberne to 
Goldsboro could be more easily repaired than that, which ran to 
the same point from Wilmington.^ 

On the last day of February Cox arrived at Newberne from 
Schofield's camp, and made immediate preparations for com- 
mencing the repairs upon the railway. He organised two 
divisions out of convalescents belonging to Sherman's army and 
garrison troops, and was also joined by a division of new troops, 
which was assigned to the 23rd Corps. With these he moved out 
to cover the work of repairing the railroad through Dover Swamp, 

Lee had been recently appointed by Act of Congress General- 
in-Chief of all the Confederate forces, and on February 23rd he 
had summoned Joseph Johnston, who had remained unemployed 
since July, when he was relieved of the command of the Army 
of Tennessee at Atlanta, to take command of all the troops which 
were being concentrated to check Sherman's advance. Johnston 
detached Bragg with Hoke's division and such portions of the 
Army of the Tennessee as had by that time arrived from the 
West, to crush Cox's three divisions advancing from Newberne.^ 
He expected that Bragg would have time to effect that object and 
still rejoin the main army, which was being concentrated about 
Smithfield. 

Bragg took up his position at Kinston, on the Neuse River, 
about three miles beyond Dover Swamp, and, moving out of the 
town, arrayed his army along the South West Creek. On March 
8th, 9th, and loth there was some sharp fighting along that Creek. 

1 Cox's March to the Sea, 154-5. 

'■^ Johnston states that the reinforcements from the Army of the Tennessee which 
joined Bragg numbered less than 2,000 men (Narrative, 379). They were under the 
command of D. H. Hill. 



460 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Bragg gained an initial success on the 8th by suddenly falling 
upon an advanced force of two regiments, which he routed, captur- 
ing nearly three-quarters of the whole command.^ But he was 
unable to gain any further advantage against Cox's line, which 
was formed along the right bank of the Creek at the head of the 
swamp, and on the night of the loth withdrew his forces and 
hastened through Goldsboro to rejoin Johnston. 

Kinston was occupied by the Federal forces on the 14th, and 
the railroad quickly repaired as far as that point. The rest of the 
23rd Corps joined Schofield at Kinston, having marched from 
Wilmington by land.- Terry's Corps in the meantime had 
advanced from Wilmington along the railroad to Goldsboro : and 
Schofield was now ready to march on Goldsboro and join hands 
with Sherman, as soon as that general came within reach. 

Sherman, at Savannah, had been hoping that by the middle of 
January the weather might be sufficiently favourable for his 
Carolina campaign. His plan was to feint simultaneously at 
Charleston and Augusta, but Columbia, the capital of South 
Carolina, was his real objective. With a view to deceiving his 
opponents he sent the right wing early in the month by water to 
Beaufort, and directed Howard, its commander, to concentrate at 
Pocotaligo. Slocum was directed with the left wing to march 
some forty miles up the Savannah on both banks, and then re- 
unite his command at Robertsville in readiness to join Howard. 
By these movements not only was the appearance of threatening 
Augusta and Charleston kept up, but the two wings at Roberts- 
ville and Pocotaligo could be easily supplied by water, and thus 
would be able to start on their march for Columbia with their 
trains full. But the weather proved exceptionally unfavourable : 
rain fell day after day, converting the country almost into a lake. 
At Sister's Ferry, where Slocum was to cross the Savannah, the 
river was swollen to a breadth of three miles.^ On the last day of 
January, Howard's wing was concentrated at Pocotaligo, and the 
following day the advance commenced. 

A series of rivers, deep and bordered by swamps, run through 
South Carolina into the Atlantic, keeping a line parallel to the 
Savannah. A small force skilfully handled might make the cross- 
ing of any one of these rivers in their lower reaches an extremely 
difficult task. Sherman therefore decided to move his army up 
the ridge, between the valleys of the Savannah and the Salke- 
hatchie, till he reached the upper and narrower waters of the latter 
river.* He also intended to break up the railway system of South 

' Cox's March to the Sea, 158. 

- Schofield himself had come by sea from Wilmington to Newberne on M.arch 7th. 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 168. 

■* The Salkehatchie is the name given to the upper course of the Combahee. 



Feb., 1865] SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS 461 

Carolina, as in the previous campaign he had done that of Georgia, 
in order to prevent a rapid concentration of the Confederate forces 
against him. 

At the same time as Sherman commenced his advance, a Council 
of War was being held near Augusta, at which Beauregard, Hardee, 
G. W. Smith, commanding the Georgia militia, and D. H. Hill, 
who had recently been appointed to the command of a division in 
S. D. Lee's Army Corps, were present. The Confederate generals 
reckoned that a force of 33,450 men could be concentrated at 
Augusta by February 4th or the following day.' The Richmond 
Government would seem, however, to have been unable to resign 
itself to the evacuation of Charleston at so early a date, and 
Sherman advanced with such speed through swamps deemed im- 
passable by his opponents that the opportunity for concentration 
was lost. While the Confederate leaders were deliberating, 
Sherman was marching through the Salkehatchie swamps, some 
ten or twelve miles every day by mud roads, nearly every mile of 
which had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of his train of 
2,500 wagons.'^ Wheeler's cavalry was the only force available at 
the moment to check his advance : and though every effort was 
made to delay the Federal march by burning bridges and holding 
the long causeways over the swamps, the leading division of 
a column was generally found strong enough to outflank the 
cavalry and force its retreat.^ 

Sherman's army went steadily forward. On February 7th 
Howard struck the Augusta and Charleston Railroad at Midway; 
on the 1 2th both forks of the Edisto were crossed, and the 
Columbia branch line was broken up at Orangeburg. The speed 
of Sherman's advance necessitated the abandonment of the pro- 
posed concentration at Augusta. The Georgia militia were left to 
hold that city, where they were quite useless, but they refused to 
serve outside the bounds of their own State. Beauregard hurried 
by a lengthy detour to Charlotte, in North Carolina, where it was 
proposed to make the next attempt at concentration, with that 
part of the Army of Tennessee which had reached him. 

On the 17th the Federals reached Columbia. General Wade 
Hampton, as a South Carolinian of great popularity and influence, 
had been sent south by Lee in the hope that he might arouse the 
flagging spirits of his countrymen. His cavalry evacuated 
Columbia on the approach of the Federal forces, after burning the 
two railway-stations and setting fire to the cotton-bales piled in 
the middle of the street, to prevent them falling into the hands of 
the enemy. A strong wind rose which fanned the flames, and, in 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 169. But 3,000 men of this force did not reach Augusta 
till nearly a week later. 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 168. ^ Cox's March to the Sea, 170. 



462 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

spite of the efforts of the Federal soldiers, the greater part of the 
city was destroyed. In the South the destruction of Columbia 
was represented as Sherman's deliberate act. But that general, 
though merciless in his destruction of everything which could be 
regarded as of military value to the Confederate cause, in all his 
orders forbade the destruction of private property and dwellings. 
It is true that intoxicated soldiers aided the spread of the con- 
flagration, and, doubtless, there were many in the army who con- 
sidered that the destruction of the capital was a fitting punishment 
for the State, which had been the first to secede, and aided at its 
ruin. But the charge of incendiarism cannot justly be brought 
against the Federal commander, and before continuing his march 
he took steps to provide the starving population of the ruined city 
with food.^ 

On the same day that Columbia fell into the hands of Sherman, 
Hardee commenced to evacuate Charleston. The systematic de- 
struction of the railroad, which connected the South Carolinian 
seaport with Augusta, warned him that he had no time to waste if 
he wished to withdraw his forces by the sole remaining railway 
through Florence. He took his army by rail to Cheraw, on the 
Great Pedee River, where he proposed to make his next stand. 
On February i8th Federal troops occupied Charleston. 

Though Hardee had constructed strong works behind the Great 
Pedee, he had not a sufficient force to prevent Slocum, with the 
left wing of the Federal army, turning his position ; and on 
March 3rd the right wing occupied Cheraw. Immediately after 
capturing Columbia Sherman had made a demonstration in the 
direction of Charlotte, tearing up the railway for a distance of 
forty miles." Besides the simple destruction of the railway track, 
his object was by threatening Charlotte to delay the concentration 
of Johnston's forces for the protection of Raleigh, which was the 
point that he was really aiming at. 

Hardee from Cheraw fell back to Fayetteville on the Cape Fear 
River, but he was too weak to attempt to hold that line, and on the 
iith Slocum entered Fayetteville.^ The occupation of this town 
brought Sherman into communication with the P'ederal forces 
holding Wilmington. But he resolved to press on to Goldsboro, 
as he saw that Hardee was unable to offer any effective resistance, 
and learnt that the railway from Newberne was being rapidly 
repaired. 

When at Cheraw, Sherman had heard of Johnston's appoint- 
ment to command the forces in his front, and the news that his old 
antagonist was again in the field warned him that he would 

' Cox's March to the Sea, 173 6. 

'^ The railway was destroyed almost up to Winnsboro. 

' Cox's March to the Sea, 1 79. • 



March, 1865] SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS 463 

probably have to encounter a better organised opposition than he 
had yet met. On leaving Fayetteville, where he waited for a day 
or two in the vain hope of getting from Wilmington shoes and 
clothing, of which his soldiers were sorely in need,^ he ordered 
that four divisions of either wing should march light, whilst the 
rest should accompany the trains and help them along." By this 
arrangement he hoped to have a sufficient force to check any 
attempt that Johnston might make against either column. 

On the 1 6th a sharp encounter took place at Averasboro, 
where Hardee had entrenched a position : but Slocum deploying 
two divisions of the 20th Corps drove Hardee back to a second 
entrenched position, which was abandoned during the night. 
Sherman argued from this engagement that Hardee had stood to 
fight in order to give Johnston the more time to concentrate in 
front of Raleigh, and the fact that only Hardee's troops were 
engaged seemed to indicate that Johnston could not be sufficiently 
strong to advance south of the Neuse River in time to prevent him 
reaching Goldsboro.^ 

There were, however, certain facts, essential to the formation of 
a right judgment, of which Sherman was necessarily in ignorance. 
He did not know that Johnston had detached a strong force under 
Bragg against the Federal force operating from Newberne, or that 
the object of Hardee's stand at Averasboro had been to give time 
for Bragg to return from his unsuccessful expedition. Johnston, 
being in telegraphic communication with his subordinates, could 
form a truer estimate of the military situation than was possible for 
Sherman, who on leaving Fayetteville had again cut himself off 
from communication with Schofield. Johnston saw that if a blow 
was to be struck at Sherman, before he could be joined by the 
forces of Schofield's Department, it must be struck at once. He 
issued orders accordingly for a general concentration at Bentonville 
on the 1 8th. This was a small village on the road from Smithfield 
to Clinton, about three miles west of the point where that road was 
crossed by another from Averasboro to Goldsboro, along which the 
left Federal column was advancing. Johnston's information was to 
the effect that Slocum's two Corps were nearly a day's march apart 
and that distance away from Howard's wing.* By advancing from 
Bentonville and striking Slocum's left flank he hoped to overwhelm 
the left wing in detail. 

With a force of about 22,000 men,^ Johnston took up a position 

* Cox's March to the Sea, 183. 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 184. Sherman ordered the left wing to march some way 
up the east bank of the Cape Fear River before turning off to the right towards Golds- 
boro. He thus created the impression that he was threatening Raleigh, the State 
capital. ^ Cox's March to the Sea, 185. '* Cox's March to the Sea, 186. 

^ Cox estimates the Confederate force at 22,000 infantry besides cavalry, whose 
strength is stated as 5,500. Johnston gives his strength on the 19th in infantry and 



464 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

right across the Averasboro road with the two wings swung forward, 
the right hidden in the woods. The right wing consisted of the 
troops of the Army of Tennessee and one division of Hardee's 
command ; the left was held by Bragg with Hoke's division, rein- 
forced by Hardee's other division.^ On the 19th Slocum was push- 
ing on towards Goldsboro with the 14th Corps leading. The 20th 
Corps was eight miles behind.^ It had proved impossible, owing 
to the wretched condition of the roads from incessant rain, to keep 
the two Corps closed up, and the right wing was several miles away 
marching by parallel roads. 

The Federal advance first encountered Johnston's cavalry, and 
thinking that he had only cavalry in his front, Davis, the Corps 
commander, pressed forward with his leading division under Carlin 
and directed Buell's brigade to move to the left of the road so as 
to outflank the supposed position of the Confederates. The capture 
of some prisoners revealed the fact that Johnston's whole army 
had to be encountered. Slocum, on reaching the front, ordered up 
the second division under Morgan and deployed it on the right of 
Carlin's, being ignorant that a strong force was concealed in the 
woods on his left. Suddenly the Confederate right rushed to the 
attack. Buell's brigade was swept away. Carlin's other brigades 
were taken in flank and successively driven back, and a gap made 
in the Federal line. As the Confederate centre pressed along the 
road in pursuit of Carlin's retreating troops, they were themselves 
taken in flank by a vigorous charge of one of Morgan's brigades. 
The pursuit was checked ; and the 20th Corps, which on the sound 
of the guns in front, had hurried forward, now began to arrive on 
the battlefield. A fresh line was formed, on which Carlin's division 
rallied, about a mile in rear of the point where the fight commenced, 
and the repeated efforts of the Confederate right to drive back this 
line were repulsed. Between the right of the reformed line and 
the left of Morgan's division, which on the right of the road had 
entrenched itself in front of Bragg's line, a gap existed ; and some 
of the Confederate troops penetrated this interval and tried to take 
Morgan's line in reverse but without success. 

artillery as 14,100. According to his account the cavalry were not engaged on that day, 
Butler's division, which had been engaged on the i8th, having been sent to watch the 
movements of the Federal right wing {Narrative, 392). 

^ The troops of the Army of Tennessee, commanded by Stewart, consisted of the 
remnants of his own Corps and S. D. Lee's, which latter was commanded by D. \\. Hill. 
They numbered 3,950 (Johnston's Narrative, 384). It had been originally intended 
that Hoke's division should form the left wing, posted across the road at right angles, 
whilst the other two were to be deployed "obliquely en hhelon to the right " (4 B. & L., 
703). Rut the battle had already commenced before Hardee's two divisions had come 
up, and in consequence of Bragg's urgent and, as it would seem, unnecessary appeal for 
reinforcements, one of Hardee's divisions was ordered to form on Hoke's left. Johnston 
and Wade Hampton both seem to regard this departure from the original plan as one of 
the chief reasons why the Confederates failed to gain a decisive success. 

" Cox's March to the Sea, 185. 



March, 1865] SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS 465 

Johnston, seeing that the fury of his attack had spent itself upon 
Davis' Corps, and that heavy reinforcements were coming up to 
Slocum's aid, called off his troops and withdrew the right wing to 
its former position, but Bragg's wing was drawn back and faced 
to the east to meet Howard's expected advance from that direction.^ 
Johnston's sole object now was to hold Bentonville and cover the 
bridges over Mill Creek in his rear, whilst he was sending off his 
wounded and preparing for a retreat to Smithfield. 

On the 20th Howard's two Corps came up and took a position 
fronting Bragg's line. But Sherman, who had sent orders by 
couriers to Schofield to move at once to Goldsboro, and to Terry 
with the loth Corps to march on Cox's bridge over the Neuse, was 
not disposed to waste valuable life in attacks upon Johnston's 
entrenched position; and even, when on the 21st a favourable 
opportunity presented itself of breaking through Johnston's left 
and capturing the bridges in his rear, he declined to avail himself 
of it, and ordered Howard to recall his troops.^ He knew that 
Johnston must retreat and that it was an absolute certainty that 
the whole of the Federal forces could be united on the north bank 
of the Neuse in open country, and, therefore, refused to take any 
unnecessary risks.^ 

On the night of the 21st Johnston retreated across Mill Creek 
to Smithfield, and on the 22nd Sherman resumed his march. 
Schofield had already on the 21st entered Goldsboro, and on the 
same day Terry had reached Cox's bridge and laid a pontoon 
bridge over the Neuse, by which Sherman crossed the river and 
himself entered Goldsboro on the 23rd. With the addition of the 
23rd Corps, which was now reunited with the Grand Army of the 
West, and the loth Corps, he had under his command, a force of 
nearly 90,000 men.^ 

From Savannah to Goldsboro the Grand Army of the West had 

^ For the details of the battle of Bentonville see Cox's March to the Sea, 188-193. 
Johnston's account of the battle differs in several points. He says that the charge of the 
right wing conducted by Hardee drove the Federals from two lines of entrenchments, but 
the victorious troops, owing to the denseness of the thicket through which they were 
advancing, were ordered to halt and re-form their line : then the Federals made an attempt 
to assume the offensive and attacked Stewart's troops, but were easily repulsed, and with 
this repulse the action really ceased. Throughout the engagement Bragg on the left was 
held in check by the troops confronting him, and in Wade Hampton's opinion handled 
his troops feebly. Only two brigades of the 20th Corps seem to have taken part in the 
fighting. Cox speaks of the Confederate general Bate as commanding two divisions of 
Cheatham's Corps of the Army of Tennessee and forming the extreme right of Hardee's 
line, but according to Johnston's account no troops of Cheatham's Corps joined him till 
the 20th. It would appear from Johnston's Nan-ative, 394, that a considerable number 
of troops from the Army of Tennessee joined him after the battle of Bentonville. 

^ The force which penetrated Johnston's lines was Mower's division of the 17th Corps. 
Both Johnston and Hampton claim that it was driven back by a sudden attack made by 
a small force under Hardee and Hampton. 

2 Cox's March to the Sea, 195. * Cox's March to the Sea, 196. 

2 H 



466 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

marched 425 miles in fifty days, of which ten were allotted to rest. 
Though but little interfered with by the enemy's forces and attended 
by but slight loss (at Averasboro, 554: at Bentonville, 1,646)/ 
yet the march through the Carolinas had been one continuous 
battle with the elements, and must be reckoned a much greater 
achievement than the more famous march through Georgia, which 
by comparison was a mere pleasure trip. As a triumph of physical 
endurance and mechanical skill on the part of the army and of 
inflexible resolution in the general, it stands unrivalled in the 
history of modern war ; and it had as direct an influence upon the 
final issue of the campaign round Richmond as if it had been con- 
ducted within sound of Lee's guns.- 

' 4B. & L., 698. 

- It is true, as Ropes (lo Massachusetts M. H. S., 149) points out, that it was not 
until the battle of Five Forks had been lost, that Lee commenced his retreat, and that it 
was the movements of the Armies of the Potomac and James which led up to the 
capitulation of Appomattox ; but Sherman's march through the Carolinas prevented any 
reinforcements being sent to Lee, and would have compelled him to evacuate Richmond 
very soon, if Grant's operations had not already produced that result. 



CHAPTER XXVI 
NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Naval operations in the West— The Eads gunboats— Composition of the crews— Naval 
success at Fort Henry — Failure of the navy at Fort Donelson— The navy at Island 
No. lo— The Carondelet runs past the batteries— Gunboats at Shiloh— Navy at Fort 
Pillow— Confederate rams sink the Cincinnati— "Wi^ EUet rams — Battle of Memphis 
—Importance of New Orleans — Strength of the Federal force — The Confederate 
defences — Bombardment of the Forts— Caldwell breaks the boom — The Battle of 
April 24th— Fight above the Forts— Fall of New Orleans— Advance on Vicksburg— 
Farragut passes Vicksburg, June 28th — The Confederate ram Arkansas — Destruction 
of the Arkansas — Porter relieves Davis — The Cairo sunk in the Yazoo — Capture 
of Arkansas Post — Importance of the Red River — Loss of the Queeyi of the West — 
Loss of the Indianola—Yo.xia.g\ii passes the batteries at Port Hudson — Porter runs 
past the Vicksburg Batteries — Unsuccessful attack by the navy on Grand Gulf^ Porter 
ascends the Red River to Alexandria — Sinking of the Cincinnati — The navy in the 
North Carolina Sounds— Capture of Hatteras Inlet — Capture of Roanoke Island 
— Capture of Port Royal — The Merrimac — The Merrimac attacks the Federal fleet, 
March 8th — Destruction of the Cumberland and Congress — The Monitor — The battle 
of March 9th— Operations in Charleston harbour — Raid of the Confederate ironclads 
— The Monitor Mo7itaiik—^2X1\t of April 7th— Capture of the Atlanta— T>\x Pont 
relieved by Dahlgren — Confederate use of submarine boats — The Confederate iron- 
clad, Albemarle — Mobile Bay — Delay imposed upon Farragut — The Confederate 
ironclad, Tennessee — Farragut's ironclads — Battle of Mobile Bay — Sinking of the 
Tecu7}isek—Yz.xxz.gVi\. takes the lead— The fight with the gunboats— Surrender of 
the Tennessee — Capture of Fort Fisher — The Confederate commerce-destroyers : 
the Alabama, the Florida, the Shenandoah— 1\\t blockade of the Southern coast. 

THE work performed by the Federal navy during the war 
was Titanic. Not only were the 3,000 miles of coastline 
effectually blockaded, but the waters of the principal rivers 
were controlled by Northern flotillas. The possession of these 
inland waters secured the lines of communication of the invading 
armies and enabled the Federal commanders to push into the 
very heart of the Confederacy without fear of being severed from 
their base. It was in the West that the superiority of the Federal 
navy made itself especially felt. The possession of the Mississippi 
(Map VI.) cut the Confederacy in twain, and the control of 
the Tennessee and the Cumberland preserved Kentucky to the 
Union and was an indispensable preliminary to the conquest of 
Tennessee.^ 

^ For the naval operations on the Mississippi and its tributaries, except where special 
reference is made to other authorities, Mahan's Gulf and Inland Waters has been 
followed throughout. 

467 



468 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

In the West the Federal Government at first treated the naval 
force as if it were a division of the army, and put the construction 
of a river fleet under the charge of the War Office. In May, 1861, 
Commander Rodgers was directed to prepare a naval force. He 
purchased in Cincinnati three river steamers, the Tyler^ Lexington^ 
and Conestoga. These were converted into gunboats by receiving 
oak bulwarks five inches thick, but carried no iron plating. The 
Tyler was armed with seven guns, the Lexington with six, and the 
Conestoga with three. They reached Cairo on August 12th. 
Five days earlier the War Office had contracted with J. B. Eads, of 
St. Louis, for the construction of seven gunboats. These vessels 
were partially protected with armour, 175 feet long and with 
50 feet beam ; they carried a casemate pierced for thirteen guns. 
The forward end of the casemate bore 2\ inches of iron, with 
a backing of 24 inches of oak. The rest of the casemate was 
unprotected, except abreast of the boilers and engines, where 
2\ inches of iron, but without backing, were carried. The sterns 
of these vessels were entirely unprotected, and the armour over the 
boilers was too weak to afford adequate protection. The vessels 
were of 512 tons burden, drew from 6 to 7 feet of water, and 
steamed about 9 knots an hour.^ All seven did good work in the 
Western waters, and their names will constantly recur in the 
course of the narrative. They were called the Cairo, Carondelet, 
Ctncinfiati, Louisville, Moicnd City, Pittsburg, and St. Louis (after- 
wards the De Kalb). Two larger vessels, the Bentoti and Essex, 
were purchased by the Government. They differed from the seven 
built for the Government in being larger and stronger, but were of 
the same general type. Besides the three wooden gunboats in 
commission and the nine ironclads in preparation, a fleet of thirty- 
eight mortar-boats was also being built. 

But whilst the work of construction was being rapidly pushed 
forward, very considerable difficulty was experienced in finding 
trained crews. In January, 1862, Captain Foote, who had relieved 
Rodgers, reported that though he hoped to have all the gunboats 
in commission by the 20th, he could only muster one-third crews 
for them. An attempt was made to fill up the deficiency by drafts 
from the army. But the quality of the men thus supplied was so 
inferior, as the army officers detailed for the purpose the worst of 
their men, that Foote, after a short experience, declined any further 
drafts. The crews were mainly made up of coasting and merchant 
seamen from the East, of steamboat men from the rivers, and of a 
few sailors from the lakes. 

After the violation of the neutrality of Kentucky by Polk in 
September, 1861, the wooden gunboats saw some service in the 
Mississippi. In November the Tyler and Lexington convoyed a 

' I B. & L. , 339 (Eads' own statement). 



Feb., i862] NAVAL OPERATIONS 469 

land force under Grant to Belmont, and besides engaging the Con- 
federate batteries at Columbus, played an important part in covering 
the re-embarkation of the troops. 

On November 13th Captain Foote was promoted Flag-Officer, 
which placed him above the command of any army officer, except 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Department. 

On February 2nd, 1862, Foote arrived at Paducah with the 
three wooden gunboats and four of the ironclads, as it had been 
found impossible to provide crews for the others. This naval 
force was intended to take part in the expedition up the Tennessee 
against Fort Henry and to destroy the railway bridge over the 
river connecting Columbus with Bowling Green. The original 
design embraced a joint attack by army and navy upon the fort. 
But such heavy rain had recently fallen that the roads were 
almost impassable, and the navy had to do the work unaided. 
The rise in the river proved, however, of great service to the 
attacking force, as it swept away from their moorings a number 
of Confederate mines and flooded the lower part of the fort, 
where at the close of the action the men fighting the guns were 
waist-deep in water.^ On February 6th the ironclads moved up 
to the attack in line abreast with the wooden gunboats in second 
line. They opened fire at a distance of 1,700 yards and steamed 
steadily on till within 600 yards of the fort. After about an hour's 
engagement the Essex received a shot in her boilers. An ex- 
plosion took place, and the vessel drifted down-stream. The 
other ironclads continued the action. Various disasters befell the 
Confederate guns. Of the two heaviest, one exploded and the 
other was spiked by its own priming-wire. Of the twelve guns 
which could be brought to bear upon the fleet, seven had been 
put out of action, when the Confederate flag was hauled down 
and the fort surrendered to the navy. The same day the wooden 
gunboats pushed twenty-five miles up the river to the railway 
bridge. This was destroyed, and the gunboats continued up 
the Tennessee to Florence, in Alabama, where further progress 
was stopped by the Muscle Shoals. They returned to Cairo on 
the nth, having destroyed several steamers and bringing with 
them a large steamer, the Eastport, which was being converted into 
a gunboat. This vessel was taken into the Federal navy, and two 
years later was lost in the Red River Expedition. 

The wooden gunboats were just in time to take part in the 
expedition against Fort Donelson. Foote was of opinion that 
this fort, a very much stronger work than Fort Henry, would 
prove more than a match for his gunboats, and would have pre- 
ferred to wait till his fleet was better prepared. But yielding to 
the urgency of Halleck and Grant, he entered the Cumberland 

1 I B. &L.,37i. 



470 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

with four ironclads and two wooden gunboats. The Carondelet 
reached the neighbourhood of the fort on the I2th, and on the 
13th engaged the hostile batteries at long range. Next day the 
whole naval force advanced to the attack. Again the ironclads in 
line abreast led the way with the wooden gunboats in second line. 
The action commenced about 3 p.m., when the vessels opened fire 
at a distance of about a mile, and continued to advance till they 
were within 400 yards. For an hour and a half the fight raged 
with great fury, and the Confederate gunners were showing signs 
of flinching, when a lucky shot carried away the wheel of the flag- 
ship St. Louis, and almost at the same time the tiller of the 
Louisville was shot away. Both vessels drifted helplessly down- 
stream ; whereupon the other vessels abandoned the now unequal 
contest. Foote's anticipation had been fulfilled, though it is 
probable that the navy would have succeeded in silencing the 
batteries but for the chance which disabled simultaneously two of 
the four ironclads. 

The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson broke through the 
centre of the first line of Confederate defence and necessitated the 
evacuation of the works at Columbus. Most of the heavy guns 
were transferred from those works to Island No. 10 and New 
Madrid, some sixty miles further down-stream.^ This new Con- 
federate post on the Mississippi lay at the point where the river 
makes a huge double bend, Island No. 10 being at the bottom of 
the first bend, and New Madrid in the second. Pope, marching 
through Missouri, reached the right bank below New Madrid, and 
by planting batteries on that bank cut off the supplies of that 
place and compelled its evacuation. With great labour a canal 
was cut through the submerged forest land on the Missouri bank, 
by which the transports were enabled to join the army without 
going near the guns on the island. But the gunboats drew too 
much water to follow this route, whilst, if the Confederate forces 
in the island and on the left bank were to be captured, it was 
essential that the gunboats should run past the batteries and 
get below to cover the passage of Pope's troops. P""oote had come 
down the river with six ironclads and ten mortar-boats, and on 
March 17th attacked the batteries at long range. The distance, 
however, was too great to produce much effect. 

At that time Foote's squadron was the only naval force which 
the Federals had on the Mississippi. Farragut had not yet 
reached New Orleans, and report declared that the Confederates 
were collecting a formidable squadron at Memphis. This rumour 
proved much exaggerated ; but under the circumstances Foote 
refused to risk his fleet by exposing it in a close-range action, 
especially as his ships would now be fighting down-stream, and 

» I B. & L., 439- 



Aprii , 1862] NAVAL OPERATIONS 471 

if disabled would drift into the grasp of the Confederates. On the 
other hand, the Confederate flotilla might soon be moving up the 
river, and would then make short work of Pope's transports. The 
army officers pressed Foote to run past the batteries in the night, 
but the naval commander considered the risk too great. But 
Commander Walke, of the Carondelet, believed that it could be 
done, and volunteered to make the attempt.^ 

The Confederate position was a very strong one against any 
force coming down-stream. On the island were four batteries 
mounting 23 guns, whilst 32 guns were in position along the 
Tennessee shore. There was also a floating battery moored off 
the island carrying 9 or 10 heavy guns. On the night of April ist 
a boat expedition landed on the island, and taking the garrison by 
surprise, spiked one battery. 

On the night of the 4th Walke determined to attempt his 
perilous feat. Every possible device had been adopted to protect 
the vessel. The boilers and other vulnerable spots were covered 
with layers of chain-cable, hawsers, and lumber. On the port 
side a barge was lashed to cover the magazine. The steam was 
allowed to escape through the wheel-houses to prevent the sound 
which was made when it issued through the smoke-stacks. At 
10 p.m. the moon set, and a great thunderstorm was swiftly 
rushing up. Walke cast off" from his moorings in pitch dark- 
ness, which from time to time was illuminated by the lightning 
flashes. Only the eastern channel between the island and the 
Tennessee shore was available. Fortunately the floating battery 
had that same day drifted down the river. The passage was 
made without loss, though the soot in the smoke-stacks twice 
caught fire, and by the sudden blaze betrayed the position of the 
vessel.^ 

But the thunderstorm disconcerted the aim of the gunners, and 
the Carondelet escaped unhit. Her arrival below New Madrid 
sealed the fate of the Confederates. On the 6th she engaged 
the batteries lower down towards Tiptonville, and one battery 
was captured and its guns spiked. On that night the Pittsburg 
ran past the island, and the next day the two gunboats silenced 
the batteries down-stream, and Pope, crossing his troops over the 
river, cut the line of the Confederate retreat and compelled the 
surrender of the whole force. Without the co-operation of the 
Navy such a triumph would have been impossible, and the highest 
credit is due to the gallant Walke for being the first to make the 
attempt to run past heavy batteries. 

Meanwhile the Tyler and Lexington had accompanied Grant's 
army up the Tennessee to Pittsburg Landing, and on April 6th, in 

1 I B. & L., 442. 2 I B^ L_^ 444_ 



472 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the great battle of Shiloh, played an important part by covering 
the left of the Federal position.^ 

The Confederates prepared to make their next stand on the 
Mississippi at Fort Pillow, eighty miles below New Madrid. Pope 
was arranging for a combined attack with the land and naval 
forces upon that position, when he was called away to take part 
in Halleck's advance on Corinth. The Federal flotilla bombarded 
Fort Pillow, but found itself opposed by a new foe. In January 
the military authorities at New Orleans had seized fourteen river 
steamers and converted them into rams by strengthening their 
bows with iron casing, whilst the engines were protected with 
cotton bales and pine bulwarks. Six of these vessels were kept at 
New Orleans to resist Farragut's threatened advance. The other 
eight were sent up the river to close its upper waters against the 
descending fleet. 

On May loth the rams steamed up from Fort Pillow and 
attacked the Cincinnati, which was anchored off the Arkansas 
shore to protect a mortar-boat bombarding the fort from behind a 
point on that bank. The Federals were taken by surprise, and 
the Cincinnati was rammed twice and sank. The Mound City, 
which was the first to come to her aid, was also rammed, and, to 
escape sinking, ran ashore. Three of the rams were disabled, and 
drifted down-stream under the guns of the fort, followed by their 
comrades, as the rest of the Federal gunboats came into action. 
The Cincinnati and Mound City were repaired and ready for action 
again by the end of the month. 

In March Colonel Charles Ellet, Junr., who for some years had 
advocated the use of the steam ram in warfare, had been instructed 
by the Federal Government to purchase some river steamers and 
convert them into rams on a plan of his own. He bought seven 
vessels, selecting them for their speed and strength, and built on to 
each three solid timber bulkheads, whilst a two-foot bulwark of 
oak protected the boilers. 

Fort Pillow was abandoned after Beauregard's evacuation of 
Corinth, and the Federal fleet now under Davis- continued down 
the river towards Memphis. It now consisted of five ironclads 
with two of Ellet's rams, the Queen of the West and the Monarch? 
The Confederate rams were lying off" Memphis, and on June 6th 

' Mahan quotes the testimony of both Grant and Beauregard to the good work done 
by the gunboats. Bragg, however, quoted in i B. & L. , 567, says that the fire of the 
gunboats " did not in the slightest degree mar our prospects or our progress." But he 
admits that it terrified the reserves and stragglers and caused the troops to abandon the 
contest. 

^ On May 9th Foote resigned his command and went north, suffering from the effects 
of a wound received at Fort Donelson. 

* A third of Ellet's rams, the Switzerland, arrived after the battle was decided, and 
took part in the pursuit. 



June, 1862] NAVAL OPERATIONS 473 

steamed up to attack. The Federal ironclads were already 
dropping down the river with their heads up-stream. As soon as 
the first gun was fired, the two Federal rams unmoored and rushed 
straight at the Confederates through the intervals between the gun- 
boats. The Confederate rams, expecting to have to deal only with 
gunboats, fell into some confusion at this sudden attack. The 
Queen of the West rammed one of her opponents and sunk her in 
deep water, but was herself rammed and ran ashore. The Monarch 
was charged from opposite sides by two rams, which missing their 
mark, collided with each other. One was so severely injured that 
she ran ashore ; the other was rammed by the Monarch, and at the 
same time received a shot in her boiler and sank. The Federal 
gunboats had now come into action. Another Confederate ram 
received a shot in her steam-chest and ran ashore. Having lost 
half their number, the rest took to flight, but were hotly pursued 
for ten miles. One was destroyed, two captured, and only one 
escaped. 

On the 29th Davis left Memphis with four ironclads and six 
mortar-boats, and on July ist joined hands above Vicksburg with 
Farragut, who had ascended the river from the Gulf (Map X.). 

New Orleans was considerably the largest city and the com- 
mercial capital of the Confederacy. It contained the most skilled 
workmen and the largest workshops in the South. Its capture 
would open the Mississippi, and be at any rate the first step in the 
process of cutting the Confederacy in twain. Moreover, its fall 
would checkmate Napoleon III.'s thinly veiled design of recognis- 
ing the Confederacy. Had the attempt been made in the summer 
of 1 86 1, it is far from unlikely that a Federal fleet would have 
encountered only the faintest resistance, and that the whole course 
of the Mississippi would have passed forthwith under Federal 
control.^ But the Federal Government was not prepared for war, 
and took time to realise that the struggle was a desperate one, 
and could only be ended by the complete subjugation of the 
South. Consequently the attempt to open the Mississippi from 
the Gulf was not undertaken till the spring of 1862. 

For the command of the naval force David Glasgow Farragut 
was selected. The Nelson of the American navy was then just 
over sixty years old. He had been a midshipman on board the 
Essex, when that vessel was captured during the war of 1812 in 
Valparaiso Harbour by the English cruisers Phcebe and Cherub. 
His service record was excellent. By birth a native of Tennessee, 
his Southern kinsmen and friends had vainly endeavoured to 
seduce him from his allegiance to the United States. 

^ ' ' Any three vessels could have passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip a month after 
the commencement of the vi'ar, and gone on to Cairo without any trouble " (Admiral 
Porter, 2 B. & L., 23). 



474 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

On February 20th he arrived in Mississippi Sound to take com- 
mand of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron. This force, 
entirely composed of wooden vessels, consisted of the 40-gun 
frigate, Colorado : four screw sloops, the Hartford, Pensacola, 
Brooklyn, and Richmond: one side-wheel steamer, the Mississippi: 
three screw corvettes, the Oneida, Varuna, and Iroquois, and nine 
screw gunboats. There was in addition a mortar flotilla of twenty 
schooners, each carrying one 13-inch mortar, with a squadron of 
six gunboats assigned for their special protection. This section 
was under the command of Commander D. D. Porter. The 
greatest difficulty was experienced in getting two of the heaviest 
vessels over the bar, and the Colorado in spite of every effort had 
to be left outside. 

The Confederates profited by this respite to strengthen their 
defences. New Orleans lies no miles from the mouths of the 
Mississippi. Ninety miles below the city at the Plaquemine Bend 
stood on opposite banks Forts St. Philip and Jackson, mounting 
between them 126 guns. ^ But a large proportion of these guns 
were of light calibre, being 32-pounders or smaller. Fort Jackson 
was on the right bank, 800 yards below P^ort St. Philip. Across 
the river between the two forts a powerful raft of cypress logs 
had been placed, but in March a sudden freshet carried away 
the centre of this boom, and the gap was filled by seven or eight 
schooners secured by two anchors each and fastened to each other 
and the ends of the boom by i-inch chains. Their masts had 
been taken out, and with the rigging were suffered to drift astern to 
foul the screws of approaching vessels. 

Major-General Mansfield Lovell was in command of the Depart- 
ment, but only had at his disposal some 3,000 raw troops imperfectly 
armed. Nearly every available man had been drawn away to 
assist Johnston in his great attack on Grant. The first line of the 
Confederate defences represented by the two forts was under the 
command of Brigadier-General Duncan. - The naval force in the 
river was commanded by Commander Mitchell, who was independ- 
ent of the military commanders. It consisted of four vessels of the 
Confederate navy, two ships belonging to the State of Louisiana, 
and six steamers of the River Defence fleet.^ These last were, 
however, under the command of a merchant captain, who refused 
to recognise the authority of the naval commander. The Louisiana, 
an ironclad of the Merrimac type, carrying sixteen heavy guns, was 
much the most formidable vessel in Mitchell's squadron. But her 

' For this total, 74 in Fort Jackson and 52 in Fort St. Philip, see 2 B. & L., 75. 

- Duncan was in general command of the coast defences. Colonel Iliggins was in 
immediate command of the two forts. 

' These six steamers were sister vessels of the eight rams which had been sent up 
the river and were defeated at Memphis. 



April, 1862] NAVAL OPERATIONS 475 

gun-ports were too small, and her engines, taken from an old river 
steamer, were too weak.^ She was not yet ready for action and 
was still in the hands of the artificers. The most effective vessel 
proved to be the cigar-shaped ironclad Manassas, carrying one 
32-pounder carronade firing right ahead. Her engines also were 
defective, and she had no ram.- Another ironclad was also in 
process of construction. 

On April i8th the mortar flotilla opened fire on the forts, and 
the bombardment was steadily maintained for the next five days 
and nights. Fort Jackson was the principal objective. The 
schooners took position about 3,000 yards below the fort under 
cover of a wood on the right bank, and their mast-heads were 
dressed with bushes, that they might not be distinguished from the 
trees. Though Fort Jackson was invisible from their decks, yet 
its exact position had been ascertained by triangulation, and the 
fire of the mortar-boats was extremely accurate. 

But though 16,800 shells were fired in the six days, the fort was 
not forced to surrender, nor was its fire silenced, as Porter had ex- 
pected. Farragut had never placed much confidence in the mortar 
flotilla. But the Navy Department had decided upon its employ- 
ment before he received the command.^ Convinced that the 
bombardment would not force the forts to surrender, he determined 
to run past their batteries and make straight for New Orleans. 

But it was essential that the boom across the river should first be 
broken. This was done on the night of the 20th by Lieutenant 
Caldwell in the gunboat Itasca!^ The original design was to tor- 
pedo one of the hulks. But the attempt failed. The gunboat then 
steamed up the narrow channel between the left bank and the 
eastern end of the boom, and charging at full speed from above 
broke the chains between two of the hulks.^ A passage was now 
clear : for only two hulks at the eastern end and one at the 
western retained their original positions. On the same night the 
Louisiana came down the river, but Mitchell, deaf to the entreaties 
of the army officers, insisted on mooring her just above Fort St. 
Philip, as she still had the artificers on board and also lacked 

^ Wilson, i. 41. For description of the Merrimac, see p. 486. 

'■^ The Manassas had been originally a Boston tugboat. "An arched roof of 5-inch 
timber was thrown over her deck, and this covered with a layer of old-fashioned rail- 
road iron, from three-fourths to one inch thick." When first converted into a 
warship she had been provided with a cast-iron prow under water. On October 
1 2th, 1 86 1, she had come down the river and attacked the Richmond, In the 
collision her prow was wrenched off. " She now had no prow, the iron of the hull 
only being carried round the stem." 

3 2 B. cSc L,, 70, 

* Assisted by the gunboat Pinola. Fleet-Captain Bell commanded the two gun- 
boats. 

" The hulk at the eastern end of the boom had already been dislodged by the 
Itasca. 



476 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

motive power. By the 23rd all preparations on board the fleet 
were complete. But it was necessary to make sure that the Con- 
federates had not put any fresh obstructions in the gap between 
the hulks. After dark Caldwell went up the river in a row-boat 
and found that the passage was still quite clear. 

At 2 a.m. on the 24th Farragut hoisted the signal on his flag- 
ship, the Hartford. He had finally decided to run past the forts 
in two columns, the starboard column starting first, and its last 
ship being followed by the leading vessel of the port column, so 
that the fleet would ultimately be formed in single line ahead. It 
took the heavy vessels some time to purchase their anchors in the 
strong current, and the noise of getting under way put the Con- 
federates on the alert. The gunboat Cayuga, leading the star- 
board column, passed through the opening in the boom at 
3.30 a.m., followed by the Pensacola, Mississippi, Oneida, Varuna, 
and three gunboats. 

As the second vessel reached the gap, the Confederate guns 
opened fire from both banks. The Cayuga, Varuna, and another 
gunboat steamed rapidly ahead. The Cayuga was only fifteen 
minutes under the fire of the forts, and the Varuna an even 
shorter period. Having passed the batteries, they became engaged 
with the flotilla further up the river. The heavier Federal 
vessels advanced more slowly, engaging the forts deliberately, and 
sometimes stopping altogether to give more effect to their broad- 
sides. The Pensacola and Mississippi both engaged Fort St. Philip, 
and their fire temporarily drove the gunners from their posts. The 
Manassas, steaming down the river after an unsuccessful attempt 
to ram the Pensacola, struck the Mississippi, but without disabling 
her. Shortly after the current carried the Mississippi over towards 
the west bank. The Oneida, next in line, now had her course 
clear before her and ran quickly by close under the left bank, 
where the fire of St. Philip passed over her. The two last gun- 
boats of this column were delayed. It would seem that the port 
column started before the starboard column had cleared the 
obstacles and its leading vessels overlapped the rear vessels of 
the other. The Hartford, leading the second column, soon found 
herself in great peril. She was steering in to attack Fort Jackson 
when the advance of a fire-raft drove her across the river, and 
she ran aground under Fort St. Philip. In this position she was 
attacked by the fire-raft, which was pushed against her by the tug 
Mosher. 

The flames quickly caught and leapt up her rigging, whilst the 
guns of both forts were playing upon her. But the crew, encour- 
aged by the heroic example of their commander, proved staunch. 
The flames were got under : a shot in her boilers sank the Mosher 
with her gallant crew of six men, and the Hartford, getting clear 



April 24, 1862] NAVAL OPERATIONS 477 

of the shoal, passed up the river out of range. The Brooklyn, 
her immediate follower, in the dense smoke lost sight of her leader 
and collided with one of the rear gunboats of the starboard 
column. She fell off across the stream under a heavy fire from 
St. Philip. When she got clear of the boom, she was rammed by 
the Manassas, but the blow seemed at the time to have done no 
serious damage. Nearing St. Philip her captain, seeing the Hart- 
ford aground, stopped the engines and dropped down to the help 
of the flagship.^ When the Hartford extricated herself, the 
Brooklyn followed her past St. Philip, into which she poured a 
heavy fire, and just above the fort exchanged broadsides in passing 
with the Louisiana. The Richmond and a gunboat passed the 
forts with but little loss. But the next two vessels, the Pinola and 
Iroquois, suffered more severely. The former was exposed to a 
heavy fire from St. Philip, and the light of the fire-rafts enabled 
the gunners to take good aim. The Iroquois, after passing St. 
Philip, was roughly handled by the Louisiana, with which she 
collided. The last three gunboats of the second column failed to 
make the passage. The Itasca received a shot in her boilers, and 
the other two fouled the obstructions. But with the passage of the 
heavy ships the day was won. 

Above the forts a confused fight had been raging between the 
Confederate flotilla and the Federal ships, which first passed up 
the river. The Confederates were overmatched, and few of their 
vessels acquitted themselves with credit. The rams of the River 
Defence Fleet, thinking only of escape, ran ashore and were fired 
by their crews. But the Varuna, which had pushed ahead out of 
reach of support, was fiercely engaged by the Governor Moore, 
and after being rammed by two opponents sank close to the east 
bank. The Cayuga and Oneida made short work of the other 
Confederate ships. The Manassas followed the Federal fleet up 
the river, but when the Mississippi turned upon her took to flight 
and ran ashore. Daybreak found only three Confederate vessels 
surviving. The Louisiana was moored above Fort St. Philip and 
two others had taken refuge under the guns of the forts. 

Farragut's bold determination had been completely justified. 
With a loss of only one vessel and of 37 men killed and 147 
wounded,^ he had passed the forts, and New Orleans lay at his 
mercy. On the 25th the fleet continued up the river and, after 
easily silencing two weak batteries four miles below New Orleans, 
appeared before the city at noon. The wildest confusion prevailed 
there. Cotton and shipping had been set on fire, including the 

^ 2 B. &. L., 63-4. The Brooklyn was more seriously injured by her collision with 
the Manassas than at first sight appeared. Her "side was stove in about six feet 
below the waterline. A little more would have sunk her." See also 2 B. & L. , 69. 

2 2 B. & L., 73. 



478 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Mississippi, an ironclad, which was nearly completed but could not 
be taken up-stream owing to lack of tugs. General Lovell had 
left the city, which was occupied by the land forces under General 
Butler on May ist. The forts had been surrendered by General 
Duncan on April 28th, but Commander Mitchell, claiming to be 
independent of the military authorities, set the Louisiajia on fire. 

When once New Orleans was in the hands of the land forces, 
Farragut proceeded up the river. Baton Rouge and Natchez 
surrendered at the first summons, and no resistance was encoun- 
tered till Vicksburg was reached. That city was at the time the 
last remaining stronghold of the Confederates on the Mississippi. 
Situated midway between New Orleans and Memphis, and four 
hundred miles distant from either, it was a position of great 
natural strength. Two miles above Vicksburg the river makes a 
great bend from north-east to south-west, and between the two 
parallel reaches is a narrow tongue of land not more than a mile 
wide. On the left bank the bluffs rise high above the river. At 
the top of the bend they are 260 feet high, gradually sinking to 
about 1 50 feet. Though not nearly so strong as later in the war, 
the batteries at Vicksburg, in the summer of 1862, were fairly 
formidable. They mounted twenty-six (or possibly only twenty- 
two) guns, ranged along a line some three miles long. 

From the first it was plain that the co-operation of a land force 
was necessary to effect the reduction of the place. But the force 
under Butler was not strong enough for the purpose. So Farragut 
waited till the inevitable fall of Corinth should enable Halleck to 
send to his aid some portion of his great army of 100,000 men. 
But Halleck signally failed to grasp the strategic problem and left 
the naval forces severely alone. 

Under the circumstances Farragut would have preferred to 
return down the river with his fleet, which sorely needed repairs. 
But the great anxiety of his Government for the reduction of 
Vicksburg determined him to run past the batteries and join hands 
with Davis' flotilla. He had with him besides his flagship, the 
Brooklyn, Richmond, Iroquois, Oneida, and six gunboats, also the 
steamers and seventeen mortar schooners of Porter's flotilla. The 
schooners commenced the bombardment on June 26th, continued 
it throughout the 27th, and at 3 a.m. of the 28th the fleet, covered 
by the fire of all Porter's vessels, started to run past the batteries. 
This was accomplished by the majority of the ships with but 
slight loss,' but the Brooklyn and two of the gunboats, owing to a 
misinterpretation of their orders after engaging the batteries for 
two hours, dropped down-stream again. 

' The total loss was fifteen killed and thirty wounded. Eight of the former belonged 
to the crew of one of the slcaniars of the mortar llotiila, which received a shot in her 
boiler. 



July, 1862] NAVAL OPERATIONS 479 

The night's work made it plain to Farragut that he could run 
past the batteries without much risk whenever he chose, but that 
he could not hope to effect more than temporarily silencing the 
guns. On July ist he was joined by Davis. 

It was known that a formidable ironclad ram, the Arkansas, was 
up the Yazoo, and on July 15th the Carondelet, Tyler, and the 
Queen of the West were sent up that river to look for her. The 
ram had been built at Memphis, but was hurried down-stream in 
a still incomplete condition just in time to escape capture. She 
was of the Merrimac type, carrying ten guns in a casemate pro- 
tected with three inches of railroad iron. In the Yazoo her con- 
struction was rapidly completed, and coming down the river on 
the 15th she encountered the Federal squadron about six miles 
from the mouth. They turned and retreated down-stream. The 
Arkansas followed in pursuit, and a running fight ensued between 
her and the two gunboats, the Quee^i of the West having fled out 
of sight on the first discovery of the ram. The Carondelet was 
at a great disadvantage, as her stern guns were overmatched by 
her opponent's bow guns. After about an hour's action, having 
her wheel-ropes shot through, she retreated close to the bank 
where the Arkansas, with her heavier draught, could not follow 
her.^ The ram continued down-stream in pursuit of the Tyler. 
Her speed was, however, reduced to little more than a knot an 
hour owing to her smoke-stack having been riddled with shot. 
She failed to overtake the Tyler, and, on entering the Mississippi, 
ran boldly through the Federal fleet to find shelter under the guns 
of Vicksburg. The Federals were caught off their guard. Only 
one vessel had steam up, and her captain let the opportunity 
escape him. The ram safely reached Vicksburg after exchanging 
broadsides with each of the Federal vessels as she passed. 

Farragut, apprehensive lest the ram should go down-stream and 
play havoc with Porter's flotilla, at once determined to run past 
the batteries with his own squadron and endeavour to destroy the 
ram before she had time to refit. But the necessary preparations 
were not completed till night had fallen, and under cover of the 
darkness the Arkansas changed her position. Farragut's squadron 
passed the batteries in the night, but quite failed to damage the 
ram, as her position could not be made out. 

A week later Davis sent the Essex and Queen of the West to 
attack her. The two vessels started soon after dawn of the 22nd, 

^ The Carondelet in this running fight was at a double disadvantage. Her stern was 
only armed with two 32-pounder smoothbores, and was unprotected by armour. The 
commander of the Arkaiisas, Captain Brown, claims to have disabled his opponent. 
He says (3 B. & L., 575) that as the Arkansas passed the Carondelet, not a shot was 
fired from the latter ship and no flag was flying. The Federal accounts deny this latter 
statement, and say that the Arkansas' flag was down as she passed. 



480 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

but the Arkansas was well handled, and the Essex not daring to 
ram bow to bow, passed down the river under a heavy fire. The 
Queen of the West rammed the Confederate vessel, but without 
inflicting vital injury, and then returned up-stream. 

As there was no prospect of a sufficiently large force becoming 
available for a combined attack on Vicksburg, Farragut returned 
with his fleet to New Orleans. The Mississippi was falling and 
the health of the crews was suffering. 

The Arkansas, having been hastily refitted, was sent down the 
river on August 3rd to take part in the attack on Baton Rouge.^ 
On the way her engines broke down, and she ran hard into the 
bank. In this plight she was discovered by the Essex, which came 
up the river to look for her. On the appearance of the Federal 
ironclad the Arkansas was set on fire by her crew and destroyed. 

When Farragut withdrew from below Vicksburg, Davis with his 
squadron ascended the river to Helena. The Essex, Sumter^ and 
two gunboats were the only Federal vessels remaining in the 
Mississippi between Vicksburg and New Orleans. In October 
Davis was relieved by Porter. Two new types of vessels were 
now added to the Mississippi fleet. One consisted of "light- 
draughts" or "tinclads," vessels of very light draught, and pro- 
tected against musketry by a thin coating of iron from a half to 
three-quarters of an inch thick. These vessels were specially 
intended for service in the tributaries. The other class was com- 
posed of five ironclads, intended to be faster and stronger, both 
for offence and defence, than the Eads gunboats, the Chillicothe^ 
Choctaw, Indianola, Lafayette, and Tuscumbia? 

In November Porter ordered an expedition up the Yazoo. A 
number of Confederate steamers were known to be plying on this 
river and its tributaries, and at Yazoo City, eighty miles up the 
river, a navy-yard had been established, and three powerful war 
vessels were being built. On December 12th the Cairo was sunk 
by a mine in the Yazoo. The mines were removed and two 
landing-places secured, but the joint attack of the land and naval 

' Made by General Breckinridge (see Cap. XVII.). 

* The Sumter was one of Ellet's rams, which had accompanied Farragut's squadron, 
when it returned below Vicksburg on July 15th. 

* The Tuscumbia, of 565 tons, carried three 1 1 -inch guns in her forward casemate 
and two loo-pounder rifles in a stern casemate. The Indianola, of 442 tons, also had 
two casemates, and carried two ii-inch guns in one and two 9-inch guns in the other. 
The Chillicothe, of 303 tons, carried two 11 inch guns in one casemate. These three 
vessels were specially Ijuilt for the Government. They drew from five to seven feet of water,^ 
but " were so weakly built as to be dangerous and comparatively inefficient vessels." 
The Choctaw and Lafayette of 1,000 tons each were purchased by the Government and 
converted into ironclads equipped with rams. They were more powerful vessels than the 
other three. The Choctaw carried three 11 -inch guns and one 100- pounder rifle in the 
forward casemate, two 30-poun(ier Parrot rifles and two 24-pounder howitzers in two 
Ihwartship casemates. The Lafayette carried two ii-inch and four ginch guns, two 
24-poundcr howitzers, and two loo-poundcr rifles in one casemate (Mahan, 111-14). 



Feb., 1863] NAVAL OPERATIONS 481 

forces under General Sherman at the end of the month failed, and 
the beginning of the next year found the naval force back again 
in the Mississippi. 

McClernand relieving Sherman, made a move up the Arkansas 
River against Arkansas Post, which was being used as a base 
from which Confederate vessels could dash out into the Mississippi 
and interfere with the Federal line of communications up the 
river. The land force was accompanied by three ironclads and all 
the light-draught gunboats of Porter's fleet. On January nth the 
fort surrendered. The special work assigned to the ironclads of 
silencing the three heavy guns in the casemates of the fort was 
most efficiently done.^ After the surrender the De Kalb ascended 
the White River to a point fifty miles above St. Charles, and 
destroyed the railway depot on the line to Little Rock, the capital 
of the State. 

By Farragut's withdrawal to New Orleans the Confederates had 
regained undisputed control of the Mississippi between Vicksburg 
and Port Hudson. This part of the river was of special import- 
ance to the Confederacy, as supplies could be brought from the 
Trans-Mississippi States down the Red River. Already the 
Eastern States in the South were largely dependent for their food 
upon the three Western States, and, if Vicksburg was to be 
reduced, it was essential that the Federal navy should regain 
possession of that section of the Mississippi into which the Red 
River discharges its waters. 

On February 2nd, 1863, Porter despatched the Queen of the 
West to run past the batteries and prey upon the Confederate 
commerce in the lower Mississippi and its tributaries. The ram 
got safely past Vicksburg and, having replenished her bunkers 
from a coal barge which was floated down-stream a few nights 
later, started up the Red River in company with a small steamer, 
the De Soto. But the recklessness of her youthful commander, 
Colonel C. R. Ellet, quickly caused her loss. Dashing up the 
river on the 14th in pursuit of three large steamers, of which he 
had received information, he suddenly found himself under the 
guns of a battery. The Queen ran aground ; a shot cut the steam 
pipe and stopped the engines. A wounded officer was on board, 
whom it was impossible to move. So the crew, instead of firing 
the vessel, left her to the Confederates and made their escape to 
the De Soto. 

But a still more disastrous result was to follow from Ellet's 
rashness and lack of due preparation. On the night of February 
1 2th the ironclad Indianola had run past the batteries to join the 
Queen in her raid. Having gone down to the mouth of the Red 

1 For Sherman's unsuccessful attack at Chickasaw Bkiffs and McCIernand's expedi- 
tion to Arkansas Post, see Cap. XVII. 



482 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

River, her captain, hearing that a Confederate squadron was 
coming to attack him, retired up-river, but on the night of the 
24th was overtaken by the pursuing squadron, which consisted of 
the captured Queen^ a ram and two small steamers, and after a 
sharp engagement was forced to surrender his vessel, which was in 
a sinking condition. The hidianola did not long remain in Con- 
federate hands. For a dummy monitor sent down the river two 
nights later as a joke by Porter so alarmed the Confederates on 
board the prize that they set her on fire. But the river between 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson was again under the control of the 
Confederates. 

By this time conditions were favourable for another advance up 
the river by the Gulf squadron, and after the Federals had lost 
control of the river below Vicksburg by the capture of the Queen 
of the West and the Indianola, Farragut judged that the time had 
come for his fleet to attempt to recover possession of that portion 
of the river. But the task was much more formidable than in the 
previous year. During the interval the Confederates had estab- 
lished powerful batteries at Port Hudson. This position was a 
strong one. The town lies on the east bank just below a sharp 
bend of the river. The bluffs beginning at the bend extend 
a mile and a half down-stream, and are of a height of from eighty 
to hundred feet. Just below the bend a spit runs out from the west 
bank opposite the town. Along the bluffs nineteen heavy guns 
were mounted at different points, and in the ensuing action a 
considerable number of field guns also took part. 

On March 14th Farragut appeared below Port Hudson with the 
Hartford, Richmond, Mississippi, Monongahcla, and three gun- 
boats. Each of the larger vessels, with the exception of the 
Mississippi, took with them a gunboat secured on the port-side to 
protect these smaller vessels from the heavy fire of the batteries. 
The Essex and some mortar schooners were to remain below and 
cover the passage of the fleet by their fire. At 10 p.m. the ships 
got under weigh. The Hartford with the Albatross led and ran 
past the batteries without suffering serious injury, though the flag- 
ship narrowly escaped running aground. None of the other 
vessels were successful in the attempt. The RicJiniond had her 
safety-valves damaged by a shot, and losing her motive power, had 
to be carried down-stream by her consort. The Monongahela ran 
aground and, when at last she got off, her engines ceased to move 
owing to a crank-pin being heated, and she drifted down-stream. 
The Mississippi ran hard aground and had to be set on fire by her 
crew. But in spite of this partial failure Farragut with his two 
vessels was again in possession of the river between Port Hudson 
and Vicksburg, and the mouth of the Red River was closed to the 
Confederates. Having only a fraction of his fleet with him, 



April, 1863] NAVAL OPERATIONS 483 

Farragut called upon Porter for reinforcements. In that admiral's 
temporary absence on a Bayou expedition, General A. W. Ellet^ 
commanding the rams of Porter's fleet assumed the responsibility 
of sending down two of them, the Lancaster and Sivitzcrland, to 
join Farragut. The two rams started down-river on the night of 
the 24th, but the sun had risen before they reached the batteries. 
The Switzerland got safely past, though repeatedly hulled and 
receiving two shots in her boilers, but the Lancaster was sunk. 

In the meantime Porter above Vicksburg had made two un- 
successful attempts to turn the right flank of the Vicksburg 
defences by the Yazoo.^ When Grant determined to put his army 
across the river below Vicksburg, the co-operation of the fleet was 
required to silence the batteries at Grand Gulf. Porter agreed to 
run past Vicksburg on the night of April i6th. As the sole object 
of the fleet was to get past the batteries with the smallest possible 
loss, every precaution was taken to prevent the enemy from seeing 
or hearing the fleet, as it passed. Each vessel was to take down 
on her starboard side a coal barge in order that the fleet might not 
be hampered by want of fuel in its operations below Vicksburg. 
Seven ironclads were selected for the expedition, which was ac- 
companied by three transports laden with stores. Though the 
Confederates quickly discovered the ships and poured in a heavy 
fire as they passed, the fleet got safely by with the loss of one 
transport and one coal barge. On the night of the 22nd six more 
transports laden with stores ran past the batteries with the loss of 
one of their number. 

When the land and naval forces were united below Vicksburg, 
the next step was for the navy to silence the guns of Grand Gulf, 
after which the troops were to cross in the transports and storm 
the works. To resist this attack the Confederates had two 
batteries of four guns each about three-quarters of a mile apart.^ 
The upper battery was close to the water's edge, about seventy-five 
feet above the stream. But the bluffs, on which the lower battery 
was mounted, were about 300 yards distant from the river-bank. 
On the morning of the 29th the fleet steamed down the river. 
P'our vessels were assigned to attack the lower battery, whilst the 
other three were to deal with the upper one. The lower battery 
was silenced, and then the efforts of all the vessels were con- 
centrated against the other. But, as at Fort Donelson, it proved 
too hard a task for the ships to silence guns which could bring 

^ A. W. Ellet was the younger brother, and C. R. Ellet, the unhicky commander of 
the Queen of the West, the son of the creator of the ram fleet. 

^ For the naval expeditions by way of the Yazoo Pass and Steele's Bayou, see 
Cap. XVII. 

■■' Besides the heavier guns in these two batteries, there were five light rifled guns in 
different parts of the Confederate works. 



484 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

a plunging fire upon them from a commanding height. After an 
engagement of over four hours' duration, Grant and Porter decided 
that it was impossible to carry the works from the river. The 
troops were marched still further down-stream, and the ships with- 
drew out of range up-stream. That night they ran past the 
batteries and rejoined the army below. 

With the land forces safely established on the east bank, the 
main work of the navy was done, but it continued to render 
valuable assistance till the end of the operations against Vicks- 
burg and Port Hudson. The ships which had remained above 
Vicksburg took part on April 30th in Sherman's demonstration 
against Haines' Bluff. Farragut patrolled the river between the 
mouth of the Red River and Port Hudson, and prevented reinforce- 
ments being sent across to Port Hudson from General Taylor in 
Louisiana. Porter ascended the Red River with three ironclads and 
some smaller vessels, and without encountering any opposition 
reached Alexandria early in May. This movement was in co- 
operation with the advance of General Banks' army overland upon 
the same place as a preliminary to undertaking the siege of Port 
Hudson. 

During that siege the Essex and six mortar-boats kept up a 
constant bombardment and series of engagements with the water- 
batteries. Porter on his return from the Red River, finding that 
the Confederates had abandoned Haines' Bluff, sent an expedition 
up the Yazoo to capture Yazoo City. The Confederate com- 
mander set fire to the navy-yard and three war steamers on the 
stocks, and abandoned the city. 

On May 22nd Porter's fleet below Vicksburg engaged the water- 
batteries in co-operation with Grant's attack on the land front. 
On the 27th the Cinci?ifiat{, which had remained above Vicksburg, 
was sunk in an engagement with a hill battery at the northern 
end of the Confederate lines. After Grant formally invested 
Vicksburg and established his depot of supplies on the Yazoo 
River, the chief duty of the navy was to keep open the line of 
communications up the Mississijjpi and prevent the Confederates 
interfering from the banks with the free passage of the store 
transports up and down the river. 

On June 7th the Confederate general, Taylor, attacked a brigade 
of coloured troops holding Milliken's Bend. This force was 
driven in great confusion under the river-bank, and only saved 
from destruction by the presence of the Choctaw, whose fire com- 
pelled the Confederates to retire. A similar service was rendered 
on July 4lh by the Tyler to the garrison of Helena, which was 
attacked by a greatly superior force under General Holmes. The 
commander of the gunboat placed her in such a position that her 
broadside played upon the enemy, who was advancing to the 



I86I-2] NAVAL OPERATIONS 485 

attack, whilst with her bow and stern guns she raked the Confede- 
rate artillery, which was posted above and below the town. It 
was largely owing to the assistance thus rendered that Holmes 
was beaten off with heavy loss. 

Shortly after the fall of Vicksburg, the De Kalb, when ascending 
the Yazoo, was sunk by a mine. She was the third of the Eads 
gunboats to be lost.^ 

Turning from the inland waters of the West to the coastline of 
the East (Map XII.), it will be noted that the main duty of the 
Federal navy was to enforce the blockade. For that purpose it 
was found to be more effective to seize a port and hold it with one 
or two vessels than to watch it with a considerably larger force 
from the sea. 

The first operation which the Federals undertook aimed at 
securing control of the inland waters of North Carolina, viz. 
Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. In August an expedition was 
sent to seize Hatteras Inlet. The two forts guarding the inlet 
were bombarded by the naval squadron under Flag-Officer 
Stringham, and on the 29th the Federals were in possession of the 
best sea entrance to the North Carolina Sounds.^ It was not, 
however, till the following year that any real use was made of the 
position thus gained. 

In January, 1862, a large expedition sailed under the command 
of General Burnside and Flag-Officer Goldsborough. The objec- 
tive of this expedition was Roanoke Island, which divides Pamlico 
and Albemarle Sounds. The island was defended by five forts 
mounting thirty-two heavy guns,^ and a squadron of seven very 
weak gunboats, known as the " Mosquito Fleet." On Feb- 
ruary 7th the fleet silenced the batteries, and the land forces were 
disembarked the same day. The next day the entrenchments 
were carried and the whole garrison captured. On the lOth the 
Mosquito Fleet was attacked and destroyed. 

This victory gave the Federals complete control of the Sounds. 
On March 12th the greater part of Burnside's force started for 
Newberne on the Neuse River, the second commercial city in 
North Carolina,* which was captured on the 14th. On April 26th 
Fort Macon, commanding the channel from the Atlantic to 
Beaufort, North Carolina, was reduced. The Federals were thus 
firmly established on the coast of North Carolina. 

At the end of October, 1861, a strong expedition under Major- 
General T. W. Sherman and Flag-Officer Du Pont sailed for the 
South Carolina coast. Their objective was Port Royal, which 
commanded the approach to Beaufort, South Carolina, lying some 

* The other two were the Cairo, sunk by a mine in the Yazoo, December I2th, 
1862, and the Cincinnati, sunk in action with the Vicksburg batteries. May 27th, 1863. 
2 I B. & L., 632-3. 3 I B. & L., 645. * I B. & L., 651. 



486 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

miles up the river of the same name. Port Royal itself was 
defended by two forts mounting forty-three guns and three very 
weak gunboats. On November 7th the fleet attacked the forts, 
and after a spirited engagement forced their evacuation during the 
afternoon ; on the 9th Beaufort was occupied, and the Federals 
thus secured one of the finest harbours on the Atlantic coast.^ 

When Virginia seceded, the Federal officer in command at 
Norfolk abandoned the navy-yard after setting fire to the ships 
there. Amongst these vessels was the JMcrriniac^ a 40-gun frigate 
of 3,500 tons, one of the six screw-frigates which, constructed in 
185s, were regarded at the time as the finest vessels in the United 
States Navy." The Mcrrimac sank before the flames had done 
their work, and in the summer she was raised and rebuilt by the 
Confederates as an ironclad. Mr. Mallory, the Confederate Secre- 
tary of the Navy, had at once recognised the uselessness of build- 
ing wooden vessels to contend against the superior numbers of the 
Federal navy. But believing that " invulnerability might com- 
pensate for numerical inequality," he had turned his attention to 
the construction of armoured vessels.^ The Merriviac was the first 
of the Confederate ironclads, and the others subsequently built were 
modelled upon her. She was cut down to the water-line, and on 
her hull was constructed amidships a rectangular casemate 170 feet 
long. The sides of this casemate, which was rounded at both 
ends, were composed of twenty-four inches of wood, over which 
four inches of iron rolled from rails were laid, and sloped at an 
angle of forty-five degrees.* The iron plating was continued 
two feet below the water-line. Two 7-inch rifled guns were 
mounted in this casemate fore and aft, working on pivots, whilst 
each broadside carried one 6-inch rifled and three 9-inch smooth- 
bore Dahlgren guns. The pilot-house was at the forward end of 
the casemate, rising three feet above the deck, and was of solid 
cast iron.^ A cast-iron ram projecting four feet was fitted to the 
stem. The stern of the vessel was almost flush with the water, but 
forward a light false bow of timber was built on. 

The Mcrriviac had several distinct defects. Her motive power 
was still the same as when she had been in the United States 
Navy. The engines and boilers had been condemned after her 
last cruise, and had not been improved by their recent experience. 
But the mechanical skill and resources of the South were not 
equal to providing her with a better set. Not more than five 
knots an hour could be got out of them, and they could not be 
relied upon for more than six hours at a stretch.*^ She drew 

» I B. & L., 68g. - I B. & L., 612. ^ i B. & L., 631. 

* Some accounts say tliirty-five degrees (i B. & L. , 717). 

* I B. & L., 717, from the account of Naval Constructor Porter, who was chiefly 
responsible for the reconstruction of the Merrimac. " i B. «& L., 694. 



March 8, 1862] NAVAL OPERATIONS 487 

twenty-two feet of water, and steered so badly that it took thirty 
to forty minutes to turn her.^ Her unarmoured ends extended 
no feet of her total length of 280 feet, and the rudder and pro- 
peller were quite unprotected.^ She was manned by a crew of 
300 men selected from the land forces, many of whom had had 
some experience as seamen or gunners. The officers were a very 
capable set, and the commander, Commodore Buchanan, had had 
a deservedly high reputation in the United States Navy. 

As soon as it was known that Ericsson was constructing for the 
Federals a rival ironclad, all speed was made to enable the 
Merrimac to deal with the enemy's wooden fleet before she could 
be encountered by a vessel of her own kind. On March 8th, 1862, 
accompanied by five small gunboats,^ she steamed into Hampton 
Roads (Map VH.). The Federal squadron in those waters was 
on paper a powerful one. Anchored off Fortress Monroe were 
two steam frigates, once sister vessels of the Merrimac, the Min- 
nesota, and Roanoke, with the St. Lawrence, a sailing frigate of 
fifty guns. Off Newport News, seven miles further up, lay at 
anchor the 50-gun frigate Congress and 30-gun sloop Cumberland, 
both sailing vessels. 

Soon after i p.m. the Congress, Cumberland, and shore batteries 
opened fire. But the shots glanced harmlessly off the sides of the 
casemate. When within short range the Merrimac opened fire. 
But Buchanan placed more reliance upon his ram than his guns. 
Steering straight at the Cumberland, he rammed her. The sloop 
at once began to sink. A huge hole had been made in her side, but 
her gallant crew refused to surrender, and continued to serve their 
guns until the vessel sank. The Congress slipped her cable and 
endeavoured to escape, but ran aground. The Merrimac took up 
a position within 150 yards of her, where she could rake her 
opponent with her whole broadside. The Congress was in a 
desperate plight, as she could only bring two guns to bear on the 
Merrimac, and the other frigates coming up to her help took the 
ground and could afford no assistance. After an hour's resistance, 
being on fire in more than one place and having suffered very 
heavy loss, she surrendered. The Confederates, unable to take 
possession of their prize, fired red-hot shot into her until she was 
in flames. 

It was now 5 p.m. ;^ nearly two hours of daylight remained, and 
the Minnesota, hard aground, seemed destined to be the next 
victim. But the pilots on board the Merrimac would not venture 
to take the vessel into the northern channel, where she would have 

1 I B. & L., 696. 

* For a description of the Merrimac see the article in I B. & L. , 693-4, by Colonel 
Wood, C.S.A., who served on board as a lieutenant ; also i Wilson, 4-5. 

^ I Wilson, 15. Other accounts say only two. * i B. & L., 700. 



488 THE CIVIL WAR LN THE UNITED STATES 

had the Minnesota at her mercy, but kept to the southern channel 
at a distance of nearly a mile from the frigate. Finding it im- 
possible to complete the work of destruction that night, and 
distrusting the capacity of her engines to stand any further strain, 
her commander withdrew. She had started a slight leak, and had 
left her ram in the side of the Cumberiand} l^ut her armour had 
kept out every projectile, and there seemed nothing to prevent her 
returning next morning to destroy the Minnesota. But at 9 p.m. 
on that eventful day the Monitor reached Hampton Roads. 

In August, 1 86 1, the Washington Navy Board had at last taken 
alarm at the report of the progress which was being made with the 
Merrimac, and invited designs for the construction of ironclads. In 
September, after much difficulty, Ericsson persuaded the Navy 
Board to construct an ironclad after a design of his own. The 
keel of the Alonitor was laid on October 25th ; she was launched 
on January 30th, 1862, and turned over to the Government as 
ready for sea on February 19th. 

In the construction of his vessel Ericsson was governed by three 
main considerations. First, she must be built in a very short 
space of time, as otherwise the Merrimac would have time to 
destroy the wooden fleet in Hampton Roads and then ravage the 
Northern seaboard at her pleasure. Secondly, she must be of light 
draught for use in the shallow waters of the Southern coast. 
Thirdly, in order to make her invulnerable she must carry a great 
thickness of armour, and the other two considerations dictated 
that therefore her guns must be few and possess an all-round fire. 

The Monitor was Ericsson's solution of these problems. She 
carried two 11 -inch Dahlgren smooth bores in a revolving turret. 
She was 172 feet long, of 1,000 tons displacement, and drew \o\ 
feet of water. The hull was almost entirely submerged ; there was 
only two feet of freeboard, and this was protected by five inches of 
iron. The deck was protected by one inch of iron, and both 
anchor and propeller were sheltered by the overhang. The anchor 
being hung in a well forward, could be lowered without a single 
man being exposed to view. The turret in the centre of the ship, 
20 feet in diameter inside and 9 feet high, was protected by eight 
inches of iron, and revolved upon a central pivot, which was sup- 
ported upon the ship's bottom. The square pilot-house projected 
four feet above the deck, was formed of 9-inch blocks of wrought 
iron held down by 3-inch bolts, was forward of the turret and could 
barely hold three men. The ventilation was entirely artificial, air 
being forced into the ship and escaping through the turret, where, 

' Colonel Wood, in liis .icc(junt, says that the ram was badly secured, and was left in 
the side of the Cumberland. But Naval Constructor I'orter says that the ram was so well 
secured, that though broken in two by striking the Cumberland, the fastenings to the 
vessel were not brolicn loose (i B. & L., 717). 



March 9, 1862] NAVAL OPERATIONS 489 

in action, the atmosphere was consequently rendered very oppres- 
sive and thick. The chief defect in the vessel was that the captain 
in the pilot-house and the executive officer in the turret were 
separated, the sole communication between the two being by 
a speaking-tube. The commander was Lieutenant Worden, the 
executive officer Lieutenant Greene, and the crew all told, officers 
and men, numbered fifty-eight.^ 

The Moftitor left New York in tow of a tug on March 6th. 
When once at sea her unseaworthy character was quickly demon- 
strated, and twice within thirty-six hours she narrowly escaped 
foundering." She entered Hampton Roads by the light of the 
still blazing Congress, and was directed by the commanding officer 
on the station to take up her position near the Minnesota in order 
to protect her against the attack, which was certain to be made 
next day. Early on the 9th the Merrimac left her anchorage. 
The presence of the Monitor was known. But no misgivings seem 
to have entered the mind of Lieutenant Jones, who was in tem- 
porary command owing to Buchanan having been wounded the 
previous day. During the night the injuries inflicted in her first 
engagement had been hastily repaired, but the loss of her smoke- 
stack had reduced her speed. The engagement between the two 
ironclads commenced about 8.30 a.m., and continued with one or 
two lulls till about i p.m. For some time the fight was carried on 
at close quarters, but without the armour of either ship being 
penetrated. The Merrimac had no solid shot on board, whilst 
that of the Monitor was of ordinary cast iron, and the powder 
charge only 15 lbs., though the gun, as was subsequently proved, 
could have stood double that charge. The Monitor had the great 
advantage of being faster, nimbler in manoeuvre, and of much 
lighter draught. Early in the engagement Worden made an 
attempt to ram, hoping to disable his opponent's screw, which, 
however, he just missed. 

Finding that the Monitor's turret was invulnerable, Jones deter- 
mined to leave her and devote himself to the Minnesota. But his 
pilot was in too great dread of the frigate's broadside, and instead 
of bringing the Merrimac within short range, ran her aground.^ 
The Monitor unsuccessfully attempted to take advantage of this 
favourable opportunity of ramming her opponent."* Getting afloat 
again, the Merrimac in her turn tried to ram, but her defective 
engines could not get up sufficient speed to make the blow 

^ This account of the Monitor is taken from i Wilson, 7-1 1. 

2 I B. & L., 723. 

^ I B. & L., 718 (account of the Mtrriniac^s surgeon). 

* I Wilson, 29. No reference to this episode is made either by Colonel Wood or 
Lieutenant Greene, the executive officer of the Monitor, But it is admitted by the 
Merrivtac's surgeon that she ran aground and did not get afloat again for fifteen or 
twenty minutes. 



490 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

effective. Soon after the Monitor hauled off to shallower water, 
where the Merrimac could not follow, in order to replenish the 
ammunition in her turret. It was necessary to retire out of action 
for the purpose, as the turret had to remain stationary whilst the 
ammunition was being hoisted up through a scuttle in its floor 
from a second scuttle in the deck below. In about a quarter of 
an hour the Monitor was ready to renew the engagement. The 
Merrimac's gunners now concentrated their fire upon the Monitor's 
pilot-house. At length a shell striking it burst just outside the 
sight-hole where Worden had stationed himself It drove in one 
of the iron blocks, of which the structure was composed, blinding 
the commander with powder and iron. Believing that the pilot- 
house was entirely wrecked, Worden gave orders to sheer off. 
Some time elapsed before the change of command was effected, 
and when the Monitor, now under the command of Lieutenant 
Greene, again came out to battle, the Merrimac, either because she 
believed her antagonist beaten, or because she no longer dared 
trust her crazy engines after their severe trial, had withdrawn, and 
the fight was over.^ 

Fierce and obstinate as had been the contest, the losses and 
injuries on either side were absurdly small. On neither ship was 
a single man killed, and the armour of both vessels had proved 
invulnerable. The Merrimac had suffered the more of the two, as 
her thinner armour was opposed to the heavier shot of the Monitor. 
But though her iron plating was in many places shattered, the 
wooden backing, though broken, had nowhere been perforated. 
The Merrimac retired to Norfolk to repair her injuries. Com- 
modore Tattnall, now in command," was eager to try conclusions 
again with the Monitor. As soon as his ship was repaired he 
steamed out into Hampton Roads on April nth, but the Monitor 
was lying with the rest of the Federal squadron below Fortress 
Monroe, and refused to leave her shelter. The Federal authorities, 
content with having neutralised the Merrimac, reasonably declined 
to risk on the issue of a single combat the safety of the sole 
protector of the Chesapeake, and for a similar reason the Con- 
federate Government forbade Tattnall to go below Fortress 
Monroe and expose in an unequal combat under the guns of the 
fortress the one vessel which guarded the James and closed the 
waterway to Richmond. 

Neither of the combatants in this epoch-making battle was 
destined to have a long life. The doom of the Merrijnac came 

' Lieutenant Greene says that the change of commander took up about twenty 
minutes, that during the interval the Merrimac, leaking badly, began to retreat, and 
that the Monitor fired a few shots after her. Colonel Wood says that the Merrimac 
wailed for an hour for the Monitor to renew the conflict, and then withdrew. 

* Tattnall assumed command on March 29th (i B. & L. , 706). 



1863] NAVAL OPERATIONS 491 

first. When Johnston abandoned the Peninsula it was found 
impossible to take the Merrimac up the James, and Tattnall had 
to destroy her.^ The Monitor did not long survive her foe. Very 
unwisely she was sent at the end of the year to sea to form part 
of the squadron blockading Charleston, and on the night of 
December 30th foundered off Cape Hatteras in a storm. 

The naval operations off Charleston (Map XII.) form an in- 
teresting commentary upon the ability of ironclads to contend 
with forts. Charleston harbour was strongly defended. Right in 
the centre of the narrow entrance lay Fort Sumter, whilst on either 
flank a number of forts and batteries on Morris and Sullivan's 
Islands swept the approach. The channel was sown with mines, 
and a double line of obstructions had been drawn across it from 
Fort Sumter to Sullivan's Island.^ The navy was now called 
upon to perform a very different task to that which Farragut 
accomplished on the Lower Mississippi, at Port Hudson and 
Mobile, and signally failed of success. Besides the other defences 
the Confederates had constructed two small ironclads of the 
Merrimac type, protected with four inches of iron upon a backing 
of wood, provided with a ram and carrying one four guns and the 
other six. At the beginning of 1863 ^^e blockading fleet was 
entirely composed of unarmoured vessels, and early on the morn- 
ing of January 31st the two ironclads came out under cover of a 
thick mist to attack the wooden ships. Two Federal vessels were 
taken by surprise and forced to surrender, but the ironclads re- 
turned to the harbour without waiting to secure their prizes.^ 

The success which had attended the Monitor caused the Federal 
Government to form a very exaggerated estimate of the offensive 
powers of vessels of that type. It was resolved to reinforce the 
blockading squadron off Charleston with ironclads as fast as they 
could be built, in the belief that they would be able to destroy the 
forts and force the surrender of Charleston itself. The Montauk, 
the first ironclad to arrive in the beginning of 1863, was regarded 
as an improved Monitor, and differed in the following details : — 
The pilot-house was placed above the turret, but was stationary. 
Her displacement was 1,850 tons. Her turret was protected by 
1 1 -inch instead of 8-inch armour. Inside the turret one of the two 
ii-inch guns had been replaced by a 15-inch gun.^ 

Rear-Admiral Du Pont was in command of the blockading 
squadron. He was a sailor of the old school, and had little faith 

' As the Merrimac, the Confederate ironclad lives in history, but in the Confederate 
Naval List she was renamed the Virginia. 

» I Wilson, 87. But see 4 B. & L., 67. 

^ That both Federal vessels surrendered is plain from Professor Soley's article (4 
B. & L., 28). But the commander of the second Federal vessel rehoisted his colours, as 
no notice was taken of his surrender. 

■* I Wilson, 89. 



492 THE Civil. WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

in the new-fangled ironclads.^ By way of testing the capabilities 
of the new battleship, he sent her to engage Fort McAllister in 
Ossabaw Sound. The result was not encouraging. The ironclad 
engaged the fort on January 27th and again on February ist, with- 
out success. But her commander, Wordcn, of Monitor fame, 
succeeded in destroying, on February 28th, the commerce- 
destroyer Nashville? This vessel had run aground a short dis- 
tance above the line of obstructions drawn below Fort McAllister 
across the Great Ogeechee River, and lay quite at the mercy of the 
15-inch gun of the ironclad, which quickly set her on fire. The 
Federal Government despatched ironclad after ironclad to Charles- 
ton, and on March 30th a more serious and protracted attack was 
made by three fresh monitors on Fort McAllister, but again with- 
out success.^ In spite of these warnings the Government insisted 
that Du Pont should fight a pitched battle with the Charleston 
forts. 

Du Pont ordered the attack to be made on April 7th. He had 
now under his command seven monitors and two other ironclads. 
One of these latter, the Keokuk^ was inadequately protected by two 
inches of armour and carried two 11 -inch guns in two casemates. 
The other, the New Ironsides,, was a fine ironclad of the Merrimac 
type, but very much more powerful. She was of 3,480 tons, and 
carried two 150-pound rifled guns and fourteen ii-inch smooth 
bores in a casemate protected by 4|-inch iron plates in one 
thickness. The attack, as the fleet commander had foreseen, re- 
sulted in failure. His ships only carried into action thirty-four guns 
against seventy-four mounted in the Confederate batteries, though 
the Federal artillery was much heavier than that of their opponents. 
The engagement lasted for over an hour, but Fort Sumter, against 
which the attack was almost exclusively directed, remained un- 
silenced, whilst the attacking vessels were so severely handled that 
the reports of their captains dissuaded the admiral from renewing 
the attack next day, and during the night the Keokuk, which had 
approached nearer to the forts than any other vessel, sank.'* 

In June Du Pont, having been informed that a formidable iron- 
clad of the Merrimac type was building at Savannah, sent two 
monitors to keep an eye upon her. This ironclad, the Atlanta, was 
originally an English steamer, built on the Clyde, and purchased 
by the Confederate Commissioners in Plngland, On her arrival at 
Savannah it was resolved to convert her into an ironclad ram for 
coast defence. She was reconstructed in Ossabaw Sound. When 

' I Wilson, 91. 

'^ The Nashville began her career as a commerce-destroyer. She crossed the Atlantic 
and hack again, and made two prizes. Subsequently she was employed as a blockade 
runner, till destroyed by the Moutauk (i Wilson, 165). 

^ 4 B. & L. , 29. * For this engagement, see I Wilson. 91-5. 



1863-4] NAVAL OPERATIONS 493 

the upper works had been removed, a massive platform of timber 
twenty-seven inches high, and projecting six feet from her sides, was 
erected upon her hull. This structure was intended to protect her 
from the ram. On this platform was built a casemate, protected by 
four inches of iron backed by eighteen inches of wood. In it she 
carried two 7-inch rifled guns mounted on pivots and three 100- 
pound rifled guns in broadside. She steamed eight knots an 
hour, and was regarded by the inhabitants of Savannah as a very 
powerful vessel. They were destined to be speedily undeceived. 
She started from Savannah on June 17th, expecting to make short 
work of the two monitors ; but the result was exactly the other 
way. Only one monitor engaged her, and after an action of fifteen 
minutes, in which the Atlanta fired eight times and her antagonist 
only five, the Confederate ironclad struck her flag. Her gunners 
failed to make a single hit, whilst her armour afforded no adequate 
protection against the projectiles of the monitor's heavier gun.^ 

The Government had determined to recall Du Pont, and put in 
his place an officer who had more faith in the capabilites of the 
monitor. His successor was Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, a skilled 
artillerist ; but he met with no greater success than his predecessor, 
and after several ineffective attempts, confined his operations to 
enforcing the blockade. Morris Island was captured and Fort 
Sumter laid in ruins ; but no Federal war vessel entered Charleston 
Harbour until the garrison was withdrawn in consequence of 
Sherman's operations. 

The unsuccessful attacks of the monitors showed up the inherent 
defects of that type of vessel when engaged with forts. Though 
but little susceptible of injury themselves, they were equally 
incapable of inflicting injury. In Du Font's words *' whatever 
degree of invulnerability they might have, there was no correspond- 
ing quality of destructiveness as against forts." 

The Confederate ironclads in Charleston Harbour were no match 
for the monitors. In the hope of destroying the Federal ironclads 
by stealth, the Confederates resorted to submp«"Tr7=^ -, t ,/_vJ^-L»uats. 
In February, 1864, the Housatonic was sent to the bottom. The 
submarine which accomplished this feat had lateral fins by which 
she could be raised or submerged, but carried no reserve of air, and 
therefore proved the coffin of her successive crews. Five times she 
had sunk and been raised again.^ On the sixth occasion she was 
manned by two army officers and five volunteers. These brave 
men, knowing that they were going to certain death, successfully 
performed their task and paid for their success with their lives.^ 

^ For the Atlanta and her capture, see i Wilson, 98-100. 
"^ I Wilson, 104 ; Morris' American Navy, 259. 

' " Fixed in the hole that it had itself created, sucked in by the enormous inrush of 
water, was the ill-fated submarine," when discovered some three years later by divers sent 



494 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Among the many daring episodes of the war, the destruction of 
the Albemarle by Lieutenant Gushing stands out conspicuously. 
With a view to recovering the command of the North Carolina 
Sounds, an ironclad of the Merrimac type, the Albemarle, was 
constructed some miles up the Roanoke River, She started 
down the river on April i8th, 1864, with the artificers still on 
board. The unusually high water carried her over the obstruc- 
tions which the Federals had placed across the river to prevent 
her coming down. Continuing down-stream she encountered two 
wooden gunboats coming up. She rammed and sank one, and 
put the other to flight. Thus the control of the Roanoke River 
was regained by the Confederates, and the Federal garrison in 
Plymouth, which was besieged by General Hoke, surrendered the 
next day. 

After this prompt though easy success, the commander of the 
ironclad determined to venture into Albemarle Sound and dispute 
the control of its waters with a squadron of wooden vessels, which 
the admiral commanding the North Atlantic Squadron had made 
haste to despatch there. On May 5th a sharp encounter took 
place between the Albemarle and seven gunboats.^ The Federals 
seem to have made but poor use of their numerical superiority, 
and the combat resolved itself into a duel between the Albemarle 
and the Sassacus. The gunboat rammed her opponent, but was 
considerably damaged in the process, whilst a shot from the 
Albemarle penetrated her boiler. The Sassacus, rendered helpless, 
drifted clear of her antagonist, who withdrew to the river, and the 
engagement ceased by mutual consent. 

The result of this action made it plain that wooden vessels were 
unequal to the task of destroying the ironclad. No monitor could 
cross Hatteras Bar and enter the Sounds.- Lieutenant Cushing, 
already distinguished for various daring exploits, now proposed to 
attack the ram with steam launches. Two boats of this type were 
expressly constructed at New York, but one of them was lost on 
the voyage. Cushir;^ took command of the survivor. His plan 
was to land below Plymouth, off which town the Albemarle was 
lying, carry her by boarding, and take her down-stream before the 
alarm could be given. On the night of October 27th he ascended 
the Roanoke.^ About a mile below Plymouth lay the wreck of 
the gunboat, which had been sunk in April. Here the Confederates 
had established a piquet to guard against any surprise. Cushing 

down to the Hotaaioiiic (Burpoyne's Submarine Navit^ation, i. 57). In this work a very 
interesting account is given of the attempts made during the war at submarine warfare. 
Mr. Burgoyne descril)es the Keokuk, which was sunk off Charleston, as a submersible: 
"When submerged to the utmost the turrets and funnel alone showed above water" 
(i. 62). '4B. &L.,628. - 4B. & L., 634. 

■' The first attempt was made the previous night, but the launch ran aground and 
could not be got off till day was at hand (i Wilson, iii). 



1 864] NAVAL OPERATIONS 495 

had intended to " rush " this piquet before it could give the alarm. 
But the Confederates kept so bad a look-out that the launch stole 
by unseen. Fortune seemed to favour the enterprise. On a point 
just below the Albemarle the Confederates had been in the habit 
of lighting fires to prevent a surprise. But on that particular 
night the fires had burnt low. Cushing was approaching the shore 
to land his little crew when the alarm was given by a stray dog.^ 
The Confederates were immediately on the alert, and the launch 
was discovered. Seeing that it was useless to land, Cushing made 
a rush at the Albemarle, in the hope of sinking her with his 
torpedo.^ On approaching he found her protected by a boom of 
logs. He backed the launch and charged the boom at full speed. 
The launch jumped the logs, and he found himself by the side of 
the ironclad. The torpedo was lowered and fired. The ironclad 
began to sink. But the launch was damaged beyond possibility of 
escape. Most of her crew were made prisoners. One man only — 
her gallant commander — escaped to rejoin the Federal fleet. 

The destruction of the Albemarle bore immediate fruit. The un- 
disputed control of Albemarle Sound was restored to the Federals, 
and on the last day of the month Plymouth was recaptured. 

Mobile (Map X.) was the most important port held by the Con- 
federates on the Gulf after the fall of New Orleans and the evacuation 
of Pensacola. The city stands at the head of a bay which is thirty 
miles long and from six to fifteen miles broad. The main entrance 
lies between Dauphin Island on the west and Mobile Point on the 
east, and is nearly three miles broad. But from Dauphin Island a 
sand-bank runs out, narrowing the deep water channel to less than 
2,000 yards. On Dauphin Island was Fort Gaines, too far distant, 
however, to constitute a serious obstacle to a fleet trying to enter 
the Bay. On Mobile Point was Fort Morgan, mounting forty heavy 
guns with seven others mounted in a water battery thrown up 
close alongside. Another entrance into the Bay from Mississippi 
Sound was protected by Fort Powell, mounting six guns, but was 
not practicable for ships of heavy draught. A line of piles had 
been driven in from Fort Gaines across the sand-bank to prevent 
any light vessel from entering, and where the line of obstructions 
ceased a triple line of mines extended as far as a red buoy, 
which was little over 200 yards from the guns on Mobile Point^ 

1 I Wilson, 112. Cushing simply says : "Just as I was sheering in close to the wharf 
a hail came from the ironclad, and was repeated" (4 B. & L., 636). Captain Warley, 
commander of the Albemarle, is also silent on the subject of the dog's barking, and says : 
"The launch was quite close to us when we hailed, and the alarm was given" 
(4B. & L., 642). 

'■^ The torpedo was a spar torpedo. In the infancy of torpedo warfare the torpedo 
was fitted to a spar, which could be run out from the stem of the vessel. 

•^ These details are taken from Mahan's Gulf and Inlattd Waten, Cap. VIII., whose 
account has been closely followed for the whole engagement. 



496 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

This narrow passage had been left for the benefit of blockade 
runners, and by it alone could a Federal fleet enter the Bay. 

Farragut, who had resumed the command of the Western Gulf 
Blockading Squadron in January, 1864, was anxious to take pos- 
session of Mobile Bay as quickly as possible. He knew that 
Mobile itself could not be reduced except by a considerable land 
force, but he also knew that the Confederates were building iron- 
clads in the river above the city, and he wished to gain possession 
of the Bay before these formidable antagonists should be com- 
pleted. Once in possession of the Bay he could prevent the iron- 
clads from being brought over the Dog River Bar, and enforce the 
blockade more effectively than was possible from without ; but to 
accomplish his purpose he required the co-operation of one brigade 
of troops to reduce the forts, after he had run past and isolated 
them, and of at least one ironclad to aid his wooden vessels in 
their encounter with the works on Mobile Point.^ The task was a 
far harder one than that which he had so successfully surmounted 
two years earlier in the Lower Mississippi. Then the fall of New 
Orleans was inevitable, if once the fleet passed the Mississippi 
forts. But Mobile City was impregnable against a purely naval 
attack, and to maintain himself inside the Bay it was necessary for 
the forts commanding the entrance to be reduced. But the Govern- 
ment turned a deaf ear to his entreaties. The ironclads were 
required for blockading purposes at other points, and no land force 
could be spared, as the ill-fated Red River Expedition absorbed all 
the available troops in the Department. 

Meanwhile the Confederates were pushing on the construction 
of their great ironclad, the Tennessee^ with all speed. She was un- 
questionably the most powerful war vessel ever possessed by the 
Confederacy. Her hull had been constructed in 1863 at Selma, 
150 miles up the Alabama River, and, when completed, was towed 
down to Mobile to receive the iron plating specially prepared in 
the rolling mills at Atlanta. Her length was 209 feet, and, when 
fully armed, she drew 14 feet of water. Midway between bow 
and stern the casemate, 79 feet long and 29 feet broad, was con- 
structed of 25 inches of wood. Over this was laid the iron plat- 
ing, 6 inches thick at the forward end and 5 inches everywhere 
else. She carried six guns, a 7.12-inch R.M.L. at each end and 
two 6-inch R.M.L. on either broadside. A solid knuckle, formed 
by continuing the sides of the casemate two feet below the water- 
line, and then inclining them inwards to meet the hull, protected 
the vessel against ramming. Covered with four inches of iron, the 
knuckle, when continued round the bows, became a ram. But 
powerful as was the vessel thus constructed, she still had two very 
grave defects. Her engines, which had been transferred from a 

' 4 B. & L., 379. 



Aug. s, 1864] NAVAL OPERATIONS 497 

river steamer, were too weak, and could not do more than six knots 
an hour on the day of battle ; and her steering chains, instead of 
being carried under the armoured deck, ran over it, and were thus 
exposed to the fire of an opponent. In March, 1864, the Tennessee 
was ready for service, but it was two months later before she was 
got over the Dog River Bar and brought into the lower bay. Her 
commander. Admiral Buchanan, had hoped to take the blockading 
fleet by surprise, and intended on May 19th to cross the outer bar 
and attack Farragut's wooden vessels. But the ironclad was 
found to be aground when the anchor was weighed. Her presence 
in the Bay was discovered, and Buchanan contented himself, when 
the tide floated off" his ship, with taking her down to Fort Morgan. 

By August Farragut's repeated demands for troops and ironclads 
had been at length answered. On the 3rd General Gordon Granger 
with a division of troops appeared off Dauphin Island, and four 
monitors had either arrived or were on the point of doing so. Two 
of these, the Chickasaw z.Vi6. Wmnel^ag-o, ca.me from the Mississippi; 
they carried four i i-inch guns in two turrets protected by eight and 
a half inches of armour. The other two, the Tecuniseh and Man- 
hattan, came from the Atlantic coast, and were larger vessels, 
carrying two 15 -inch guns in a single turret protected by ten 
inches of armour. It had been intended to make a joint attack 
on the 4th, and on that day Granger disembarked his troops, but 
Farragut was unable to co-operate, as all his vessels had not yet 
arrived. On the morning of the 5th the fleet steamed in to attack. 
As at Port Hudson, the wooden vessels were lashed together in 
pairs. The monitors formed a starboard squadron slightly in 
advance of the Brooklyn^ the leading wooden vessel. 

The first gun was fired at 6.47 a.m.,^ and at 7.15 a.m. the action 
became general. The Brooklyn began to overhaul the monitors, 
which were steaming slowly to give full effect to their fire ; and 
her captain, not wishing to pass them, stopped her engines and 
then began to back.^ Orders were signalled from the Hartford, 
next in line, to go on. But the Brooklyn continued backing, and, 
as her bows fell off towards the fort, threatened to block the channel. 
The Hartford had stopped her engines, but the flood tide was 
carrying her on to the leader, and the Richmond was coming up 
close behind. A collision seemed inevitable. In the meanwhile 
a terrible disaster had overtaken the Tecuniseh, leading the ironclad 

1 4 B. & L., 398 (note). 

" 4 B. & L., 387. It seems quite plain from the narrative of Lieutenant Kinney, 
who was acting as signal-officer on board the Hartford, that the Brooklyn stopped before 
the disaster which overtook the Tecuniseh. After the ironclad sank, Farragut signalled 
to the Brooklyn to go on, but the order was not obeyed. Mahan (p. 232) states that the 
Brooklyn stopped after the Tecumseh sank, and attributes her action to the appearance of 
"certain objects in the water ahead, which were taken for the moment for buoys to 
torpedoes." 

2 K 



498 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

squadron. Her captain seems to have considered that his special 
task was to engage the Tennessee^ which with three gunboats was 
stationed just above the mine field in the centre of the channel, 
from which position a raking fire was poured into the attacking 
fleet. As the Tennessee shifted her position slightly to the west, 
the Tecuinseli passed on the wrong side of the red buoy^ in pursuit, 
was struck by a mine, and immediately sank. 

It was at this crisis of the battle that Farragut took the lead of 
his fleet. There was no room to pass the Brooklyn in the main 
channel. Though he had just seen the TecnmseJi sink, he ordered full 
speed ahead and steered to the west of the red buoy. As the Hartford 
crossed the fatal line, the primers of the mines were heard snapping 
under her bottom, but no explosion took place, and the flagship 
passed out of the range of the fort into the Bay.- But she had 
still to reckon with the Tennessee and the gunboats."^ The latter 
retreated as the Hartford advanced, and kept up a raking fire, 
which inflicted heavy loss. The Tennessee waited, intending to ram 
as soon as her opponent came within reach. But the Hartford, being 
the faster vessel, easily avoided her thrust, and continued up the 
Bay in pursuit of the gunboats. The Tennessee followed her for 
some little distance ; then Buchanan suddenly changed his plan, 
and turning his ship steamed down to attack the other wooden 
vessels. 

The Tennessee ran past the Federal line, exchanging broadsides 
with the successive vessels, but without ramming.* The Monon- 
gaJiela made a gallant effort to ram the ironclad, and struck her 
a slanting blow, which inflicted no injury. Last of the line was the 
Oneida, crippled by a shot in her boiler. In her the Tennessee hoped 
to find an easy victim, but the approach of the monitors drove her 
off under the guns of Fort Morgan. 

Whilst the ram was running past the rest of the Federal fleet, the 
flagship and her consort, the Metacomet, were disposing of the Con- 
federate gunboats. The Metacomct, the fastest vessel in the fleet, 
cut loose from the Hartford, and going in pursuit of the Selma, 
whose fire had been much the most deadly, compelled her to sur- 
render. Of the other two gunboats, one was so disabled by the 

' Farragut had issued a special order, directing his captains to pass to the east of the 
red buoy. 

- Mahan suggests as a probable explanation that "the tin torpedoes were poorly 
lacr|uercd and corroded rapidly under the sea-water," whilst "those which sunk the 
7'ecumseh had been [there is good reason to believe] planted but two or three days 
before." 

' The three Confederate gunboats were paddle-wheel steamers, unarmoured except 
round the boilers. They were the Selma, carrying four guns, and the Gaines and the 
Morxaii carrying six each. 

■• The Tennessee apparently tried to ram the Monongahela, but failed. It does not 
seem that she tried to ram any of the other vessels. She certainly avoided the first three, 
the Brooklyn, Kiihnwnd, and /.lulawanna (4 15. iV L. , 393). 



Aug. 5, 1864] NAVAL OPERATIONS 499 

Hartford's fire that she was run aground under the guns of the fort 
and afterwards set on fire by her crew ; the other retreated into the 
shallow water near the fort, and, when night came, escaped to 
Mobile. 

It was now a little after 8.30 a.m. The Federal fleet, having 
successfully accomplished the passage, anchored about four miles 
above the fort. It was not expected that the Tennessee would 
come out from under the shelter of Fort Morgan, and the crews 
were just sitting down to breakfast, when the ironclad was seen 
steaming up for battle. It was a counsel of despair, though the 
Tennessee had suffered but little thus far. As she approached, 
Farragut signalled to his fastest vessels to try to run her down. 
He was determined not to let the ram escape, whatever it might 
cost him. First the MonongaJiela and then the Lackawanna 
rammed the Tennessee, but both suffered more damage than they 
inflicted. Next came the turn of the Hartford. The two admirals 
approached as if they would ram bow to bow. But at the last 
moment the Tennessee slightly changed her course. The vessels 
grazed each other as they passed.^ The Hartford fired her port 
broadside of seven 9-inch guns into her opponent, but, though the 
ships were only ten feet apart, no harm was done the Tennessee. 
The Confederate gunners only succeeded in replying with one 
gun, and this was the last shot fired by them during the action. 
The Hartford was preparing to ram again, when she came into 
violent collision with the Lackawanna, which was also seeking to 
ram the Tennessee a second time. The monitors now joined in the 
fight. The Chickasaw hung close under the Tennessee s stern, 
pounding her with her 11 -inch guns. The fate of the Confederate 
ironclad was now settled. Her smoke-stack had been shot away 
and her speed reduced to barely four knots an hour." The forward 
and aft port shutters had been jammed and her two heaviest guns 
thus rendered useless, whilst the broadside guns could not be 
brought to bear. The rudder chains had been cut by a shot from 
the Chickasaw , and the ship would no longer answer her helm. 
Buchanan had been severely wounded. The Ossipee was approach- 
ing to ram, and the other wooden vessels were getting into position 
for the same purpose. At 10 a.m. the Tennessee struck her flag, 
not having been able to fire a shot for over twenty minutes, and 
the battle of Mobile Bay came to an end. The fruits of victory 
were quickly gathered in. Fort Powell was evacuated the same 
night. Fort Gaines surrendered on the 7th and Fort Morgan on 
the 23rd, and the whole Bay passed under the control of the 
Federal fleet. 

The capture of nearly all the important ports on the Confederate 
coast, with the exception of Charleston and Wilmington, enabled 

1 I Wilson, 130. 2 4 B. & L., 404. 



500 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the Federal Government to concentrate for the two expeditions 
against Fort Fisher in December, 1864, and January, 1865, "the 
largest fleet ever assembled under one command in the history 
of the American Navy." It numbered nearly sixty vessels and 
carried over 600 guns.^ Four monitors, the New Ironsides, and 
three of the largest steam frigates in the service were included. 
Admiral Porter was appointed to the command of this great fleet, 
owing to the ill health of Farragut, which obliged him to decline 
the command originally designed for him.- 

The remarkable success which attended the Confederate com- 
merce-destroyers was largely due to the neglect of the Federal 
Government to safeguard the principal trade routes. Small as was 
the number of the cruisers, the Federal merchant marine was 
driven from the seas and carrying trade destroyed. By far the 
most famous of these cruisers was the Alabama. At the outset of 
the war the Confederate Government, recognising that it was 
impossible with its very limited resources to build fast cruisers, 
sent agents to purchase vessels in Europe. Captain Bulloch, of 
the Confederate navy, arrived in England in June, 1861, and made 
a contract with the firm of Lairds, of Birkenhead, for the construc- 
tion of the Alabama, Owing to the dilatoriness of the British 
Government in acting upon the representations of the Federal 
minister in London, the Alabama was allowed to leave port on a 
pretended trial trip on July 29th, 1862. Off the Azores she was 
met by another steamer with her outfit and crew, and commis- 
sioned as a Confederate cruiser by Captain Raphael Semmes on 
August 24th. Her cruise lasted for twenty-two months, and 
during that period she captured sixty-eight prizes. She began by 
capturing ten whalers in the neighbourhood of the Azores, then 
crossed the Atlantic and captured twelve corn vessels off the New- 
foundland banks. Coming south, she captured the mail steamer 
Ariel o^i Hayti, and then learning of Banks' intended expedition 
against Galveston, Semmes crossed the Gulf, hoping to work 
havoc among the transports.^ He found a naval squadron off 
Galveston, and the Hatteras gave chase to the Alabama. Having 
drawn his pursuer several miles away from the rest of the squadron, 
Semmes turned upon her, and in fifteen minutes compelled her to 
surrender, as she was in a sinking condition (January nth, 1863). 
The Hatteras was a converted river excursion boat, and no match 
at all for the Alabama.^ 

; 4 B. & L., 655. 

'■* For the operations leading up to the capture of Fort Fisher, see Cap. XXV. 

' Galveston had been occupied l^y the Federals in October, 1862, but recaptured 
January 1st, 1863, by a force under (jcncral Magruder. 

* The Alabama was built for S]5ccd rather than battle. She carried one loo-pounder 
rifled gun pivoted forward, one 8-inch smooth-bore on a pivot aft, and six 32-pounders, 
The Hatteras carried four 32-pounders and one l2-pounder smooth-bores, with two 



1864] NAVAL OPERATIONS 501 

After this victory Semmes judged it wise to leave home waters, 
and steered into the central Atlantic till he reached the junction of 
the African and South American trade routes. Following the 
latter southwards to the Brazilian coast, he made twenty-four 
prizes. Having spent two months in those waters, he crossed the 
Atlantic to Cape Town ; thence he betook himself across the 
Indian Ocean to the China Sea. Making but few prizes in his 
eastern voyage, he returned back down the east coast of Africa to 
Cape Town, and then went up the Atlantic to Cherbourg, entering 
that port on June nth, 1864. Eight days later, having hastily 
refitted his vessel, he came out to fight the Federal warship 
Kearsarge} The two ships were not unequally matched, but the 
Federal was in much better fighting trim, and after an hour's 
action the Alabama struck her flag, and immediately sank. It is 
curious to notice that this, the most famous of the commerce- 
destroyers, never entered a Confederate port. 

Next to the Alabama the Florida was the most successful of the 
commerce-destroyers. Built in England and designed as a war- 
ship, she left Liverpool in March, 1862. Having taken on board 
her armament in West Indian waters, she ran the blockade into 
Mobile. There she remained four months, completing her equip- 
ment and collecting a crew, and on January 15th, 1863, ran out to 
sea through the blockading squadron.- Her principal cruising 
ground was in the North Atlantic betweeen Brazil and the Federal 
States. She captured a mail steamer when within ten miles of 
the Delaware coast, and took in all thirty-seven prizes ; ^ but on 
October 7th, 1864, she was attacked, when totally unprepared, by 
the Federal sloop Wachusett, in the neutral harbour of Bahia, and 
in violation of international law captured. 

The Shenandoah was another English-built cruiser, which met 
with considerable success. Originally built for the Bombay trade, 
she was secured by the indefatigable Bulloch, and left England in 
October, 1864. Her chief objective was to be the whaling fleet in 
the North Pacific. Being very shorthanded at the commencement 
of the voyage, she was obliged to stop at Melbourne, and there 
completed her crew. It was not till June, 1865, that she reached 
the Behring Sea. Having no authentic news that the war was 

30-pounder and one 20-pounder rifles. The weight of her broadside was not half that 
of the Alabama (i Wilson, 154). 

^ The Kearsarge had her engines protected by a 6-foot belt of armour improvised 
from chain cable, but carried one less gun than the Alabama, two 11 -inch smooth-bores, 
one 30-pounder rifle, and four 32-pounder guns. Her ii-inch guns gave her a marked 
superiority, and her gunpowder was in a much better condition than that on board the 
Alabama, The weight of the Federal broadside was 366 pounds, that of the Confederate 
305. Moreover, the crew of the Alabama during their long cruise had received no 
artillery practice. The fight lasted one hour and two minutes. The action commenced 
at 10.57 a.m., and the Alabama sank at 12.24 p.m. (4 B. & L., 616-621). For the 
details of the Alabamans voyage, i Wilson, 152-164, has been followed. 

2 4 B. & L., 595. =* I Wilson, 151. 



502 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

over, her commander fell upon the whaling fleet, and in a week 
captured twenty-five prizes.^ 

For the damage done by these three cruisers the British Govern- 
ment in 1872 was condemned by the Geneva Arbitration Board to 
pay 15I million dollars to the United States. 

The successes achieved by the Southern commerce-destroyers 
had no effect upon the result of the war. Far otherwise was it 
with the blockade of the Confederate coasts maintained by the 
Federal navy. This blockade of over 3,000 miles of coast-line had 
two objects : to prevent the export of cotton, and to stop the im- 
port of military stores. At first, with the limited number of vessels 
at the disposal of the Federal Government, it was impossible to 
enforce the blockade strictly, and all sorts of vessels, sailing as 
well as steamers, went in and out of the Confederate ports. But 
as the great exertions of the North rapidly increased the size of 
their fleet by buying up all kinds of vessels and converting them 
into warships, the difficulty of running the blockade became in- 
creasingly great. The unseaworthy character of the hastily im- 
provised ships, which formed the blockading squadrons, necessitated 
the occupation of Southern ports, which might serve as bases for 
refitting the vessels thus employed,- and at the same time the 
occupation of such positions tended to interrupt the water inter- 
course between the chief centres of population in the South, a 
large proportion of which were on or near the sea-coast. By the 
middle of 1862 blockade -running was practically confined to 
steamers specially built, and all the efforts of the Federal navy 
failed to prevent blockade-running as carried on by these vessels 
from being a profitable speculation. It was the occupation of the 
Confederate ports, much more than the watch kept by the Federal 
cruisers, which put an end to the blockade-running. The occupa- 
tion of Mobile Bay in August, 1864, closed what was virtually the 
last port on the Gulf,^ and with the fall of Charleston and Wil- 
mington early in 1865 the last ports on the Atlantic coast were 
lost. The blockade of the coast-line, thus conducted, in conjunction 
with the conquest of the Mississippi, starved the Confederacy into 
submission. 

1 4 B. & L., 599. 2 I Wilson, 184. 

•* Though the Confederales still retained Galveston on the Gulf, the conquest of the 
Mississippi prevented that port from being of any service to the eastern half of the 
Confederacy. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

FALL OF RICHMOND AND COLLAPSE OF THE 
CONFEDERACY 

Richmond during the winter — Lee appointed Commander-in-Chief — Difficulties of Lee's 
task — Re-election of Abraham Lincoln — Slavery abolished by the Federal Congress 
— Federal movement against the Boydton road — Confederate attack on Fort 
Stedman — Fort Stedman in the hands of the Confederates — Fort Stedman re- 
captured — Grant prepares to strike in force the Southside Railway — Instructions 
given to Sheridan and the Corps commanders — Lee's counterpreparations — 
Skirmishing on the 29th and 30th March — Lee's failure to crush Warren's Corps — 
Fitzhugh Lee and Pickett drive back Sheridan's cavalry — Battle of Five Forks — 
The Confederate left turned — Warren relieved of the command of the 5th Corps 
— General assault on the Petersburg lines — Lee's lines broken — Death of A. P. Hill 
— Capture of Forts Gregg and Whitworth — Lee abandons Petersburg — Surrender 
of Petersburg and Richmond — Grant's pursuit — Battle of Sailor's Creek — Surrender 
of Ewell's Corps — The Confederates cross the Appomattox— Humphreys holds Lee 
fast — Sheridan intercepts Lee's retreat — Communications between Grant and Lee — 
The Confederates vainly attempt to drive Sheridan out of their path — Surrender of 
the Army of Northern Virginia — Collapse of the Confederacy — Surrender of Johnston's 
army — Wilson's successful expedition — Fall of Selma and Mobile — Surrender of 
Taylor and of Kirby Smith — Capture of President Davis. 

THE winter of 1864-5 was a period of unrelieved gloom and 
depression in Richmond. Grant had been steadily extending 
his lines on the south side of the Appomattox towards the 
left (Map VIII.). It was certain that, as soon as the return of 
spring rendered military operations possible, a determined attempt 
would be made by the Federals to secure possession of the South- 
side Railway. Lee would be compelled to extend his lines still 
farther to the right, and sooner or later the Confederate line of 
defence must become so thin that it could be broken at some point 
or other. The limits of conscription had been reached ; ^ the 
refusal of the Federal Government in 1864 to exchange prisoners 
prevented their opponents from filling the vacancies in their ranks ; 
and the already scanty numbers were being diminished by an 
increasing stream of deserters. 

In the Confederate capital the stock of provisions was running 
short. Lee's troops were dependent for their supplies upon the 

^ Conscription, which in 1862 applied to men between eighteen and thirty-five, had 
been gradually extended, until it embraced all between the ages of seventeen and fifty, 
" robbing alike the cradle and the grave." 

503 



504 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

two railways, the Southside and Danville lines, which alone re- 
mained open ; the rolling stock upon these lines was so worn out 
as to be inadequate to the heavy work now put upon it. ^ There 
was not enough bread in Virginia to feed Lee's army, and meat 
had to be imported from abroad. When the capture of Fort 
Fisher closed the port of Wilmington, starvation stared the Con- 
federate armies in the face.- It is probable, indeed, that a consider- 
able store of provisions could have been brought into Richmond 
and Petersburg from the country districts if the Government had 
been able to pay for them in gold ; but the farmers refused to take 
the worthless Confederate paper money in payment. Longstreet 
went so far as to suggest the desperate expedient, that the Govern- 
ment should impress gold as well as bread and mealstufifs.^ But 
the suggestion was not adopted. 

In various States the people were beginning more or less openly 
to dissociate themselves from the cause of their leaders. In 
Richmond itself there was a growing feeling of discontent with 
President Davis' administration. An Act of Congress was passed 
appointing a Commander-in-Chief of all the Confederate forces in 
the field. This Act took out of Davis' hands the control of the 
war and invested the Commander-in-Chief with virtually dictatorial 
powers.'* Sorely against his will Davis was obliged to ratify the 
Act and appoint Lee to the post. The substitution of General 
Breckinridge for Mr. Seddon as Secretary of War was another 
concession which the sorely tried President had to make to public 
opinion. 

The task, which Lee in his new position had to face, was one of 
stupendous difficulty. In no quarter was any gleam of hope to be 
seen. In the Shenandoah Valley Early had been hopelessly beaten ; 
and Sheridan was free either to operate against Lynchburg and 
secure one of Lee's two lines of retreat, or else to join forces with 
Grant and still further increase the overwhelming superiority of 
the Federal armies round Richmond. 

In Tennessee Hood had suffered a crushing defeat, and an 
advance into South-West Virginia or North Carolina by Thomas' 
victorious troops might be looked for. Sherman had occupied 
Savannah on December 21st; and whether he transported his 
army by sea to City Point or marched overland to effect a junction 
with Grant, his army would shortly have to be reckoned with. 

' Humphreys, 31 1. 

^ In P'ebruary the Commissariat arrangements liad been so far improved that three 
and a half million rations of meat and two and a half million rations of bread had been 
collected in the reserve depots at Richmond, Lynchliurg, Danville, and (Jreenboro. 

^ President Davis, in a message to Congress in March, proposed to impress the 
supplies needed for the army, if the owners would not sell. 

It docs not seem that Lee exercised the powers with which he had been invested, 
but considered himself as still subordinate to the President. 



1864-5] FALL OF RICHMOND 505 

To meet this overwhelming concentration of force Lee could 
draw upon no fresh troops. The ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-shod Army of 
Northern Virginia was practically the only organised army left to 
the Confederacy. Too late. President Davis recognised the error 
of tying down that gallant army to the defence of Richmond. It 
would have been no light matter to abandon the national capital 
with its arsenals, workshops, and foundries ; and its evacuation 
would have been a heavy blow to the Confederate cause. But at 
any rate Lee's army, the chief bulwark of that cause, would have 
been set free to manoeuvre in the open field, instead of being cooped 
up behind entrenchments, where its efficiency as a fighting force was 
being daily impaired. 

Had Davis realised in time that the strength of a nation consists 
in its armies rather than its cities, the struggle might have been 
prolonged ; and there was always a chance, whilst the Confederate 
armies remained in the field, that the North, weary of the gigantic 
efforts which it had been called upon to make, might recognise the 
independence of the Southern Confederacy. But the re-election 
of Lincoln to the Presidency by an overwhelming majority in 
November, 1864, was a proof that the North meant to see the war 
through. Lincoln's great victory at the polls over the Democratic 
candidate, General McClellan, was largely due to the successes 
which Sherman and Sheridan had been winning in Georgia and the 
Shenandoah Valley, whilst Lee was held to the defence of Rich- 
mond and prevented by the mistaken views of his Government 
from striking a counterblow. Lincoln, encouraged by his re- 
election, about which he had at one time entertained grave doubts,^ 
was confirmed in his determination to continue the war, until the 
restoration of the Union should be accomplished. He bore no 
rancour towards the Southern States, and was ready to make peace 
on the two conditions of the Restoration of the Union and the 
Emancipation of the Slaves. In this latter point his hand was 
immensely strengthened by an amendment to the Constitution, 
passed in Congress by the necessary two-thirds majority on 
January 31st, 1865, which made Abolition of Slavery a fundamental 
part of the Constitution." 

On February 3rd Lincoln consented to meet informally on board 
a steamer in Hampton Roads three Confederate commissioners to 
discuss the possibilities of peace. But it was quickly seen that no 
common understanding could be arrived at, as the Confederate 
commissioners made it a sine qua non that the independence of the 
South should be recognised. The negotiations came to nothing. 
The sword alone could untie the Gordian knot. 

In December Warren had destroyed the Weldon Railway as far 

^ Schouler, 47 1-2, 478. 

^ This amendment still required to be ratified by three-fourths of the States. 



506 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

south as Hicksford (MapVII.),forty miles from Petersburg. Informa- 
tion was received that supplies were still being brought by wagon 
from Hicksford by the Boydton road to Petersburg, and on 
February 5th Gregg's cavalry division was sent to strike that road 
at Dinwidclie Court House and interrupt the trains supposed to be 
upon the road. The cavalry was supported by the 5th Corps and 
two divisions of the 2nd Corps, now under the command of General 
Humphreys in place of Hancock, who had been sent to Washington 
to organise a new ist Army Corps. 

During the winter the Confederates had strengthened and ex- 
tended their entrenchments on and about Hatcher's Run (Map 
VHL). Their entrenched line now reached from Hatcher's Run 
on the south of the Appomattox to White Oak Swamp on the 
north of the James, a distance of thirty-seven miles.^ To protect 
his extreme right against Warren's threatened advance, Lee con- 
centrated parts of Hill's and Gordon's Corps in the Hatcher's Run 
entrenchments, and some sharp fighting took place on the 5th and 
6th. Warren, advancing to Dabney's Mill, was driven back ; and 
Gregg on reaching the Boydton road found that it was but little 
used. The chief result of the three days' operations, from February 
5th to the 7th, was that the Federals extended their lines as far as 
the Vaughan road crossing of Hatcher's Run.'- 

Lee after assuming supreme command had quickly decided that 
to save his army he must abandon Richmond. His intention was 
to withdraw to Danville (Map VH.), unite with Johnston's force in 
North Carolina, and attack Sherman before Grant could come to 
his assistance. But the animals of the artillery and transport trains 
were in so emaciated a condition as to be useless for heavy work, 
until the roads should have recovered, and Lee feared lest before 
he could withdraw his army, Grant might extend so far to the left 
as to make retreat impossible.^ He therefore determined to make 
a sortie in force against the Federal lines near the Appomattox, in 
the hope that Grant would be compelled to draw back his left to 
reinforce his right. The task was assigned to Gordon, commanding 
the 2nd Army Corps, whose reputation as a leader of dash and 
enterprise had been steadily growing. The point selected for 
attack was Fort Stedman, about a mile and a half south of the 
Appomattox, where the main lines of the two armies were but 
150 yards apart and the pic}uet lines only a third of that distance.* 
In addition to the 2nd Corps reinforcements were ordered to 
Gordon from Hill's and Longstreet's Corps as well as a detach- 
ment of cavalry, whose special task was to be the destruction of 
the Federal telegraph wires and pontoon bridges over the Appo- 

' Humphreys, 310, note. ^ Ilunipbreys, 312-15. 

* Lee intended to take the shorter road to Amelia Court House along the south bank 
of the Appomattox (Swinton, 574-5). ■• Humphreys, 317. 



March, 1865] FALL OF RICHMOND 507 

mattox.^ As soon as Fort Stedman was carried, the attacking 
force was to push forward to the high ground in rear of the Federal 
lines, where it was erroneously supposed that three forts had been 
built, whose fire commanded Fort Stedman and the adjacent 
portion of the Federal lines. But as a matter of fact no such 
forts existed ; and the redoubts whose fire would sweep Fort 
Stedman and its approaches were in the main line of entrench- 
ments. An infantry division was held in reserve which, as soon as 
the Federal lines were broken, was to sweep down their entrench- 
ments to the Federal left, and this movement was to be supported 
by the other troops holding the Confederate lines as fast as their 
fronts were cleared.- 

At 4.30 a.m. on March 25th Gordon assaulted. As Confederate 
deserters were allowed to enter the Federal lines with their arms, 
the piquet posts were easily surprised, and the storming party, 
rushing forward to the main line, carried Fort Stedman and three 
adjacent batteries. There, however, the Confederate success 
ended, Gordon's attack was left almost entirely unsupported. The 
detachments, which were sent forward to seize the supposed forts, 
penetrated to the military railroad from City Point, but were then 
driven back by Hartranft's division of the 9th Corps.^ Assaults 
made from Fort Stedman upon the forts on its right and left were 
repulsed : and as soon as there was sufficient light to distinguish 
friend from foe, the Federal artillery in the main works and from 
the high ground in the rear, where General Parke ordered part 
of his field artillery to be posted, opened fire upon Fort Stedman. 
So heavy a fire swept the space between the lines of the two 
armies that neither could reinforcements be sent from Lee's lines 
to Gordon in Fort Stedman, nor could the Confederates in their 
enemy's works escape. 

Shortly before 8 a.m. Hartranft's division attacked and re- 
captured Fort Stedman. Of Gordon's command 1,949 were taken 
prisoners, and his loss in killed and wounded was also heavy.* 

^ Humphreys, 318. '^ Humphreys, 318. ^ Humphreys, 319. 

* Humphreys, 321, estimates the Confederate loss at nearly 4,000 and the Federal 
about 2,000. The Confederates captured Fort Stedman and Batteries X., XL, and 
Xn. But they failed to gain possession of Fort Haskell to their right and Fort 
McGilvery to their left. This failure prevented Gordon from securing a broad front on 
which he might deploy his forces for a forward movement. It is not clear what was the 
force which reached the railway. Humphreys thinks that they were Gordon's three 
detachments. Gordon says that he never knew what became of these detachments, and 
Hartranft thinks that the force which he encountered was a heavy line and groups of 
skirmishers. From his account (4 B. & L. , 584-9) it would follow that a considerably 
larger force pressed forward towards the railway than is generally recognised. Most 
accounts represent Gordon's main efforts as being directed against Fort Haskell and 
Battery IX., which latter effectually blocked the road to Fort McGilvery. Gordon 
accounts for his failure on the ground that the attack was delayed owing to the late 
arrival of Longstreet's troops from the north bank of the James, and daylight found " the 
plan only half executed." It is plain that the Confederate plan of attack miscarried, as 



508 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Following upon Gordon's repulse the commanders of the 2nd and 
6th Corps attacked and carried the Confederate piquet lines, but 
found the main lines of entrenchments too strongly held to justify 
an assault. Gordon's sortie, so far from relieving the pressure 
upon Lee's right, had enabled the Federals to gain an advanced 
position from which a few days later a successful assault was 
made. 

Grant had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable, 
if possible, to leave to the Armies of the Potomac and the James 
the work of crushing Lee's army. If Sherman's army were to 
participate therein, sectional jealousy might be aroused. Through- 
out the war the Army of the Potomac had been pitted against the 
Army of Northern Virginia, but except at Gettysburg had failed 
to gain any marked success over it. It seemed but just that, as 
a reward for the years of toil and of dogged perseverance in the 
face of continued failure, it should have the honour of forcing its 
old antagonist to surrender at last. Grant saw that Lee must 
abandon Richmond within a few days at the latest. If Lee 
succeeded in effecting a junction with Johnston's forces, the 
struggle might be prolonged some time longer. But the Federal 
general was now on the point of striking a blow, which, if success- 
ful, would probably prevent Lee from reaching Johnston, and 
would leave him no alternative except to surrender. On March 
24th Grant had issued orders for a general movement to com- 
mence on the 29th.^ The defeat of Gordon's sortie confirmed 
him in his determination. He had visited upon his enemy a very 
much heavier loss than he had himself suffered. On the 26th 
Sheridan's cavalry were brought from the north bank of the 
James and posted on the left of the Federal position, and on the 
night of the 27th, General Ord, commanding the Army of the 
James, made a secret march with three infantry divisions and one 
cavalry division, and, unknown to the Confederates, was placed 
in rear of the 2nd Corps. General Weitzel was left in command 
of the troops immediately threatening Richmond. Two divisions 
occupied the Bermuda Hundred entrenchments, and only one 
division held the lines on the north bank of the James.^ 

Grant's purpose was to concentrate all his available forces on 
his left, and with them strike such a blow as would force Lee to 
abandon his lines. Abraham Lincoln had already arrived at 
Grant's headquarters in anticipation of the speedy fall of the 
Southern capital. On the 27th Sherman arrived at City Point by 
water. He was informed of Grant's plans for the reduction of 

Lee had concentrated about half his army to take part in the movement. General 
Parke, commanding the 9th Corps, was the senior officer in the absence of Meade on 
that part of the Federal lines which was attacked. 

' Humphreys, 316. '^ Humphreys, 323. 



March, 1865] FALL OF RICHMOND 509 

Richmond, and it was settled that, if the co-operation of his army 
should after all be required, he should move from Goldsboro on 
April loth, and after feinting at Raleigh (Map I.) turn sharp to 
the right and reach the Roanoke River near Weldon, where he 
would be within sixty miles of Petersburg. Having arrived there, 
he would either move to Burkesville, the junction of the Southside 
and Danville railroads, and prevent Lee escaping by either of 
these roads, or hold himself in readiness for any movement which 
Grant might direct. Grant, however, was full of hope that before 
the day fixed for the commencement of Sherman's co-operative 
movement Lee's army would have ceased to exist. 

Sheridan on the 28th received orders to move with his cavalry 
early on the following morning to Dinwiddle Court House (Map 
Vn.). He was informed that the 2nd and 5th Corps would be 
within supporting distance, and was directed to try and force the 
enemy out of their entrenchments into open ground by threaten- 
ing to turn their right. But if the Confederates clung to their 
entrenchments he was told to "cut loose" and ride straight for the 
Danville Railway. This he was to thoroughly destroy as near the 
Appomattox as possible, and he was then to break up the South- 
side Railway west of Burkesville. Having ruined the two railroads, 
he could either return to Grant or join Sherman. These orders 
were, however, subject to modification, and actually were altered 
the following day. The 2nd Corps was ordered to cross Hatcher's 
Run (Map VHI.) by the Vaughan road crossing on the morning 
of the 29th as soon as its entrenchments had been occupied by 
Ord's troops, and to move forward with its right on the Run and 
its left in communication with the 5th Corps, which was ordered 
to cross the Run lower down and move along the Quaker road 
towards the Boydton road. Wright was ordered to hold himself 
in readiness to withdraw his Corps from their entrenchments, 
which were then to be occupied by an extension of the 9th Corps 
to its left.i 

Lee, as soon as he discovered Grant's new movement, hurried up 
reinforcements to the extreme right. The works constructed in 
the neighbourhood of Hatcher's Run during the winter had not 
been permanently garrisoned, but were only occupied by a sentry 
line. ^ Now, as Grant's movement developed, troops from other 
parts of the Confederate lines came pouring into these entrench- 
ments. Anderson with Johnson's division and Wise's brigade 
occupied the extreme right of the entrenchments along the White 

* Humphreys, 324-5. 

^ These works started at the Crow House, and then ran from the Boydton road crossing 
along the south side of Hatcher's Run, covering the White Oak road to its intersection 
with the Claiborne road ; they then turned northward, covering the latter road till they 
reached the Run (Humphreys, 310). 



510 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Oak road. Pickett's division was ordered to the same point. Hill 
extended to the right so as to connect with Anderson's left. Four 
of his brigades under Heth held the entrenchments on the south 
side of the Run, and Wilcox with four more brigades occupied 
those on the north side. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division was 
ordered from the extreme left across the James to the extreme 
right at Five Forks, as soon as Sheridan's movement to Grant's 
left was known to Lee. He reached Sutherland Station on the 
Southside railroad on the night of the 29th.^ 

During the 29th Sheridan received orders from Grant not to 
strike at the railways, but to co-operate with the 2nd and 5th 
Corps against the Confederate right. The only fighting on the 
29th was done by the leading division of Warren's Corps, which 
being attacked on the Quaker road by two brigades of Anderson's 
command, drove them back into the White Oak road entrench- 
ments. As rain fell heavily during the night of the 29th and 
throughout the 30th, rendering it necessary to corduroy the roads 
for the passage of the artillery and trains,- the Federal infantry 
confined themselves to pushing close up to the entrenchments in 
their front without attacking. There was some sharp skirmishing 
on the road from Dinwiddle Court House to Five Forks, between 
Sheridan's and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. On the evening of the 30th 
Fitzhugh Lee was joined by the cavalry of W. H. F. Lee and 
Rosser, from Stony Creek depot, and Pickett reached P'ive Forks 
with five infantry brigades. General Lee directed Pickett with his 
infantry and all the cavalry to move from Five F'orks on the 31st, 
and drive Sheridan from the Court House, whilst he himself pro- 
posed with the troops in the White Oak road entrenchments to fall 
upon the left flank of the 5th Corps. But in order to effect this 
concentration on his extreme right, he was obliged to leave the rest 
of his line but weakly defended. Parke and Wright, as the result 
of the reconnaissances made on the 30th, reported to Grant their 
confidence that they could carry by assault the works in their 
respective fronts.* 

Grant now determined to reinforce Sheridan with one infantry 
Corps, so as to enable him to turn Lee's right, and with the rest of 
his infantry to attack the Petersburg entrenchments. But the 
heavy rain, which fell continuously, caused a postponement of the 
proposed operation.* On the morning of the 31st Warren advanced 

^ Humphreys, 326. - Humphreys, 327. 

' Huuii)hrcys, 329. Al one period on Ihe 30lh Grant had been so discouraged by 
the foul weather that he determined to suspend operations, but he was dissuaded by 
Sheridan, who rode over on purpose to expostulate, and Rawlins, his chief-of-the-staff 
(2 Sheridan's Memoirs, 142-5). 

■• Orders were sent to the Cor])s-comnianders at 8.30 a.m. that there would be no 
movement of the troops that day, but in consefjuence of information received from 
Warren, the 5th Corps was ordered to gain possession of the White O.ik road, if a 



March 31, 1865] FALL OF RICHMOND 511 

with the 5th Corps to gain possession of the White Oak road. 
The Confederate entrenchments on the south side of Hatcher's 
Run ran along that road for some distance and then turned north- 
wards so as to cover the Claiborne road, until they again reached 
the Run. The White Oak road from its junction with the Clai- 
borne road extended four miles west to Five Forks, and if Warren 
could secure possession of this part of the road, which was not 
defended by entrenchments, Lee's extreme right at Five Forks 
would be separated from the troops holding the entrenchments in 
front of the Claiborne road. But at the same time as the 5th 
Corps was advancing to secure the White Oak road Lee was in 
person preparing to attack its left flank. The leading Federal 
division was close to the road, when it was assailed on the front 
and left flank by four Confederate brigades. It was driven back 
in considerable confusion. Crawford's division, which was sup- 
porting Ayres' advance, shared the same fate, and both divisions 
were forced across a tributary of Gravelly Run, where the third 
division under Griffin was in reserve. But a sudden attack by 
Miles' division of the 2nd Corps struck the advancing Confederates 
on the left flank. Griffin's division moved against their right flank, 
and they fell back to the position south of the road, which Ayres 
had occupied earlier in the morning. In the course of the after- 
noon Warren again moved forward to the White Oak road and 
drove the enemy from the slight breastwork which they had thrown 
up, and gained the road, forcing the Confederate brigades, which 
had attacked him in the morning, to retreat to their fortified lines. 
Humphreys on Warren's right kept up a vigorous demonstration 
against the works south of Hatcher's Run and prevented the troops 
holding them from sending reinforcements to the brigades which 
were engaged by Warren.^ 

Fitzhugh Lee, on the morning of the 31st, started from Five 
Forks with his three cavalry divisions. His object was, whilst 
pressing the hostile cavalry in front with one division, to throw the 
other two against their left flank. But the crossings over Chamber- 
lain's Creek, across which lay the approach to the Federal left, 
were so strongly held, that it was not until the arrival of Pickett's 
infantry upon the scene that the Federals were forced to retire. 
Fart of Sheridan's cavalry were driven eastwards to the Boydton 
road, but rejoined their commander after nightfall. With the rest 
of his force Sheridan formed line of battle in front of Dinwiddle 
Court House, and, though hard pressed, succeeded in holding the 
enemy's superior numbers at bay, till night put an end to the 

reconnaissance, which Warren had already ordered, showed that it was practicable 
(Humphreys, 330). 

^ Mott's division attacked the works at the Boydton road crossing and Hays' the 
Crow House redoubt, both unsuccessfully. 



512 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

combat. Warren on the White Oak road heard the sound of 
Sheridan's battle steadily receding southwards, and, judging that 
he was being driven back, sent a brigade across country to attack 
the enemy's flank and rear.^ 

Sheridan finding that he could not hold on to Dinwiddie Court 
House unless reinforced, sent both to Warren and Meade for help. 
The situation was grave. The Confederate forces in front of the 
Court House were in a position to intervene between Sheridan and 
Warren's and Humphreys' Corps, and after leaving a force to hold 
the cavalry in check might move against the left rear of the in- 
fantry.'- Warren was directed to fall back from the White Oak road 
to the Boydton road and to send one division by the latter road to 
Sheridan's aid. But the Boydton road bridge over Gravelly Run 
had been destroyed, and the stream was so swollen as to be unford- 
able for infantry.^ Sheridan's purpose was to make a combined 
attack with his own cavalry and Warren's reinforcements upon the 
enemy in his front at daybreak of April 1st. 

During the night Pickett, learning of the presence of a Federal 
force in his rear, withdrew his troops to Five Forks, where he en- 
trenched a position ' (see Plan). The Confederate line was about 
a mile and three-quarters in length, with a short return about one 
hundred yards long on its left. The infantry brigades occupied 
the entrenchments with W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division on the 
right, Rosser's in rear at the Ford road crossing of Hatcher's Run 

^ Humphreys, 336. 

' At the same time, as Sheridan clearly saw, the Confederate infantry by following 
him to Dinwiddie Court House had completely isolated itself, and a rare opportunity 
was offered the Federal army (2 Sheridan's Memoirs, 154). 

^ Warren's operations on the night of the 31st were severely censured by Grant and 
Sheridan. But his position was a very difficult one. The order directing him to send one 
division to Sheridan and withdraw the rest of his corjis to the Boydton road was received 
about 9.30 p.m., the fourth order which he had had since 5 p.m. But at 10.50 p.m. he 
received another order directing him whilst sending one division down the Boydton road 
to move the other two across country into the road from Dinwiddie Court House to Five 
Forks, so as to fall upon the enemy's rear, whilst Sheridan attacked their front. A 
further order, received at i a.m., made it perfectly jilain that in Meade's eyes the im- 
portant thing was to send a division direct to Sheridan's help. But as it was very doubtful 
whether that reinforcement could possibly reach Sheridan by daybreak, at which hour he 
was expecting to be attacked, and as it was anticipated that without such reinforcement 
Sheridan would be obliged to retreat by the Vaughan road, Warren, instead of startini, 
his two divisions at once against the enemy's rear, waited until he knew that his other 
division had established connection with Sheridan. Ayres' division was crossing 
Gravelly Run at 2 a.m., and the other two divisions did not commence their march till 
5 a.m. For this delay Warren was censured by the Court of Enquiry which met many 
years later to investigate his conduct (Humphreys, 336-43). 

* Pickett's withdrawal seems to have been due to the movements of Bartlett's brigade, 
which, about 5 ji.m. on the 31st, Warren had sent across country from the White Oak 
road to Sheridan's aid. This brigailc struck the direct road from Dinwiddie Court House 
to the White Oak road near Dr. Boisseau's, and drove some Confederate skirmishers 
across Gravelly Run. Bartlett's presence in his rear became known to Pickett about 
10 p.m., and he did not learn that the Federal brigade had sulisequently been with- 
drawn, in accordance with Meade's orders (Humphreys, 342). 



April i, 1865] FALL OF RICHMOND 513 

guarding the trains, and Munford's on the left, dismounted, cover- 
ing the ground beyond the left flank of the infantry and connecting 
with a cavalry force which was covering the ground to the right of 
the Claiborne road entrenchments. 

Sheridan, since daylight,^ had been following Pickett with two 
of his cavalry divisions. Finding that the Confederate generals 
intended to make a stand at Five Forks, he determined to demon- 
strate with his cavalry against the right of their line, whilst the 5th 
Corps, which was now concentrated near Gravelly Run Church, was 
to assault the left." Mackenzie's cavalry division,^ which had been 
placed under Sheridan's command, was to strike the White Oak 
road, move along it in conjunction with and to the right of the 5th 
Corps, and try to cut off the Confederate line of retreat by securing 
the Ford road crossing over Hatcher's Run. 

About 4 p.m. the 5 th Corps advanced to the attack. Warren 
was under the impression that the Confederate line reached nearly 
half a mile further east than was really the case.* Consequently 
only Ayres' division came at once into action. It assaulted and 
carried the return on the Confederate left. The other two divisions 
passed through the woods north of the White Oak road, where they 
had some sharp skirmishing with Munford's dismounted cavalry 
and got right in the rear of the Confederate entrenchments, Craw- 
ford's division, which was leading, having reached the Ford road. 
Fronting south they moved on Five Forks.^ The Confederates 
with their line of retreat cut off made desperate efforts to repel the 
assaults, which were directed against them from three sides. On 
the extreme right W. H. F. Lee repulsed an attack of two of 
Custer's brigades. But the infantry brigades successively changing 
front to the left, were forced back by the superior numbers of the 
5th Corps, one upon the other, until at last the whole line gave way 
and fled west through the woods towards the Southside Railway. 

Neither Pickett nor Fitzhugh Lee were with their troops when 
the attack commenced : they had ridden to the north side of 
Hatcher's Run, and the density of the woods prevented the sound 
of firing from reaching them. Pickett, receiving information that 

^ Humphreys, 343. 

' As the 5th Corps had not been in time to intercept Pickett's retreat, it was halted by 
Sheridan's orders at J. Boisseau's, near the forks of the road. It was not ordered up to 
the front till i p.m. 

^ This division belonged to the Army of the James, and had originally been com- 
manded by Kautz. On joining Sheridan on the morning of the ist, it was at first posted 
at Dinwiddle Court House, awaiting further orders. 

■* An impression apparently shared by Sheridan (Humphreys, 346-7). 

" Crawford's division was facing south on the Ford road. Griffin's division, which 
formed Warren's centre, moved south-west against the enemy's rear, and after a hard 
struggle carried a new line of entrenchments, which the Confederate infantry on the left 
were trying to throw up in order to check Ayres' advance from the return, which he had 
already captured (Humphreys, 349). 

2 L 



511 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the battle had begun, hastened to the scene of action ; but before 
he arrived, Ayres had broken the Confederate left, and all his efforts 
to retrieve the day were vain. Fitzhugh Lee only got back to 
Hatcher's Run in time to find that the Ford road was in the hands 
of the Federals, and consequently was prevented from taking any 
part in the engagement. After the battle he collected his three 
cavalry divisions on the north bank of Hatcher's Run and with- 
drew to Sutherland Station (Map VI 1 1.), where he was joined during 
the night by four infantry brigades under R. H. Anderson, which 
Lee had sent from the right of his entrenchments to aid in rallying 
Pickett's beaten troops and to close that line of approach to 
Petersburg.^ On the morning of the 2nd Pickett, with the rem- 
nants of his infantry, joined Anderson at Sutherland Station. 

The battle of Five Forks was decisive of the fate of Petersburg. 
It gave the Federals possession of the Southside Railway, and 
forced Lee to send such heavy detachments to prevent the Federals 
entering Petersburg by the line of that railway, that at other points 
he was unable to hold his lines in sufficient strength. It was almost 
certainly a mistaken policy which required Pickett to fight at Five 
Forks at all.- He was forced to hold an isolated position, four 
miles away from the nearest point of the Confederate entrench- 
ments, without any strong natural obstacles to protect either flank, 
and if his left were turned he would be cut off from the rest of 
Lee's army. A strong defensive position might have been taken 
up on Hatcher's Run or at Sutherland Station, where the conse- 
quences of defeat would have been less disastrous. As it was, he 
lost at least 4,500 prisoners and six guns. On neither side were the 
losses in killed and wounded heavy.^ 

In the hour of victory, when the Confederate infantry were flying 
from the field, Sheridan relieved Warren of the command of the 
5th Corps. He had been authorised by Grant early that day to 
take this step if he judged it expedient. Owing probably to the 
fact that the Army of the Potomac had practically two commanders, 
its Corps commanders had developed the habit of deciding at their 
own discretion the manner and time in which the movements 
ordered from headquarters should be executed. Warren was an 
engineer officer of high scientific attainments and with a brilliant 
war record, but his caution rendered him an unsuitable colleague 
for the fiery Sheridan, who was always eager to snatch at any 
opportunity which chance might present. In the battle of April ist 

' Fitzhugh Lee thinks that if Anderson had marched by the direct road to Five Forks 
he would have come in on the flank and rear of the enemy's right, and would have 
"probably changed the result of the uneven contest" (4 15. & L., 712). These troops, 
however, seem not to have been despatched to the right till after news had reached Lee 
of Pickett's defeat (Humphreys, 354). 

- llumiihreys, 355; Lee's /.ee, 376. •' Humphreys, 353-4. 



April 2, 1865] FALL OF RICHMOND 515 

Sheridan did not consider that Warren had displayed sufficient 
energy in bringing his troops into action or in pushing the attack, 
and accordingly called Griffin to take his place at the head of the 
5th Corps. In the Court of Enquiry held in 1879 after Warren's 
repeated requests, Sheridan, though readily admitting that Warren 
had displayed the skill and energy in handling his Corps which 
might be required of an ordinary commander (to which fact, in- 
deed, overwhelming testimony was produced at the Court of 
Enquiry), justified his action on the ground that what was required 
at so critical a moment was an officer of extraordinary ability. 
Grant on April 3rd appointed Warren to command the forces left 
in Petersburg and City Point.^ 

In anticipation of Sheridan's success Grant had ordered a general 
assault to be made by Parke, Wright, and Ord upon the Petersburg 
entrenchments as soon as it was light on the 2nd. Fearing, how» 
ever, lest Lee in despair should withdraw during the night from hit 
lines and fall upon Sheridan, who now lay across his right flank, he 
ordered his artillery to open fire along the whole length of his lines 
at 10 p.m. The Confederate guns replied, and for two hours a 
tremendous cannonade was maintained. It was indeed the death- 
knell of the Confederacy : for Lee's position on the morning of the 
2nd was such that he could have but little chance of repelling a 
determined assault made all along the line. Pickett's defeat had 
necessitated the withdrawal of Field's division, accompanied by 
Longstreet in person, from the north bank of the James, and the 
Richmond defences were only held by two divisions under Ewell. 
The Bermuda Hundred lines were manned by Mahone's division. 
Had Grant on the night of the ist massed troops on the north 
bank of the James, Richmond would have been in his hands on 
the morning of the 2nd. But he did not know that Field's division 
had been withdrawn, and preferred to secure the evacuation of 
Richmond by the capture of Petersburg. South of the Appomattox 
Gordon's Corps, over 7,000 strong, held the entrenchments opposite 
the 9th Corps' lines.'- But from Gordon's right to Hatcher's Run 
only four brigades were available to meet the attack of Wright's 
and Ord's commands. South of Hatcher's Run four more brigades 

^ Sheridan, in his Memoirs, is very unfair to Warren. He says (ii. 161) that Warren 
on the 1st exhibited distinct apathy and gave the impression that he wished the sun to go 
down before the battle could be begun. But as a matter of fact Warren attacked about 
4 p.m., and it seems clear that Sheridan mistook for apathy an attitude of concentrated 
thought. Again, Sheridan complained that portions of the 5th Corps gave way owing to 
Warren making no effort to inspire his troops with confidence. But Sheridan was with 
Ayres' division and saw nothing of Warren, who was on the right with Crawford's and 
Griffin's divisions. No one after reading Sheridan's account would expect to find that 
Crawford's division suffered more heavily than either of the other two. For the finding 
of the Court of Enquiry, ordered in December, 1879, see 4 B. & L., 723-4, and 
Humphreys, 357-361. For an eulogy of Warren's conduct at Five Forks, see Swinton, 
598-600. ^ Humphreys, 363. 



516 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

held the White Oak road and Claiborne road entrenchments. 
At Sutherland Station on the Southside line Anderson had four 
infantry brigades as well as Pickett's infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's 
cavalry. The weakest spot in the Confederate lines was on the 
north side of Hatcher's Run in front of the 6th Corps and Ord's 
divisions : and if the line were broken there both the forces on the 
south side of Hatcher's Run and Anderson at Sutherland Station 
would be cut off from Petersburg. 

At 4.40 a.m. the 6th Corps advanced to the assault. The 
advanced position captured on March 25th now proved invaluable 
as affording cover for concentrating a column of attack within 
striking distance of the enemy's lines. In fifteen minutes the 
6th Corps carried the lines in its front with a loss of 1,100 killed 
and wounded.^ Some of the victorious Federals made their way 
across the Boydton road to the Southside Railway, and it was by 
one of these parties probably that General A. P. Hill was killed as 
he was riding from Lee's headquarters to rally the soldiers of his 
Corps. Sweeping down the entrenchments to the left, the 6th Corps 
pressed on towards Hatcher's Run, where they met part of Ord's 
command, which had carried the entrenchments on the north bank 
of the Run. The two Corps were directed to march straight on 
Petersburg with Ord's troops leading. About 4.30 a.m. Parke had 
assaulted the lines held by Gordon's Corps with two columns 
moving from either side of Fort Sedgwick. He carried the first 
line of entrenchments, capturing twelve guns and 800 prisoners, 
and secured possession of the Confederate lines for a distance of 
nearly a quarter of a mile on either side of the Jerusalem plank 
road, but found himself confronted by a second line of works 
which he vainly endeavoured to carry. Later in the day Gordon 
made several attempts to recover the lines lost in the morning, but 
Parke repulsed all his attacks.- 

On the south side of the Run the 2nd Corps had unsuccess- 
fully attacked the Confederate works on the night of the 1st. 
Humphreys was afterwards ordered to send one of his divisions 
to report to Sheridan. It was not intended that he should attack 
on the 2nd, but finding that the lines on the north side of the Run 
had been carried, he attacked in his front with his two remaining 
divisions.^ The entrenchments on the south side of the Run were 
carried, and the Confederates withdrew from the White Oak road 
works, as their position was now rendered untenable by the break- 
ing of their lines to the east. Humphreys was called off from the 
pursuit of this force and ordered to march direct on Petersburg. 
Miles' division of the 2ncl Corps, however, which Sheridan on the 

' Humphreys, 365. - Humphreys, 366. 

•• Humphreys, 366. He had been ordered not to attack the Crow House redoubts 
beoausc one of his divisions (Miles') was absent with Sheridan. 



April 2, 1865] FALL OF RICHMOND 517 

morning of the 2nd had sent back to join Humphreys, came up 
with Heth's retreating brigades, and after two unsuccessful attempts 
carried the entrenchments which they had hastily thrown up.^ The 
Confederates retreated in great disorder westwards, a part crossing 
the Appomattox, but the majority joined Anderson's command, 
which was moving along the south bank of the river in the direction 
of Amelia Court House (Map VH.). Sharp skirmishing went on 
throughout the day between Sheridan's cavalry and Anderson's 
rearguard. 

Lee in Petersburg was now forced back into his last line of 
entrenchments within the suburbs of the city. On the west side, 
where the hostile pressure was heaviest, his line ran from the 
Appomattox along the east bank of Old Town Creek (Map 
VIII.). On the further bank were some advanced works, the 
strongest of which were Forts Gregg and Whitworth. Grant 
determined to crown the day's work by capturing these two 
redoubts, and Ord was directed to assault them. Fort Gregg was 
captured after a desperate struggle. Its garrison of 300 was 
either killed or captured, and the Federal loss was over 700. Fort 
Whitworth was more easily gained possession of, as Wilcox, to 
save useless bloodshed, ordered his troops to abandon it.^ A final 
assault was ordered to be made upon Lee's lines both at Petersburg 
and Richmond early on the 3rd, but during the night the Army 
of Northern Virginia withdrew from its works and commenced its 
retreat westwards. 

Lee had sent a message to President Davis immediately after 
the 6th Corps carried his lines, that Richmond would have to be 
abandoned.^ All that he could possibly hope to do was to hold 
on to the Petersburg lines till night, and thus gain time for or- 
ganising the retreat. To attempt to hold Richmond after the 
loss of Petersburg was not to be thought of for a moment. For 
Sheridan would have quickly secured the Danville Railroad, and 
the fate of the Southern capital would then have been sealed. By 
abandoning Richmond forthwith there was at any rate a chance 
that the Army of Northern Virginia might yet be saved for active 
operations in the field. At 8 p.m. the evacuation commenced. 
As the southern bank of the Appomattox was now in the hands 
of the Federals, Lee had to withdraw his troops in Petersburg to 
the north bank, and march along it until he could recross out of 
reach of Grant's army. Longstreet with Field's division and what 
still remained in Petersburg of Heth's and Wilcox's divisions led 
the way. Gordon with the 2nd Corps followed : Mahone with- 
drew during the night from Bermuda Hundred and marching by 
Chesterfield Court House crossed the Appomattox after Gordon 
at Goode's bridge (Map VII.), where Longstreet's troops had also 

^ Humphreys, 368. ^ Humphreys, 370. * Humphreys, 371. 



518 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

crossed. Ewell withdrew his two divisions across the James and 
crossed the Appomattox by the Danville railway brid^^e. Ander- 
son's command marched along the south bank of the river. 
Amelia Court House was named as the point of concentration.^ 

Very early on the 3rd the Federals discovered that the enemy 
had retired, and Petersburg was quietly taken possession of. In 
Richmond during the night fires broke out in different parts of 
the city in consequence of the destruction of the military stores 
which Ewell had ordered.- The same fate which had overtaken 
Columbia threatened the late capital of the Confederacy. At 8.15 
a.m. on the 3rd the city was formally surrendered by its mayor to 
General Weitzel, and Federal troops quickly extinguished the 
flames and restored order. On the following day Abraham Lincoln 
visited the city which had so long defied him, and almost un- 
attended, leading his little boy by the hand, walked through its 
streets, amid the adoring salutations of the negroes, to the Grey 
House, where his rival had so lately ruled. Jefferson Davis had 
left Richmond on the evening of the 2nd for Danville, which was 
proclaimed as the new seat of government. Lee hoped to lead 
his army to the same place, whence a junction could be effected 
with Johnston's army by the railroad through Greenboro. 

Grant bent all his energies to prevent his enemy from making 
good his escape. Sheridan with the cavalry and the 5th Corps was 
directed to reach the Danville Railroad at some point between the 
Appomattox and its junction with the Southside line.^ Meade 
with the 2nd and 6th Corps followed, moving west in the direction 
of Amelia Court House, whilst Ord with his command, to be 
followed by the 9th Corps, marched towards Burkesville along the 
line of the Southside Railway. 

Lee had hoped to get all his army concentrated at Amelia Court 
House on the night of the 4th. But Longstreet's Corps was the 
only one which actually reached the Court House on that day : and 
Ewell and Anderson did not come up till the following morning.'* 
Lee has stated that he was delayed a whole day at the Court House, 
because the provisions, which he had ordered to be sent from Dan- 
ville, were not forthcoming, and a day had consequently to be spent 
in collecting food and forage for the men and animals. But what- 
ever were the facts about the missing rations — and the Danville 
authorities denied that any requisition from Lee for supplies ever 
reached them ^ — it seems plain that Lee was not able to effect his 

' Humphrey.s, 371. 

'^ The fire seems to have been caused by the Confederates setting fire to the stores of 
tobacco (Lee's Lee, 381). 

^ Sheridan was to keep near to the Appomattox, "so as to feel Lee's army constantly" 
(Humphreys, 373). 

* Ewell did not arrive before noon. "* Lee's Lee, 383 ; Swinton, 642. 



April 6. 1865] FALL OF RICHMOND 519 

concentration at as early an hour as he had hoped. There had not 
been time before the hasty flight from Richmond to see that the 
trains were made as light as possible and only ammunition and 
medical supplies carried in the wagons. The roads were still very 
bad, and the speed of the retreat was delayed by the slow progress 
of the heavily laden trains. The loss of a day proved fatal to Lee. 
For Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th Corps reached Jetersville on 
the Danville Railroad, some eight miles south-west of Amelia Court 
House, on the afternoon of the 4th.^ The infantry entrenched a 
position, and the 2nd and 6th Corps were pushed forward as fast as 
possible to reinforce Sheridan. They did not, however, reach Jeters- 
ville till the afternoon of the 5th, and Meade gave orders for an 
advance to be made against Lee's army at 6 a.m. on the 6th. 

Lee had himself moved out from Amelia Court House on the 
afternoon of the 5th to sweep Sheridan out of his path, of whose 
presence he had learnt the previous evening. But on receiving 
information that he had not merely cavalry to deal with, but that 
a strong infantry force was entrenched across his road, he turned to 
his right and directed his line of march towards Rice's Station and 
Farmville.^ Though forced to abandon the direct route to Danville, 
he still hoped that he might be able to reach that place by a round- 
about route, passing through Prince Edward Court House, whilst 
if that road was also found to be blocked he could still continue to 
retreat from Farmville to Lynchburg. 

But already Stoneman's cavalry of Thomas' army was tearing 
up the railway on the further side of Lynchburg, and the 4th Army 
Corps was advancing in the same direction from East Tennessee. 
These forces would have been able to hold the mountain passes 
long enough to enable Grant to catch up the rear of Lee's retreat- 
ing army. Consequently Lee's only chance of escape was to reach 
Danville and join Johnston. As Meade was advancing towards 
Amelia Court House on the morning of the 6th, the rearmost 
Confederate columns could be seen in motion on the left. The 
order of march was changed, and the three Army Corps were soon 
heading west in pursuit. Longstreet's Corps, to which Mahone's 
division had been assigned, reached Rice's Station by a night march 
at sunrise of the 6th.^ But the progress of the other three Corps, 
which were encumbered with the trains, was very much slower. 
Sheridan's cavalry was hanging on their left flank and rear, making 
dashes, when opportunity offered, at the trains, whilst Gordon's 
Corps, which formed the rearguard, was hard pressed by the 2nd 
Corps. 

At Sailor's Creek the Confederates were finally brought to bay. 
A mile on the north side of the Creek the road forks : one branch 

^ Humphreys, 374. "^ Rice's station was on the Lynchburg Railway. 

^ Humphreys, 377. 



520 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

goes straight on across the Creek to Rice's Station, the other runs 
west and crosses the Creek close to its junction with the Appo- 
mattox. This latter road was taken by the Confederate trains 
and Gordon's Corps. The 2nd Corps followed in close pursuit. 
In the running fight, which continued till nightfall, Gordon lost 
heavily. A great part of the trains, which he was endeavouring 
to save, were captured, and in his own Corps he lost 1,700 prisoners 
and four guns.^ During the night he marched to High Bridge on 
the Appomattox. 

Anderson's and Ewell's Corps had kept straight on the road 
to Rice's Station, but anxiety for the safety of the trains and the 
rearguard caused them to halt after crossing Sailor's Creek.^ 
Sheridan's cavalry seized the opportunity, and secured the road 
in advance of Anderson's Corps, whilst the 6th Corps closed in 
upon Ewell. The Confederates had no artillery. Ewell's Corps 
being attacked in front by the 6th Corps and on the flank by a 
cavalry brigade, in spite of a brave resistance, found itself forced 
to surrender, when Anderson's Corps in its rear was driven from 
its temporary entrenchments by Sheridan's cavalry. Very nearly 
the whole of Ewell's Corps was captured : out of a total force of 
3,600 not more than 250 escaped. Anderson did not lose so 
heavily, as his line of retreat was not entirely cut off, but of about 
6,000 men in his command he probably lost 2,600.^ Ewell, with 
eleven general officers, was amongst the prisoners.* Johnson's 
division of Anderson's Corps retained its organisation, and on 
rejoining Lee was assigned to Gordon's Corps. But the battle of 
Sailor's Creek virtually destroyed two out of Lee's four small 
Corps. 

Throughout the day Longstreet's Corps with Lee in person had 
been waiting for the other Corps to come up. At length Lee took 
Mahone's division and returned towards Sailor's Creek to see what 
had become of the rest of his army. Shortly before dusk, on 
reaching the crest on the south side of the Creek, he discovered 
the appalling nature of the disaster which had overtaken his rear. 
Longstreet was ordered to march from Rice's Station to Farmville, 
where he crossed the Appomattox on the morning of the 7th. At 

^ Humphreys, 381. 

"■^ It does not seem quite clear whether Sheridan's cavalry gained possession of the 
Rice's Station road before or after Anderson's force halted on the south side of Sailor's 
Creek. Sheridan (2 Memoirs, 180) claims that Merritt's and Crook's divisions (three in 
all) secured the road and cut off Anderson from Longstreet, and that also one cavalry 
brigade and a battery cut in between Ewell's rear and the head of Gordon's column, 
forcing the latter to take the right-hand road. Ewell (4 K. & L. , 721) states that it was 
the presence of Federal cavalry in force on the road which C(jmpclled Anderson to halt. 
Humphreys, 382, says that "Crook moving to the left found General Anderson strongly 
posted with temporary breastworks running across the Rice's Station road, and sent 
Gregg to take possession of and form across the road " 

^ For these figures see Humphreys, 383-4. ■* 4 B. & L,, 722. 



April 8, 1S65] FALL OF RICHMOND 521 

Farmville a supply of rations had been accumulated, and the 
starving Confederates got their first regular meal since the retreat 
began.^ Gordon and Mahone crossed the river at High Bridge 
below Farmville. Ord after reaching Burkesville had marched 
on the 6th along the Lynchburg railroad and found Longstreet's 
Corps encamped at Rice's Station. But it was then too late in 
the day to organise a line of battle. A small force, which he 
had sent on in advance, before he knew of Longstreet's position, 
consisting of two infantry regiments and the Headquarters' cavalry, 
less than 600 men in all,- to destroy High Bridge and the bridges 
at Farmville, was overtaken by Rosser's and Munford's cavalry 
divisions, and after a brave resistance forced to surrender to over- 
whelming numbers. By the morning of the 7th Lee's army, now 
reduced to two infantry Corps and one cavalry Corps, was once 
again on the north bank of the Appomattox. To delay pursuit 
the bridges were set on fire. But the 2nd Federal Corps, which 
resumed the pursuit at 5.30 a.m. on the 7th, arrived in time to 
save the railway and wagon bridges at High Bridge.^ The 
Farmville bridges were destroyed, and the ford, by which Crook 
crossed his cavalry over the river, was too deep for the passage of 
infantry. 

Lee, having marched four miles along the Lynchburg road, halted 
and formed line of battle.^ His object was to give his trains time 
to get on in advance. But the delay proved fatal. Humphreys, 
with two divisions of his Corps, attacked the Confederate line. 
Though Miles' division was roughly handled by Mahone, Hum- 
phreys succeeded in detaining Lee, and thus gave time to Sheridan 
to head him off at Appomattox Station. Crook's cavalry, having 
crossed by the ford above Farmville, had some fighting with Fitz- 
hugh Lee's cavalry. The Federals were driven back, and General 
Gregg, commanding the leading brigade, was taken prisoner. On 
the night of the 7th Lee resumed his march. Had he not felt 
himself obliged to halt and offer battle to Humphreys' Corps, he 
could have reached Appomattox Station on the 8th, where he 
would have found rations waiting him, and Lynchburg on the 
following day.^ For the two infantry Corps'^ under Ord would not 
have been up in time to prevent Sheridan's cavalry from being 
driven out of Lee's path. 

The Federal cavalry reached Appomattox Station on the evening 
of the 8th, and captured four trains, which had been sent with 
supplies from Lynchburg.'^ Sheridan took up a position for the 

^ Humphreys, 386 ; Lee's Lee, 385. ^ Humphreys, 385. 

' Humphreys, 3S7. ■* Lee's Lee, 386. 

' Humphreys, 391. ^ The 5th and the 24th. 

"^ Tlie presence of these trains at Appomattox Station was due to a telegram sent 
to Lynchburg by Sheridan in Lee's name (2 Sheridan's Memoirs, 176, 189). 



522 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

night across the road, which Lee was marching on, south-west of 
Appomattox Court House, which was occupied by Lee's advance- 
guard that same night During the day's march Gordon's Corps 
had exchanged places with Longstreet's, which now formed the 
rearguard. Though there was no heavy fighting on the 8th, Hum- 
phreys' Corps was all the time in close pursuit, and went into camp 
for the night within three miles of Longstreet."^ 

Communications had already been opened between the two 
commanding generals as regards the surrender of the Confederate 
army. On the 7th Grant had written to Lee, pointing out the 
hopelessness of further resistance, and asking for the surrender of 
his army to avoid needless bloodshed. To this Lee replied that, 
though he did not share Grant's view of the hopelessness of his 
position, yet he should like to know what terms Grant would offer 
in the possible event of his surrender. Grant's answer on the 8th 
was to the effect that he should be satisfied if the army surrender- 
ing was disqualified for bearing arms against the United States 
until duly exchanged. To this Lee replied late the same day that 
he did not think that the time had yet come to treat of surrender, 
but, as the object of both was peace, he should be glad to meet 
Grant, and discuss any propositions which might tend to the desired 
end. Not unnaturally Grant declined the proposed interview : as 
he stated in his answer of the morning of the 9th, he had no 
authority to treat on the subject of peace. Lee, though several of 
his general officers were pressing him to surrender,'^ determined to 
make one last effort. Fitzhugh Lee and Gordon were directed as 
early as possible on the 9th to move out against Sheridan, If 
only cavalry were encountered, they were to attack and clear a 
way for the rest of the army. But if, as Lee feared, Sheridan had 
been reinforced by a strong body of infantry, then they must 
abandon the attempt, and no alternative would be left but to 
surrender. 

At daybreak Fitzhugh Lee and Gordon, with thirty guns, 
moved out against the Federal cavalry, and it was Lee's in- 
tention, if the attack on Sheridan was successful, to send the 
bulk of his trains and part of his artillery to Lynchburg, and 
with the rest of his artillery and the ammunition wagons to 
march his army to Campbell Court House with the purpose 
of ultimately reaching Danville.-' At first the attack seemed 
likely to be successful. Sheridan only had cavalry at his dis- 
posal, and in spite of an obstinate resistance they were being 
gradually forced back. But between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m., Ord, with 
the 5th and 24th Corps, reached the battlefield. From Ord's 
report it would seem that he was only just in time.^ The Federal 

' FTumphrey!, 392. There was some skirmishing in the vicinity of .\ppomattox 
Station. * Lee's I ee, 392. ■* Lee's Lee, 387. •• Humphreys, 397. 



April, 1865] FALL OF RICHMOND 523 

cavalry were falling back in confusion before the advance of 
Gordon's infantry. But on the appearance of such heavy rein- 
forcements, the Confederate leaders, in accordance with their 
instructions, began to withdraw their troops from the engagement. 

The contingency, which Lee had feared, had come to pass. 
Close on his rear was the 2nd Corps : in front a strong force of 
infantry and cavalry blocked the road : the time for surrender had 
arrived. The closing scene of the long duel between the Armies 
of the Potomac and Northern Virginia took place at Appomattox 
Court House about i p.m., and at 4 p.m. the surrender of the 
Confederate army was formally announced to the Army of the 
Potomac.^ Grant proved himself a generous foe : the terms which 
he had offered on the 8th formed the basis of the capitulation. 
Rations were distributed from the Federal stores to the hungry 
Confederates : and those of the Confederate cavalry and artillery 
who owned their own horses were allowed to retain them. The 
total number of officers and men paroled on the 9th was 28,356. 
To such meagre proportions was the once great Army of Northern 
Virginia reduced. 

With the surrender of Lee's army, the Confederacy collapsed. 
The only organised army left in the field was Johnston's, in North 
Carolina (Map XII.). On April loth Sherman moved out from 
Goldsboro against it, and on the 13th occupied Raleigh, Johnston 
slowly retiring before him. The following day the Confederate 
general opened negotiations for an armistice, and military opera- 
tions came to an end. The assassination of Abraham Lincoln in 
Ford's theatre at Washington, on the night of the 14th, though by 
depriving the South of one of its best friends, it greatly compli- 
cated the political situation, had no effect upon the military 
position. It tended to make Sherman and Johnston, both of 
whom were sincerely desirous of peace, more eager to come to 
terms. Between these two generals an armistice and a convention, 
which they fondly hoped might serve as a basis for the general 
pacification of the South, were arranged. But the Federal 
Government refused to ratify either armistice or convention. 
Stanton, who was at the moment predominant in Washington, 
charged Sherman with treachery, and ordered Grant to hasten to 
Raleigh and take charge of the negotiations with Johnston. On 
April 26th Johnston formally surrendered his army at Greenboro 
on the same terms that had been granted to Lee. The number of 
officers and men paroled amounted to 37,047. But about 8,000 
men had already deserted the ranks since the armistice of the 
1 8th, for fear of being made prisoners of war.' 

Further south, General Wilson had conducted a very successful 
cavalry expedition into Alabama, defeating Forrest and capturing 

* Humphreys, 399. '^ Cox's March to the Sea, 243. 



524 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

Selma (Map X.), the last great manufacturing arsenal of the South,^ 
on April 2nd. General Canby, commanding the Department of 
the Gulf, reinforced by the i6th Corps of Thomas' army, had 
commenced a campaign against Mobile, the last stronghold on the 
Gulf held by the Confederates. On April 9th Fort Blakeley was 
taken by storm, and Mobile itself surrendered on the 12th. On 
May 4th General Richard Taylor surrendered the remaining 
Confederate forces in Mississippi and Alabama to General Canby. 
In the Trans-Mississippi Department the last actual fighting of 
the war took place on May 13th in Texas, and on May 26th 
General Kirby Smith, commanding in that Department, sur- 
rendered all his forces. On May loth a squadron of Wilson's 
cavalry had captured Jefferson Davis near the Florida border- 
line.2 

With the capture of its President, and the surrender of all its 
forces in the field, the resistance of the South came to an end. 
The Restoration of the Union and the Abolition of Slavery were 
accomplished facts. 

^ Cox's March to the Sea, 204. 

2 Jefferson Davis was imprisoned for two years, and then indicted for treason, but in 
May, 1867, he was released on bail, and the case never came to trial. He lived more 
than twenty years longer at his home in Mississippi (Schouler, 621, note i). 



CHAPTER XXVIII 
RETROSPECT 

WHEN the great struggle came to an end, the exhausted 
combatants on either side might well marvel at the vast 
proportions which it had assumed. This had been no 
ninety days' affair, no picnic march to Richmond ; but for four 
years the North had been pouring out its blood and treasure in an 
endeavour, which had often seemed hopeless but at last was 
crowned with signal success, to force back into the Union the 
seceding States, whose military resources had at first been regarded 
with a contempt wholly unjustifiable in the light of subsequent 
events. The South, too, must have realised that it had altogether 
failed to grasp at the outset the dogged resistance, the inflexible 
determination, the obstinate refusal to bow to disasters, however 
heavy and however numerous, of an opponent whose strength and 
staying power had been greatly underestimated. 

The struggle had been colossal, a war of giants : no previous war 
had ever in the same time entailed upon the combatants such enor- 
mous sacrifices of life and wealth : ^ and perhaps no previous war 
had ever been so completely decisive in its results. To the men of 
that day who saw the Southern Confederacy beaten to its knees 
after almost superhuman efforts and in spite of many a victory, the 
greatest marvel of all was perhaps that the South had held out so 
long against such enormous resources and overwhelming odds. 
Those who contrasted the total disappearance of the Confederate 
armies with the fact that the North had in 1865 over a million of 
men under arms might indeed feel wonder that the struggle had 
not terminated long ago. The utter collapse of the Confederacy 
caused men for the time to blind themselves to the tremendous 
power which the defeated combatant had wielded, and to ignore 

^ Dodge gives the deaths in the Federal armies during the war at 359,528, and this 
estimate does not include " the great number who died at home, from the results of ex 
posure, wounds, or diseases contracted in the line of duty. Counting all losses directly 
due to the war, it would be safe to say that half a million men were lost in the North and 
close upon the same number in the South." The same authority estimates the total cost 
of the war to the North at 3,400,000,000 dollars or nearly two and a half millions a day 
A Bird' s-Eye View of our Cii'il War, 324-6). 



526 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

the enormous difficulties of the task which the victor had at last 
triumphantly surmounted. 

But to men of a later generation the wonder rather is that the 
North ever succeeded in the gigantic work of subjugation which 
had been imposed upon it. The conquest of such a vast expanse 
of territory, held by a nation in arms, has no parallel in history. 
The feat which the North achieved was a greater one than that 
which Napoleon attempted to his own undoing, when he invaded 
Russia in i8i2. 

A brief survey, therefore, of the various stages through which this 
mighty conflict passed, and of the causes of the ultimate triumph 
of the North, will not be out of place. As has been already pointed 
out, the two combatants at the outset of the war were by no means 
unequally matched. The superior numbers of the North were 
counterbalanced by the fact that the South was standing on the 
defensive in an enormous theatre of war. Both powers had prac- 
tically to create a volunteer army. Had either side been able to 
put into the field during the first half-year of the war a single Army 
Corps of regular troops, the issue would probably have been 
decided with as great rapidity as the most sanguine supporter of 
either cause anticipated.^ But the North found itself unable to 
make any effective use of its regular army. In spite of President 
Lincoln's call for an increase of regulars in May, 1861, there were 
never as many as 26,000 regulars on the rolls, and always less than 
20,000 "present for duty."- The volunteer service was much the 
more popular, and the chief function of the regular army was to 
provide officers for the volunteer regiments and to fill the posts in 
the Staff Departments. In some respects it proved an actual 
advantage to the Confederacy that it had no regular troops to rely 
upon. Its fighting force was necessarily of a single type, whereas 
in the North, as long as General Scott remained at the head of 
the United States' armies, an attempt was made to differentiate 
between the regulars and volunteers, which proved prejudicial to 
the organisation as a whole. McDowell's army, which took the 
field in the summer of 1861, was, inconsequence of General Scott's 
neglect of the volunteer forces, a less efficient instrument of war- 
fare than that which confronted it under Johnston and Beauregard 
on the banks of Bull Run. 

But the North possessed one tremendous advantage over its 
opponent in being a naval power. The task of maintaining an 
effective blockade of three thousand miles of coast might well 
have seemed an impossible one, but nevertheless it was accom- 
plished with very tolerable success, because the Confederacy was 

' I Henderson, 207. 

- General K. V. Greene's "The Unileil Suies Army," S(-rib>te>''s ^faga^itle, Novem- 
ber, 1901. 



RETROSPECT 527 

incapable of producing any force which could contend with the 
Federal navy on the sea. But the command of the sea was not 
necessarily decisive of the issue. It isolated the South, and caused 
it to be gravely inconvenienced during the first year of the war by 
the lack of necessary military material. But most of these 
deficiencies had been made good by the middle of 1862, and the 
Southern territories were quite capable of providing subsistence 
for their population for an indefinite period. The really decisive 
factor in the war was the adaptation of the naval resources of the 
North to river warfare. The vast extent of the theatre of war, 
the only partially developed railway system of the South, and the 
configuration of the country, caused the river system of the North 
American Continent to become of commanding importance in the 
operations of the war. It was in the West, where the Red River 
(Map I.), the Mississippi, the Tennessee, and the Cumberland 
offered a waterway through the very heart of the Confederacy, 
that the really decisive campaigns of the war were fought out. 

The military genius of the great Confederate leaders, Lee and 
Jackson, the unrivalled fighting capacity of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, and the close proximity of the rival capitals, have caused 
a disproportionate attention to be concentrated upon the Eastern 
theatre of war. But it was in the West that the decisive blows 
were struck. The capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in 
July, 1863, was the real turning-point of the war, and it was the 
operations of Sherman's Grand Army of the West which really 
led to the collapse of the Confederacy at Appomattox Court 
House.^ The Confederate authorities were fully alive to the 
danger with which a Federal advance by the great rivers 
threatened them. An attempt was made to equip a river fleet, 
which might contest with the Federal vessels the possession of 
the rivers of the South, but it was quickly found that the inferiority 
of the South in material appliances and mechanical skill was a 
fatal handicap in the struggle. 

An attempt was next made to close the rivers to the Federal 
fleets by the construction of heavily armed works on their banks. 
But in this new departure a grave mistake was committed when 
these works were constructed on altogether too extensive a scale, 
so that they more nearly resembled entrenched camps, and re- 
quired armies to hold them. Consequently when these fortresses 
were eventually forced to capitulate, the Confederacy suffered a 
loss in the men captured in them which it could ill afford. At 
Vicksburg the number of troops surrendered exceeded thirty 
thousand, the largest capture that up to that time had been made 

^ The Armies of the Potomac and the James brought about the evacuation of Peters- 
burg and Richmond and the capitulation of Lee's army, but it was the operations of 
Sherman's and Thomas' armies which made these successes absolutely decisive. 



528 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

in modern warfare.^ At Port Hudson, a few days later, seven 
thousand more Confederates surrendered. And these heavy losses 
were incurred in the summer of 1863, when already the shrinkage 
in numbers was beginning to make itself felt, and the Confederate 
authorities were finding themselves unable, at all the different 
decisive points in the theatre of war, to meet the Federal advance 
with forces of approximate strength. 

The neutrality of Kentucky, which was maintained till Sep- 
tember, prevented any extensive operations in the West during 
the first year of the war. It was quite impossible for Albert S. 
Johnston, the commander of the Confederate forces in that region, 
to assume the offensive with the troops at his disposal, of whom 
all were raw recruits, and a great number still without the neces- 
sary equipment. Federal operations were limited to restoring the 
authority of the United States Government in Missouri, and hold- 
ing Kentucky, after the fiction of neutrality was abandoned, for 
the Union. 

In the Eastern theatre of war McClellan's overwhelming 
superiority of strength made .short work of the Confederate 
forces, which were endeavouring to hold West Virginia, and 
gained so firm a hold upon that section of the country that 
General Lee later in the year found himself unable to recover 
the lost ground. The central feature of the first year's operations 
consequently became the Bull Run campaign, and the strategic 
question is, whether the Confederate Government made full use 
of the victory gained on July 21st. It may be fairly admitted 
that the expectation of so many Southerners, that the victory of 
Bull Run ought to have led to the capture of Washington, was 
ill-founded. But, on the other hand, it can hardly be denied that 
the Confederate Government made a grave mistake in not assum- 
ing the offensive at a later period of the year and forcing the 
Army of the Totomac to fight a decisive battle before McClellan 
had had time to thoroughly organise it. A Confederate victory 
won on Northern soil would have had a great effect upon public 
opinion both in America and in Europe. But President Davis 
and his chief military adviser, General Lee, had commenced the 
war with the determination, .sound enough at that early stage of 
events, of standing on the defensive ; and, after Lee was despatched 
to West Virginia, Davis still adhered to the strictly defensive 
policy, even when the circumstances, under which it had originally 
been decided on, had wholly altered. 

The result of the inactivity of the victorious Confederate army 
in the autumn of 1861 was that in the following spring the Federal 
armies assumed the offensive all along the line. In the West the 
immense advantage, which the naval superiority of the Federals 

' Kiskc, 247. 



RETROSPECT 529 

conferred, was quickly made plain. The advance up the Tennessee 
and the Cumberland broke through the centre of the Confederate 
first line of resistance, and led at once to the abandonment of the 
capital of Tennessee and of the strong position on the Mississippi 
which the Confederates had established at Columbus. A further 
advance of the Federal forces, coupled with Johnston's failure to 
crush the opposing armies in detail at Shiloh, led to the abandon- 
ment of the second line of Confederate resistance, and the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad fell into the hands of the victors, whilst 
the Mississippi was opened as far south as Vicksburg. Earlier in 
the year Farragut had captured New Orleans, the commercial 
capital of the South, and his vessels now ran past the batteries 
of Vicksburg and joined the flotilla which was descending the 
river. Had Halleck displayed ordinary energy, Vicksburg, which 
at the time was only partially fortified and weakly garrisoned, 
would have fallen early in the summer, and the Mississippi through- 
out its entire length would have passed under the unchallenged 
control of the Federals. But Halleck at Corinth reached out 
neither to his right against Vicksburg nor to his left against 
Chattanooga, and allowed Bragg to move his troops via Mobile 
to Chattanooga, to forestall Buell's advance against that fortress 
and himself assume the offensive. The invasion of Kentucky by 
Bragg's and Kirby Smith's armies called Buell back in hot haste 
from his advanced position to the Ohio, but a great opportunity 
was lost when the Confederate commander allowed Buell to regain 
his base at Louisville without a battle. His one chance of gaining 
a decisive success was to have barred Buell's road at Munfordville 
and forced him to fight a battle against superior numbers, and on 
ground not of his own choosing, in order to regain his communi- 
cations. Later in the year, when the containing force under Van 
Dorn had been defeated at Corinth, Grant found himself in a 
position to assume the offensive, and commenced the first of his 
unsuccessful attempts against Vicksburg. At the very end of the 
year Rosecrans, with the Army of the Cumberland, advanced 
against Bragg, and at Murfreesborough a battle was fought, which, 
though tactically drawn, was strategically a Federal victory, as 
Bragg was obliged to abandon Murfreesborough. 

In the East McClellan moved the Army of the Potomac by 
water to the Yorktown Peninsula. Hampered by the crude strate- 
gical conceptions of his Government, and too often pausing to take 
counsel of his fears, he nevertheless approached within four miles 
of the Confederate capital. But by that time Lee had concen- 
trated his forces, and promptly assuming the offensive, compelled 
McClellan to abandon the line of the York River and retreat 
across the Peninsula to the James. Here he was in a very favour- 
able position for renewing the campaign with the James as an 



530 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

absolutely safe line of communications. But the Federal Govern- 
ment had long since lost all confidence in their general, and insisted 
upon the abandonment of the campaign and the transference of a 
great part of the Army of the Potomac to serve with Pope. Lee, 
assuming the offensive against his new opponent, completely out- 
generalled him, and drove his demoralised army to seek refuge 
within the fortifications of Washington. The invasion of Mary- 
land, with which Lee followed up his successful campaign against 
Pope, had a political as well as a strategical object. The Con- 
federate Government hoped that the sight of Southern troops in 
Maryland would cause its inhabitants to rise in favour of secession, 
and that with the accession of that State to the Southern cause the 
northern boundary of Maryland might become the line along 
which the military operations of the next year would be conducted. 
But McClellan resumed command of Pope's beaten troops, and 
after a drawn battle with Lee at the Antietam, compelled the 
Army of Northern Virginia to recross the Potomac without having 
accomplished its purpose. McClellan having served their turn, 
the Federal Government superseded him for Burnside, and the 
costly experiment of Fredericksburg was the result, when the 
Federal attempt to resume the offensive and reach Richmond by 
yet another route was rudely checked with terrible loss. 

The summer of 1862 saw the Confederacy attain its high-water- 
mark of success. Both in East and West its armies had assumed 
the offensive, but the autumn found Lee driven from Maryland 
and Bragg from Kentucky. Both attempts to win fresh States to 
the Confederate cause proved failures. 

1863 was the critical year of the conflict. The Federals assumed 
the offensive both in East and West. But Hooker's defeat at 
Chancellorsville, coupled with Grant's repeated failures against 
Vicksburg and the inactivity of the Army of the Cumberland, gave 
the Confederate Government an excellent opportunity of again 
throwing their opponents on the defensive. But the opportunity 
was badly used. Lee preferred to make a second invasion of the 
North, and it is within the limits of possibility that, had he been 
loyally served by his chief lieutenant, the Army of the Potomac 
might have been crushed in detail, and the North forced to make 
peace. Whether, however, Lee could have won any victory which 
would have counterbalanced Grant's success at Vicksburg is, at 
any rate, an open question, and it would probably have been a 
wiser course to transfer a considerable part of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia to the West after the victory of Chancellorsville, and 
either by reinforcing Bragg against Rosecrans, or Johnston against 
Grant, to have thrown the Federal armies of the West back upon 
the Ohio, and thereby kept the Mississippi open between Vicks- 
burg and Port Hudson. "The drums that beat for the advance 



RETROSPECT 531 

into Pennsylvania seemed to many of us to be beating the funeral 
march of the dead Confederacy." ^ With Lee's defeat at Gettys- 
burg and the fall of Vicksburg, the Confederate cause might well 
be considered as ultimately doomed. The control of the Missis- 
sippi enabled the Federals to cleave the Confederacy in twain, and 
the resources of Western Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, States 
rich both in men and cattle, were for ever lost to the Richmond 
Government. 

Rosecrans' advance forced Bragg out of Chattanooga, and it 
was only the despatch of two divisions from Lee's army which 
prevented the Federals from marching into Georgia. The rein- 
forcements from the East had come too late and, though Chicka- 
mauga was a Southern success, Grant was enabled to concentrate 
a superior force against Bragg, and compelled that unlucky general 
to abandon all the advantages of his dearly won victory. 

Only a desperate effort by the Southern armies could stave off 
the fast approaching disaster in 1864. Both in East and West the 
Federals in superior strength were confronting the two remaining 
Confederate armies. Had President Davis allowed his generals 
to concert some joint plan of campaign by which the Confederates 
might have taken the offensive in one or other of the theatres of 
war, the Southern cause would not have been utterly hopeless. 
But by forcing both armies to pursue an isolated defensive policy 
he allowed the Federal armies in both fields to make full use of 
their numerical superiority, and to steadily near their respective 
goals. The substitution of Hood for Johnston in the West only 
hastened the catastrophe, and Atlanta, "the gate-city of the South," 
was soon in Sherman's hands. Hood's ill-judged invasion of 
Tennessee enabled Sherman to march practically unopposed 
through Georgia and reach the Atlantic coast before the end of 
the year: and the crushing defeat of the Army of Tennessee by 
Thomas at Nashville left the Confederacy with only one army 
in the field. That army, under the indomitable Lee, offered a 
splendid resistance to its old foe, the Army of the Potomac. 
Grant, in spite of an enormous expenditure of life, found himself 
unable to reach Richmond by the direct route, and after the 
appalling slaughter of Cold Harbour moved his troops across the 
James and sought to find an entrance to the Confederate capital 
by the " back-door " of Petersburg. During the latter part of the 
year the Federal commander was extending his left towards the 
railways, on which Richmond and Lee's army depended for sub- 
sistence. But his progress was slow, and the decisive blow of the 
campaign was struck in the Shenandoah Valley, where Sheridan 
completely out-generalled Early and opened the road for a move- 
ment, if necessary, against the Confederate railways from the right. 
1 D. II. Hill in 3 13. & L., 639. 



532 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

By the beginning of 186$ the Confederate position was hopeless. 
Too late Lee was appointed Generalissimo and the resolve taken 
to abandon Richmond. The condition of the roads prevented the 
evacuation taking place until Grant had matured his plans, and 
was ready to make the final movement against Lee's lines of 
communication. 

The triumphant advance of the Western armies was depriving 
the Confederacy of section after section of its territory. The 
process had begun with the fall of Vicksburg. Sherman's march 
through Georgia was a fitting continuation of it. 

Practically nothing was left to the Confederate Government 
at the beginning of 1865 except south-west Virginia and the 
Carolinas. Sherman was already sweeping through the Carolinas, 
and Johnston, who had been placed in command of the remnants 
of Hood's army and such other forces as could be found on the 
Atlantic coast, could only offer a feeble resistance and do nothing 
more than delay the irresistible advance of an overwhelmingly 
superior army. 

Had Lee succeeded in bringing his troops safely off from Rich- 
mond and joining hands with Johnston in North Carolina, it is 
hard to see how any other advantage would have been gained 
except to postpone the inevitable result for a few months at the 
most. The rapidity with which Grant took up the pursuit of Lee 
is a fairly good proof that he would not have left Sherman to con- 
tend single-handed against Lee and Johnston for any length of 
time : and it is altogether probable that Sherman would have been 
quite capable by himself of dealing with the Confederates' united 
forces. 

The surrender of Lee's army, which had so long been the back- 
bone of Confederate resistance, was followed by the almost instan- 
taneous surrender of all the other forces in the field, even in distant 
Texas. That the close of regular warfare was not followed by a 
period of guerilla operations, which could only have served to em- 
bitter the feeling of the combatants, and however long continued 
could have only added to the sum total of human misery without 
affecting the political result, was due to the patriotic action of 
Lee, Johnston, and other Confederate leaders. President Davis, 
maddened at the failure of all his hopes, would not have hesitated 
to force upon his unhappy countrymen this further load of suffering, 
but Lee steadily set his face against any such proceeding.^ The 
Confederate armies had been fairly and squarely beaten, and it 

' For Presidenl Davis' desire to carry on what coultl only be under the circumstances 
guerilla warfare, see 4 B. & L., 764-5. For Lee's decision and the part played by 
General Wise in urging him to that decision, see the address delivered by Mr. C. F. Adams 
before the American Antiquarian Society on October 30lh, 1901, entitled " Lee's 
Momentous Choice." 



RETROSPECT 533 

only remained for the defeated side to accept the verdict of the 
God of Battles and, beating their swords into ploughshares, to 
endeavour to play their part as good citizens under the new order 
of things. 

This brief survey of the outlines of the war should serve to 
make it plain that the strategical views of the Confederate Govern- 
ment were largely responsible for the result. President Davis in- 
sisted upon maintaining a rigidly defensive policy and on applying 
in the New World the military methods of the Aulic Council, 
which had already been sufficiently discredited in Europe. Never 
able to comprehend the merits of an offensive-defensive policy, the 
Southern President threw away the advantage which his cause 
originally possessed in holding the interior lines. It was a real 
misfortune to the South that its official Head possessed a certain 
amount of military experience, and in consequence a greatly ex- 
aggerated opinion of his own military abilities. As General Grant 
phrased it, " on several occasions he came to the relief of the Union 
army by means of his superior military genius^' The verdict of 
General Beauregard will probably be that ultimately accepted by 
history : " We needed for President either a military man of high 
order, or a politician of the first-class without military pretensions. 
The South did not fall crushed by the mere weight of the North ; 
but it was nibbled away at all sides and ends, because its executive 
head never gathered and wielded its great strength under the 
ready advantages that greatly reduced or neutralised its adversary's 
naked physical superiority. It is but another of the many proofs 
that the passive defensive policy may make a long agony, but can 
never win a war." ^ 

It is not, of course, claimed that the Northern Government made 
no mistakes. Lincoln, Halleck, and Stanton managed between 
them to commit plenty of strategical blunders. The most fatal 
mistake was probably the recall of McClellan from the banks of 
the James in the summer of 1862. But it does not necessarily 
follow that, because Richmond ought to have fallen in that year, 
therefore the ultimate issue of the war would have been decided 
any earlier. When once Grant had fairly established his reputa- 
tion as the first soldier of the North, the Federal President gave 
him a free hand, and abstained from any interference with the 
military measures of his trusted commander. 

Quite apart from his military mistakes. President Davis is open 
to severe criticism for his administrative methods. It has been 
freely charged against him that he altogether underestimated the 
probable duration of the struggle, and failed to take adequate 
measures for providing his forces in the field with the necessary 
equipment. He, however, stoutly denied this charge, and main- 

> I B. & L., 226. 



534 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UxNITED STATES 

tained that the lack of military material at the beginning of the 
war was not due to any want of foresight on his part, but to the 
action of the British Government, which prevented his agents from 
carrying out in their entirety the commissions with which he 
charged them. It cannot, however, be seriously denied that 
President Davis made a very grave mistake in not providing a full 
treasury by a liberal exportation of cotton during the first twelve 
months of his administration. Had such a policy been adopted 
the treasury of the Confederacy would have been richer than that 
of the Federal States, and the means would have been retained up 
to the end of the war of paying the soldiers. But instead the 
Confederate Government contented itself with establishing a paper 
currency, which soon was depreciated in value. It was, in General 
Joseph Johnston's opinion, the want of pay that caused the rank 
and file of the Confederate armies to melt away in the closing 
year of the war. When the currency became worthless the Southern 
soldier had to choose between his duty to his country and the 
claims of his starving wife and children. The sanctity of the 
family tie proved stronger even than his patriotism, and the stream 
of desertion steadily increased.^ 

An attempt has been sometimes made to explain the fall of the 
Confederacy by the loss of certain eminent generals during the 
course of the war. Albert Sidney Johnston fell on the field of 
Shiloh in April, 1862. His military record had been a good one, 
and the South regarded him at the commencement of the struggle 
as their ablest general. He enjoyed President Davis' confidence 
to an extent probably unequalled by any other general in the 
Confederate service ; and no doubt his loss was a great blow to 
Confederate hopes in the West. " The West perished with Albert 
Sidney Johnston, and the Southern country followed.'"' No one 
realised the severity of the blow more fully than the President 
himself "The fortunes of a country hung by the single thread of 
the life that was yielded on the field of Shiloh." General Richard 
Taylor expressed himself in hardly less emphatic language : " VV^ith 
him at the helm there would have been no Vicksburg, no Missionary 
Ridge, no Atlanta : had it been possible for one heart, one mind, 
and one arm to save her (the Confederate) cause, she lost them 
when Albert Sidney Johnston fell on the field of Shiloh."^ 

But, in spite of such testimony to Johnston's military ability, it 
must be said that the single campaign in the Civil War which he 
directed does not bear out the high opinion entertained at the 
South of his generalship. General Grant pronounced him vacillat- 

' For an indictment of Davis' policy, see Johnston's Narrative^ Cap. XIII., and Mr. 
Barnwell Rhett's article in i B. & L., 99-110. 

"^ General R. L. Gibson, C.S.A., quoted in I B. & L., 568. 
' Destruction and f^eronUruction, •232-3. 



RETROSPECT 535 

ing and undecided in his actions. It may be freely conceded that 
the Confederate cause in the West suffered greatly from his loss, 
that, had he been spared, probably the failures of Bragg's cam- 
paigns, and certainly the disaster which befell Pemberton's army 
at Vicksburg, would have been avoided. But it is altogether prob- 
able that the loss which the Confederacy sustained in Stonewall 
Jackson's death at Chancellorsville was a much heavier blow than 
Johnston's fall at Shiloh. With Jackson Lee lost his right arm, 
and from that time victory ceased to follow the banners of the 
Army of Northern Virginia. Lee's own judgment was that if he 
had had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg he would have won a 
great victory, and have forced the North to concede peace and 
independence to the South. Whether the campaign of Gettys- 
burg could have under any circumstances led to such a result is 
certainly open to question. But it is a fascinating speculation, 
what would have been the fate of Grant's Vicksburg campaign 
had Jackson survived Chancellorsville and been sent to take the 
chief command in the West, or how it would have fared with 
Rosecrans' army at Chickamauga, had Jackson been there in place 
of Bragg. 

But could Jackson in the distant fields of the West have repeated 
the earlier triumphs won in his native Virginia? Could any one 
man — Lee, or Jackson, or A. S. Johnston — by his military genius 
have saved the Confederacy from succumbing ultimately to the 
superior resources of the North? Whenever the Confederate 
armies assumed the offensive pure and simple, defeat was the 
result. Twice Lee invaded the North, but in either case without 
success. Bragg's invasion of Kentucky was a distinct failure, and 
Hood's invasion of Tennessee in the autumn of 1864 was nothing 
less than a disaster. By standing on the defensive, with an intelli- 
gent use of the advantages of the interior lines and a watchful 
eye for any opportunity of delivering a counterstroke, the life of 
the Confederacy would have been prolonged. But without foreign 
intervention, and as long as Abraham Lincoln held the reins of 
power at the North, the Confederacy would have gone on losing 
ground : and time at last, coupled with an empty treasury, 
would have brought the inevitable result. Against the great 
military genius of certain of the Southern leaders Fate opposed 
the unbroken resolution and passionate devotion to the Union, 
which he worshipped, of the great Northern President. As long 
as he lived, and ruled the people of the North, there could be no 
turning back. The preservation of the Union was a sacred charge 
committed to his care, and though he yielded up his life before 
the surrender of all the Confederate forces in the field, yet he had 
lived long enough to see his work crowned with abiding success. 
He knew that the end had come with the surrender of Lee and 



536 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

his army. The Union was restored, the future of the United 
States assured, and in that knowledge he passed to his rest. 



NOTE ON RECONSTRUCTION 

President Lincoln, in his Second Inaugural Address, had expressed the 
desire to " bind up the wounds of the nation." But many weary years 
elapsed before the wounds of the conquered South were healed. Lincoln 
had proclaimed that in any one of the seceding States, in which one-tenth 
of the voters would take an oath to support the Constitution, the laws, 
and the emancipation proclamations, and would set up a republican form 
of government, the Federal Government would recognise that government 
as the legally established government of that State.^ In accordance with 
that promise, three Southern States — Arkansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana 
— had been "reconstructed" in 1864. President Johnson proposed to 
pursue his predecessor's policy. As a Southerner himself and an old 
State Rights' supporter, he held that the seceding States were entitled 
to resume their political rights under the Constitution. But Congress was 
not inclined to let the South off so easily. It held that the Southern 
States had by rebellion forfeited their place in the Union and were degraded 
to the position of Territories, and that it was the duty of Congress to 
impose conditions upon them before they could be readmitted to the 
Union. As the Republicans had a two-thirds majority in both Houses, 
they were able to override the President's veto. The President fiercely 
inveighed against Congress, denouncing it as no true Congress at all, 
because the Southern States were unrepresented, and the conflict between 
President and Congress on the reconstruction policy continued with 
increasing violence throughout Johnson's term of office, and led ultimately 
to his impeachment. 

By the end of 1865 all the Southern States (except Texas) ^ had set up 
new Governments, and their respective Legislatures had accepted the 
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, abolishing slavery throughout 
the United States. But their acceptance of this Amendment was coupled 
with various laws dealing with "vagrancy" and the regulation of negro 
labour, which to the North seemed an attempt to revive the old slavery 
under the new form of forced labour. 

In March, 1865, a Freedmen's Bureau had been established for one 
year, under the supervision of the War Department, to provide for the 
protection and support of liberated negroes. 

In July, 1866, an Act was passed continuing the operations of the 
Bureau for another two years and conferring upon it somewhat enlarged 
powers. This Act "practically superseded the legislation of the re- 
conquered States regarding the coloured people."^ A month earlier 
Congress had passed, and proposed for ratification by the State Legislatures, 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This Amendment con- 
ferred "citizenship, State as well as Federal, on all persons born or 

' Charming, 562. - 2 Bryce, 472. ^ 2 Bryce, 474. 



NOTE ON RECONSTRUCTION 537 

naturalised in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction therof, 
forbade legislation by a State abridging the privileges or immunities of a 
citizen of the United States, and provided for reducing the representation 
in Congress of any State in proportion to the number of its citizens 
excluded from the suffrage." It also provided for the disqualification 
" from voting or office [of] all persons, who having ever taken an oath to 
support the Constitution of the United States had been concerned in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same."^ Thus at the same time 
as full political rights were conferred upon the black population the vast 
majority of the Southern whites were disfranchised. It was inevitable, 
if this Amendment were carried, that political power in the South would 
be transferred to the negro, and that the white would be at the mercy 
of his former slaves. It is not surprising, therefore, that all the Southern 
Legislatures except Tennessee rejected this Amendment. Thereupon 
Congress, in March, 1867, proceeded to pass the Reconstruction Act, the 
object of which was to create provisional Governments in those States not 
yet readmitted to the Union (thus ignoring the State Governments already 
established in the South by the whites) and to fix the conditions for their 
readmission. This Act divided up all the South (except Tennessee) into 
five Military Districts, to be administered by Federal miUtary officers, 
which should continue until a State Convention should have framed a new 
Constitution and the State Legislature should have ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Then and then only could the State be readmitted to the 
Union. 2 

In consequence of this Act a swarm of Northern whites poured into 
the South, hoping to make their fortunes there under the new regime. 
Then ensued the era of "carpet-bag" administrations. The white 
adventurers easily led the negro by the nose and secured for themselves 
the chief administrative functions in the various States. " Such a Satur- 
nalia of robbery and jobbery has seldom been seen in any civilised 
country." 3 The terrible consequence to the South of these corrupt 
administrations may be gauged by the appalling increase in the different 
State debts. 

In 1868, under the Reconstruction Act, six Southern States were re- 
admitted to the Union. In the same year the Fourteenth Amendment, 
having been accepted by three-quarters of the States, became part of the 
Constitution. The Presidential Election of that year turned upon the 
reconstruction policy. The Democratic party had adopted Johnson's 
plan,* but General Grant defeated the Democratic candidate, Horatio 
Seymour, by 215 electoral votes to 79. The result of the Republican 
victory was the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbade the suffrage "to be 
denied or abridged on account of race, colour, or previous condition 
of servitude," the acceptance of which, as well, as of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, was now made the price of readmission for the four Southern 
States — Virginia, Texas, Georgia, and Mississippi — still remaining outside 
the Union. ^ 

^ 2 Bryce, 474. 

* 2 Bryce, 475. Negroes were admitted as voters and delegates to the Conventions. 

^ 2 Bryce, 476. * Channing, 568. ^ Channing, 569. 



538 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 

By 187 1 these four States were brought into the Union, and the 
Fifteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution (March, 1870). 
These three Amendments, which were added to the Constitution as 
the result of the Civil War, finally defined the legal position of the negro 
in the reconstructed Union. ^ But in 1872 a general Amnesty Act 
restored the great mass of Southern whites to the enjoyment of full 
political rights. These now made use of their recovered privileges to 
eject the carpet-bag administrations, and this was the easier to accomplish, 
as a political reaction had begun to set in at the North in favour of leaving 
the reconstructed States to work out their own salvation. By 1876 in all 
the Southern States the whites had regained control of the State Govern- 
ments, and in order to secure their supremacy, successfully adopted 
various devices for suppressing the black vote.^ 

In 1877 the last Federal troops left in the South were recalled by 
President Hayes. 

^ The Thirteenth Amendment gave the negro emancipation, the Fourteenth gave him 
political rights, and the Fifteenth confirmed him in them. 
* 2 Bryce, 480. 



INDEX 



Ackworth, 372-4 
Adairsville, 369-70 
Albemarle Sound, 484, 494-5 
Alexander, Col., C.S.A., 234 (note)-6, 243 
Alexandria (on the Potomac), 55, 102-3 

(note), 113, 122 
Alexandria (in Louisiana), 304-5, 484 
Allatoona, 369, 371, 373, 397-8 
Amelia Court House, 517-9 
Ammen, Gen., U.S.A., 172-4 
Anderson, J. R., Gen., C.S.A., 59 
Anderson, R., Gen., U.S.A., I1-3, 16-7 
Anderson, R. H., Gen., C.S.A., 61, 64 
(note), 108, 131, 133, 145 (note), 195-6, 
199-201, 204-6, 209 (note), 223, 225, 
230-1, 233, 237, 314, 317-20; com- 
manding 1st Corps of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, 322-3, 326, 331, 333, 
335. 345. 357, 360, 424-6, 509-10, 5H, 
516-8 ; at Sailor's Creek, 520 
Appomattox Court House, 522-3 
Aquia Creek, 32, 96-7, 102, 104, 122, 144 
Archer, Gen., C.S.A., 149 (note), 201, 224 
Arkansas Post, 254, 481 
Armistead, Gen., C. S.A., 64 (note), 77, 

236-7 
Ashby, Gen., C.S.A., 85, 88-9, 91 
Ashland Station, 70, 330, 334 
Athens, 177, 288 
Atlanta, 365-6, 379, 381, 386, 389, 391, 

403, 405 
Augusta, 403-4, 406, 460-2 
Averasboro (engagement of), 463 
Averell, Gen., U.S.A., 194, 202, 204, 

41 1-4, 420-1, 423, 425-30 
Ayres, Gen., U.S.A., 358, 511, 513-4 

Baird, Gen., U.S.A., 280 (note), 292 
Baltimore, 19-20, 122, 222, 416, 419 
Banks, Gen., U.S.A., 82, 84-9, 95, 97-8, 

109, 254, 256, 262, 270-1, 303-5, 308, 

484 
Barksdale, Gen., C.S.A., 146, 196, 207-8, 

229-30 
Barlow, Gen., U.S.A., 201, 212, 316, 

318-9, 323, 325-6, 335, 337 
Bartow, Gen., C.S.A., 36, 41 
Bate, Gen., C.S.A., 373, 375, 449 



Baton Rouge, 249, 260, 478, 480 
Battles— 

Antietam (or Sharpsburg), 129-36 

Atlanta, 384-5 

Bentonville, 463-5 

Bull Run (or First Manassas), 36-41 

Cedar Creek, 434-8 

Cedar Run, 98 

Champion's Hill, 266 

Chancellorsville, 197-214 

Chantilly, 116 

Chattanooga, 291-3 

Chickamauga, 281-5, 294-6 

Chickasaw Bluffs, 253 

Cold Harbour, 336-7 

Corinth, 251 

Cross Keys, 91 

Drewry's Bluff, 343 

Fisher's Hill, 429-30 

Five Forks, 510-5 

Fort Donelson, 157 

Franklin, 446-8 

Frayser's Farm, 76 

Fredericksburg, 149-51 

Gaines' Mill, 71-2 

Gettysburg, 223-38, 243-6 

luka, 250 

Jonesboro, 391 

Kenesaw Mountain, 377-8 

Kernstown, 85 

Malvern Hill, 77-8 

Manassas, Second (or Second Bull 
Run), 109-15 

McDowell, 87 

Memphis (naval), 473 

Merrimac and Monitor (naval), 50, 
488-90 

Mill Springs, 47 

Mobile Bay (naval), 495-9 

Monocacy, 416-7 

Mount Ezra Church, 387-8 

Murfreesborough, 185-9 

Nashville, 451-5 

Newmarket, 412 

New Orleans (naval), 475-7 

Opequon, 427-9 

Peach-tree Creek, 382-3 

Pea Ridge, 162 (note) 



539 



540 



INDEX 



Battles (continued) — 
Perry ville, i8i 
Petersburg, 346-8 
Port Pludson (naval), 482 
Port Republic, 91 
Prairie Grove, 162 (note) 
Sailor's Creek, 520 
Seven Pines, 61-4 
Shiloh, 166-9, 1 7 1-5 
Spottsylvania, 323-9 
Wilderness, 314-21 
Williamsburg, 57 
Wilson's Creek, 45 (note) 
Winchester, 89 
Beaufort (North Carolina), 485 
Beaufort (South Carolina), 48, 407, 485-6 
Beauregard, Gen., C. S.A., bombards Fort 
Sumter, 15, 17 ; at Bull Run, 32, 35-41, 
43; transferred to the Mississippi, 159- 
61 ; at Shiloh, 163-5, 167-70, 173-5 5 
177-8, 220, 248, 309-10 ; at I'etersburg, 
341-3, 346-8, 353, 358 ; in the West, 
309, 400, 402, 404, 442, 461 ; quoted, 533 
Beaver Dam Creek (engagement of), 70 
Bee, Gen., C.S.A., 36-7, 41 
Belmont (engagement of), 153 
Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of War, 

83-4, 192 (note) 
Bermuda Hundred, 340-I, 343, 345-8, 360, 

363, 508, 515, 517 
Berry, Gen., U.S.A., 61 (note), 198, 203-4 
Berryville, 2i8, 419-20, 423-6 
Beverly, 22-3 
Big Black bridge (engagement of), 266-7, 

271 
Birney, Gen. , U.S.A., 64 (note), 150 (note), 
204,230,316-7,319,324-6,350,357,360 
Blair, F. P., Gen., U.S.A., 20-1, 260, 

376, 384-7, 402 
Blair, Montgomery, 20 
Bonham, Gen., C.S.A., 39 (note), 41 
Boonsborough, I2I, 124, 220 
Boonville (engagement of), 21 
Bowen, Gen., C.S.A., 260-2, 266 
Bowling Green (Kentucky), 46, 153, 155, 

179, 182-3, 248 
Bowling Green (Virginia), 331 
Bragg, Gen., C.S.A., at Shiloh, 163-4,167, 
169, 171, 173-4; Commander-in-Chief 
in the West, 178-9, 182 ; at Murfrees- 
borough, 183-9; 250, 253, 260, 264,273; 
in the Chickamauga campaign, 274-82, 
284-7, 289, 291-5; Commander-in-Chief 
at Richmond, 301-2, 309-10, 399; in 
North Carolina, 459-60, 463-5 
Branch, Gen., C.S.A., 59, 68, 70, lio 

(note) 
Brandy Station, 195, 217 
Brannan, Gen., U.S.A., 284, 295 
Breckinridge, Gen., C.S.A., 9, 164, 167, 
184-5, 187-9, 280 (note), 282, 294-5, 



332. 334i 336, 344. 412-4. 416, 427-8, 

439 ; Secretary of War, 504 
Bridgeport (Alabama), 178, 279, 285, 287, 

289 
Bridgeport (Mississippi), 267 
Broad Run (engagement of), 103 
Brooks, Gen., U.S.A., 133 (note), 208, 

218 
Brown, Gen., C.S.A., 448 
Brown, Governor of Georgia, 400, 404 
Bruinsburg, 261 
Buchanan, Admiral, C.S.N. , 487, 489, 

497-9 

Buchanan, President, 10-4 

Buckner, Gen., C.S.A., 156-8, 279, 280 
(note), 282, 289 

Buell, Gen., U.S.A., 46-7, 153-4, 159-62, 
165; at Shiloh, 169, 171-3; 176-82, 184, 
250 

Buford, Gen. .U.S.A., in, 113 (note), 223 

Bulloch, Capt., C.S.N., 500-1 

Bunker Hill, 34, 420, 423-6 

Burkesville, 350, 509, 518 

Burnside, Gen., U.S.A., 36, 48, 94, 123, 
128, 134 ; commanding the Army of the 
Potomac, 141-8, 150-2; 268, 276-8, 
286 ; at Knoxville, 288-9, 293 ; 302, 
3". 317-8, 320, 323, 325, 327, 329, 
331-3. 335. 337 ; the Petersburg mine, 
35.3-7; 485 

Butler, Gen., U.S.A., 20, 248, 309, 340-5, 

363. 457. 478 
Butterfield, Gen., U.S.A., 198, 245-6 

Cairo, 153, 160 

Caldwell, Lieut., U.S.N., 475-6 

Calhoun, 368-9 

Canby, Gen., U.S.A., 305, 395-6, 524 

Canton, 263, 266, 268 

Carlisle, 218-20, 222-3 

Carrick's Ford (engagement of), 23 

Casey, Gen., U.S.A., 60-1 

Cashtown, 222-3 

Cassville, 369-70, 372 

Centreville, 33-6, 39-40, 84, 103, 106-II, 

1 15-6, 219 
Chaflin's Bluff, 341, 345, 357-8, 360 
Chalmers, Gen., C.S.A., 172, 449, 451-2, 

455 
Chanibersburg, 32, 140, 219-20, 223, 420-I 
Chancellorsville, 193-8, 203, 206-7, 209, 

313. 321 
Charleston, il, 44, 48, 192, 403, 408, 

460-2, 491-3, 502 
Charlestown, 34, 424, 426 
Charlotte, 461-2 
Charlottesville, 97, 344, 348, 351-2,412-4, 

419. 431. 433. 439-40 
Chattanooga, 47, 177-9, 185-8, 249-50, 
277-9, 284-90, 293, 302, 365, 397, 403, 
448 



INDEX 



541 



Cheatham, Gen., C.S.A., 165, 282, 383, 

38s, 387, 444-7, 451-2, 454 
Chickasaw Bluffs, 253, 267 
Cincinnati, 179-80 
Cleburne, Gen., C.S. A., 294-5, 373, 384-5, 

446-7 
Clifton, 423-5 
Clinton (Mississippi), 263-5 
Clinton (North Carolina), 463 
Cloyd's Mountain (engagement of), 411 
Cobb, Howell, Gen., C.S. A., 11 (note), 

28 (note), 405 
Cold Harbour, 335-6, 344 
Colquitt, Gen., C.S. A., 212-3 
Colston, Gen., C.S. A., 200-1, 203 
Columbia (South Carolina), 395, 460-2 
Columbia (Tennessee), 275, 443-5, 456 
Columbus (Georgia), 396 
Columbus (Kentucky), 22, 46, 153-5, 158- 

60, 184, 248, 251-3, 255, 469 
Columbus (Mississippi), 261 
Corinth, 161-2, 164-5, '67-8, 170, 176-7, 

183-4, 248, 250-1, 255, 401 
Couch, Gen., U.S.A., 60-2, 123-4, 129, 

150, 191 (note), 197, 206, 218 
Cox, Gen., U.S.A., 134, 376-8, 443-5. 

458-60 
Crampton's Gap (engagement of), 123-4 
Crawford, Gen., U.S.A., 230, 314-S. 333. 

358, 363, 511, 513 
Crittenden, Gen., U.S.A., 165, 185-7, 189, 

276, 279-80, 282-3, 286 
Crook, Gen., U.S.A., 309, 41 1-3, 419-21, 

423, 428, 430, 439, 521 
Crump's Landing, 166, 168-9 
Culpeper, 84, 97, 99, 105, 141, I43, I9S. 

217, 219-20, 232, 297-9, 301 
Gulp's Farm (engagement of), 377 
Cumberland, 414, 418, 420-1 
Curtis, Gen., U.S.A., 162 (note), 254 
Gushing, Lieut., U.S.N., 494-5 
Custer, Gen., U.S.A., 351-2, 432, 435, 

437-40, 513 
Cutler, Gen., U.S.A., 324, 326 
Cutshaw, Major, C.S. A., 424-5 

Dahlgren, Col., U.S.A., 232, 246 

Dahlgren, Admiral, U.S.N., 493 

Dallas, 371-2 

Dalton, 279, 301-2, 365, 367, 389, 398 

Danville, 506, 518-9 

Davis, Flag Officer, U.S.N., 249, 472-3. 
479-80 

Davis, Gen., U.S.A., 186, 188, 371, 378, 
387-8, 391, 402, 464-5 

Davis, Jefferson, elected President of the 
Confederacy, 14-15, 20, 24; earlier 
career, 28; limitations, 29; 31, 35, 40; 
attends a Council of War, 43-4 ; 50, 52, 
57,66, 79, 120, 144, 158; resumes supreme 
control of military operations, 192; 216, 



220, 232 ; appoints Pemberton to relieve 
Van Dorn, 251 ; disagreement with J. 
E. Johnston, 272-3, 281 ; visits the Army 
of Tennessee, 286; 301, 305; prejudiced 
against J. E. Johnston and Beauregard, 
309 ; 388 ; his greatest mistake, 392 ; 397, 
399. 504-5 ; abandons Richmond, 517-8 ; 
captured, 524; 528, 532 (note); adversely 
criticised, 533-4 
Decatur (Alabama), 163, 399, 400, 442 
Decatur (Georgia), 381, 384-5, 397 
Deep Bottom, 353, 358, 360 
Devens, Gen., U.S.A., 201, 203, 212-3 
Dinwiddle Court House, 359, 506, 509-12 
Dodge, Gen., U.S. A., 288, 364, 384-5, 387 
Donaldson, Gen., U.S.A., 448, 450, 452 
Doubleday, Gen., U.S.A., 108 (note), 149, 

224, 246 
Douglas, Stephen, 3, 8-9 
Dowdall's Tavern, 202-3, 213 
Drewry's Bluff, 59, 341-3, 345- 347 
Duncan, Gen., C.S. A., 474, 478 
Du Pont, Admiral, U.S.N., 485, 491-3 

Early, Gen., C.S. A., 39, 41, iii, 131-2, 
145, 148, 150, 196, 207-9, 218, 220, 
222-4, 226-7, 231-3, 239, 242, 299, 
320-3, 332, 334-5 ; in command of the 
2nd Corps of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, 344; 357, 413-S ; invades 
Maryland, 416-20; in the Shenandoah 
Valley, 423-34. 436-40, 504 

East Point, 386-8 

Edward's Station. 263-5 

Ellet, A. W., Gen., U.S.A., 483 

Ellet, C, Col., U.S.A., 472 

Ellet, C. R., Col., U.S.A., 481 

Eltham's Landing (engagement of), 58 

Emory, Gen., U.S.A., 304, 417-8, 421, 
423, 428 

Ericsson, 487-8 

Ewell, Gen., C.S. A., 36, 71, 74, 86-7, 
89-91, 102-3, 108; commanding the 
2nd Corps of the Army of Northern 
Virginia in the Gettysburg campaign, 
216-20, 223-7, 231, 233-4, 241-2, 244; 
299 (note), 300 ; in the Wilderness, 3 1 3-7, 
319; at Spottsylvania, 327, 329; 331, 
333-4, 354. 515, 518; surrenders at 
Sailor's Creek, 520 

Fairburn, 390, 405 

Fairfax Court House, 43, 116 

Fair Oaks Station, 61-2 

Falmouth, 96, 104, 143, 193, 196, 198, 

218-9 
Farmville, 519-21 
Farragut, Admiral, U.S.N., 303, 308, 396, 

473. 475-80, 482-4, 496-500 
Fayetteville, 462-3 
Ferrero, Gen., U.S.A., 354-6 



542 



INDEX 



Field, Gen., C.S.A., 318, 320, 328, 337, 

347-8, 353, 363, 515, 517 
Fisher's Hill, 424, 426, 429, 433, 438 
Florence (Alabama), 251, 399, 401, 442, 

469 
Florence (South Carolina), 462 
Floyd, Gen., C.S.A., 11-2, 52-3, 156-8 
Foote, Admiral, U.S.N. , 155-6, 160, 

468-71 
Forrest, Gen., C.S.A., 158, 165, 177-8, 

184, 253, 282, 303, 330, 397, 401, 442-5, 

448-9, 451, 453, 456, 523 
Fort Donelson, 154-8, 248, 275, 469 
Fort Fisher, 457, 500, 504 
P'ort Harrison, 360-1 
Fort Henry, 154-5, 160, 248, 251, 401, 

469 
Fort Jackson, 248, 474-6 
Fort McAllister, 408, 492 
Fort Monroe, 49, 51, 54, 94, 97, 102 (note), 

123 (note), 220, 309 
Fort Pemberton, 257-8 
Fort Pillow, 154, 170, 248, 472 
Fort Stedman, 506-7 
Foster, Gen., U.S.A., 302, 305, 353, 364, 

407-8 
Fox, Capt., U.S.N., 16, 17 (note) 
Frankfort, 180, 182 
Franklin (Tennessee), 275, 445-6 
Franklin (Virginia), 86-7 
Franklin, Gen., U.S.A., 56, 58, 63, 70, 

72, 76, 102 (note), 115, 123-4, 127-8, 

132-4, 136; commanding the left wing 

of the Army of the Potomac, 143 ; at 

Fredericksburg, 146-7, 149-151 ; 191 

(note), 422 
Frederick City, 82, 120-I, 123, 220, 222, 

239, 416-7, 421-2 
Fredericksburg, 58, 82, 87, 89, 91, 95-6, 

143-6, 152, 192-4, 196-7, 207, 217, 314, 

322 
Fremont, Gen., U.S.A., 21, 45-7, 85-7, 

89-91, 93. 96 
French, Gen., U.S.A., 131, 133, 150-1, 

297 (note), 300 
French, Gen., C. S.A., 397 
Front Royal, 31, 88-91, 424, 430, 433, 435 

Gadsden, 398-9, 401 
Gainesville, 102, 105-9, 111-2 
GaK-eston, 303, 500, 502 (note) 
Garfield, Gen., U.S.A., 283 (note) 
Garnett, K. B., Gen., C.S.A., killed at 

Gettysljurg, 236-7 
Garnett, R. S., Gen., C.S.A., killed at 

Carrick's Ford, 23 
Garrard, Gen., U.S.A., 365, 371, 380 
Geary, Gen., U.S.A., 206, 233, 244, 288, 

290 
Getty, Gen., U.S.A., 315 8, 436 
Gettysburg, 222-4, 226-7, 231-2, 243 



Gibbon, Gen. , U.S.A., 108 (note), 149-50, 
316-9, 324-6 

Gillmore, Gen., U.S.A., 309, 340, 342, 
344 

Globe Tavern (engagement of), 358-9 

Gloucester, 54-6 

Goldsboro, 459-60, 462-5, 509, 523 

Gordon, 404, 406 

Gordon, Gen., C.S.A., 231, 244, 315, 320, 
322, 326-7, 332, 417, 427, 434-6, 438, 
506-8, 515-7, 519-23 

Gordonsville, 95-8, 141, 195, 200, 309, 
312-4, 351, 419, 431, 439-40 

Gracie, Gen., C.S.A., 346-7 

Grafton, 23, 83 

Grand Gulf, 249, 259-62, 483 

Grand Junction, 252-3 

Granger, Gordon, Gen., U.S.A., 276, 282, 
284, 286, 293, 295, 364, 497 

Granger, R. S., Gen., U.S.A., 400 

Grant, Gen., U.S.A., 21, 153-5 '< captures 
Fort Donelson, 1 56-60; 163-4 ; at Shiloh, 
168-9, 1 7 1-4 ; 176-8 ; in the Vicksburg 
campaign, 250-65, 267-9, 271 ; 275; 
commanding the Military Division of the 
Mississippi, 286 ; at Chattanooga, 287- 
94 ; 302, 305 ; appointed Commander-in- 
Chief, 306 ; earlier history, 306-7 ; 308 ; 
with the Army of the Potomac, 312-3, 
316, 318, 320-1, 323, 325, 327, 329, 331- 
4°, 343-5 ' before Petersburg, 348-9, 
352-4. 357-63; 378, 381, 393. 396, 400, 
402, 408, 41 1-3, 416, 419-22, 424-6, 
431, 433-4. 439-40, 443, 450, 45^-7, 
503, 506 ; turns Lee's left, 508-10, 514-5, 
517; pursuit of Lee, 518, 522-3; 533, 
537 

Gregg, D., Gen., U.S.A., 238, 314, 351-2, 
357, 359. 361-2, 506 

Gregg, I., Gen., U.S.A., 521 

Gregg, Gen., C.S.A., 149 (note) 

Gregg, J., Gen., C.S.A. , 263 (note) 

Grenada, 252, 257, 261 

Greenboro, 518, 523 

Greene, Gen., U.S.A., 130, 132-3, 231 

Greene, Lieut., U.S. N. , 489-90 

Griffin, Gen., U.S.A., 151, 314-5, 358, 

5". 515 
Grover, Gen., U.S.A., no, 427 (note) 
Groveton, 107-9 
Guinea Station, 331-2 
Guntersville, 275, 399-400 

Hagcrstown, 121, 124, 126, 220, 239 
Haines' Bluff, 253-6, 258, 260, 267 
Halleck, Gen., U.S.A., comniamling the 
Department of the Missouri, 46-7 ; ap- 
pointed Commander-in-Chief at Wash- 
ington, 94-5, 99, 104, 113, 116, 120, 
142-3, 152; in the West, 153-4, 159-65, 
169-71, 176 (note), 177, 182; 183-4, '91 



INDEX 



543 



(note), 219, 221, 239, 249-52, 255, 274-5, 
278, 288, 303, 305-6; Chiefof the Staff at 
Washington, 307, 420, 426, 433, 437, 450 

Halltown, 90, 121, 421-3, 425-6 

Hamlin, Lieut.-Col., U.S.A., historian of 
Chancellorsville, 21 1-4 

Hampton, Wade, Gen., C.S.A., 41, 62 
(note), 119, 321, 323; commanding the 
Cavalry of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, 330, 344, 351-2, 359-60, 362 ; at 
Columbia, 461 

Hampton Roads, 50, 55, 487-90, 505 

Hancock, 82-3 

Hancock, Gen., U.S.A., at Fredericks- 
burg, 150-I; 206; commanding the 2nd 
Army Corps, 218; at Gettysburg, 224, 
226, 230, 241 ; 301, 314, 316-21, 323-5, 
328-9, 331-3, 335-7, 346-7, 353-4, 357, 
362, 506 

Hankinson's Ferry, 262, 269 

Hanover Court House, 59, 66, 334 

Hanover Junction, 331-2, 344 

Hardee, Gen., C.S.A., 164, 166, 174, 181 ; 
at Murfreesborough, 185-6 ; 275, 287 
(note) ; at Chattanooga, 292-3 ; 302 ; in 
the Atlanta campaign, 369-70, 372-6, 
383-5. 387. 390-1 ; 399, 404-8, 461-4 

Harper's Ferry, 19, 32, 84, 90, 102, 120-3, 
128, 140, 218, 220, 239, 416, 419-21, 425 

Harrisburg, 217, 220, 222-3, 243 

Harrisonburg, 86, 90-1, 414, 430-2, 440 

Harrison's Landing, 67, 78-9, 94-5 

Harrodsburg, 180-2 

Hascall, Gen., U.S.A., 376-7 

Hatch, Gen., U.S.A., 96, 114, 407 

Hayne, Attorney-General of South Caro- 
lina, 13-5 

Hays, Gen., C.S.A., 231, 320 (note) 

Haxall's Landing, 75, 330 

Heintzelman, Gen., U.S.A., 35, 50-1, 58, 
60, 63, 76, 102 (note), 105, 109, 113, 
221 (note) 

Helena, 162 (note), 253, 256-7, 270, 480, 
484 

Heth, Gen. , C.S. A. , 223-4, 233, 244, 315-6, 
318, 320, 323, 337, 358-9, 361-2, 510, 

517 

High Bridge, 520-1 

Hill, A. P., Gen., C.S.A., 68, 70-1, 75, 
77) 97-8, 102-3, 106 ; at the Second 
Manassas, 109-1 1, 114; at the Antietam, 
135-7; at Fredericksburg, 145, 148-9; 
at Chancellorsville, 200-1, 204; com- 
manding the 3rd Corps of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, 216-20; at Gettys- 
burg, 223-7, 231, 233, 237, 241 ; defeated 
at Bristoe Station, 299 ; in the Wilder- 
ness, 313-4, 316-8; on the North Anna, 
331-3; at Cold Harbour, 336-7; 345, 
347-8 ; at Petersburg, 350, 358-62, 506, 
510; death, 516 



Hill, D. H., Gen., C.S.A., 57, 60-1, 64 
(note), 68, 71, 74; at Malvern Hill, 
77-8; 82, 119, 121; ''the lost despatch," 
123; at Turner's Gap, 124; at the Antie- 
tam, 126-7, 13OJ 133; at Fredericksburg, 
145, 148; 192, 216; at Chickamauga, 
280-2 ; 287, 295, 461; quoted, 531 

Hindman, Gen., C.S. A., 162 (note), 280 
(note), 282, 284 

Hoke, Gen., C.S. A., 150 (note), 231, 332, 

336, 346, 359. 363. 458-9, 484 

Holly Springs, 252-3 

Holt, Federal Secretary of War, 14-5 

Holmes, Gen., C.S. A., 32 (note), 75-7, 
162 (note), 270, 273, 484-5 

Hood, Gen., C.S. A., 72, 108 (note), 112; 
at the Antietam, 129, 131 ; 145 (note), 
148, 192, 198, 215, 217 ; at Gettysburg, 
227, 229-30, 233, 237 ; at Chickamauga, 
281-3 ; i" the Atlanta campaign, 367- 
74, 376-7 ; appointed to the command 
of the Army of Tennessee, 381-5, 387- 
90 ; evacuates Atlanta, 391-3 ; attacks 
Sherman's line of communications, 397- 
403 ; invades Tennessee, 442-7 ; advances 
on Nashville, 449 ; defeated by Thomas, 
451.453-6; 504 

Hooker, Gen., U.S.A., 57, 60, 64 (note), 
67, 78, 103, 105, 108-10, 115; com- 
manding the 1st Army Corps, 123 ; at 
the Antietam, 128-31 ; 143; Commander- 
in-Chief of the Army of the Potomac, 
190-200 ; defeated at Chancellorsville, 
202-10, 212-5 ; 217-20 ; relieved of his 
command, 221 ; at Chattanooga, 286-92 ; 
commanding the 20th Corps in the 
Atlanta campaign, 364, 368, 370, 375-7, 
383 ; relieved of his command, 386 

Hovey, Gen., U.S.A., 252, 265-6 

Howard, Gen., U.S.A., 37, 39, 41, 151 ; 
commanding the lith Corps at Chan- 
cellorsville, 191 (note), 193, 200-2, 210, 
212, 214; at Gettysburg, 224; 288, 290; 
commanding the 4th Corps in the Army 
of the Cumberland, 364, 367-8, 372, 380, 
382 ; commanding the Army of the 
Tennessee, 386-8, 390-1, 398, 402, 404, 
460-1, 465 

Huger, Gen., C.S. A., 60-1, 64 (note), 
76-8 

Humphreys, Gen., U.S.A., 151, 230; 
commanding the 2nd Army Corps, 506, 
511-2, 516-7, 521-2 

Hunt, Gen., U.S.A., 225 (note), 228 (note), 
234-5, 246 

Hunter, Gen., U.S.A., 35, 338, 344, 352, 
412-5, 418-20, 422 

Imboden, Gen., C.S.A., 41, 223, 239, 412 
Island No. 10, 154, 160, 169, 248, 470 
luka, 183, 250, 288 



544 



INDEX 



Jackson (Mississippi), 252, 255, 261-4, 
269-72 

Jackson (Tennessee), 161, 253 

Jackson, Governor of Missouri, 20-1, 45 
(note) 

Jackson, H. R., Gen., C.S.A., 52 

Jackson, T. J. (Stonewall), Gen., C.S.A., 
at Bull Run, 35-8, 41 ; in the Peninsular 
campaign, 68, 70-1, 74-5, 77-8; Valley 
campaign, 81-92; defeats Banks at Cedar 
Run, 96-8 ; in the Second Manassas 
campaign, 100-3, I07> 109-11, 1 14- 7; 
captures Harper's Ferry, 121-2 ; at 
the Antietam, 128-32, 136; 141; at 
Fredericksburg, 144-5, 148-50, 152 
(note) ; in the Chancellorsville cam- 
paign, 192, 194-204; death, 211 ; 212-3, 
242, 535 

Jackson, W. II., Gen., C.S.A., 172, 372, 

374-5 
Jefferson City, 20-1 

Jenkins, A. G., Gen., C.S.A., 219-20, 223 
Jenkins, M., Gen., C.S.A., killed in the 

Wilderness, 319 
Johnson, Andrew, President of the United 

States, 183 (note), 536 
Johnson, Bushrod, Gen., C.S.A., 284, 346, 

350. 355-6, 520 
Johnson, Edward, Gen., C.S.A., 82, 84, 

86-8, 218, 220, 223, 225, 231-4, 242-4, 

324-6 
Johnson, E., Gen., C.S.A., 445, 447-8 
Johnson, R. W., Gen., U.S.A., 1S6, 1S8, 

292, 372-3 

Johnston, A. S., Gen., C.S.A., 26; Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the West, 46, 153, 
'55"6i 158; evacuates Nashville, 160; 
163-5; killed at Shiloh, 167-8; 173-4, 
248, 534-S 

Johnston, J. E., Gen., C.S.A., 26; at 
Harper's Ferry, 32 ; eludes Patterson, 
34-5 ; at Bull Run, 36-7, 40 ; 43, 50, 
52, 57 ; attacks McClellan at Seven 
Pines, 60-4; Commander-in-Chief in 
the West, 263-9; causes of his failure to 
relieve Vickshurg, 272-3 ; 276, 302, 
309-10; in the Atlanta campaign, 
365-76 ; retreats behind the Chatta- 
hoochee, 379-80 ; relieved of his com- 
mand, 381, 392-3; commanding in 
North Carolina, 459, 462-5, 508, 518 ; 
surrenders at Greenboro, 523 ; quoted, 

534 
Johnston, Col., C.S.A. , on the Shiloh 

controversy, 173-5 
Jones, D. R., Gen., C.S.A., 40, 135 
Jones, J. R., Gen., C.S.A., 130-1 
Jones, W. E., Gen., C.S.A., 413 
Jonesboro (engagement oO, 390-I 
Jordan, Gen., C.S.A., on the Shiloh 

controversy, 174-5 



Kautz, Gen., U.S.A., 342, 346, 351, 353, 

360 
Kearny, Gen., U.S.A., 60-1, 108, iio-i, 

1 15 -6 
Keenan, Major, U.S.A., at Chancellors- 
ville, 213-4 
Keifer, Gen., U.S.A., narrative of Cedar 

Creek, 438 (note) 
Kelly, Gen., U.S.A., 82-3 
Kemper, Gen., C.S.A. , 236-7 
Kcrnstown, 85, 420, 428, 439 
Kershaw, Gen., C.S.A., 150 (note), 229, 

318, 328, 336-7, 347-8, 357, 424-S. 

430-1. 434-6, 438-9 
Keyes, Gen., U.S.A., 37, 41, 50-1, 58, 

60, 63, 73, 102 (note) 
Kilpatrick, Gen., U.S.A., 237-8, 365, 388, 

402, 404-6, 409 
King, Gen., U.S.A., 95, 98, 107-9, i'2 
Kingston (Georgia), 369, 372, 374, 400 
Kingston (Pennsylvania), 220 
Kinston (engagement of), 459-60 
Knoxville, 162, 177, 276-7, 281, 28S-9, 

293, 301-2 

Lafayette, 279-80 

Lake Providence, 255-6 

Lane, Gen., C.S.A., 149 (note), 205, 214, 

237 (note), 327 
Law, Gen., C.S.A., 227, 229-30, 320 
Lawton, Gen., C.S.A., 67, 72, 130 (note) 
Ledlie, Gen., U.S.A., 347, 354-5. 357 
Lee, Fitzhugh, Gen., C.S.A., 195, 200-1, 
321-2, 335, 337, 351-2, 357, 424-5, 
430 (note), 510-1, 513-4, 516, 522 
Lee, R. E., Gen., C.S.A., 26, 31 ; military 
adviser at Richmond, 35 ; fails to re- 
conquer West Virginia, 52-3 ; 57 ; as- 
sumes command of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, 63; earlier history, 65-6; takes 
the offensive against McClellan, 67-71, 
73-7, 79-80; takes the offensive against 
Pope, 96-102; at the Second Manassas, 
1 1 2-7; first invasion of the North, 
118-21, 123-6; at the Antietam, 128-9, 
131. I33> 136-7. 140-1 ; overruled by 
the President in the choice of a battle- 
field, 144 ; at Fredericksburg, 145-6, 
148, 152; in the Chancellorsville cam- 
paign, 192-9, 202-3, 205-9, 211; re- 
organises the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, 216; second invasion of the North, 
217-20; at Gettysburg, 222-3, 225-9, 
232-45; 297-301, 309-10; in the Wilder- 
ness, 313-4, 316-7, 3'9, 321 ; at Spott- 
sylvania, 323, 325-8 ; on the North 
Anna, 331-3 ; at Cold Harbour, 334-8 ; 
344-5. 347, 35°- i, 354, 356-8, 360, 
412-3, 415, 418, 420, 425, 439; ap- 
pointed General-in-Chief, 459, 461, 
503-6 ; 508-11, 514-5 ; evacuates Rich- 



INDEX 



545 



mond, 5i7~2i ; surrenders at Appo- 
mattox, 522-3 ; 532 (note), 535 
Lee, S. D., Gen., C.S.A., 387, 390-1, 442, 

444. 451-2, 454-5 
Lee, W. H. F., Gen., C.S.A., 194-5, 350, 

358, 510, 512-3 
Leesburg, 82, 84, 219, 419-20 
Lexington (Kentucky), 179, 277-8, 288 
Lexington (Virginia), 413 
Lincoln, Abraham, President of the United 
States, 2, 4-6, 8-10 ; inaugurated as 
President, 15-6; calls out militia, 18; 
volunteers, 20 ; declares a blockade of 
the Confederate coasts, 27 ; his early 
training, 29-30; 45-6, 48-52, 55-6, 58, 
85, 90, 122 ; issues the Emancipation 
Edict, 140; 142-3, 152, 159, 162, 176, 
190-1 (note), 219, 221 (note), 239, 251, 
289, 312 ; re-elected President, 393-4 ; 
401, 409; discusses possibilities of peace 
in Hampton Roads, 505; 508, 518; as- 
sassinated at Washington, 523 ; 535-6 
Little Rock, 162 (note), 254, 305, 481 
Logan, Gen., U.S.A., 263, 266, 364, 373, 

378, 384-7, 390, 402, 450 
Lomax, Gen., C.S.A. , 428, 430, 434, 437 
Longstreet, Gen., C.S.A. , 39 (note), 41, 
57-8 ; at Seven Pines, 60-4 (note) ; 68, 
71, 74-7 (note), 98-9 ; at the Second 
Manassas, 108, 112, 114-6; 121, 124, 
126-7, 141 ; commanding the 1st Corps 
of the Army of Northern Virginia, 144-5 ; 
192, 216-7, 219-20 ; at Gettysburg, 
222-3, 225-30, 232-5, 237, 240-5 ; at 
Chickamauga, 281-6, 295 ; sent to East 
Tennessee, 287-9, 293, 301-2, 305 ; 
suggested plan of operations, 310; re- 
joins Lee in Virginia, 313-4 ; wounded 
in the Wilderness, 316-9; at Richmond, 
363, 504, 506, 515^ 517; 519-22 
Loring, Gen., C.S.A., 52, 82-3, 257, 265 

(note), 266, 271, 375-6, 383 
Louisa Court House, 99, 194, 323, 351 
Louisville, 178, 180, 182-4, 250 
Lovejoy Station, 388, 391, 397, 404 
Lovell, Mansfield, Gen., C.S.A., 474, 478 
Luray, 88, 90-1, 412, 429, 434 
Lynchburg, 309, 338, 344, 352, 41 1-5, 

431, 440, 504, 519, S2I-2 
Lyon, Gen., U.S.A., 20-1 ; killed at 
Wilson's Creek, 45 

Macon, 397, 403-4 

Magruder, Gen., C.S.A., 49, 54, 56-7, 60, 

62, 69, 72-8 
Mahone, Gen., C.S.A., 64 (note), 319, 

323, 328, 350-1, 356, 358-9, 362, 515, 

517, 519, 521 
Manassas Junction, 31-5, 39, 48, 52, 84-5, 

101-3, 106-7, 109, III, 219 
Manchesters(Maryland), 226 

2 N 



Manchester (Tennessee), 276 
Mansfield, Gen., U.S.A., 123, 129-30 
Marietta, 371-7, 397 
Martinsburg, 34, 120-2, 218, 416, 418, 

426, 428, 437 
Mason and Dixon's line, 5, 8 (note) 
McCall, Gen., U.S.A., 67, 70-1, 76 
McClellan, Gen., U.S.A., in West Vir- 
ginia, 23 ; 40-1 ; earlier career, 42 ; re- 
organises the Army of the Potomac, 43 ; 
appointed Commander-in-Chief, 44-8 ; 
difficulties with the President, 49-52 ; 
delay at Yorktown, 53-8 ; on the Chicka- 
hominy, 59-60, 63, 67 ; attacked by 
Lee, 69-70, 72 ; retreats to the James, 
73-6, 78-9 ; recalled from the Peninsula, 
95, 116; takes the field against Lee, 
122-3 ; !^t the Antietam, 129, 134, 137; 
fails to follow up success, 139-40; re- 
lieved of command, 141-2 ; 191 (note) ; 
Democratic candidate for the Presidency, 

394, 50s 

McClernand, Gen., U.S.A., 155, 157, 164, 
166, 172-3, 176 (note), 251, 253-5, 
259-63, 265-6, 268, 272, 4S1 

McCook, A. McD., Gen., U.S.A., 165 
(note), 173, 181, 185-9, 276, 280, 282-3, 
286, 295 

McCook, E. M., Gen., U.S.A., 365, 388 

McDowell, Gen., U.S.A., commanding 
at Bull Run, 32-5, 37-9, 41 ; 48, 50 
(note), 55-6, 58-60, 85, 89, 93 ; at the 
Second Manassas, 105-7, 109, 11 1-4 

McLaws, Gen., C.S.A., 119, 121, 123-4, 
127-8, 131-3, 145 (note), 196, 199, 203, 
206-9 (note), 216-7, 229-30, 233, 237 

McPherson, Gen., U.S.A., 252, 255-7, 
260, 262-6, 272 ; in command of the 
Army of the Tennessee, 307, 364, 366-8, 
370, 372-4, 377-8, 380-3 ; killed in the 
battle of Atlanta, 384 

Meade, Gen., U.S.A., 149-50, 191 
(note) ; commanding the 5th Corps at 
Chancellorsville, 193 ; Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army of the Potomac, 
221-2; at Gettysburg, 223-9, 231-4, 
238-42, 244-6; 297-301, 31 1-2, 314, 
316, 329, 337-8, 347, 349-50, 353-4. 
356-7, 360, 362, 416, 422, 512, 518-9 

Mechum's River Station, 86, 92 

Memphis, 154, 161, 170, 248-9, 251-3, 
255-6, 259-60, 268, 288, 302-3, 470, 
472-3 

Meridian, 260-1, 302 

Merritt, Gen., U.S.A., 423, 427, 431-2, 

434-5, 439 
Middletown (Maryland), 220, 239 
Middletown (Shenandoah Valley), 88, 

435-6 
Miles, Col., U.S.A., 35, 40 
Miles, Gen , U.S.A., 360, 511, 516, 521 



546 



INDEX 



Milledgeville, 403-4, 406 

Millen, 403-6, 409 

Milliken's Bend, 253-6, 259, 270 

Milroy, Gen., U.S.A., 86-7, 218 

Mitchell, Commander, C.S.N., 474-5, 478 

Mobile, 44, 178, 308, 395-6, 403, 495-6, 

524 
Montgomery, 14, 44, 396 
Moorefield, 86, 421 
Morgan, Gen., C.S.A., 177-8, 184, 274, 

411 
Morgan, Gen., U.S.A., 254 (note), 464 
Morris Island, 491-3 
Mosby, Col., C.S.A., 431, 439 
Mott, Gen., U.S.A., 316-9, 323-6, 360 

(note)-i 
Munford, Gen., C.S.A., 513, 521 
Murfreesborough, 160, 163, 178-9, 183-5, 

188, 273, 448 

Nashville, 47, 154-8, 160, 162, 177-9, 

182-5, 248, 402, 442-3, 448, 451 
Natchez, 249, 478 
Negley, Gen., U.S.A., 1S8, 2S0 (note), 

283, 295 
Nelson, Gen., U.S.A., 165, 167 
Nevvberne, 48, 192, 459, 463, 485 
New Madrid, 154, 160, 169-70, 248, 470 
Newmarket, 86, 88, 90, 412, 430, 432-3, 

439 
New Orleans, 25, 44, 248-9, 254, 260, 

270, 473-4, 477, 480 
Newton, Gen., U.S.A., 246, 378, 3S3 
Newtown, 88-90, 426 
New York, 122, 298 
Nolin, 153, 184 
Norfolk, 19, 59 

Orange Court House, 144-5, I93> 30i( 3^3 
Ord, Gen., U.S.A., 250-1, 360-1, 412 
(note) ; commanding the Army of the 
James, 457, 508-9. S'S-^, 521-2 
Osterhaus, Gen., U.S.A., 368, 402 

Palmer, Gen., U.S.A., 187, 189, 288, 

364, 388 
Parke, Gen., U-S A., commanding the 

9th Army Corps, 357, 361-2, 507, 510, 

515-6 
Patterson, Gen., U S.A., 32, 34-5 
Peebles Farm (engagement of), 361 
Pegram, Gen., C.S.A., 23, 320 (note), 

434, 438 I 

Pemberton, Gen., C.S.A., 251-3, 257, 

260-1, 264-7, 269, 271-3, 286 
Pender, Gen., C.S.A., no, 214, 223-4, 

231-2, 234, 244 
Pendleton, Gen., C.S.A., 216, 226 
Pensacola, 14, 44, 164, 403 
Perry, Gen., C.S.A., 231 (note), 237 

(note), 320 



Petersburg, 60, 95, 338, 341-8 ; the mine, 

353-7; 359, 506, 514-7 : evacuated, 518 

Peltigrew, Gen., C.S.A., 62 (note), 223, 

233-7 
Philadelphia, 122, 217, 222, 243 
Pickens, Governor of South Carolina, 

12-3, 15 
Pickett, Gen., C.S.A., 64 (note), 145 

(note), 192, 198, 215, 223, 232-3 ; in 

the Gettysburg charge, 234-8, 243, 245 ; 

314, 332-3, 341, 347-8, 360; defeated 

at Five Forks, 510-4 
Piedmont (East Virginia), 35, 433 
Piedmont (Shenandoah Valley), 344, 413, 

431 
Pillow, Gen., C.S.A., 156-8 
Pittsburg Landing, 163-7, 471 
Pleasant Hill (engagement of), 304 
Pleasanton, Gen., U.S.A., 197, 213-4, 217, 

219, 223, 245 
Plymouth, 494-5 
Polk, Gen., C.S.A., 21-2, 153, 164, 166-7, 

180-1, 185-6, 188-9, 248, 275 
Pope, Gen., U.S.A., in command of the 
Army of Virginia, 93, 95-101 ; at the 
Second Manassas, 103-7, 109-15; re- 
lieved of his command, 116; in the 
West, 160, 169-70, 176, 221 (note), 470 
Porter, Admiral, U.S.N., 257-60, 457, 

474-5, 480-4, 500 
Porter, Fitz John, Gen., U.S.A., com- 
manding the 5th Army Corps, 5S-9, 63, 
70 ; at Gaines' Mill, 71-2 ; 76, 102 (note), 
105; at the Second Manassas, ni-6; 
129, 136-7; cashiered, 142 
Port Gibson, 261-2, 271 
Port Hudson, 249, 252, 261 (note)-2, 264, 

270-1, 482 
Port Republic, 86, 90-1, 413, 430-1 
Port Royal (South Carolina), 485-6 
Port Royal (Virginia), 145, 192, 331 
Port Walthall Junction, 341, 343 
Potter, Gen., U.S.A., 327, 347, 353, 355-7, 

359 (note), 361 
Powell, Gen., U.S.A., 430, 434-5 
Prentiss, Gen., U.S.A., 164, 166-7, 169, 

172, 174, 270 
Price, Sterling, Gen.,C.S.A., 21, 45 (note), 

177. 183, 250, 395 
Pulaski, 401, 442-3 

Raleigh, 462-3, 509, 523 

Ramseur, Gen., C.S.A., 212, 420, 427-8, 

434, 438 
Ransom, Gen., C.S.A., 145 (note), 192,355 
Rappahannock Station, 99, ico, 299 
Raymond, 263, 265, 271-2 
Reams' Station, 350-2, 359-60 
Reno, Gen., U.S.A., io5(note)-6, 108-11; 

killed at Turner's Gap, 1 24 
Resaca, 366-9, 398 



INDEX 



547 



mhRJ 

Reynolds, J. F., Gen., U.S.A., 105-6, 
108-9, 1 14-5; commanding the ist 
Army Corps, 146, 191 (note), 194, 198, , 
202, 205, 220-1 ; killed at Gettysburg, j 
223-4 ; 246 I 

Reynolds, J. J., Gen., U.S.A., 52, 295 I 

Rice's Station, 519-21 

Rich Mountain (engagement of), 23 ! 

Richardson, Gen., U.S.A., 40, 63-4 
(note), 131, 133-4 

Richmond (Kentucky) (engagement of), 

179 

Richmond (Virginia), 24, 49, 58, 60, 66-7, 
92, 96, 143, 192, 310, 330-1, 338, 340-1, 
345, 348, 357-8, 503-5, 517-8, 531 

Ricketts, Gen., U.S.A., 97-8, 106, 108-9, 
112, 1 14-5, 336, 416-7,428 

Ringgold, 279-80, 366 

Robinson, Gen., U.S.A., 314-5 

Rockville, 222, 417-8 

Rodes, Gen., C.S.A., 200-1, 203, 212, 
218, 220, 223-4, 226, 231, 233, 242, 
244 ; at Spottsylvania, 322, 326-7 ; 335, 
417, 420 ; killed at the Opequon, 427-8 

Rome, 369, 371, 397-8, 400, 403 

Romney, 82-4, 86 

Rosecrans, Gen., U.S.A., in West Vir- 
ginia, 52-3, 82; 176; commanding the 
Army of the Cumberland, 182-4; ^t 
Murfreesborough, 185-8; 250-1, 273-5 '> 
mancEUvres Bragg out of Tennessee, 
277-9 ; at Chickamauga, 280-1, 283-5 ; 
relieved of the command, 286 ; 287, 

294-6, 395 
Ross, Gen., U.S.A., 257-8 
Rosser, Gen., C.S.A., 352 (note), 432, 

434, 436-7, 439-40, 510, 512, 521 
Rossville, 283-4, 293 
Rosswell, 379-80 

Rousseau, Gen., U.S.A., 188, 386, 448 
Russell, Gen., U.S.A., 299, 428 

Sabine Cross-roads (engagement of), 304 
Savannah (Georgia), 44, 48, 396, 403-9, 

460, 492-3, 504 
Savannah (Tennessee), 163-5 
Schenck, Gen., U.S.A., 37, 86-7 
Schofield, Gen., U.S.A., 268, 302; com- 
manding the Army of the Ohio, 364, 
366, 370, 372, 375-8, 380-2, 385, 
387-91, 401, 442-6; at Nashville, 449- 
50, 452-5 ; commanding the Depart- 
ment of North Carolina, 456, 458-60, 

463, 465 
Schurz, Gen., U.S.A., 203, 212-3 
Scott, Winfield, Gen., U.S.A., 11, 16, 

20, 25, 31-2, 42, 44, 526 
Seddon, Confederate Secretary of War, 

192, 504 
Sedgwick, Gen, U.S.A., 62-3, 131-2, 

191 (note) ; commanding the 6th Army 



Corps at Chancellorsville, 193-8, 202, 
205, 207-10 ; at Gettysburg, 230, 239 ; 
300-1 ; in the Wilderness, 314, 317, 319, 
322 ; killed, 324 
Selma, 496, 524 

Semmes, Admiral, C.S.N., 500-1 
Seward, Federal Secretary of State, 16-7 
Shaler, Gen., U.S.A., 234, 320 (note) 
Sharpsburg, 126, 129, 420, 423 
Shelbyville, 275-6 

Shepherdstown, 121, 220, 223, 416, 425 
Sheridan, Gen., U.S.A., at Perryville, 181 
(note) ; at Murfreesljorough, 186-8 ; at 
Chickamauga, 283; at Chattanooga, 290, 
292 ; commandingthecavalryintheArmy 
of the Potomac, 314, 321, 329-30, 334-5, 
344, 348, 351-3, 357; commanding the 
Middle Military Division, 422-6; defeats 
Early at Winchester, 427-8 ; at Fisher's 
Hill, 429-30; 431-4; defeats Early at 
Cedar Creek, 437-8, 439-41 ; 504-5, 
508-11 ; wins the victory of Five Forks, 
512-5 ; in pursuit of Lee, 516-22 
Sherman, T. W., Gen., U.S.A., 485 
Sherman, W. T., Gen., U.S.A., 36-7, 4I ; 
at Shiloh, 164, 166, 17 1-3; in the Vicks- 
burg campaign, 252-6, 258-60, 262-3, 
265, 267-72 ; commanding the Army of 
the Tennessee, 286, 288-93 ; in the 
Meridian expedition, 302 ; commanding 
the Military Division of the Mississippi, 
307; earlier career, 308; 312; in the 
Atlanta campaign, 364, 366-75, 377-82, 
384, 386-9 ; capture of Atlanta, 391-4; 
395-9 ; the march to the sea, 400-9 ; 443, 
449, 456, 459 ; the march through the 
Carolinas, 460-3, 465-6, 504-6, 508-9 ; 
receives the surrender of Johnston's 
army, 523 
Shields, Gen., U.S., 84-5, 90-1 
Sickles, Gen., U.S.A., 150 (note); com- 
manding the 3rd Army Corps at Chan- 
cellorsville, 191 (note), 194, 196-7, 200-5, 
210, 213-4; at Gettysburg, 228-30, 246 
Sigel, Gen., U.S.A., 45 (note), 95, 97-8, 
100, 105-6, 108-10, 1 14-5, 212, 308, 
411-2, 416 
Slocum, Gen., U.S.A., commanding the 
1 2th Army Corps at Chancellorsville, 
191 (note), 193-6, 200 ; at Gettysburg, 
221, 231, 245; commanding the 20th 
Army Corps in Georgia, 386, 391 ; com- 
manding the left wing of Sherman's 
army, 402, 404, 460, 463-5 
Smith, A. J., Gen., U.S.A., 304, 395, 402, 

443, 448 ; at Nashville, 452-5 
Smith, C. F., Gen., U.S.A., 155, 157, 160, 

163-4 
Smith, G. W., Gen., C.S.A., 43, 58, 61-4, 
379 (note), 383, 385, 387, 391, 404, 407, 
461 



548 



INDEX 



Smith, Kirby, Gen., C.S.A., 36-7, 4I1 

177-S0, 182, 304-5, 524 
Smith, Sooy, Gen., U.S.A., 302-3 
Smith, W. F. ("Baldy"), Gen., U.S.A., 

56 (note), 133 (note), 146, 287, 309, 

335-7. 340, 344-7 
Smithfiekl, 463, 465 
Smyrna, 378-80, 397 
Stanley, Gen., U.S.A., 3S6, 398, 452 
Stanton, Federal Secretary of War, 90, 

142, 191 (note), 221 (note), 251 (note), 

437, 523 

Staunton, 22, 82, 86, 97, 243, 308, 41 1-6, 
430-1, 435, 439-40 

Steedman, Gen., U.S.A., 448, 452, 454 

Steele, Gen., U.S.A., 304-5 

Steinvvehr, Gen., U.S.A., 203, 241 (note) 

Stephens, Vice-President of the Con- 
federacy, 3, 14 

Stephenson's Depot, 426-8 

Steuart, Gen., C.S.A., 89, 326 

Stevens, Gen., U.S.A., 105 (note), 1 10, 
1 1 5-6 

Stevenson, 174, 178, 277, 279, 288, 398 

Stevenson, Gen., C.S.A., 265 (note)-6, 

273 

Stevenson, Gen., U.S.A., 318-9 
Stewart, Gen., C.S.A., 295, 383, 387, 

391, 397. 444-5. 447. 451-3 
St. Louis, 20-1, 162 (note) 
Stoneman, Gen., U.S.A., 191 (note), 

193-4, 211, 217, 365, 367, 373, 380, 

388, 519 
Stony Creek Depot, 351, 359, 510 
Strasburg, 84-5, 87-8, 90, 420, 424, 426, 

429, 432-3 
Stuart, Gen., U.S.A., 166-7, 172 
Stuart, J. E. B., Gen., C.S.A., 38; rides 
round McClellan's army, 66-7 ; 74, 79, 
99, 100, 102, 117, 127, 130 2, 136; 
rides round McClellan again, 140- 1 ; 
148-9, 195-6, 199 ; in temporary com- 
mand of Jackson's CorjfS, 204-6, 20S ; 
212, 216-7, 219, 222, 232, 238 ; death, 
330 
Sudley Springs, 103, 109, 113 
Suffolk, 192, 342 
Sulphur Si)rings, lOO, 104-5, '°^ 
Sumner, Gen., U.S.A., commanding the 
2nd Army Corps, 50, 62-3, 72, 75, I02 
(note), 115, 123, 128, 1 3 1-4; at Fred- 
ericksburg, 143, 146-7, 150-1 ; 191 
(note) 
Sumter, Fort, II-3, 17, 491, 493 
Sutherland Station, 510, 514, 516 
Sykes, Gen., U.S.A., 40, 73, II4-5; 
commanding the 5th Army Corps, 228 
(note), 242 (note) 

Taliaferro, Gen.,C.S.A., 102-3, '06, 'o^. 
145, 148, 150 



Tattnall, Commodore, C.S.N. , 490-1 

Taylor, Gen., C.S.A., 270, 304-5, 399, 
400, 404, 484, 524 

Terry, Gen., U.S.A., 358, 363, 457-8, 
460, 465 

Thomas, G. li.. Gen., U.S.A., 25; at 
Mill Springs, 47; 165 (note), 176 (note), 
iSo, 183; at Murfreesborough, 185-8; 
248, 276, 279; at Chickamauga, 281-4; 
commanding the Army of the Cumber- 
land, 286 ; 289-90, 292-6, 302 ; in the 
Atlanta campaign, 364, 366, 370, 372, 
374-8, 381-2, 391, 397-8; 400-2, 443; 
defeats Hood at Nashville, 450-6 ; 504 

Thomas, Gen., C. S.A., 201 

Todd's Tavern, 197, 314-5, 321-3 

Torbert, Gen., U.S.A., 314, 351-2 (note), 
422-3, 427, 432, 434, 436, 439-40 

Trenton, 278-9, 289 

Trevylian Station (engagement of), 351 

Trimble, Gen., C.S.A., 102, 237 (note) 

Tullahoma, 18S, 275-6 

Tupelo, 170, 177-8, 456 

Turner's Gap (engagement of), 1 23-5, 
127-8 

Tuscumbia, 400- 1 

Tyler, D., Gen., U.S.A., 33, 35-7 

Tyler, E., Gen., U.S.A., 416 

Tyler, R., Gen., U.S.A., 329, 332 

Urbana, 49, 51 

Van Dorn, Gen., C.S.A., defeated at Pea 
Ridge, 162 (note); 165, 170, 177, 183, 
249-53, 260, 274-5 
Vaughan, Gen., C.S.A., 413-4 
Versailles, 180-1 

Vicksburg, 162 (note), 170, 216, 240, 
^ 248-9, 251-5, 258-73, 302, 478-80, 483 
Vilhinow, 366, 39S 

Wadsworth, Gen., U.S.A., 223, 231, 

314-9, 324 
Wagner, Gen., U.S.A., 446-7 
Walker, J. G., Gen., C.S.A., 119, 121, 

128, 131-3, 270 (note) 
Walker, R. L., Col., C.S.A., 234 (note) 
Walker, W. H. T., Gen., C.S.A., 280 

(note)-2, 295 
Wallace, Lew., Gen., U.S.A., 156-7, 164, 

166, 168-9 (note), 173, 416-7 
Wallace, W. II. L., Gen., U.S.A., 164, 

166-7, 172 
Warren, Gen., U.S.A., 229 (note), 230, 

299-300 ; commanding the 5th Army 

Corps, 301, 314 5. 3i7> 3i9, 323. 325-9. 

331-2, 335. 337. 356-9. 361-2, 505-6; 

at Five Forks, 510-5 
Warrenton (Mississippi), 256, 264 
Warrenton (Virginia), 34, 52, 95, 100, 

103-5, 141, 297 



INDEX 



549 



Wanenton Junction, 103, 105-6, 109 
Washington, 12, 14, 19, 31, 40, 42-3, 50-2, 

95, 116, 219, 221, 307, 344, 417-8, 437, 

523 
Waterloo, 100, 104-5, 108 
Wauhatchie, 278, 28S 
Waynesboro (Georgia), 409 
Waynesboro (Tennessee), 442 
Waynesboro (Virginia), 413-4, 431-31 440 
Webb, Gen., U.S.A., 230, 236 
Weitzel, Gen., U.S.A., 363, 457, 508, 518 
Weldon, 342, 509 
West Point (Virginia), 49, 57 
Wheeler, Gen., C.S.A., 180 (note), 275, 

282, 285, 289, 295, 372, 383, 385, 389, 

397, 402, 404-S. 409. 461 
Wheeling, 22-3 
White House, 58-9, 64, 67, 74, 334-5, 

343-5? 352, 440 
Whiting, Gen., C.S.A., 41, 62, 67, 72, 

77, 343 
Wickham, Gen., C.S.A. , 430, 432 
Wilcox, Gen., C.S.A., 64 (note), 208, 

230-1, 350. 361, 510 
Wilderness Tavern, 313-5, 318 
Willcox, Gen., U.S.A., 333, 355, 360 

(note)-i 
Williams, A. S., Gen., U.S.A., 84-5, 214, 

402 



Williams, T., Gen., U.S.A., 249, 256 
Williamsport, 32, 34, 121, 220, 239, 

425 
Wilmington, 48, 192, 396, 456-8, 460, 

502, 504 
Wilson, Gen., U.S.A., 314-5. 344> 349-52, 

422-3, 425, 427-8, 444, 446, 448, 452-5, 

523 

Winchester (Tennessee), 278 

Winchester (Virginia), 32, 34, 81-5, 88, 

90, 102, 120, 122, 217-8, 416, 420, 

423-4, 426-8, 437 
Wise, Gen., C.S.A., 52-3, 509, 532 

(note) 
Wood, Gen., U.S.A., 165 (note), 189, 

283-4, 290, 292, 295, 372-3, 452-4 
Woodstock, 85, 90, 430, 432 
Worden, Capt., U.S.N., 489-90, 492 
Wright, Gen., C.S.A., 230-2, 237 
Wright, Gen., U.S.A., 180, 315, 320; 

commanding the 6th Army Corps, 324-6, 

331-2, 336-7, 350,418-20, 423, 427-8; 

at Cedar Creek, 434, 436-7, 438 (note); 

509-10, 515 

Yazoo City, 256, 258, 480, 484 
Yellow Tavern (engagement of), 330 
York, 220, 222-3 
Yorktown, 54-7 



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